Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
FIL-STAR MARITIME CORPORATION, CAPTAIN VICTORIO S.
MIGALLOS and GRANDSLAM ENTERPRISE
CORPORATION,
Petitioners, - versus - HANZIEL O. ROSETE, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 192686 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PEREZ,* and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November 23, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the March 23, 2010
Decision[2]
and the June 8, 2010 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 103256, which reversed the
October 17, 2007 Resolution[4] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
and ordered the reinstatement of the May 21, 2007 Decision[5] of
the Labor Arbiter (LA), awarding
disability benefits to respondent Hanziel Rosete (respondent).
In 2005, petitioner Fil-Star Maritime
Corporation (Fil-Star), the local
manning agency of co-petitioner Grandslam Enterprise Corporation (Grandslam), hired respondent as third officer
on board the ocean-going vessel M/V Ansac Asia. He was in charge of the loading and unloading
operations of the vessels cargo primarily consisting of soda ash in bulk. Respondent stated that the nature of his work
exposed him to minute particles of soda ash during the loading and unloading
operations. On
Thereafter, the petitioners re-hired
respondent to work as second officer on their vessel for a period of nine (9)
months. On
On
On
On
A. Left eye is legally blind
B. Partial permanent disability
Partial because
the visual activity of the right eye is 20/20.
It is permanent
because the poor visual activity of the left eye, hand movement, has poor
prognosis for visual recovery.[7]
The petitioners denied his claim for
permanent total disability and only rated his incapacity as Grade 7. Respondent stressed that, under their Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), he should be considered legally blind
meriting entitlement to permanent total disability benefits in the sum of
US$105,000.00 for being unable to perform his job for more than 120 days from
his repatriation.
Thus,
on
The petitioners averred that after
almost a month aboard the vessel, respondent complained of a sudden blurring of
his left eye. They referred him to the
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, respondents Filstar Maritime Corporation and Grandslam
Enterprise Corp. are jointly and severally liable to pay complainant full total
and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$105,000.00 or its
equivalent amount in Philippine currency at the time of payment.
Respondents
are further ordered to pay 10% attorneys fees based on the total judgment
award.
All
monetary claims are hereby dismissed.
SO
ORDERED.[9]
The LA reasoned out that respondent left the
Not
in conformity with the ruling, the petitioners appealed to the NLRC which, in its
WHEREFORE,
the assailed Decision dated
The
payment of ten percent (10%) attorneys fees based on the judgment award is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.[12]
The NLRC ruled that the grant of US$105,000.00
based on the provisions of the CBA had no legal basis because disability
benefits under Article 28 thereon would refer only to permanent disability
resulting from accident while in employment.[13] The
NLRC held respondent was entitled to disability benefits but only up to Grade 7
as recommended by his own physician, Dr. George Pile.[14]
Both parties moved for reconsideration
of said decision, but their respective motions were denied by the NLRC in its Resolution
dated
Respondent elevated the case to the CA
via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[16] On
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions
dated October 17, 2007 and January 15, 2008 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Quezon City, in NLRC-LAC (OFW-M) No. 07-000018-07(3)
NLRC-OFW Case No. 06-08-02629-00 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiters Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.[17]
The CA held that there was no doubt
that respondent was unable to work for more than one hundred twenty days (120) the
requisite period for a grant of total disability benefits. Although the petitioners
claimed that their CBA provision should be controlling, the CA clarified that
the relevant provisions of the POEA-SEC pertaining to permanent total
disability remain essential parts of the parties valid and binding contract.[18] The
CA further stated that although respondents Central Retinal Vein Occlusion was
not listed as an occupational disease, he successfully established a causal
connection from his work as a seaman to his illness. It stressed that compensability of a
non-occupational disease, reasonable proof and not direct proof of a causal connection
between the work and the ailment is required.[19]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[20]
was likewise denied by the CA in its
Hence,
this petition.[21]
Petitioners
submit the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED PATENT AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HANZIEL O. ROSETE IS ENTITLED TO TOTAL PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED PATENT AND REVERSIBLE ERROR RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HANZIEL O. ROSETE IS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED PATENT AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HANZIEL
O. ROSETE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES.[22]
The petitioners contend that the
CA erred in ruling that respondent was entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits and for applying the provision of their CBA to award
respondent US$105,000.00. They aver that Article 28 of their CBA only pertains
to permanent disability suffered as a result of an accident.[23]
The petition is partly meritorious.
The first issue is whether
respondent is entitled to claim disability benefits from the petitioners.
There is no quibble that
respondent is entitled to disability benefits.
The Standard Employment Contract (SEC) for seafarers was created
by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) pursuant to
its mandate under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 247[24]
dated
In this case, respondent was
diagnosed with Central Retinal Vein Occlusion
of his left eye. Central
retinal vein occlusion is medically defined as the blockage of the central
retinal vein by a thrombus. It causes painless vision loss which is usually sudden, but it can also
occur gradually over a period of days to weeks.[26] This condition, despite numerous medical
procedures undertaken, eventually led to a total loss of sight of respondents
left eye. Loss of one bodily function
falls within the definition of disability
which is essentially "loss or impairment of a physical or mental function
resulting from injury or sickness."[27]
Although
Central Retinal Vein Occlusion is not listed as one of the occupational diseases
under Section 32-A of the 2000 Amended Terms of POEA-SEC,[28]
the resulting disability which is loss of sight of one eye, is specifically
mentioned in Section 32 thereof (Schedule of Disability or Impediment for
Injuries Suffered and Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness
Contracted). More importantly, Section
20 (B), paragraph (4) states that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of
this Contract are disputably presumed
as work-related.[29]
The disputable presumption that a
particular injury or illness that results in disability, or in some cases death,
is work-related stands in the absence of contrary evidence. In the case at bench, the said presumption
was not overturned by the petitioners. Although, the employer is not the
insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them and
assumes the risk of liability.[30] Consequently, the Court concurs with the
finding of the courts below that respondents disability is compensable.
