Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
GILBERT QUIZORA, Petitioner, - versus - DENHOLM CREW MANAGEMENT (
Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 185412 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, BRION,* ABAD, MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November 16, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for
review challenging the September 10, 2008 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which set aside the Resolutions[2] of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated September 20, 2004
and May 24, 2005, and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA)
dated June 27, 2002.
The Facts
Records show that in 1992, Denholm
Crew Management (Philippines), Inc. (respondent
company), a domestic manning agency that supplied manpower to Denklav
Maritime Services, Ltd. (Denklav), a
foreign maritime corporation, hired the services of Gilbert Quizora (petitioner) to work as a messman on
board the international vessels of Denklav. Based on Article 4.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement[3] (CBA) entered into by and between the Association of Marine Officers and Seamen Union
of the Philippines (AMOSUP)
and Denholm Ship Management (Singapore) Ltd., represented by Denklav, his
contractual work as messman was considered terminated upon the expiration of
each contract. Article 5.1 thereof provided that the duration of his sea service
with respondent company was nine (9) months depending on the requirements of
the foreign principal. After the end of
a contract for a particular vessel, he would be given his next assignment on a
different vessel. His last assignment was from
After the expiration of his contract with MV
Leopard, petitioner was lined up for another assignment to a different vessel,
but he was later disqualified for employment and declared unfit for sea duty after
he was medically diagnosed to be suffering from venous duplex scan (lower
extremities) deep venous insufficiency, bilateral femoral and superficial
femoral veins and the (L) popliteal vein. In laymans terms, he was medically
found to have varicose veins.
Subsequently,
petitioner demanded from respondent company the payment of disability benefits,
separation pay and reimbursement of medical expenses. His demands, however, were denied. He then
submitted his claim before the AMOSUP, but it was likewise denied. Thereafter, he
filed with the LA a complaint for payment of disability benefits, medical
expenses, separation pay, damages, and attorneys fees.
On
On
appeal, the NLRC issued its Resolution dated
Upon the denial of its motion for
reconsideration in the NLRC Resolution dated
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS OF $60,000.00 CONSIDERING
THAT:
1)
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT HIS ACQUISITION OF
VARICOSE VEINS WAS CAUSED BY HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT WITH PETITIONER COMPANY.
2)
VARICOSE
VEINS IS A COMMON DISEASE FOR THOSE WHO ARE AT LEAST 30 YEARS OLD. IT CAN BE
ACQUIRED GENETICALLY OR CAN BE DUE TO LACK OF EXERCISE. HENCE, TO BLAME THE
PETITIONER COMPANY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VARICOSE VEINS IS MOST UNFAIR AND UNJUST.
3)
WHILE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAY HAVE ACQUIRED A DISABILITY, HE NEVER LOST HIS EARNING
CAPACITY PERMANENTLY SO AS TO ENTITLE HIM TO DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER THE CBA.
Decision of the Court of Appeals
On
Unsatisfied
with the CA decision, petitioner raised before this Court the following
ISSUES
I
WHETHER
RESPONDENT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PETITIONERS ILLNESS IS NOT WORK
RELATED
II
WHETHER
PETITIONERS ILLNESS IS WORK RELATED
III
WHETHER
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS
In advocacy of his position, petitioner
argues that the burden of proving that his illness is not work-related rests on
the respondent company. Citing the provisions of the Philippine Overseas and
Employment Authority Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), he claims
that illnesses not listed therein are disputably presumed work-related. It is
only when the claim is under the provisions of the Employees Compensation Act that
the claimant has the burden of proving that the illness is work-related. As it
is not listed, he is relieved from the trouble of proving the work-relatedness
of the illness because it is already disputably presumed by law. Hence,
respondent company should rebut this presumption by proving otherwise but,
unfortunately, it failed to do so.
To petitioner,
there is little difficulty in showing that acquiring varicose veins is work-related
for a seafarer. He avers that he was engaged by respondent company as a
seafarer for nine (9) years covering seven (7) contracts with their vessels;
that he was medically screened in every contract; and that he was found fit to
work up to his last contract on board the vessel MV Leopard.
Moreover, petitioner
claims that he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because
his varicose veins have rendered him permanently incapacitated to return to
work as a seafarer.
Position of respondent company
Respondent company counters that there is no evidence showing that
petitioners varicose veins were caused by his previous employment with
respondent company, that this disease was work-related, and that it caused him
permanent disability.
