Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
|
ALFONSO T.
YUCHENGCO, Petitioner, - versus - THE MANILA CHRONICLE
PUBLISHING CORPORATION, NOEL CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY
P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO, THELMA SAN JUAN and ROBERT COYIUTO, JR., Respondents. |
G.R. No. 184315 Present:
VELASCO, JR., PERALTA, MENDOZA,
and REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 28, 2011 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
For
resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration[1] dated
At the outset, a brief narration of the factual and procedural antecedents that transpired and led to the filing of the motions is in order.
The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993, several allegedly defamatory articles against petitioner were published in The Manila Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing Corporation. Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 136, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1114, under three separate causes of action, namely: (1) for damages due to libelous publication against Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of the editorial staff and writers of The Manila Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishing; (2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for attorneys fees and costs against all the respondents.
On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision[3] in favor of petitioner.
Aggrieved,
respondents sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA). On
Respondents
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5]
praying that the CA reconsider its earlier decision and reverse the decision of
the trial court. On
Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before this Court which puts forth the following assignment of errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL, ET AL. V.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., CITED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, WARRANTED THE REVERSAL OF THE CA DECISION DATED MARCH 18,
2008.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE COMPLAINT
FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC
FIGURE.[7]
On
Respondents
later filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
Meanwhile,
respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration with Attached Supplemental Motion, both dated
On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution[9] resolving to recall the Resolution dated March 3, 2010; grant Coyiuto, Jr.s motion for leave to file supplemental motion for reconsideration; note the supplemental motion for reconsideration; and require petitioner to comment on the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
On June 22, 2010, petitioner filed his Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration[10] dated January 15, 2010 and Comment on respondent Coyiuto, Jr.s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration[11] dated 17 March 2010.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents moved for a reconsideration of the earlier decision on the following grounds:
1. MALICE-IN-FACT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN.
2. PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC FIGURE.
3. THE SUBJECT OF THE PUBLICATIONS CONSTITUTES FAIR
COMMENTS, ON PUBLIC ISSUES, ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND NATIONAL CONCERN.
4. RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT IN A RECKLESS MANNER OR IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS COVERED BY THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
5. THE PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTS THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
6. THERE IS NO LEGAL OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO HOLD DONNA
GATDULA, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, LIABLE FOR THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS, TOGETHER
WITH THE EDITORS AND STAFF OF THE NEWSPAPER.
7. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO HOLD THELMA
8. THE QUICK NOTES COLUMN OF MR. RAUL VALINO ARE BASED
ON FACTS; THUS, NOT LIBELOUS.
9. ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. IS NOT IMPLEADED WITH THE EDITORS
AND STAFF MEMBERS OF THE
10. THE AWARDED DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE, EQUITABLE AND
UNJUSTIFIED.[12]
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Coyiuto, Jr. raises the following arguments:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE COURT OBVIOUSLY
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT IN PETITIONERS AMENDED COMPLAINT (DATED OCTOBER 17,
1994), RESPONDENT ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. WAS NOT SUED FOR DAMAGES ALLEGEDLY DUE TO
LIBELOUS PUBLICATIONS (FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION). HE WAS SUED, HOWEVER, IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY FOR ABUSE OF RIGHT (SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION) ALLEGEDLY, AS CHAIRMAN
OF THE BOARD, OFFICER, PRINCIPAL
OWNER, OF THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION UNDER ARTICLES 19 AND 20
OF THE CIVIL CODE. AS SUCH, THE
IMPOSITION OF MORAL (P25 MILLION PESOS) AND EXEMPLARY (P10
MILLION PESOS) DAMAGES AGAINST RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. HAS NO BASIS IN LAW AND
CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 2219 AND 2229, IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 2233, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE CIVIL CODE AS WILL BE ELUCIDATED HEREUNDER.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, APART FROM THE
SELF-SERVING/UNILATERAL ALLEGATION IN PARAGRAPH 3.11 OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ANNEX C OF PETITION FOR REVIEW), NO IOTA OF EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED ON TRIAL IN
SUPPORT OF THE ALLEGATION THAT RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. WAS CHAIRMAN,
PRINCIPAL OWNER AND OFFICER OF RESPONDENT MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING
CORPORATION. SEC DOCUMENTS SHOW THE
CONTRARY, AS WILL BE DISCUSSED HEREUNDER.