Now, the Court shall determine
whether respondent is entitled to be awarded permanent total or permanent
partial disability benefits.
It should be noted that the
company-designated physician assessed the loss of respondents left eye as a
permanent partial disability while respondents own physician indicated his
disability as Grade 7.
The Court is more inclined to rule, however, that respondent is suffering
from a permanent total disability as he was unable to return to his job that he
was trained to do for more than one hundred twenty days already. The recent case of Valenzona v. Fair
Shipping Corporation, et al.,[31] citing Quitoriano v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc.,[32] elucidated the
concept of permanent total disability, in this wise:
Thus, Court has applied the Labor
Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. x x x
x x
x x
There
are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D.
No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and
(3) permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules
of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates the disabilities as follows:
Sec. 2. Disability. - (a)
A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the
employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period
not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these
Rules.
(b)
A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness
the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these
Rules.
(c) A disability is partial and
permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a
permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body.
In Vicente
v. ECC (G.R. No. 85024, January 23, 1991, 193 SCRA 190, 195):
x x x the test of whether or not an employee suffers from
'permanent total disability' is a showing of the capacity of the employee to
continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus,
if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to
perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within
the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which,
in more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability),
then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from 'permanent total disability'
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
A
total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or
totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the
employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom (Austria v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 146636, Aug. 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 216, 221). On the
other hand, a total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously
for more than 120 days. Thus, in the very recent case of Crystal Shipping,
Inc. v. Natividad (G.R. No. 134028, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 268,
270-271), we held:
Permanent
disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he lose[s] the use of any part of his body. x x x
Total
disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.[33]
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
A total disability does not require that the employee be
completely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury
must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn
from it.[34]
On the other hand, a
total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than
120 days.[35] What is crucial is whether the
employee who suffers from disability could still perform his work notwithstanding
the disability he incurred. Evidently,
respondent was not able to return to his job as a seafarer after his left eye
was declared legally blind. Records show
that the petitioners did not give him a new overseas assignment after his
disability. This only shows that his
disability effectively barred his chances to be deployed abroad as an officer
of an ocean-going vessel.
Therefore, it is fitting that respondent
be entitled to permanent total disability benefits considering that he would
not able to resume his position as a maritime officer and the probability that
he would be hired by other maritime employers would be close to impossible. Indeed, a sight-impaired maritime applicant cannot
stand in the same footing as his healthy co-applicant.
The next issue to be resolved is
whether respondents entitlement to permanent total disability
benefits should be based on the CBA or his POEA-SEC which integrated the 2000
Amended Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels.
The Court holds that respondent
is entitled to claim permanent total disability benefits based on his POEA-SEC
and not based on their CBA as earlier ruled by the
The CBA
provisions on disability are not applicable to respondents case because
Article 28 thereon specifically refers to disability sustained after an
accident. Article 28 of the ITF-JSU/AMOSUP CBA specifically
states that:
Article 28:
Disability
28.1 A seafarer who
suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident whilst in the employment of the Company regardless of fault, including
accidents occurring while travelling to or from the ship, and whose ability to
work as a seafarer as a result thereof, but excluding permanent disability due
to wilful acts, shall be in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation
according to the provisions of this Agreement. [Emphasis supplied]
Respondent
failed to show that the blurring of his left eye was caused by an accident on
board the ship. Thus, Article 28 of the
CBA cannot be used to compute his disability benefits.
Accordingly, what should
govern the computation of his disability benefits is the POEA-SEC incorporating the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions. Under Section 20 (B), paragraph 6, of the
2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions, to wit:
SECTION 20.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
x x x x
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR
ILLNESS
The liabilities
of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or
illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x x
6. In case of permanent total or
partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall
be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in
Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an
illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
Based on the schedule of
disability under Section 32 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and
Conditions, permanent total disability is classified as Grade 1. Thus, respondents disability benefit should
be computed as follows:
Grade 1: US$50,000.00 x 120% = US$60,000.00
As to the award of attorneys
fees, the Court likewise affirms the ruling that respondent is entitled to it
as provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code:
Art.
2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
x
x x x
(8)
In actions for indemnity under workmens
compensation and employers liability laws;
x x x x
In the case at bench, respondent was compelled to
litigate in order to claim disability benefits from the petitioners. Thus, the award of attorneys fees is justified
pursuant to Article 2208 (8) of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The March 23, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that petitioners Fil-star Maritime
Corporation and Grandslam Enterprise Corp. are jointly and severally liable to
pay respondent Hanziel O. Rosete full total and permanent disability benefits
in the amount of US$60,000.00 or its equivalent amount in Philippine currency
at the time of payment. All other
aspects of the CA Decision stand.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T IO N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order No. 1152 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-27.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Reorganizing the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and for Other Purposes.
[25] E.O. No. 247, Sec. 3(i) and (j).
[26]
<http://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/eye_disorders/retinal_disorders/central_retinal_vein_occlu
sion.html> (visited
[27] Labor Code, Article 167(n).
[28] Also known as Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 2000.
[29] Italics supplied.
[30] Seagull
Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, 388 Phil. 906, 914 [2000], citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v.
NLRC, 366 Phil. 646, 654-655 [1999].
[31] G.R.
No. 176884,
[32] G.R.
No. 179868,
[33]
[34] Austria v. CA, 435 Phil. 926, 932 [2002], citing Gonzaga v. ECC, 212 Phil. 405, 414 [1984].
[35] Rule
XI, Section 1(b) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.