Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
NIA JEWELRY MANUFACTURING OF METAL ARTS, INC.
(otherwise known as NIA
MANUFACTURING AND METAL ARTS, INC.) and ELISEA B. ABELLA,
Petitioners,
- versus - MADELINE C. MONTECILLO and LIZA M. TRINIDAD,
Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 188169
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, ARANAL-SERENO,
and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November
28, 2011 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January 9, 2009 Decision[2]
and the May 26, 2009 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01755. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision dated August 31, 2005 and Resolution dated October
28, 2005 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fourth Division,
(1) to reinstate petitioners to their respective positions as goldsmiths without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and
(2) to pay petitioners their full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time their compensation was withheld up to their actual reinstatement.
The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the RECOMPUTATION of the total monetary award due to petitioners in accord with this decision. The Labor Arbiter is ORDERED to submit his compliance within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision, with copies furnished to the parties.[4] (citations omitted)
The assailed Resolution denied the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The Factual Antecedents
Madeline Montecillo (Madeline) and
Liza Trinidad (Liza), hereinafter referred to collectively as the respondents,
were first employed as goldsmiths by the petitioner Nia Jewelry
Manufacturing of Metal Arts, Inc. (Nia Jewelry) in 1996 and 1994, respectively.
Madeline's weekly rate was P1,500.00 while Liza's was P2,500.00. Petitioner
Elisea Abella (Elisea) is Nia Jewelry's president and general manager.
There were incidents of theft
involving goldsmiths in Nia Jewelry's employ.
On August 13, 2004, Nia Jewelry
imposed a policy for goldsmiths requiring them to post cash bonds or deposits
in varying amounts but in no case exceeding 15% of the latter's salaries per
week. The deposits were intended to answer for any loss or damage which Nia
Jewelry may sustain by reason of the goldsmiths' fault or negligence in handling
the gold entrusted to them. The deposits shall be returned upon completion of
the goldsmiths' work and after an accounting of the gold received.
Nia Jewelry alleged that the
goldsmiths were given the option not to post deposits, but to sign
authorizations allowing the former to deduct from the latter's salaries amounts
not exceeding 15% of their take home pay should it be found that they lost the
gold entrusted to them. The respondents claimed otherwise insisting that Nia
Jewelry left the goldsmiths with no option but to post the deposits. The
respondents alleged that they were constructively dismissed by Nia Jewelry as
their continued employments were made dependent on their readiness to post the
required deposits.
Nia Jewelry averred that on August
14, 2004, the respondents no longer reported for work and signified their
defiance against the new policy which at that point had not even been
implemented yet.
On September 7, 2004, the respondents
filed against Nia Jewelry complaints[6]
for illegal dismissal and for the award of separation pay.
On September 20, 2004, the
respondents filed their amended complaints[7]
which excluded their earlier prayer for separation pay but sought reinstatement
and payment of backwages, attorney's fees and 13th month pay.
Labor Arbiter Jose
Gutierrez (LA Gutierrez) dismissed the respondents' complaints for lack of
merit but ordered Nia Jewelry to pay Madeline the sum of P3,750.00, and Liza, P6,250.00, representing their proportionate entitlements to 13th month pay for
the year 2004. LA Gutierrez ratiocinated that:
Their [respondents] claim is self-serving. As evidence to (sic) their claims that they were made to sign blank trust receipts, complainants presented Annexes 'A'[,] 'B' and 'C'. Our examination, however, shows that they are not blank trust receipts but rather they are filled up trust receipts.
The undisputed facts show that complainants were piece workers of the respondent who are engaged in the processing of gold into various jewelry pieces. Because of the nature of its business, respondent was plagued with too many incidents of theft from its piece workers. x x x This deposit [not exceeding 15% of the salary for the week of the piece worker] is released back upon completion of work and after accounting of the gold received by him or her. There is an alternative, however, the piece worker may opt not to give a deposit, instead sign an authorization to allow the respondent to deduct from the salary an amount not to exceed 15% of his take home pay, should it be found out that he lost the gold [entrusted] to him or her due to his or her fault or negligence. The complainants did not like to post a deposit, or sign an authorization. They instead told their fellow goldsmiths that they will bring the matter to the Labor Commission. Complainants did not anymore report for work and did not anymore perform their tasks. The fact of complainants not being dismissed from employment was duly attested to by his co-workers who executed their Joint Affidavit under oath, Annex '4'.