SO HOW COULD RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. BE IMPLEADED TO HAVE ABUSED HIS
RIGHT AS A NON-CHAIRMAN, NON-STOCKHOLDER, NON-OFFICER OF RESPONDENT MANILA
CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION? IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF
RESTS ON THE PARTY ASSERTING A FACT OR ESTABLISHING A CLAIM (RULE 131, REVISED
RULES OF COURT).[13]
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the motion for reconsideration generally restates and reiterates the arguments, which were previously advanced by respondents and does not present any substantial reasons, which were not formerly invoked and passed upon by the Court.
However,
from the supplemental motion for reconsideration, it is apparent that Coyiuto,
Jr. raises a new matter which has not been raised in the proceedings below. This notwithstanding, basic equity dictates
that Coyiuto, Jr. should be given all the opportunity to ventilate his
arguments in the present action, but more importantly, in order to write finis to the present controversy. It should be noted that the Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration was later recalled by this Court in the
Resolution dated
From these Comments and contrary to Coyiuto, Jr.s contention, it was substantially established that he was the Chairman of Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation when the subject articles were published. Coyiuto, Jr. even admitted this fact in his Reply and Comment on Request for Admission,[14] to wit:
4. Defendant
Robert Coyiuto Jr. ADMITS that he was the Chairman of the Board but not
President of the Manila Chronicle during the period Novemeber (sic) to December
1993.
5. Defendant
Robert Coyiuto Jr. DENIES paragraph 11.
He has already conveyed such denial to plaintiff in the course of the
pre-trial. It was The Manila Chronicle,
a newspaper of general circulation, of which he is, admittedly Chairman of the
Board, that published the items marked as plaintiffs Exhibits A, B, C, D, E,
F, and G.
x x x x
12.
This case, based on plaintiffs Amended
Complaint, is limited to the publications in The Manila Chronicle marked
plaintiffs Exhibits A to G, consecutively, published by defendant Manila
Chronicle. Thus, only the question of
whether Mr. Robert Coyiuto, Jr. was Chairman and President of defendant Manila
Chronicle, during these publications and whether he caused these publications,
among all of plaintiffs queries, are relevant and material to this case. And defendant Robert Coyiuto, Jr. has
answered that: Yes, he was Chairman of the Board. No, he was never President of The Manila
Chronicle. No, he did not cause the
publications in The Manila Chronicle: it was the Manila Chronicle that
published the news items adverted to.[15]
Both the trial court and the CA affirmed this fact. We reiterate that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. While this Court has recognized several exceptions[16] to this rule, none of these exceptions exists in the present case. Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA.
More importantly and contrary again to Coyiuto, Jr.s contention, the cause of action of petitioner based on abuse of rights, or Article 19, in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code, warrants the award of damages.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.[17]
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[18] it was elucidated that while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. The Court said:
One of the more notable
innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE
COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.[19]
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.[20] Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the libelous articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20.
Consequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages to petitioner. Such damages may be awarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioners anguish.[21] Further, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.s argument, although petitioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, still such violations directly resulted in the publication of the libelous articles in the newspaper, which, by analogy, is one of the ground for the recovery of moral damages under (7) of Article 2219.[22]
However, despite the foregoing, the damages awarded to petitioner appear to be too excessive and warrants a second hard look by the Court.