Petitioner
omitted to mention his health after his stint on the MV Leopard. Also, his
application for a new contract with respondent company came long after the
contract ended. He was discovered to have varicose veins in March 2001, or
months after his last employment contract with respondent company ended in July
2000. So, it is difficult to conclude that his varicose veins can only be
attributable to his previous employment with the company.
Besides, petitioners
employment was not continuous but on a per-contract basis which usually lasted
for nine (9) months depending on the requirement of the foreign principal. He was
considered signed-off upon the expiration of each contract. It was possible that
he acquired varicose veins while he was signed-off from the vessels of respondent
company. Except for his bare allegations, there is nothing to support his
theory that his intermittent contracts of employment with respondent company
had reasonable connection with his acquisition of varicose veins. He neither presented
proof on this point nor offered a medical expert opinion.
Respondent
company further argues that the disputable presumption under Section 20(B) (4)
of the 2000 POEA SEC is completely irrelevant to this case. First, the 2000 POEA-SEC initially took
effect sometime in July 2002. Petitioners last employment contract with
respondent company was from November 1999 to July 2000. Thus, at the time the
parties entered into an overseas employment contract in November 1999, the
provisions of the POEA-SEC, which were deemed incorporated into the contract,
were those from the 1996 POEA-SEC. Hence, it is the 1996 POEA-SEC, not the 2000
POEA-SEC, which should govern his claim for disability benefits. The disputable
presumption relied upon by petitioner does not appear in the 1996 POEA-SEC but
can only be found in the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Second, even assuming that the 2000 POEA-SEC
governed petitioners previous employment with respondent company, he was still
not entirely relieved of the burden to submit evidence to prove his claim
because Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC specifically pertains to
work-related injury or illness. Therefore, it is still incumbent upon him to
present proof that his varicose veins were reasonably connected to his work.
Respondent company
opines that varicose veins is a common disease for those who are at least 30
years old and it can be acquired genetically or through lack of exercise.
Lastly,
respondent company asserts that there is no showing that petitioners varicose
veins caused him permanent disability. While affliction with varicose veins may
bring pain and discomfort to the body of a person, the illness is not permanent
as it can actually be treated, either through self-help or medical care.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Before
tackling the issue of what rule governs the case, there is a need to compare the
provisions of Section 20-B of the 1996
POEA-SEC and Section 20-B of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC
reads as follows:
SECTION
20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
B.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS:
The
liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during
the term of his contract are as follows:
1. The
employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on
board the vessel;
2. If the
injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port,
the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental,
surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer
is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However,
if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising
from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer
until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been
established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon
sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to
sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to
work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated
physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120)
days.
For this
purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his
return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance.
Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement
shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
4. Upon
sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer
shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event that the seafarer is
declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is
unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or
another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
5. In case
of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of
employment caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be
compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section
30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or
disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable
at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
On the other hand, Section 20 (B) of
the 2000 POEA-SEC reads:
SECTION
20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
B.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The
liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or
illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
1. The
employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on
board the vessel;
2. If the
injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port,
the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental,
surgical and hospital treatment, as well as board and lodging, until the
seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However,
if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising
from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer
until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been
established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon
sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to
sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to
work, or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one
hundred twenty (120) days.
For this
purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon
his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case
a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance.
Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall
result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a
doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor
may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.
5. Upon
sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer
shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared
(1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work, but the employer is unable to
find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel
of the employer despite earnest efforts.
6. In case
of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either
injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the
schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of
his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates
and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was
contracted. [Emphasis supplied]
Considering that petitioner executed
an overseas employment contract with respondent company in November 1999, the
1996 POEA-SEC should govern. The 2000
POEA-SEC initially took effect on
The employment of seafarers, including
claims for death benefits, is governed by the contracts they sign every time
they are hired or rehired; and
as long as the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy, they have the force of
law between the parties. While the seafarer and his employer are governed by
their mutual agreement, the POEA rules and regulations require that the POEA
Standard Employment Contract be integrated in every seafarers contract.
A perusal of Jerrys employment contract
reveals that what was expressly integrated therein by the parties was
DOLE Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 or the POEA Amended Standard Terms
and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean-Going Vessels, and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, series of 2000. However, POEA had issued Memorandum Circular
No. 11, series of 2000 stating that:
In view of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated 11
September 2000 on the
implementation of certain amendments of the Revised Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels as
contained in DOLE Department Order No. 04 and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09,
both Series of 2000, please be advised of the following:
Section
20, Paragraphs (A), (B) and (D) of the former Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels, as provided in DOLE Department
Order No. 33, and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, both Series of 1996 shall apply in lieu of Section 20 (A), (B) and (D) of the Revised Version;
x x x x
In effect, POEA Memorandum Circular No.