As further evidence to prove that they were dismissed, complainants presented the minutes of [the] Sept. 7, 2004 conference.
We examined the statements therein, we find that there is no admission on the part of the respondents that they terminate[d] the complainants from employment. Respondents only inform[ed] the complainants to put up the appropriate cash bond before they could be allowed to return back to work which they previously refused to perform, as a sign of their protest to the requirement to post cash bond or to sign an authorization.
x x x x
x x x It is clearly shown that complainants were paid with their 13th month pay for the year 2001, 2002 and 2003. However, for the year 2004, considering that complainants have worked until the month of August, we rule to grant them the proportionate 13th month pay as there is no showing that they were already paid. The other money claims are denied for lack of merit. x x x.[8]
The respondents filed an appeal
before the NLRC which affirmed LA Gutierrez's dismissal of the amended
complaints but deleted the award of 13th month pay based on findings
that the former had contracted unpaid individual loans from Nia Jewelry. The
NLRC found that:
x x x [I]t was complainants who refused to work with the respondents when they were required to post cash bond or sign an authorization for deduction for the gold material they received and to be manufactured into various jewelries. x x x We find it logically sound for the latter [Nia Jewelry] to innovate certain policy or rule to protect its own business. To deprive them of such prerogative [management prerogative] will be likened to 'killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.'
x x x [C]omplainants failed to prove their affirmative allegations in the respective complaints that they were indeed dismissed. On the contrary, respondents have convincingly shown that if (sic) were complainants who voluntarily abandoned from (sic) their work by refusing to abide with the newly adopted company policy of putting up a cash bond or signing an authorization for deduction for the gold materials entrusted to them in case of loss or pilferage.
x x x [B]oth complainants are still
indebted with (sic) the respondents in the amounts of P5,118.63 in the
case of Madeline Montecillo and P7,963.11 in the case of Liza
Montecillo. Such being the case[,] Madeline Montecillo has still on account
payable of P1,368.63 while Liza Montecillo is still indebted of P1,713.71.
This principle of offsetting of credit should be allowed to preclude unjust
enrichment at the expense of the respondents.[9]
The respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari[10]
before the CA ascribing patent errors in the appreciation of facts and
application of jurisprudence on the part of the NLRC when it ruled that what
occurred was not a case of illegal dismissal but of abandonment of work.
On January 9, 2009, the
CA rendered the now assailed Decision[11]
reversing the findings of the LA and the NLRC. The CA ruled:
According to [the] private respondents, they required a deposit or cash bond from [the] petitioners in order to secure their interest against gold thefts committed by some of their employees. If the employee fails to make the required deposit, he will not be given gold to work on. Further, [the] private respondents admitted during the conciliation proceedings before Executive Labor Arbiter Violeta Ortiz-Bantug that [the] petitioners would only be allowed back to work after they had posted the proportionate cash bond.
The Labor Code of the
ART. 113. Wage Deduction. No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except:
(a) In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;
(b) For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and
(c)
In cases where the employer is authorized by law or
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor.
Article 114. Deposits
for loss or damage. No employer shall require his worker to make deposits
from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage
to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except
when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the
practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable
as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
Applying these
provisions to the case at bar, before [the] petitioners may be required to
deposit cash or agree to a salary deduction proportionate to the value of gold
delivered to them, the employer must comply with the relevant conditions
imposed by law. Hence, the latter must prove that there is an existing law or
regulation authorizing it to impose such burden on its employees. And, in case
of deposit, that it is engaged in a trade, occupation or business where such
requirement is a recognized practice. Nia Jewelry obviously failed in this
respect. Surely,
mere invocation of management prerogative cannot exempt it from compliance with
the strict requirements of law. Accordingly, [w]e hold that Nia Jewelry's
unilateral imposition of cash deposit or salary deduction on [the] petitioners
is illegal. For that matter, when Ni[]a Jewelry refused to give assignment to
[the] petitioners or to admit them back to work because they failed to give
cash deposit or agree to a salary deduction, it was deemed to have
constructively dismissed [the] petitioners. Obviously, such deposit or salary
deduction was imposed as a condition for [the] petitioners' continuing
employment. Non-compliance indubitably meant termination of [the] petitioners'
employment. Suldao vs. Cimech System Construction, Inc.[12]
enunciated:
Constructive dismissal
or a constructive discharge has been defined as quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer
involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. There is constructive
dismissal when the continued employment is rendered impossible so as to foreclose
any choice on the employee's part except to resign from such employment.
