Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD Division
|
ATTY.
LETICIA E. ALA, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE
SOLIVER C. PERAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Cebu
City; JUDGE SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Cebu City; JUDGE GENEROSA C. LABRA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, Cebu City; JEOFFREY S. JOAQUINO, Clerk
of Court VII, Regional Trial
Court, Office of the Clerk of
Court, Cebu City; EL CID R. CABALLES, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,
Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu City, and FORTUNATO T. VIOVICENTE, JR.,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Cebu City, Respondents. |
|
A.M. No.
RTJ-11-2283 (Formerly OCA
I.P.I. No. 10-3478-RTJ) Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, BRION,* PERALTA,
MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: November 16, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this
Court is the Verified Complaint[1]
with an Urgent Prayer for Transfer of Venue dated July 27, 2010 filed by Atty.
Leticia E. Ala (complainant) charging all respondents with various
violations relative to Civil Case No. CEB 32893, entitled VTL Realty Corporation v. Atty. Leticia E. Ala and docketed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The Facts
In May 2000,
complainant was the counsel of Adelaida Alba-Chua (Mrs. Chua) in Civil
Case No. Q-00-40681, entitled Adelaida
Alba-Chua v. Benson Go Chua, for declaration of nullity of marriage at the
RTC, Branch 107, Quezon City (QC), presided by then Judge Rosalina L.
Luna-Pison (Judge Pison). In 2002,
complainant was replaced as counsel but recognized as Intervenor in the said
case.
On
6.
The attorneys fees of Atty. Ala although computed on the basis of her
10-percent claim against the 30% share of petitioner shall be paid, assumed and
collected from the share exclusively belonging to Mr. Benson Chua, but the
manner of payment of which shall be subject to further discussion between Atty.
Ala and respondent, Benson Chua.[3]
Complainant
filed her Motion for Execution of the Partial Judgment, which was granted by
the Court in its Resolution[4]
dated
Meanwhile, upon
motion by Chua, Judge Pison inhibited herself from the case. In June 2004, the
case was re-raffled to RTC, Branch 94, QC, presided by Judge Romeo F. Zamora (Judge Zamora). In his Resolution[5]
dated
On
Earlier, on
On
On
In the meantime,
Civil Case No. CEB-32893 was re-raffled to RTC, Branch 23,
In May 2007, respondent
Judge Labra inhibited herself upon motion by complainant. The case was
re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 10,
The marriage
nullity case, in the meantime, had been re-raffled from one sala to another since then. After Judge Zamora inhibited himself from the
case, Judge Ma. Elisa Sempio-Dy of RTC, Branch 225, QC, took over until she was
made to recuse herself upon motion by Chua.
Thereafter, the case was re-raffled to RTC, Branch 89, QC presided over
by Judge Elsa A. De Guzman, and eventually to RTC, Branch 102, QC, whose presiding
judge, Judge Lourdes A. Giron (Judge Giron), directed the consolidation
of ownership of the property under TCT No. 110723 in favor of complainant.
In an Order[8]
also dated December 3, 2007, the same day the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued by
respondent Judge Peras, as more
than one year had elapsed from the execution sale without redemption, Judge Giron
directed the issuance of the Sheriffs Final Certificate of Sale and a Writ of
Possession in favor of complainant, and directed the Register of Deeds to
cancel TCT No. 110723 and issue a new title in complainants name. Accordingly,
the Sheriffs Final Certificate of Sale[9]
and the Writ of Possession[10]
were issued on December 7 and 10, 2007, respectively.
On
As a result, Chua
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed
as CA G.R. SP No. 98597, questioning the execution sale conducted on
On the basis of
the said resolution, complainant filed another Motion to Dismiss in the
injunction case, which was denied by respondent Judge Peras in his Order[14]
dated
In view of the
above factual background, complainant filed the present complaint against the
respondents on the following grounds:
1.
