Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE FELIX FLORECE, JOSE
FLORECE, AND JUSTINO FLORECE, Petitioners, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND SOCORRO FLORECE, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 187409
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, PEREZ, ARANAL-SERENO,
and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: November 16, 2011 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Justino Florece (Justino), for himself and on behalf of his
deceased brothers Felix Florece (Felix) and Jose Florece (Jose), assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated August 20, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31034.
The instant case stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by the
petitioners against Hilario Florece (Hilario) and his wife Socorro Florece
(Socorro) for falsification of public document punishable under Article 172 of
the Penal Code.
In the said complaint, the petitioners
alleged that they are the children-heirs of the late spouses Gavino and Clara
Florece, who were the registered owners of a 1,290 square meter parcel of land
in La Purisima, Nabua, Camarines
Sometime in 2003, Felix decided to erect a nipa hut in said parcel
of land. However, Hilario protested the same, claiming that said parcel of land
was already registered under his name and that he acquired the same by virtue
of a deed of transfer from his parents. Hilarios parents, in turn, acquired
the property from the petitioners as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 21, 1973 signed by the latter.
Claiming that they never executed said Deed of Absolute Sale, the petitioners
filed a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutors Office, which after
finding probable cause to indict Hilario and Socorro for falsification of
public document under Article 172 of the Penal Code, filed the corresponding
Information with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Nabua-Bato,
Camarines
On November 26, 2006, the MCTC of Nabua-Bato rendered a Judgment[2]
convicting Hilario and Socorro of the crime charged. The MCTC of Nabua-Bato
opined that accused Hilario and Socorro, being in possession of and having made
use of the alleged falsified deed of sale, are presumed to be the material
authors of the falsification.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37,
Thereafter, Socorro filed a Petition for Review[4]
with the CA asserting that the RTC of Iriga City erred in affirming her
conviction of the crime charged. Socorro asserted that the prosecution failed
to prove that she indeed falsified the questioned deed and that her conviction
for the offense charged was merely based on presumption.
On August 20, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,[5]
acquitting Socorro of the crime charged. The CA concurred with the lower courts
insofar as their finding that the prosecution was able to prove that the
questioned deed was indeed forged. Nevertheless, the CA pointed out that
Hilario and Socorro were not parties and were never shown to have participated
in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and thus, could not be presumed
to be the forgers thereof.
Undaunted, the petitioners instituted the instant petition for
review on certiorari before this
Court.
The petition is denied.
The core issue here is whether or not the CA had committed reversible
error and/or grave abuse of discretion in reversing the Decision of the RTC
which convicted the respondent Socorro. The
petitioners insist that the Decision rendered by the CA should be reversed on
the ground of extrinsic fraud.
According to the herein
petitioners, in the CA proceedings, they were deprived of due process as they
had not been given the opportunity to participate in the said proceedings.
Extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is
prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by
giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had
the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at
his defeat.[6]
In the instant case, none of the foregoing circumstances exist
that would justify a finding that
extrinsic fraud was extant in the proceedings before the CA. The records would
show that in the CA, the respondent-complainant was the People of the
The fact that the herein petitioners were not able to participate
in the proceedings before the CA is immaterial. Insofar as the petitioners are
concerned, they were not parties to the criminal case. The petitioners, as
private complainants in the case below, were merely witnesses for the
prosecution. The cases cited by the petitioners herein in support of the
instant petition aptly pertain to civil cases.
In Palu-ay v. Court of
Appeals, [7]
we held that:
It
is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense,
the complainants role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom
on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of
the
While
there may be instances where a private complainant or offended party in a
criminal case may be allowed to file a petition directly with this Court, as
when there is a denial of due process, the foregoing circumstance is not extant
here.
Moreover, the instant petition for review on certiorari was not filed on time. A petition for review on certiorari must be filed within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed
from, or of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in
due time after notice of the judgment.[8]
Here, the petitioners alleged that they received a copy of the
August 20, 2008 Decision of the CA only on February 10, 2009. Thus, the
petitioners only had until February 25, 2009 to assail the August 20, 2008
Decision of the CA via a petition for
review on certiorari. However, the
petitioners were only able to file the instant petition on April 27, 2009.
Clearly, the instant petition was filed out of time.
Nevertheless, the petitioners invoke the principle of substantial
justice and beg this Court to suspend the rules in their favor. We are
however loath to heed the petitioners invocation of substantial justice. It bears
stressing that the petitioners utterly failed to advance any cogent or
intelligible explanation for their failure to file the petition on time.
The petitioners ought to be reminded that the bare invocation of "the
interest of substantial justice" is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules,
they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[9]
Lastly, a review of the findings of the CA acquitting Socorro of
the charge against her is not warranted under the circumstances as it runs
afoul of the avowed constitutional right of an accused against double jeopardy.
A verdict of
acquittal is immediately final, and a re-examination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for
the same offense.[10]
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
JOSE P. PEREZ Associate
Justice |
MA.
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 22-33.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] Amihan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Romars International Gases Corporation, G.R. No. 180819, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 406, 411.
[7] Palu-ay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112995, July 30, 1998, 355 Phil. 94, 106.
[8] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 2.
[9] Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137761, April 6, 2000, 386 Phil. 412, 417.
[10] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 383, 397.