The fact that [the] petitioners lost no time in filing the complaint for illegal dismissal lucidly negates [the] private respondents' claim that the former had abandoned their work. A contrary notion would not only be illogical but also absurd.[13] Indeed, prompt filing of a case for illegal dismissal, on one hand, is anathema to the concept of abandonment, on the other.
Finally, under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; full backwages, inclusive of allowances; and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.[14] x x x.
As for damages, it is a rule that moral damages may be recovered where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. x x x [w]e find that private respondents did not act with oppression, bad faith or fraud. They imposed a cash bond or deposit on herein petitioners in the honest belief that it was the best way to protect their interest against gold theft in the company. x x x.[15] (some citations omitted)
The Issues
The following are to be resolved in the instant Petition for Review:[16]
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION [under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court], IN EFFECT, FINDING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE NLRC, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT DECISION AND RESOLUTION THEREIN ARE IN PERFECT ACCORD WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL IN THE PRESENT CASE AND ORDERING RESPONDENTS' REINSTATEMENT AS WELL AS THE PAYMENT OF THEIR BACKWAGES AND OTHER MONETARY BENEFITS WITHOUT FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASES.[17]
The petitioners now argue that the CA
should have outrightly dismissed the petition filed before it as the
respondents had resorted to an erroneous mode of appeal. The arguments
raised in the petition were the same ones already passed upon by the LA and the
NLRC. What the respondents sought was the CA's re-evaluation of the facts and
evidence. The petition was thus based on purported
errors of judgment which are beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.
The petitioners likewise insist that
the respondents abandoned their work without
due notice and to the prejudice of the former. The respondents' co-workers
attested to the foregoing circumstance.[18] The
respondents are goldsmiths whose skills are indispensable to a jewelry
manufacturing business, thus, it is not in accord with both logic and
experience for the petitioners to just fire them only to train new workers. Moreover,
in the complaints and amended complaints, the respondents did not claim for reinstatement, hence, implying their
admission that they were not terminated.
Further, under Articles 114 and 115[19]
of the Labor Code, an employer may require a worker to post a deposit
even before a loss or damage has occurred, provided that deductions from the
deposit can be made only upon proof that the worker
is liable for the loss or damage. In case no loss or damage is incurred,
the deposit shall be returned to the worker after the conduct of an accounting
which was what happened in the case at bar. This is a valid exercise of management prerogative the scope of which includes
the setting of policies relative to working methods, procedures to be followed
and working regulations.[20]
The petitioners stress that they did
not transgress the respondents' rights. The respondents, who expressed to their
co-workers their lack of fear to have their
employment severed, are motivated by their greed to extract money from
the petitioners.
The petitioners conclude that the CA
should have accorded respect to the findings
of the LA and the NLRC especially since they were not arrived at arbitrarily or
in disregard of the evidence on record.
In the respondents'
Comment,[21]
they reiterate the arguments they had presented in the proceedings below. The
respondents emphasize that when they pleaded for reinstatement during the
conference with the petitioners on September 7, 2004, the latter openly
admitted without reservation that the former will only be allowed to return to
work if they will post the required cash bond.
Further, the respondents claim that
there was no plausible reason for them to abandon their employment considering
the length of their service and the fact that they
were being paid rates above the minimum wage. Citing Hantex Trading
Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[22]
the respondents argue that no employee in his right mind would recklessly
abandon his job to join the ranks of the unemployed and choose to unduly expose
his family to hunger and untold hardship.
