Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
VICENTE MANZANO, JR., Petitioner, - versus - MARCELINO GARCIA, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 179323 Present: Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ. Promulgated: November
28, 2011 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55408 dated September 26, 2006 and
its Resolution[2]
dated August 9, 2007, denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
This case
involves a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-25464, issued in the name of respondent Marcelino D. Garcia (Garcia). The subject parcel of land has an area of six
thousand nine hundred fifty-one (6,951) square meters and is located in
Balonguis, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City.[3]
The above
property was the subject of a deed of pacto
de retro sale dated May 26, 1992 allegedly executed by Garcia in favor of
Constancio Manzano, the predecessor-in-interest and brother of petitioner
Vicente Manzano, Jr. (Vicente) for the amount of eighty thousand five hundred pesos
(P80,500.00). Under said contract,
Garcia purportedly reserved the right to repurchase the subject property for
the same price within three months from the date of the instrument.[4]
On July
12, 1992, Constancio Manzano passed away.
His properties, including the subject of this case, were adjudicated to
his heirs by virtue of a deed of extrajudicial partition with special power of
attorney executed by them. Vicente was
named the administrator of the intestate estate of Constancio Manzano.[5]
Garcia
did not redeem the subject property within the three-month period. Consequently, Vicente instituted a petition
for consolidation of ownership over the property,[6]
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-610.
Garcia filed an opposition and answer, alleging that the document
evidencing the pacto de retro sale
was a forgery. He claimed that he and
his wife were in the United States of America (USA) from June 1, 1988 to
November 14, 1992, and therefore could not have possibly executed the said pacto de retro sale on May 26, 1992.[7]
On
February 15, 1994, Garcia filed a complaint for annulment of pacto de retro sale and recovery of the owners title with preliminary
injunction against Vicente. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-097.
In his complaint, Garcia reiterated that he and his wife never
participated in the execution of the alleged deed of pacto de retro sale dated May 26, 1992 and that in fact, they were
still in possession of the said property.
He further alleged that he came to know the existence of said document
only when the counsel of Vicente sent him a letter on January 18, 1993 demanding
that he should repurchase the property pursuant to the purported terms of the pacto de retro sale within fifteen days
from receipt of said letter. Upon
further inquiry, he discovered that a certain Mr. P. Pacot had executed the
questioned document by misrepresenting himself as Marcelino G. Garcia
(bearing the wrong middle initial) who resided in Casinglot, Misamis Oriental,
as evidenced by the Residence Certificate used in the acknowledgement page of
the pacto de retro sale.[8]
Vicentes
petition for consolidation of ownership over the property (Civil Case No.
93-610) and Garcias action for
annulment of pacto de retro sale and recovery of the owners
title with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 94-097) were consolidated
before the trial court.[9]
During
the trial, Vicente presented TCT No. T-25464 and Tax Declaration No. 41672 to
prove the due execution of the pacto de
retro sale, which was recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City.
On the
other hand, Garcia testified that he went to the USA on November 7, 1987. A few months later, he returned to the
Philippines. He went back to the USA on
June 1, 1988. His three children were
left in the Philippines, while the titles to his properties were left in the
office of his business establishment in Tablon, Cagayan de Oro City with two of
their children. Garcia testified that
the signatures appearing in the pacto de retro
sale were not his and his wifes. He
presented his passport and drivers license, both of which bear an entirely
different signature than what appeared in the pacto de retro sale document.[10]
Atty.
Demosthenes Mediante, Jr. (Atty. Mediante), the person who notarized the deed
of conveyance in question, testified that the Marcelino Garcia who appeared in
his office and who executed the pacto de
retro sale is not the same Marcelino Garcia who was in court during the
trial of the case.[11]
Perla
Babano, one of the witnesses to the execution of the pacto de retro sale, likewise testified that the person who
introduced himself as Marcelino G. Garcia and signed the document on May 26,
1992 is not the same Marcelino Garcia who was in court during the trial of the
case.[12]
On August
30, 1996, the trial court rendered its Decision on the consolidated cases in
favor of Vicente, disposing of the same as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Civil Case No.
94-097, is hereby dismissed and declaring the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale legal
and valid, and granting the prayer of petitioner in Civil Case No. 93-610 to
consolidate ownership of the land in favor of Vicente Manzano, Jr. representing
the heirs of Constancio Manzano, namely: Felix, Andrea, Maxima, Ramon and
Marciana, all surnamed Manzano, for all legal purposes. No costs.[13]
The trial
court held that Garcia failed to prove that his signature in the pacto de retro sale was forged. According to the court, Garcia should have
presented an expert witness to determine whether the signatures were made by
the same person. The trial court doubted
the testimonies of Atty. Mediante (the notary public) and Babano (one of the
witnesses to the pacto de retro sale). The court noted the admission of Atty.
