Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, - versus - DAN PADAO, Respondent. |
|
G.R. Nos. 180849 and 187143 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, ABAD, PEREZ,* and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November 16, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
These are two consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
In G.R. No. 180849, petitioner Philippine
National Bank (PNB) seeks the reversal of the
In G.R. No. 187143, PNB seeks the reversal of the
THE FACTS
A.
G.R. No. 180849
On
Sometime
in 1994, PNB became embroiled in a scandal involving behest loans. A certain Sih Wat Kai complained to the
Provincial Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) of Zamboanga del
Norte that anomalous loans were being granted by its officers: Assistant Vice
President (AVP) and Branch Manager Aurelio De Guzman (AVP de
Guzman), Assistant Department Manager and Cashier Olson Sala (Sala),
and Loans and Senior Credit Investigator Primitivo Virtudazo (Virtudazo).
The questionable
loans were reportedly being extended to select bank clients, among them Joseph
Liong, Danilo Dangcalan, Jacinto Salac, Catherine Opulentisima, and Virgie
Pango. The expos triggered the conduct of separate investigations by the COA
and PNBs Internal Audit Department (IAD) from January to August 1995.
Both investigations confirmed that the collateral provided in numerous loan
accommodations were grossly over-appraised. The credit standing of the loan
applicants was also fabricated, allowing them to obtain larger loan portfolios
from PNB. These borrowers eventually defaulted on the payment of their loans,
causing PNB to suffer millions in losses.
In
August 1995, Credit Investigators Rolando Palomares (Palomares) and
Cayo Dagpin (Dagpin) were administratively charged with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), in connection with an anomalous loan
granted to the spouses, Jaime and Allyn Lim (the Lims). These charges,
however, were later ordered dropped by PNB, citing its findings that Dagpin and
Palomares signed the Inspection and Appraisal Report (IAR) and the
Credit Inspection Report (CIR) in support of the Lims loan application
in good faith, and upon the instruction of their superior officers. PNB also
considered using Dagpin and Palomares as prosecution witnesses against AVP de
Guzman, Loan Division Chief Melindo Bidad (Bidad) and Sala.
The
following month, September 1995, administrative charges for Grave Misconduct,
Gross Neglect of Duty and Gross Violations of Bank Rules and Regulations and
criminal cases for violation of R.A. No. 3019 were filed against AVP de Guzman,
Sala, Virtudazo, and Bidad.
Consequently, they were all dismissed from the service by PNB in November 1996.
Later, Virtudazo was ordered reinstated.
On
The
case against Padao was grounded on his having allegedly presented a deceptively
positive status of the business, credit standing/rating and financial capability
of loan applicants Reynaldo and Luzvilla Baluma and eleven (11) others. It was later
found that either said borrowers businesses were inadequate to meet their loan
obligations, or that the projects they sought to be financed did not exist.
Padao
was also accused of having over-appraised the collateral of the spouses Gardito
and Alma Ajero, the spouses Ibaba, and Rolly Pango.
On
On October 11, 1999, after almost three
(3) years of inaction on the part of the Board, Padao instituted a complaint[7]
against PNB and its then AVP, Napoleon Matienzo (Matienzo), with
the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. IX in
In a Decision dated
Padao appealed to the NLRC, which, in
its Resolution[9]
dated
PNBs Motion for Reconsideration[10]
was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution[11]
dated
Aggrieved, PNB filed a petition for
certiorari[12]
with the CA but it was dismissed in a Decision[13]
dated
B.
G.R. No. 187143
During the pendency of G.R. No.
180849 before the Court, the NLRC issued an entry of judgment on September 22,
2003, certifying that on February 28, 2003, its October 30, 2002 Resolution had
become final and executory.[16]
On
On
Acting thereon, the ELA
denied PNBs motion for reconsideration on the ground that motions for
reconsideration of an order are prohibited under Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC
Rules of Procedure.
Thus, Padao filed his Motion to
Admit Computation[17]
dated
On
In a motion[20]
dated
On
On
Thus, on
In a Decision[29] dated
ISSUES
In G.R. No. 180849, PNB
presents the following Assignment of Errors:[30]
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
THE POSITION OF A CREDIT INVESTIGATOR IS ONE IMBUED WITH [THE] TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE OF THE EMPLOYER.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN TREATING THE ACT OF
FALSIFYING THE CREDIT AND APPRAISAL REPORTS AND THAT OF MERELY AFFIXING ONES
SIGNATURE IN A FALSE REPORT PREPARED BY ANOTHER AS ONE AND THE SAME DEGREE OF
MISCONDUCT WHICH WARRANTS THE SAME PENALTY.