Besides, in Anflo Management &
Investment Corp. v. Rodolfo Bolanio,[23]
this Court had the occasion to state that the filing
of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with a charge of
abandonment, for an employee who takes steps to protest his lay off
cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work.
The respondents also claim that the petitioners misrepresented to this Court that the
former did not pray for reinstatement as the dorsal portions of the
amended complaints indicate otherwise.
Moreover, the
petitioners failed to prove their authority granted by either the law, or
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, allowing them to require their
workers to post deposits. The petitioners also failed to establish that Nia
Jewelry is engaged in a trade, occupation or business
where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one or is
considered as necessary or desirable by the Secretary of
Labor.
Citing Sections 12,[24]
13[25]
and 14,[26]
Book III, Rule VIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus
Rules), the respondents posit that salary deductions made prior to the
occurrence of loss or damage are illegal
and constitute as undue interferences in the workers' disposal of their wages. Further, the workers must first be
given the opportunity to show cause why deductions should not be made. If to be
made, deductions should be fair, reasonable and should not exceed the actual
loss or damage. In the case at bar, the respondents were required to post cash
bonds even when there is no proof yet of their fault or negligence.
In the petitioners' Reply,[27]
they averred that the day after Nia Jewelry required from its employees the
posting of deposits and even before the policy was actually implemented, the respondents promptly stopped reporting for work despite
Elisea's attempt to get in touch with them. The petitioners convened the
employees to discuss the propriety of imposing the
new policy and to afford them ample opportunity to air their concerns. The
respondents' acts contravene Article 19 of the New Civil Code (NCC) which
requires every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.
Further, it is clear in the Minutes
of the Conciliation Proceedings[28] before the LA that the respondents were not willing to be reinstated and preferred instead the
payment of separation pay. Hence, no prayer for reinstatement was indicated in
the original complaints filed by them. As an afterthought, however, they
amended their complaints to reflect that they were likewise seeking for reinstatement.
The petitioners also point out that
the doctrines in Hantex[29] and Anflo Management[30]
cited by the respondents find no application in the case at bar. In Hantex,
the employer presented mere cash vouchers to prove abandonment by the employee.
In the case before us, sufficient evidence show that the respondents abandoned
their work. In Anflo Management, the employer expressly uttered words
terminating the employee who in turn filed a complaint the day right after the
incident. In the case now under our consideration, the respondents merely made
a bare claim of illegal dismissal. Rightly so in Abad v. Roselle Cinema,[31]
it was ruled that an employer's claim of not having terminated an employee,
when supported by substantial evidence, should not be outrightly overcome by
the argument that an employee would not have filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal if he were not really dismissed.
The circumstances surrounding the separation from employment should be taken
into account.
Under Article 114 of the Labor Code,
the Secretary of Labor is conferred the authority to promulgate rules
determining the circumstances when the making of deposits is deemed recognized,
necessary or desirable. However, Section 14,[32]
Book III, Rule VIII of the Omnibus Rules does not define those circumstances. What
is defined is the circumstances when deductions can be made. It can thus
be inferred that the intention is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis what
should be considered as recognized, necessary or desirable especially in
the light of the existence of myriads of businesses which are practically
impossible to enumerate in modern society. The petitioners hence argue that the
validity of requiring cash deposits should be scrutinized with due consideration of its
reasonableness and necessity. Further, Article 1306 of the NCC allows
contracting parties to establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions which
they may deem convenient provided they do not contravene the law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. In the case at bar, the policy adopted by the petitioners was neither
unreasonable nor oppressive. It was intended to benefit all the
contracting parties.
Lastly, while the respondents raise
the issue of the illegality of deductions, the petitioners stress that it is
academic because no deduction was actually made yet.
The
Court's Ruling
The instant petition is
partially meritorious.
The petitioners raise the
procedural issue of whether or not the CA validly gave due course to the
petition for certiorari filed before it under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. As the substantive issue of whether or not the
petitioners constructively dismissed the respondents is closely-intertwined
with the procedural question raised, they will be resolved jointly.