Respondent
Judge Peras, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 10,
a. Insubordination
in flagrantly disobeying the heirarchy of courts doctrine and trivializing
this Courts judicial review powers in failing to recognize its ruling in G.R.
No. 183791 affirming the execution sale in favor of complainant;
b. Gross
Ignorance of the Law in exercising jurisdiction over a case for declaration of
nullity of execution sale conducted under the direction of the RTC of Quezon
City, which is a court of concurrent jurisdiction;
c. Grave
Abuse of Discretion and Gross Ignorance of the Law in enjoining the RTC QC Order
which directed the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel TCT No. 110723 and
to issue a new title in the name of complainant;
d. Dereliction
of Duty in not resolving pending incidents within the regulatory period, and in
not resolving the many inquiries of complainant in relation to the non-payment
of the injunction bond;
e. Bias
and Partiality in insulating respondent Clerk of Court Atty. Jeoffrey S.
Joaquino (respondent Clerk of Court
Joaquino), respondent
Sheriff Fortunato S. Viovicente (respondent Sheriff Viovicente), and
VTL, from inquiries made by complainant as to lack of service of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and the non-payment of the injunction bond and the
clerks commissions in relation to the trumped-up foreclosure sale;
f. Refusing
to dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite non-payment of
injunction bond, breach of injunctive relief by surreptitiously filing for
consolidation of title by VTL, and in recognizing a patently trumped-up
foreclosure sale based on three falsified certificates of sale where the
clerks commissions were not paid; and
g. Pre-judging
the outcome of the injunction case in the Order dated
Although the
Court commiserate[s] with defendant
2.
Respondent
Judge Dumdum, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 7,
a. Gross
Ignorance of the Law in exercising jurisdiction over the case for injunction,
and issuing a TRO dated November 6, 2006 enjoining the execution sale directed
by the RTC of Quezon City, which is a court of concurrent jurisdiction;
b. Bias
and Partiality in allowing the use of his official stamp pad by Chua and Peter
Po on a falsified certificate of sale dated November 26, 2002 to give it a
semblance of regularity; and
c. Dishonesty
in approving another version of a falsified certificate of sale dated
3.
Respondent
Judge Labra, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 23,
a. Gross
Ignorance of the Law in exercising jurisdiction in the injunction case that was
later amended to a case for declaration of nullity of execution sale which was
directed by the RTC of Quezon City, which is a court of concurrent
jurisdiction;
b. Gross
Ignorance of the Law and rules on amendment of complaints, formal offer of
evidence and crafting of orders, and in failing to rule on the admissibility of
complainants formal offer of evidence on the motion to dismiss; and
c. Bias
and Partiality in flagrantly glossing over the falsified certificates of sale
and falsified annotations on TCT No. 110723 that were brought to her attention,
and for copying the arguments and authorities of adverse counsel to deny
complainants motion to dismiss.
4.
Joeffrey S. Joaquino
(Respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino),
Executive Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the RTC of
a. Gross
Incompetence, Dereliction of Duty, and Dishonesty in recommending the approval
of an injunction bond, issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction without the
payment of the injunction bond, and ignoring all formal inquiries in relation
thereto;
b. Usurpation
of the duties of the regular Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 10 of Cebu
City in the processing and issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
c. Gross
Dishonesty in recommending for approval a falsified certificate of sale dated
January 6, 2003 to Executive Judge Dumdum who was not yet an executive judge
at the time, without the payment of the clerks commissions under the rules,
and refusing to answer all inquiries thereto; and
d. Condoning
the inefficiencies of a subordinate sheriff, respondent Sheriff Caballes, in
the implementation of the writ of execution endorsed to his office sometime in
July 2005 by the RTC, Branch 94 of Quezon City.
5.
Respondent
Sheriff Caballes, Sheriff IV, Office of the Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the RTC
of
a. Dereliction
of Duty in not making a levy on July 18, 2005 during the implementation of the Writ
dated July 14, 2005 issued by the RTC, Branch 94 of Quezon City; and
b. Gross
Dishonesty in surreptitiously submitting the Sheriffs Progress Report dated
6.
