FIRST DIVISION
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ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (Deceased) substituted
by CARMEN M. TIONGCO a.k.a. CARMEN MATILDE B. TIONGCO, Petitioner, - versus - |
G.R. No. 161360 Present: Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
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JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., Respondents. |
Promulgated: October 19, 2011 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us on
appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
the Court of Appeals (CA) August 28, 2003 Decision[1]
which dismissed petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yareds appeal and affirmed the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, of Iloilo City, dismissing
petitioners complaint for annulment of affidavit of adjudication, deeds of
sale and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), reconveyance and damages. Also
assailed is the appellate courts
The factual
antecedents, as culled from the records, follow:
Matilde,
Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, all surnamed Tiongco, were born to Atanacio and Maria
Luis Tiongco. Together they were known as the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.
The present
dispute involves three parcels of land namely, Lots 3244, 3246 and 1404, all
located in
While all
of the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco have died, they were survived by their
children and descendants. Among the legitimate children of Jose were petitioner
and Carmelo Tiongco, the father of respondent Jose B. Tiongco.[5]
Sometime in
1965, petitioner built her house on
In 1983, respondent
Jose prohibited petitioner from collecting rentals from the tenants of Lots
3244 and
In 1988,
when petitioner inquired at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City,
she discovered that respondent Jose had already executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication[10]
dated
Based on
the records with the Register of Deeds, it also appears that on
Similarly,
the records of the Register of Deeds showed that
On
Respondent
Jose, for his part, argued that the petitioners father, Jose, was not an heir
of Maria Luis de Tiongco but an heir of Maria Cresencia de Loiz y Gonzalez vda.
De Tiongco. Respondent Jose claimed that he was the only legitimate son and
that while it was true that he has two other siblings, he refused to
acknowledge them because they are illegitimate.[19] Respondent Jose denied that the series of
sales of the properties was fraudulent. He claimed that
After trial,
the Iloilo City RTC ruled in favor of respondent Jose. The court a quo ruled that prescription has set in
since the complaint was filed only on
Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed to the CA[22]
which, however, sustained the trial courts ruling. The CA agreed with the trial court that an
action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. According to the
CA, when an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within
four years from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have
taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title. On the
other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the original
certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. For the rule is that the
registration of an instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds
constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery
of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.[23]
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA as
aforesaid, denied petitioners motion. Hence,
the present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner
raised the following arguments in the petition, to wit:
A.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT THAT THE
AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCO, WHO IS A
LAWYER AND IS AWARE OF ITS NULLITY, IS MERELY VOIDABLE; ON THE CONTRARY, SAID
DOCUMENT IS A COMPLETE NULLITY BECAUSE RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCO HAS
MALICIOUSLY AND IN BAD FAITH ADJUDICATED IN FAVOR OF HIMSELF THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION OVER WHICH HE, AS A LAWYER, KNOWS HE HAS NO RIGHTS WHATSOEVER AND HE
ALSO KNOWS HAS BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE PETITIONER AND HER
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST UNTIL THE PRESENT.
B.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS
COMPLAINT BY THE LOWER COURT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE THE
RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCOS AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION, BEING A TOTAL NULLITY,
THE ACTION TO DECLARE SUCH NULLITY AND OF THOSE SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS ARISING
FROM SAID ADJUDICATION DOES NOT PRESCRIBE, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE IN THIS CASE THE
PETITIONER AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE LOTS IN QUESTION AND RESPONDENT
JOSE B. TIONGCO HAS NEVER BEEN IN POSSESSION THEREOF.[24]
C.
FURTHER,
EVEN IF ARGUENDO, THE AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION IS VOIDABLE, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS STILL ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT BY THE
LOWER COURT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE THE RESPONDENT, JOSE B.
TIONGCO, BEING A LAWYER AND BEING AWARE OF PETITIONERS OWNERSHIP OF THE LOTS
IN QUESTION, THE SAID AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION MAKES THE RESPONDENT AN IMPLIED
TRUSTEE THEREOF FOR THE PETITIONER AND THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE BASED ON
TRUST DOES NOT PRESCRIBE SO LONG AS THE BENEFICIARY LIKE THE PETITIONER HAS
BEEN IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT THEREOF, AS HELD IN
THE CASE OF VDA. DE CABRERA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (267 SCRA 339).[25]
The only
issue in this case is who has a better right over the properties.
The petition
is meritorious.
The Court
agrees with the CAs disquisition that an action for reconveyance can indeed be
barred by prescription. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled
that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribe in ten (10) years from the issuance of the
However, there is an exception to this rule. In the
case of Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v.