Yolanda Mercado, et al.
v. AMA Computer College-Paraaque City, Inc.[33] is instructive as to the
nature of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:
x x x [R]ule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the
assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA
decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC
decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits
of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that
the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision
challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45
review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In
question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?[34]
It is thus settled that this Court is
bound by the CA's factual findings. The rule, however, admits of exceptions,
among which is when the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial court
or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the
action originated.[35] The case
before us falls under the aforementioned exception.
The
petitioners argue that the respondents resorted to an erroneous mode of appeal
as the issues raised in the petition lodged before the CA essentially sought a
re-evaluation of facts and evidence, hence, based on purported errors of
judgment which are outside the ambit of actions which can be aptly filed under
Rule 65.
We agree.
Again in Mercado,[36]
we ruled that:
x x x [I]n certiorari
proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not
assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the
determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate
court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are
not supported by substantial evidence. x x x.[37]
In the case at bench, in
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the respondents
before the CA, the following issues were presented for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT [NLRC] committed patent
errors in the appreciation of facts and application of pertinent jurisprudence
amounting to grave abuse of discretion or lack or in excess of jurisdiction
WHEN IT HELD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS [herein petitioners] ARE NOT GUILTY OF
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL BECAUSE IT WAS THE PETITIONERS [herein private respondents]
WHO ABANDONED THEIR JOB AND REFUSED TO WORK WITH RESPONDENTS WHEN THEY WERE
REQUIRED TO PUT UP CASH BOND OR SIGN AN AUTHORIZATION FOR DEDUCTION.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT committed patent errors in
the appreciation of facts and application of pertinent jurisprudence
amounting to grave abuse of discretion or lack or in excess of jurisdiction
WHEN IT DID NOT ORDER THE REINSTATEMENT OF HEREIN PETITIONERS AND DELETED THE
AWARD OF 13th MONTH PAY AND DENIED THE CLAIMS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES,
DAMAGES AND FULL BACKWAGES.[38]
Essentially, the issues raised by the
respondents for resolution by the CA were anchored on an alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence by the NLRC and the LA when they both
ruled that abandonment of work and not constructive dismissal occurred.
We agree with the petitioners that
what the respondents sought was a re-evaluation of evidence, which as a general
rule cannot be properly done in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
save in cases where substantial evidence to support the NLRC's findings are
wanting.
In Honorable Ombudsman
Simeon Marcelo v. Leopoldo Bungubung,[39]
the Court defined substantial evidence and laid down guidelines relative to the
conduct of judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in
the exercise of their quasi-judicial power, viz:
x x x Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in
reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government,
the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. Hence,
it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third,
administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only
be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These
principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in
an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not
authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to
the administrative agency concerned.[40]
(citations omitted)
We find the factual
findings of the LA and the NLRC that the respondents were not dismissed are
supported by substantial evidence.
In the Joint Affidavit[41]
executed by Generoso Fortunaba, Erdie Pilares and Crisanto Ignacio, all
goldsmiths under Nia Jewelry's employ, they expressly stated that they have
personal knowledge of the fact that the respondents were not terminated from
employment. Crisanto Ignacio likewise expressed that after Elisea returned from
the
Constructive dismissal
occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.[43]
In the case now under our
consideration, the petitioners did not whimsically or arbitrarily impose the
policy to post cash bonds or make deductions from the workers' salaries. As attested
to by the respondents' fellow goldsmiths in their Joint Affidavit, the workers
were convened and informed of the reason behind the implementation of the new
policy. Instead of airing their concerns, the respondents just promptly stopped
reporting for work.
Although the propriety of
requiring cash bonds seems doubtful for reasons to be discussed hereunder, we
find no grounds to hold that the respondents were dismissed expressly or even
constructively by the petitioners. It was the respondents who merely stopped
reporting for work. While it is conceded that the new policy will impose an
additional burden on the part of the respondents, it was not intended to result in
their demotion. Neither is a diminution in pay intended because as long as the
workers observe due diligence in the performance of their tasks, no loss or
damage shall result from their handling of the gold entrusted to them, hence,
all the amounts due to the goldsmiths shall still be paid in full. Further, the
imposition of the new policy cannot be viewed as an act tantamount to
discrimination, insensibility or disdain against the respondents. For one, the
policy was intended to be implemented upon all the goldsmiths in Nia Jewelry's
employ and not solely upon the respondents. Besides, as stressed by the
petitioners, the new policy was intended to merely curb the incidences of gold
theft in the work place. The new policy can hardly be said to be disdainful or
insensible to the workers as to render their continued employment unreasonable,
unlikely or impossible.