Fortunato T. Viovicente, Jr. (Respondent
Sheriff Viovicente), Sheriff IV, Branch
Sheriff of the RTC, Branch 10,
a. Dereliction
of Duty in not furnishing complainant a copy of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
and
b. Gross
Dishonesty in making a Return to the RTC, Branch 10 of Cebu City to the effect
that complainant was furnished a copy of the writ of preliminary injunction on
Lastly,
complainant asserts that she has been going through much physical, emotional
and financial stress from being forced to litigate in
In his Comment[16]
dated
On
the charge of Bias and Partiality by allowing the use of his official stamp pad,
respondent Judge Dumdum averred that he never gave Chua or Peter Po the
authority to use his official stamp pad. He explained that his official stamp
pad was kept by a clerk in an open box on her table which was accessible to
court employees, and that he gave specific instructions to the clerk to keep it
under lock and key. He also pointed out that although the questioned
certificate of sale contains his stamp, such does not show his
or the clerk of courts signatures.
Anent
the charge of Dishonesty for approving a falsified certificate of sale dated
In
his Supplemental Comment[17]
dated October 20, 2010, respondent Judge Dumdum appended certified true copies
of Official Receipt Nos. 5104637A and 5109389A dated November 16, 2006, issued
to VTL, to support his claim that he signed the certificate of sale not on
January 6, 2003, but at about November 16, 2006, when he was already Executive
Judge.
In
his Comment[18]
dated
As to the charge
of Gross Dishonesty in failing to furnish complainant with a copy of the
Progress Report, respondent Sheriff Caballes explained that it was a mere
unintentional oversight.
In his Comment[19]
dated
Regarding the
discrepancy in the dates of the mailing of the Sheriffs Return, respondent Sheriff
Viovicente explained that he prepared the mailing envelope containing a copy of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, evaluation of application for surety bond
and injunction bond addressed to the complainant, and left it on the table of
the clerk-in-charge for mailing on
In his Comment[20]
dated
With regard to
the allegation that he ignored all formal inquiries made by complainant,
respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino claimed that complainant went to his office to
inquire about the injunction case, and he answered all her queries and pointed
out to her that some of the answers to her questions could be found in the case
record. He thought that he had given sufficient explanation and that a formal
answer to complainants letters was no longer necessary.
As regards the
charge of Usurpation of the Duties of the Branch Clerk of the RTC, Branch 10, Cebu
City, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino stated that whenever the Office of the
Clerk of Court would receive an order directing the issuance of a writ, he would
issue the writ then forward it to the Branch Sheriff of the issuing court. He
added that it was the practice in their Office that all writs were issued and
signed by him, except for one or two branches.
Anent his
condonation of the inefficiencies of respondent Sheriff Caballes, respondent
Clerk of Court Joaquino pointed out that complainant never raised the matter
with him. He added that because of his workload and the fact that the RTC of
Cebu City had 28 sheriffs, he could not monitor all their activities.
Consequently, he relied on reports of the parties and their counsels regarding
the implementation of the writs assigned to him.
In his Comment[22]
dated
The
conjugal home of the parties in Sto.
Respondent Judge
Peras also denied the charge that he deliberately stalled the proceedings of
the injunction case with respect to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino
regarding the alleged non-payment of the injunction bond. He averred that when
the injunction case was raffled to him, he promptly acted on all pending
incidents, conducted hearings, received evidence, and required the submission
of pleadings on VTLs application for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. He explained that the proceedings in the injunction case were held
in abeyance pending the resolution of complainants Motion for Summary
Judgment, which was filed on
On
In her Comment[24]
dated
Complainant
filed her Reply[25]
dated
As regards respondent
Judge Peras Comment, complainant reiterated the impropriety of the
interference with the processes of the RTC,
Anent the
Comment of respondent Judge Dumdum, complainant argued that had he thoroughly
examined the documents presented, he would have seen that VTL should have filed
the injunction case before the RTC of Quezon City and not
In his Rejoinder,[26]
respondent Judge Dumdum explained that the certificate of sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds in 2007, which was distinct from the date he
approved it in November 2006.