Court of Appeals,[27]
the Court reiterating the ruling in Millena
v. Court of Appeals,[28] held that there is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance,
that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. In Heirs
of Pomposa Saludares,[29]
this Court explained that the Court in a series of cases,[30]
has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance
despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the issuance of title to the
land and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as
long as the land has not passed to an innocent buyer for value. But in all those cases, the common factual
backdrop was that the registered owners were never in possession of the
disputed property. The exception was
based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield
for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.
In Alfredo v.
Borras,[31] the Court ruled that prescription does not run against the plaintiff in
actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before
initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
his title. The Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for
reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action for
reconveyance becomes in effect an action to quiet title to
property, which is not subject to prescription.
The Court reiterated such rule in the
case of Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals,[32]
wherein we ruled that the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust
is not in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is
an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe.
Similarly, in the case of David v. Malay[33]
the Court held that there was no doubt about the fact that an action
for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten (10)
years. This rule assumes, however, that
there is an actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true
and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he remains
undisturbed in his possession, the statute of limitation would yet be
irrelevant. An action for reconveyance,
if nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title,
or its equivalent, an action that is imprescriptible. In that
case, the Court reiterated the ruling in Faja
v. Court of Appeals[34]
which we quote:
x x x There is settled jurisprudence that one who
is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one
who is in possession. No better
situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity
than that of herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of
the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted
with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these
years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to
quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and
annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one
in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then
that the statutory period of prescription commences to run
against such possessor.
In this case,
petitioners possession was disturbed in 1983 when respondent Jose filed a case
for recovery of possession.[35] The RTC of Iloilo City ruled in respondent
Joses favor but the CA on
The Court further observes that the circuitous sale
transactions of these properties from respondent Jose to Catalino Torre, then
to Antonio Doronila, Jr., and back again to respondent Jose were quite unusual.
However, this successive transfers of title from one hand to another could not
cleanse the illegality of respondent Joses act of adjudicating to himself all
of the disputed properties so as to entitle him to the protection of the law as
a buyer in good faith. Respondent Jose himself admitted that there exists other
heirs of the registered owners in the OCTs. Even the RTC found that [t]hese
allegations contained in the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by defendant
Jose B. Tiongco are false because defendant Jose B. Tiongco is not the only
surviving heir of Jose Tiongco, Matilde Tiongco, Vicente Tiongco and Felipe Tiongco
as the latters have other children and grandchildren who are also their
surviving heirs.[37]
In the case of Sandoval
v. Court of Appeals,[38]
the Court defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. He is one who buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing
was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim that he acted in
good faith.
And while it is settled that every person dealing with
a property registered under the
In this case, when the subject properties were sold to
Catalino Torre and subsequently to Doronila, respondent Jose was not in
possession of the said properties. Such fact should have put the vendees on
guard and should have inquired on the interest of the respondent Jose regarding
the subject properties.[40]
But regardless of such defect on transfer to third persons, the properties
again reverted back to respondent Jose. Respondent Jose cannot claim lack of
knowledge of the defects surrounding the cancellation of the OCTs over the
properties and benefit from his fraudulent actions. The subsequent sale of the
properties to Catalino Torre and Doronila will not cure the nullity of the certificates
of title obtained by respondent Jose on the basis of the false and fraudulent
Affidavit of Adjudication.
WHEREFORE,
the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 28, 2003 Decision and November 27, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44794 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Register of Deeds of Iloilo City is ordered to RESTORE Original Certificates of Title Nos. 484, 1482, and 368, respectively
covering Lots 3244, 1404 and 3246, under the name/s of the registered original
owners thereof.
Furthermore, respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should
not be sanctioned as a member of the bar for executing the April 17, 1974
Affidavit of Adjudication and registering the same with the Register of Deeds.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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WE
CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson |
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
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RENATO
C. CORONA Chief Justice |
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[1] Rollo, pp. 83-92 .
Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios with Associate Justices Rebecca
De Guia-
[2]
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 11-13.
[5] Rollo, p. 84.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Amerol
v. Bagumbaran, No. L-33261,
[27] G.R. No. 128254,
[28] G.R.
No. 127797,
[29] Supra note 27 at 58.
[30] Rodriguez v.
Director of Lands, 31 Phil. 272 (1915); Zarate v. Director of Lands,
34 Phil. 416 (1916); Amerol v. Bagumbaran, supra note 26; Caro
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76148, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 401.
[31] G.R. No. 144225,
[32] G.R. No.
108547,
[33] G.R. No. 132644,
[34] No. L-45045,
[35] Rollo, p. 86.
[36]
[37]
[38] G.R. No. 106657,
[39] David
v. Malay, supra note 33 at 722.
[40] Vide: Heirs of