On September 7, 2004, or
more or less three weeks after the imposition of the new policy, the
respondents filed their complaints for illegal dismissal which include their
prayer for the payment of separation pay. On September 20, 2004, they filed
amended complaints seeking for reinstatement instead.
The CA favored the
respondents' argument that the latter could not have abandoned their work as it
can be presumed that they would not have filed complaints for illegal dismissal
had they not been really terminated and had they not intended themselves to be
reinstated. We find that the presumption relied upon by the CA pales in
comparison to the substantial evidence offered by the petitioners that it was
the respondents who stopped reporting for work and were not dismissed at all.
In sum, we agree with the
petitioners that substantial evidence support the LA's and the NLRC's findings
that no dismissal occurred. Hence, the CA should not have given due course to
and granted the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the
respondents before it.
In view of our
disquisition above that the findings of the LA and the NLRC that no
constructive dismissal occurred are supported by substantial evidence, the CA
thus erred in giving due course to and granting the petition filed before it. Hence,
it is not even necessary anymore to resolve the issue of whether or not the
policy of posting cash bonds or making deductions from the goldsmiths' salaries
is proper. However, considering that there are other goldsmiths in Nia
Jewelry's employ upon whom the policy challenged by the respondents remain to
be enforced, in the interest of justice and to put things to rest, we shall
resolve the issue.
Article 113 of the Labor
Code is clear that there are only three exceptions to the general rule that no
deductions from the employees'
salaries can be made. The exception which finds application in the instant
petition is in cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations
issued by the Secretary of Labor to effect the deductions. On the other hand,
Article 114 states that generally, deposits for loss or damages are not allowed
except in cases where the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or
business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is
necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
rules or regulations.
While employers should
generally be given leeways in their exercise of management prerogatives, we
agree with the respondents and the CA that in the case at bar, the petitioners
had failed to prove that their imposition of the new policy upon the goldsmiths
under Nia Jewelry's employ falls under the exceptions specified in Articles
113 and 114 of the Labor Code.
The petitioners point out
that Section 14, Book III, Rule VIII of the Omnibus Rules does not define the
circumstances when the making of deposits is deemed recognized, necessary or
desirable. The petitioners then argue that the intention of the law is for the
courts to determine on a case to case basis what should be regarded as
recognized, necessary or desirable and to test an employer's policy of requiring
deposits on the bases of its reasonableness and necessity.
We are not persuaded.
Articles 113 and 114 of
the Labor Code are clear as to what are the exceptions to the general
prohibition against requiring deposits and effecting deductions from the
employees' salaries. Hence, a statutory construction of the aforecited provisions
is not called for. Even if we were however called upon to interpret the
provisions, our inclination would still be to strictly construe the same
against the employer because evidently, the posting of
cash bonds and the making of deductions from the wages would inarguably impose
an additional burden upon the employees.
While the petitioners are
not absolutely precluded from imposing the new policy, they can only do so upon
compliance with the requirements of the law.[44]
In other words, the petitioners should first establish that the making of
deductions from the salaries is authorized by law, or regulations issued by the
Secretary of Labor. Further, the posting of cash bonds should be proven as a
recognized practice in the jewelry manufacturing business, or alternatively,
the petitioners should seek for the determination by the Secretary of Labor
through the issuance of appropriate rules and regulations that the policy the
former seeks to implement is necessary or desirable in the conduct of business.
The petitioners failed in this respect. It bears stressing that without proofs
that requiring deposits and effecting deductions are recognized practices, or
without securing the Secretary of Labor's determination of the necessity or
desirability of the same, the imposition of new policies relative to deductions
and deposits can be made subject to abuse by the employers. This is not what
the law intends.