In G.R. No. 187143, PNB presents the following
Assignment of Errors:[31]
THE
LABOR COURTS AND THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN THEY INVARIABLY IGNORED PNBS
COUNTER-COMPUTATION AND MERELY RELIED ON RESPONDENT DAN PADAOS SELF-SERVING
COMPUTATION OF HIS MONEY AWARD.
THE
LABOR COURTS AND THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED WHEN THEY ACCEPTED THE COMPUTATION
OF RESPONDENT PADAO WITHOUT REQUIRING PROOF TO SUPPORT THE SAME.
In G.R. No. 180849, PNB
argues that the position of a credit investigator is one reposed with trust and
confidence, such that its holder may be validly dismissed based on loss of
trust and confidence. In disciplining employees, the employer has the
right to exercise discretion in determining the individual liability of each
erring employee and in imposing a penalty commensurate with the degree of
participation of each. PNB further contends that the findings of the CA are not
in accordance with the evidence on record, thus, necessitating a review of the
facts of the present case by this Court.[32]
On the other hand, Padao counters that
local bank policies implemented by the highest-ranking branch officials such as
the assistant vice-president/branch manager, assistant manager/cashier, chief
of the loans division and legal counsel, are presumed to be sanctioned and
approved by the bank, and a subordinate employee should not be faulted for his reliance
thereon. He argues that a person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose cannot be held liable. PNB is bound by the
acts of its senior officers and he, like his fellow credit investigators,
having acted in good faith in affixing his signature on the reports based on
the instruction, order and directive of senior local bank officials, should not
be held liable.[33]
Padao also claims that PNB cruelly
betrayed him by charging and dismissing him after using him as a prosecution
witness to secure the conviction of the senior bank officials, that he was
never part of the conspiracy, and that he did not derive any benefit from the
scheme.[34]
The
Courts Ruling
In the 1987 Constitution,
provisions on social justice and the protection of labor underscore the importance
and economic significance of labor. Article II, Section 18 characterizes labor
as a primary social economic force, and as such, the State is bound to protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare. Moreover, workers are
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.[35]
The
Labor Code declares as policy that the State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The
State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.[36]
While it is an employers basic
right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a measure of
self-protection against acts inimical to its interest,[37]
the law sets the valid
grounds for termination as well as the proper procedure to be followed when
terminating the services of an employee.[38]
Thus,
in cases of regular employment, the employer is prohibited from terminating the
services of an employee except for a just or authorized cause.[39]
Such just causes for which an employer may terminate an employee are enumerated
in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(a)
Serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b)
Gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)
Fraud
or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate family member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and
(e)
Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
Further,
due process requires that employers follow the procedure set by the Labor Code:
Art. 277.
Miscellaneous provisions.
xxx
b.
Subject to the constitutional right of
workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement
of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker
whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor
and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice
to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal
by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of the termination pending
resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the
appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such
dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is
in implementation of a mass lay-off. (As amended by Section 33, Republic Act No.
6715, March 21, 1989)
xxx
In
this case, Padao was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect of duties
under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code.
Gross
negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties, while
habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period
of time, depending on the circumstances.[40]
Gross negligence has been defined as the want or absence of or failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them.[41]
In
the case at bench, Padao was accused of having presented a fraudulently
positive evaluation of the business, credit standing/rating and financial
capability of Reynaldo and Luzvilla Baluma and eleven other loan applicants.[42]
Some businesses were eventually found not to exist at all, while in other
transactions, the financial status of the borrowers simply could not
support the grant of loans in the approved amounts.[43]
Moreover, Padao over-appraised the collateral of spouses Gardito and Alma
Ajero, and that of spouses Ihaba and Rolly Pango.[44]
The
role that a credit investigator plays in the conduct of a banks business
cannot be overestimated. The amount of loans to be extended by a bank depends
upon the report of the credit investigator on the collateral being
offered. If a loan is not fairly
secured, the bank is at the mercy of the borrower who may just opt to have the collateral
foreclosed. If the scheme is repeated a hundredfold, it may lead to the
collapse of the bank. In the case of Sawadjaan v. Court of Appeals,[45]
the Court stressed the crucial role that a credit investigator or an appraiser
plays. Thus:
Petitioner himself admits that the position of
appraiser/inspector is "one of the most serious [and] sensitive job[s] in
the banking operations." He should have been aware that accepting such a
designation, he is obliged to
perform the task at hand by the exercise of more than ordinary prudence.