11-00 thereby paved the way for the application of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract based on POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055, series of 1996. Worth noting, Jerry boarded the ship [in] August
2001 before the said temporary
restraining order was lifted on
Thus, petitioner cannot simply rely
on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. As he
did so without solid proof of work-relation and work-causation or
work-aggravation of his illness, the Court cannot provide him relief.
At any rate, granting that the
provisions of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption provision in
Section 20 (B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent
company to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness
of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his
claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that
the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have existed during
the term of his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of
proof belongs to respondent company.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements
must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2)
the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarers employment contract. In other
words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is
not sufficient to establish that the seafarers illness or injury has rendered
him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is
a causal connection between the seafarers illness or injury and the work for
which he had been contracted.
The 2000 POEA-SEC defines work-related
injury as injury[ies] resulting in disability or death arising out of and in
the course of employment and work-related illness as any sickness resulting
to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.[5]
Unfortunately for petitioner, he
failed to prove that his varicose veins arose out of his employment with
respondent company. Except for his bare allegation that it was work-related, he
did not narrate in detail the nature of his work as a messman aboard Denklavs
vessels. He likewise failed to particularly describe his working conditions
while on sea duty. He also failed to specifically state how he contracted or
developed varicose veins while on sea duty and how and why his working
conditions aggravated it. Neither did he present any expert medical opinion
regarding the cause of his varicose veins. No written document whatsoever was presented
that would clearly validate his claim or visibly demonstrate that the working
conditions on board the vessels he served increased the risk of acquiring
varicose veins.
Moreover, although petitioner was
rehired by respondent company several times, his eight-year service as a seaman
was not actually without a sign-off period. His contract with respondent
company was considered automatically terminated after the expiration of each
overseas employment contract. Upon the termination of each contract, he was
considered signed-off and he would have to go back and re-apply by informing
respondent company as to his availability. Thereafter, he would have to sign an
Availability Advise Form. Meanwhile, he would have to wait for a certain period
of time, probably months, before he would be called again for sea service.
Thus, respondent company can argue that
petitioners eight (8) years of service with it did not automatically mean that
he acquired his varicose veins by reason of such employment. His sea service
was not an unbroken service. The fact that he never applied for a job with any
other employer is of no moment. He enjoyed month-long sign-off vacations when
his contract expired. It is possible that he acquired his condition during one
of his sign-off periods.
As discussed in the decision of the CA,
varicose veins may be caused by trauma, thrombosis, inflammation or heredity.
Although the exact cause of varicose veins is still unknown, a number of
factors contribute to it which include heredity, advance aging, prolonged
standing, being overweight, hormonal influences during pregnancy, use of birth
control pills, post-menopausal hormonal replacement therapy, prolonged sitting
with legs crossed, wearing tight undergarments or clothes, history of blood
clots, injury to the veins, conditions that cause increased pressure in the
abdomen including liver disease, fluid in the abdomen, previous groin injury,
heart failure, topical steroids, trauma or injury to the skin, previous venous
surgery and exposure to ultra-violet rays.
Lastly, there is also no proof that petitioners
varicose veins caused him to suffer total and permanent disability. The
Pre-Employment Medical Examination[6] (PEME)
he underwent cannot serve as enough basis to justify a finding of a total and
permanent disability because of its non-exploratory nature.
The
fact that respondent passed the companys PEME is of no moment. We have ruled
that in the past the PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to
be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicants medical
condition. The PEME merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at
sea or "fit for sea service," it does not state the real state of
health of an applicant. In short, the "fit to work" declaration in
the respondents PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free
from any ailment prior to his deployment. Thus we held in NYK-FIL Ship
Management, Inc. v. NLRC:
While
a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a
seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform
petitioners of a seafarers true state of health. The PEME could not have
divulged respondents illness considering that the examinations were not
exploratory.[7]
Besides, it was not expressly stated
in his medical diagnosis that his illness was equivalent to a total and
permanent disability. Absent any indication, the Court cannot accommodate him.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member in lieu of
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per Special Order No. 1150 dated
** Designated as additional member in lieu of
Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order No. 1152 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 54-73. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[2]
[3]
[4] G.R. No.
168210,
[5] Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Cruise
Ships Catering and Services International, N.V. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 186180,
[6] Rollo, p. 217.
[7] Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Cruise Ships Catering and Services International, N.V. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 5.