In view of the foregoing,
we hold that no dismissal, constructive or otherwise, occurred. The findings of
the NLRC and the LA that it was the respondents who stopped reporting for work
are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, the CA erred when it re-evaluated
the parties' respective evidence and granted the petition filed before it. However,
we agree with the CA that it is baseless for Nia Jewelry to impose its new
policy upon the goldsmiths under its employ without first complying with the
strict requirements of the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA
dated January 9, 2009 and May 26, 2009, respectively, are REVERSED only
in so far as they declared that the respondents were constructively dismissed
and entitled to reinstatement and payment of backwages, allowances and
benefits. However, the CA's ruling that the petitioners' imposition of its new
policy upon the respondents lacks legal basis, stands.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 26-52.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; id. at 12-20.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Supra note 2.
[12] G.R. No.
171392, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 256, 260-261.
[13] Far East
Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. Lebatique,
G.R. No. 162813, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA
491.
[14] De Guzman
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 167701, December 12,
2007, 540 SCRA 21, 34.
[15] Rollo, pp. 16-18.
[16] Supra note 1.
[17]
[18] Please see the Joint Affidavit of Generoso Fortunoba, Erdie Pilares and Crisanto Ignacio, id. at 161-162.
[19] Art. 115. Limitations. No deduction from the deposits of an employee for the actual amount of the loss or damage shall be made unless the employee has been heard thereon, and his responsibility has been clearly shown.
[20] Citing
San Miguel Corporation v. Ubaldo, G.R. No. 92859, February 1, 1993, 218
SCRA 293.
[21] Rollo, pp. 182-188.
[22] 438 Phil
737 (2002).
[23] 439 Phil
309 (2002).
[24] Sec. 12. Non-interference in disposal of wages. No employer shall limit or otherwise interfere with the freedom of any employee to dispose of his wages and no employer shall in any manner oblige any of his employees to patronize any store or avail of the services offered by any person.
[25] Sec. 13. Wage deduction. Deductions from the wages of the employees may be made by the employer in any of the following cases:
(a) When the deductions are authorized by law, including deductions for the insurance premiums advanced by the employer in behalf of the employee as well as union dues where the right to check-off has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual employee himself;
(b) When the deductions are with the written authorization of the employees for payment to a third person and the employer agrees to do so, provided that the latter does not receive any pecuniary benefit, directly or indirectly, from the transaction.
[26] Sec. 14. Deductions for loss or damages. Where the employer is engaged in a trade, occupation or business where the practice of making deductions or requiring deposits is recognized, to answer for the reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer to the employee, the employer may make wage deductions or require the employees to make deposits from which deductions shall be made, subject to the following conditions:
(a) That the employee concerned is clearly
shown to be responsible for the loss or damage;
(b) That the employee is given reasonable
opportunity to show cause why deduction should not be made;
(c) That the amount of such deductions is fair
and reasonable and shall not exceed the actual loss or damage; and
(d) That the deduction from the wages of the
employee does not exceed 20% of the employee's wages in a week.
[27] Rollo, pp. 210-220.
[28]
[29] Supra note 22.
[30] Supra note 23.
[31] 520 Phil
135, 146 (2006).
[32] Supra note 26.
[33] G.R. No. 183572, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 218, citing Montoya
v. Transmed Manila Corporation, G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 596 SCRA
334, 343.
[34]
[35] AMA Computer College-East Rizal, et al. v. Allan Raymond Ignacio, G.R. No. 178520, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 633, 651.
[36] Supra note 33, citing Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co., G.R. No. 168654, March 25, 2009, 582 SCRA 417, 427.
[37]
[38] Rollo, p. 134.
[39] G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 589, citing Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil 158, 167 (2003).
[40]
[41] Supra note 18.
[42] Odilon Martinez v. B&B Fish Broker, G.R. No. 179985, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 691.
[43] Fe La
Rosa, et al. v. Ambassador Hotel, G.R. No. 177059, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA
340, 346-347.
[44] Dentech
Manufacturing Corporation, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 254 Phil
595 (1989).