As appraiser/investigator, the
petitioner was expected to conduct an ocular inspection of the properties
offered by CAMEC as collaterals and check the copies of the certificates of
title against those on file with the Registry of Deeds. Not only did he fail to
conduct these routine checks, but he also deliberately misrepresented in his
appraisal report that after reviewing the documents and conducting a site
inspection, he found the CAMEC loan application to be in order. Despite
the number of pleadings he has filed, he has failed to offer an alternative
explanation for his actions. [Emphasis supplied]
In
fact, banks are mandated to exercise more care and prudence in dealing with
registered lands:
[B]anks are cautioned to exercise more care and prudence in
dealing even with registered lands, than private individuals, "for their
business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money belonging
to their depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any
act of negligence which amounts to lack of good faith by which they would be
denied the protective mantle of the land registration statute Act 496, extended
only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the
same character and description. It is for this reason that banks before
approving a loan send representatives to the premises of the land offered as
collateral and investigate who are the true owners thereof.[46]
Padaos repeated failure to
discharge his duties as a credit investigator of the bank amounted to gross and
habitual neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. He not only
failed to perform what he was employed to do, but also did so repetitively and
habitually, causing millions of pesos in damage to PNB. Thus, PNB acted within
the bounds of the law by meting out the penalty of dismissal, which it deemed
appropriate given the circumstances.
The CA was correct in stating that when the
violation of company policy or breach of company rules and regulations is
tolerated by management, it cannot serve as a basis for termination.[47]
Such ruling, however, does not apply
here. The principle only applies when the breach or violation is one which neither
amounts to nor involves fraud or illegal activities. In such a case, one cannot
evade liability or culpability based on obedience to the corporate chain of
command.
Padao cited Llosa-Tan v. Silahis
International Hotel,[48]
where the violation of corporate policy was held not per se fraudulent or
illegal. Moreover, the said violation was done in compliance with the apparent
lawful orders of the concerned employees superiors. Management-sanctioned deviations
in the said case did not amount to fraud or illegal activities. If anything, it
merely represented flawed policy implementation.
In sharp contrast, Padao, in affixing
his signature on the fraudulent reports, attested to the falsehoods contained
therein. Moreover, by doing so, he repeatedly failed to perform his duties as a
credit investigator.
Further, even Article 11(6) of the
Revised Penal Code requires that any person, who acts in obedience to an order
issued by a superior does so for some lawful purpose in order for such
person not to incur criminal liability.
The succeeding article exempts from criminal liability any person who
acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force (Article 12, paragraph
6) or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury (Article 12, paragraph 7).
Assuming solely for the sake of
argument that these principles apply by analogy, even an extremely liberal
interpretation of these justifying or exempting circumstances will not allow Padao
to escape liability.
Also, had Padao wanted immunity in
exchange for his testimony as a prosecution witness, he should have demanded
that there be a written agreement. Without
it, his claim is self-serving and unreliable.
That there is no proof that Padao
derived any benefit from the scheme is immaterial.[49]
What is crucial is that his gross and habitual negligence caused great damage
to his employer. Padao was aware that there was something irregular about the
practices being implemented by his superiors, but he went along with, became
part of, and participated in the scheme.
It does not speak well for a person
to apparently blindly follow his superiors, particularly when, with the
exercise of ordinary diligence, one would be able to determine that what he or
she was being ordered to do was highly irregular, if not illegal, and would,
and did, work to the great disadvantage of his or her employer.
PNB, as an employer, has the basic
right to freely select and discharge employees (subject to the Labor Code
requirements on substantive and procedural due process), if only as a measure
of self-protection against acts
inimical to its interests.[50]
It has the authority to impose what penalty it deems sufficient or commensurate
to an employees offense. Having satisfied the requirements of procedural and
substantive due process, it is thus left to the discretion of the employer to
impose such sanction as it sees befitting based on the circumstances.