With regard to
the Comment of respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino, complainant asserted that he
was lying because when she went to his office, he required her to put all her
queries in writing. She did as instructed and never received a reply. Complainant
disagreed with respondent Clerk of Court Joaquinos practice of issuing all the
writs for most of the branches of the RTCs in
With respect to
the Comment of respondent Sheriff Caballes, complainant asserted that the
representative she sent during the implementation of the writ on
On the Comment
submitted by respondent Sheriff Viovicente, complainant averred that when she
inadvertently found out that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction had been issued
and asked for a copy of the Sheriffs Return signed by respondent Sheriff
Viovicente, she was informed that it had already been mailed to her on
In complainants
Supplemental Reply[27]
to the belated Comment of respondent Judge Labra, she expressed her frustration
over the mere adoption of the Comment of respondent Judge Peras. Complainant
further averred that she had no idea why respondent Judge Labra exercised
jurisdiction over the injunction case and insisted that her formal offer of
evidence was never ruled upon. She reiterated her claim of impropriety of the
interference in the judgment and processes of the RTC, QC by the RTC,
On March 17,
2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the
administrative complaints against respondent Judges Peras, Dumdum, and Labra be
dismissed for being judicial in nature; that respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino
be suspended for 30 days without pay for neglect of duty and for failure to
promptly act on letters and requests, and sternly warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely; the adiministrative
complaints against respondent Sheriffs Caballes and Viovicente be dismissed but
they be reminded to be more circumspect in the performance of their duties; and
that the request for transfer of venue for Civil Case No. CEB-32893 be denied
for lack of merit.
The Courts Ruling
The Court adopts
the findings and recommendation of the OCA with modification.
Respondents Judge Peras, Judge Dumdum
and Judge Labra
Complainant charges
respondent Judges Peras, Dumdum, and Labra with Insubordination, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion, and Bias and Partiality with respect
to their acts of taking cognizance of the injunction case and issuing orders
thereto in violation of the basic principle of law that once a court acquires
jurisdiction, it maintains the same until the controversy is finally disposed
of. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders of a co-equal court is cited as an insurmountable barrier to the
competence of another co-equal court to entertain a motion or order relative to
property which is in custodia legis
of another court by virtue of a prior writ of attachment. It is painstakingly
argued and reiterated by complainant that the orders issued in the injunction
case filed in
The Court
disagrees.
In order to find
merit in complainants allegations, a review on the merits of the respondent
Judges orders would be imperative. This task, however, is not the proper
subject of an administrative case but for a court of justice to determine in an
appropriate case. The
law provides for ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities
committed by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary
remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature include a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial, and an appeal.
The extraordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character are the special
civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, or
a motion for inhibition, or a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.[28]
The availability
of these judicial remedies precludes resort to criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings against a judge. It is an established doctrine that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against a judge are not alternative
or cumulative, complementary or suppletory to, nor a substitute for, judicial
remedies. Exhaustion of judicial remedies and the entry of judgment in the corresponding
action or proceedings, are pre-requisites for the taking of civil,
administrative, or criminal cases against the judge concerned.[29]
A review of the
records shows that complainant failed to timely raise her concerns in an
appropriate judicial proceeding. Until and unless
there is an authoritative pronouncement that the questioned orders of the
respondent Judges were indeed tainted by anomaly, there would be no ground to
prosecute the respondent Judges, either administratively or criminally, for
rendering them.