While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[23]
Even petitioner, in his Comment[24] dated June 21, 2010, agree that moral damages are not awarded in order to punish the respondents or to make the petitioner any richer than he already is, but to enable the latter to find some cure for the moral anguish and distress he has undergone by reason of the defamatory and damaging articles which the respondents wrote and published.[25] Further, petitioner cites as sufficient basis for the award of damages the plain reason that he had to go through the ordeal of defending himself everytime someone approached him to ask whether or not the statements in the defamatory article are true.
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (Peoples Journal) v. Thoenen,[26] citing Guevarra v. Almario,[27] We noted that the damages in a libel case must depend upon the facts of the particular case and the sound discretion of the court, although appellate courts were more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them. So it must be in this case.
Moral
damages are not a bonanza. They are
given to ease the defendants grief and suffering. Moral damages should be reasonably
approximate to the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.[28] The Court, therefore, finds the award of moral
damages in the first and second cause of action in the amount of P2,000,000.00
and P25,000,000.00, respectively, to be too excessive and holds that an
award of P1,000,000.00 and P10,000,000.00, respectively, as moral
damages are more reasonable.
As
for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.[29] On this basis, the award of exemplary damages
in the first and second cause of action in the amount of P500,000.00 and
P10,000,000.00, respectively, is reduced to P200,000.00 and P1,000,000.00,
respectively.
On
the matter of attorneys fees and costs of suit, Article 2208 of the same Code
provides, among others, that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation may be
recovered in cases when exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems
it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered. In any event, however, such award must be reasonable, just and
equitable.[30] Thus,
the award of attorneys fees and costs is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00.
One
final note, the case against respondent was one for damages based on the
publication of libelous articles against petitioner; hence, only civil in
nature. The rule is that a party who has
the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. Thus, respondents liability
was proven only on the basis of preponderance of evidence, which is quite different
from a criminal case for libel where proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established.
Corollarilly, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the person who caused the publication of a defamatory article shall be responsible for the same. Hence, Coyiuto, Jr. should have been held jointly and solidarily liable with the other respondents in the first cause of action under this article and not on the basis of violation of the principle of abuse of rights founded on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Because of the exclusion of Coyiuto, Jr. in the first cause of action for libel, he cannot be held solidarily liable with the other respondents in the first cause of action. Nonetheless, since damage to petitioner was in fact established warranting the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same could only be awarded based on petitioners second cause of action impleading Coyiuto, Jr. for violation of the principle of abuse of right.
It
did not escape the attention of the Court that in filing two different causes
of action based on the same published articles, petitioner intended the
liability of Coyiuto, Jr. to be different from the other respondents. It can be inferred that if Coyiuto, Jr. was
impleaded in the first cause of action for recovery of the civil liability in
libel, petitioner could not have prayed for higher damages, considering that
the other respondents, who are jointly and severally liable with one another,
are not in the same financial standing as Coyiuto, Jr. Petitioner, in effect, had spared the other
respondents from paying such steep amount of damages, while at the same time
prayed that Coyiuto, Jr. pay millions of pesos by way of moral and exemplary
damages in the second cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of this Court, dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola, to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as exemplary damages;
2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
a. the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
b. the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to
pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as attorneys fee and legal costs.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice |
|
BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 428-459.
[2]
[3]
[4] Id. at195-248.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Records, Vol. II, pp. 731-734.
[15]
[16] See Montecillo v. Pama, G.R. No. 158557,
[17] GF
Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, G.R. No. 156841,
[18] 257 Phil. 783 (1989).
[19]
[20] Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 847 (2005) .
[21] Civil Code, Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act for omission.
[22] Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
x x x x
(7) Libel, slander or any
other form of defamation;
x x x x.
[23] Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008, 542 SCRA 65, 75.
[24] Rollo, pp. 625-659.
[25]
[26] 513 Phil. 607, 625 (2005).
[27] 56 Phil. 477 (1932).
[28] Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 175587, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 738, 757-758.
[29] Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 425 Phil. 511, 524 (2002).
[30] Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque, supra note 23, at 76.