Finally, Padao claims that he
should be accorded the same treatment as his co-employees.[51]
As the ELA, however, correctly observed:
[A]s pointed out by the respondents, the case of the
complainant was different, and his culpability, much more than his
aforementioned co-employees. In the case of Palomares and Dagpin, they were
involved in only one case of over-appraisal of collateral in the loan account
of the spouses Jaime Lim and Allyn Tan (Respondents Comments, p. 1), but in
the case of complainant, his
over-appraisals involved three (3) loan accounts and amounting to ₱9,537,759.00
(Ibid.), not to mention that he also submitted falsified Credit Investigation
Reports for the loan accounts of seven (7) other borrowers of PNB (Ibid., pp. 1-2).
xxx
The number of
over-appraisals (3) and falsified credit investigation reports (7) or
countersigned by the complainant indicates habituality, or the propensity to do
the same.
The best that can be said of his acts is the lack of moral strength to resist
the repeated commission of illegal or prohibited acts in loan transactions. He
thus cannot interpose undue pressure or coercion exerted upon [him] by his
superiors, to absolve himself of liability for his signing or countersigning
the aforementioned falsified reports. It may have been allowable or justifiable
for him to give in to one anomalous loan transaction report, but definitely not
for ten (10) loan accounts. It is axiomatic that obedience to ones superiors
extends only to lawful orders, not to unlawful orders calling for unauthorized,
prohibited or immoral acts to be done.
In the case of Wilma Velasco, PNB did not pursue legal
action and even discontinued the administrative case filed against her because,
according to PNB, she appeared to have been the victim of the
misrepresentations and falsifications of the credit investigation and appraisal
reports of the complainant upon which she had to reply in acting on loan
applications filed with the PNB and for which such reports were made. She was
not obliged to conduct a separate or personal appraisal of the properties
offered as collaterals, or separate credit investigations of the borrowers of
PNB. These functions pertained to PNB inspectors/credit investigators, like the
complainant. Unfortunately, the latter was derelict in the performance of those
duties, if he did not deliberately misuse or abuse such duties.
As can be seen, therefore, the complainant and Wilma Velasco
did not stand on the same footing relative to their involvement or
participation in the anomalous loan transactions earlier mentioned. Therefore,
PNB cannot be faulted for freeing her from liability and punishment, while
dismissing the complainant from service. [Emphases supplied]
Given the above ruling of the Court
in G.R. No. 180849, the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00945, an action
stemming from the execution of the decision in said case, must perforce be
reversed.
However, Padao is not entitled to
financial assistance. In
In Central
Philippine Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v. Diasnes,[53]
cited in Quiambao v. Manila Electric Company,[54]
we discussed the parameters of awarding separation pay to dismissed employees
as a measure of financial assistance:
To reiterate our ruling in Toyota,
labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must demur the award of separation
pay based on social justice when an employees dismissal is based on serious
misconduct or willful disobedience; gross and habitual neglect of duty; fraud or willfull
breach of trust; or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or
his immediate family grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction
dismissal of employees. They must be
judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as
the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to
be an instrument to oppress the employers.
The commitment of the Court to the cause of labor should not embarrass
us from sustaining the employers when they are right, as here. In fine, we should be more cautions in
awarding financial assistance to the undeserving and those who are unworthy of
the liberality of the law.[55]
[Emphasis original. Underscoring
supplied]
Clearly, given the Courts
findings, Padao is not entitled to financial assistance.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 180849 and G.R. No. 187143 are GRANTED.
In G.R. No. 180849, the December 14, 2006 Decision and the October 2, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76584 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
In G.R. No. 187143, the December 9, 2008 Decision
and the February 24, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00945 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The June 21, 2001 Decision of the Executive Labor
Arbiter is hereby ordered REINSTATED,
with the MODIFICATION that the award of financial assistance is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member
in lieu of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order No.
1152 dated
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), pp. 7-21.
Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice
Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Associate
Justice Mario V. Lopez, concurring.
[2] Id. at 22-23. Former Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F.
Lim, Jr., with Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Associate
Justice Mario V. Lopez, concurring.
[3]
[4]
[5] Id. (G.R. No. 187143), pp. 9-27. Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice
Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and Associate Justice Elihu
A. Ibaez, concurring.
[6] Id. at 22-23. Twenty First Division, penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with
Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and Associate Justice Elihu A. Ibaez,
concurring.