[30] Thus, an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where
a judicial remedy exists and is available, for if subsequent developments prove
the judges challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed
against him at all.[31]
Thus, the charges being judicial in nature, the remedy of the complainant should
have been with the proper court for the appropriate judicial action and not
with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint.[32]
In addition to
the requirements of exhaustion of judicial remedies, and a final
declaration by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, there must also be evidence
of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the
judge in rendering said judgment or order.[33] Judges are generally not
liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith. Complainant
failed to prove that the respondent Judges acted with malice, bad faith,
ignorance, or inexcusable negligence in rendering their questioned orders.
With respect to
the other charges which are non-judicial in nature, they were satisfactorily rebutted
by the respondent judges in their respective Comments. Complainant also failed
to show that their actions or inaction pertaining to their judicial functions
were tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, and bad faith, as is required
for a disciplinary action to prosper.[34]
Judges
must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors; they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do in the performance of
their duties and functions.[35] For complainants failure to exhaust judicial remedies, to prove
malice and bad faith, and to substantiate her other allegations by substantial
evidence, the administrative complaint against respondent Judges should be
dismissed.
Respondent
Clerk of Court Joaquino
Complainant
questioned the act of respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino in recommending the
approval of the injunction bond and issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
without payment of the injunction bond, and in ignoring all formal inquiries in
relation thereto. In his defense, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino averred
that as far as he could remember, all the requirements of the injunction bond
were complied with before he indorsed it. The Court finds respondent Clerk of
Court Joaquinos mere denial to be insufficient. Considering that proof of
payment of the injunction bond should have been presented to him prior to its
approval, it should have been in his possession, and should have been presented
to prove that the injunction bond was, in fact, paid.
On his failure
to officially respond to complainants various formal inquiries regarding the
injunction bond, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquinos claim to have orally
answered the complainants formal queries when she visited the Office of the
Clerk of Court (OCC) cannot exonerate him, as a verbal reply to a formal
and written inquiry is not sufficient.[36]
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, enunciates the States
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service. Section 5 (a) thereof provides that all public officials and
employees shall, within 15 working days from receipt thereof, respond to
letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the public. The
reply must contain the action taken on the request.[37]
In fact, Administrative Circular No. 8-99 was issued to remind all employees in
the Judiciary to strictly observe Section 5 (a).
Complainant also
assails respondent Clerk of Court Joaquinos act of recommending the approval
of an allegedly falsified certificate of sale to respondent Judge Dumdum who
was not yet the Executive Judge at the time and without the payment of the clerks
commissions as required. In administrative proceedings, complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaint.[38]
In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate her allegations as she
failed to prove that the certificates of sale were falsified. On the contrary,
it has been sufficiently shown in respondent Judge Dumdums Comment that he was
already the Executive Judge at the time he approved the certificate of sale.
Furthermore, respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino presented official receipts[39]
to prove payment of the clerks commissions.
Anent the charge
of condoning the inefficiencies of respondent Sheriff Caballes, respondent
Clerk of Court Joaquino admitted that he could not monitor all 28 sheriffs of
the RTC of Cebu City, thus, he relied on reports from the parties or their
counsels regarding each sheriffs performance. This cannot excuse him from the
duty of supervising his personnel at the OCC.[40]
As Clerk of Court, it is his duty to plan, direct, supervise, and coordinate sheriffs
activities of all division/sections/units in the OCC.[41]
From
the foregoing, it is clear that respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino was remiss
in the performance of his duties. The Court, thus, finds the penalty of
reprimand to be appropriate under the circumstances. Respondent Clerk of Court Joaquino, however,
should be sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar foregoing acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent
Sheriff Caballes
Complainant
alleged that respondent Sheriff Caballes was remiss in his duty to implement
the Writ of Execution dated
It
is a settled rule that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence, and
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that respondent
has regularly performed his duties.[42]
In this case, respondent Sheriff Caballes showed that he acted promptly in the
implementation of the writ. Nevertheless, he failed in his duty to furnish the
complainant a copy of the Sheriffs Report in accordance with Section 14[43]
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with Rule IV, Section 52(B)(1)[44]
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[45]
he should be held liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. Considering, however, that it is his first administrative
offense and that such was unintentional, respondent Sheriff Caballes should be admonished
and sternly warned that the same or similar act of negligence shall be dealt
with more severely.