[7]
[8] 247 Phil. 641(1988),
cited in G.R. No. 180849, rollo, p. 111.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 180849),
pp. 54-60. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Salic B. Dumarpa, with Commissioner
Oscar N. Abella, concurring.
[10] Id. at 122-127.
[11] Id. at 128.
[12] Id. at 129-143.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Id. (G.R. No. 187143), p. 11. The CA Decision (at footnote 7, p. 11) states that the date of the
Resolution,
[17]
[18]
[19] Id. at 94-96.
[20] Id. at 97-98.
[21] Id. at 106-107.
[22] Id. at 108-110.
[23] Id. at 111-112.
[24] Id. at 113-130.
[25] Id. at 131-139.
[26] Id. at 140-148.
[27] Id. at 149-151.
[28] Id. at 152-165.
[29] Id. at 9. Twenty
First Division, penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate
Justice Mario V. Lopez and Associate Justice Elihu A. Ibaez, concurring.
[30] Id. (G.R. No. 180849), at 35.
[31] Id. (G.R. No. 187143), at 45.
[32] Id. (G.R. No. 180849), at 35-36.
[33] Id. at 362.
[34] Id. at 364.
[35] Spic N Span
Services Corporation v. Paje, G.R. No. 174084,
[36] Article 3,
Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code of the
[37] Sawadjaan v.
Court of Appeals, 498 Phil. 552, 556 (2005), citing Filipro,
Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 70546,
October 16, 1986, 145 SCRA 123.
[38] Alert
Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. v. Pasawilan, G.R. No. 182397,
[39] Article 279,
Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code of the
[40] AFI
International Trading Corporation v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 173256, October 9,
2007, 535 SCRA 347, 353-354, citing Genuino
Ice Co., Inc. v. Magpantay, G.R. No. 147740, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 195,
205-206.
[41] Citibank v.
Gatchalian, 310 Phil. 211, 217-218 (1995); National Bookstore v. CA,
428 Phil. 235, 245 (2002).
[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), p. 11.
[43] Id.
[44] Id.
[45] 498 Phil. 552,
560 (2005).
[46] Gonzales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 241 Phil. 630, 639-640 (1988), citing Tomas
v. Tomas, G.R. No. L-36897,
[47] Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), p. 7.
[48] 260 Phil. 166
(1990), where the dismissed company cashier encashed two personal checks drawn
by a Reynaldo M. Vicencio with a combined value of US$1,200.00, on the
recommendation of Fernando Gayondato, the general cashier of Puerto Azul Beach
Resort (a sister company of Silahis International Hotel), and nephew of the
Executive Vice President. It was shown in that case that Llosa-Tan initially
refused to encash the checks, citing the company policy prohibiting such
transactions, but Gayondato persisted, assuring her that the presentation of
such checks was being done upon instructions of the Executive Vice President.
[49] Sawadjaan v.
Court of Appeals, 498 Phil. 552, 556 (2005).
[50]
The initial decision of the Labor Arbiter decreeing
the dismissal of private respondent herein is fully justified by the provisions
of Article 283 (c) of the Labor Code, already above quoted. Pronouncements made
by this Court in this regard are as follows:
It is an established principle that an employer
cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts
inimical to the interest of the employer and justifying loss of confidence in
him (International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines v. Leogardo,
117 SCRA 967, 971-972 (1982); (Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Zulueta,
69 Phil. 485; Galsim v. PNB, 23 SCRA 293; PECO v. PECO Employees
Union, 107 Phil. 1003; Nevans v. Court of Industrial Relations, 23
SCRA 1321; Gas Corporation of the Philippines v. Inciong, 93 SCRA 652).
A company has the right to dismiss its erring
employees if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical to its
interest, (Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil, 485 and
International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Phil. v. Leogardo, G.R. No.
57429, October 28, 1982, 117 SCRA 967).
We concede that the right of the employer to freely
select or discharge his employees, is subject to regulation by the State
basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. But much as we should
expand beyond the economic doxy, we hold that an employer cannot be legally
compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty
of misfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of
the latter is patently inimical to his interest. The law in protecting the rights
of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer. (
[51] Rollo (G.R. No. 180849), p. 44.
[52] G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789,
[53] G.R. No. 163607,
[54] G.R. No. 171023,
[55] Supra note 53 at 207.