Respondent
Sheriff Viovicente
Complainant
charged respondent Sheriff Viovicente with Dereliction of Duty for not
furnishing her with a copy of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Gross
Dishonesty in stating in the Sheriffs Return that she was furnished a copy of
the writ of
Instead
of ensuring that the copy of the writ was indeed mailed, respondent Sheriff
Viovicente simply assumed so. For this, he should be reminded to be more
circumspect in the performance of his duties as the conduct and behavior of
every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowest clerk, are circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but above all, be beyond suspicion.[46]
Transfer
of Venue
Complainant coupled her present
administrative complaint with a prayer for transfer of venue of Civil Case No.
CEB 32893, grounded on her charges against the respondents. She alleged that
the collective actions of respondents have dove-tailed with one another,
resulting in an extremely biased dispensation of justice to her prejudice. She
contended that she has been forced to litigate in
Section 5 (4),[47]
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that this Court has the power to
order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Consequently, where there are serious and weighty reasons present, which would
prevent the court of original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial
trial, this Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent
a miscarriage of justice.[48]
Considering that
the administrative charges against the respondents, on which her request for
transfer of venue is based, have been discussed and disposed of above, and
further considering that the real property involved in the case, covered by TCT
No. 110723, is situated in Cebu City, the Court finds no serious and weighty
reasons to prevent the RTC of Cebu City from conducting a fair and impartial
trial. Accordingly, the prayer to transfer venue must be denied.
WHEREFORE,
1. The administrative complaint
against Judge Soliver C. Peras, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10,
2. Atty. Jeoffrey S. Joaquino, Clerk of
Court VII, Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu City, is REPRIMANDED and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely;
3.
El Cid R.
Caballes, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu
City, is ADMONISHED and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act of negligence shall be dealt with more severely;
4.
The administrative complaint against Fortunato T. Viovicente, Jr., Sheriff
IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Cebu City, is DISMISSED, but he is REMINDED
to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties; and
5.
The request for transfer of venue of Civil Case No.
CEB-32893 is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO
D. BRION DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate
Justice
* Designated as
additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special
Order No. 1150 dated
** Designated as additional member
in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order No.
1152 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-34.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Flores v. Abesamis, 341 Phil. 299, 312-313 (1997).
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] Dionisio v. Escano, 362 Phil. 46, 56-57 (1999).
[33] Flores v. Abesamis, supra note 28 at 313-314.
[34] Mariano v. Garafin, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2024,
[35] Flores v. Abesamis, supra note 28 at 313-314.
[36] Pamintuan v. Ente-Alcantara, 488 Phil. 279, 286 (2004).
[37]
[38] Manguerra v. Arriesgado, A.M. No. RTC-04-1854,
[39] Rollo, p. 500.
[40] 2002 Manual for Clerks of Court,
Chapter VII, D(1).
[41] Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Atty. Miguel Morales, A.M. No.
P-08-2519,
[42] Reyes v. Jamora, A.M. No. P-06-2224,
[43] Section 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ
of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be
satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the
officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ
shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty
(30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in
full, or its effectivity expires. The
return or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken,
and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the
parties. (Emphasis supplied)
[44] Section 52. Classification of Offenses.
Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave,
less grave or light, depending on their gravity of depravity and effects on the
government service.
x x x
B. The following are less grave offenses with the
corresponding penalties:
1.
Simple Neglect of Duty
1st
Offense Suspension 1 mo. 1 day to 6 mos.
2nd
Offense Dismissal
[45] CSC Resolution No.
99-1936.
[46] Santuyo v. Benito, A.M. No. P-05-1997,
[47] Section 5. The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x
(4) Order a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
[48] Mondiguin v. Abad, 160-A Phil. 672, 675 (1975).