Mediante that he notarizes around 25 to 30 documents per month and could not
describe or remember all the persons appearing before him for notarization. The court was likewise intrigued by the
testimony of Atty. Mediante that he had seen the alleged impostor Marcelino
Garcia sitting at the Cagayan de Oro Divisoria for two weeks. As regards Babano, the trial court found it
unnatural for an impersonator to show her, a stranger, documents such as the
title to the subject property. Also, the
trial court found the low price paid for the property insignificant considering
that the vendor had the right to repurchase the property within three months
from the sale.
Garcia
sought recourse with the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
55408 and was raffled to the Court of Appeals twenty-third division in Cagayan
de Oro City. On September 26, 2006, the
appellate court rendered the assailed decision reversing that of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the
decision read:
FOR
THE REASONS STATED, We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court.
In its place, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the pacto de retro sale executed on May 26,
1992, VOID AB INITIO and dismissing Civil Case No. 93-610.
Furthermore, Appellee Vicente Manzano, Jr., is
ordered to RETURN the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-25464 to
Appellant Marcelino D. Garcia. Entry No.
164181 annotated at the back of the said title is hereby ordered cancelled.[14]
According
to the Court of Appeals, there is no rule requiring expert testimony to
determine the genuineness of a signature appearing on a document. Since it was plainly obvious from the
evidence on record that the signature appearing on the pacto de retro sale is far different from the customary signature
of Garcia that appeared in his passport and drivers license, the testimony of
Garcia that the signature was not his is sufficient evidence of the forgery
pursuant to Section 50, Rule 130[15]
of the Rules of Court. The Court of
Appeals added that on the basis of Atty. Mediantes testimony, the presumption
of regularity in the execution of the public document has been sufficiently
destroyed and overcome. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the pacto de retro
sale is void ab initio pursuant to
Article 1409 in relation to Article 1505 of the Civil Code.
Hence,
Vicente is now before this Court with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED
THAT RESPONDENT AND HIS WIFE BEING IN THE UNITED STATES, COULD HAVE NOT
EXECUTED THE DEED OF PACTO DE RETRO SALE.
II.
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED,
THAT WHEN THE QUESTIONED SIGNATURES APPEAR OBVIOUSLY FAR DIFFERENT FROM THE
CUSTOMARY OR STANDARD SIGNATURES OF THE PERSON CLAIMING FORGERY, THERE IS NO
NEED OF A HANDWRITING EXPERT TO DETERMINE WHICH DOCUMENT IS FORGED.
III.
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HASTILY
CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT PROVED BY CLEAR, POSITIVE AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
THE FORGERY OF HIS SIGNATURE AND OF HIS WIFE, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR NON-PARTICIPATION
IN THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF PACTO DE RETRO SALE AND OF THE VARIANCE OF THE
STROKES OF THE SIGNATURES THEREON WHEN COMPARED TO THE STROKES APPEARING IN
THEIR GENUINE, CUSTOMARY AND STANDARD SIGNATURES FOUND IN OTHER DOCUMENTS.[16]
From an assiduous
examination of the records of the case, it is plainly apparent to this Court
that the alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto
de retro sale is utterly dissimilar from his customary signature appearing
in the evidence on record, as well as in the verifications of the pleadings
before this Court and the courts a quo. From this circumstance alone, we are
constrained to affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals finding that the pacto de retro sale was forged and,
therefore, void ab initio.
In assailing
the finding of the Court of Appeals that the signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale was forged, Vicente
echoes the opinion of the trial court that Garcia should have presented an
expert witness to prove the same.
Jurisprudence, however, is replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed
with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. Thus, in Estacio
v. Jaranilla, [17] we held:
It bears stressing that the trial court may validly
determine forgery from its own independent examination of the documentary
evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without necessarily resorting
to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting
similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen
of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Section
22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by
itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.[18]
Similarly,
in the fairly recent case of Pontaoe
v. Pontaoe, [19]
this Court held:
As to the argument that handwriting experts should
have been employed, handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination
of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing
them, but resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the
examination or the comparison of handwritings. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely
on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity. The
opinions of handwriting experts are not binding upon courts, especially when
the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which
can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned
signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court likewise explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a
comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.[20]
Insisting
on the need to present an expert witness, Vicente points out our ruling in Rivera v. Turiano,[21]
wherein we declared:
While it is true that the testimonies of handwriting
experts are not necessary, however, pursuant to the criteria enunciated in Ladignon, the private respondent must
not only show material differences between or among the signatures. In
addition, (1) he must demonstrate the extent, kind, and significance of the
variation; (2) he must prove that the variation is due to the operation of a
different personality and not merely an expected and inevitable variation found
in the genuine writing of the same writer; and (3) he must show that the
resemblance is a result of a more or less skillful imitation and not merely a
habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine
writing.[22]
In the
case at bar, however, the variance in the alleged signature of Garcia in the pacto de retro sale, on one hand, and in
the evidence on record and in the verifications of the pleadings before this
Court and the courts a quo, on the
other hand, was enormous and obvious, such that this Court can readily conclude
that the pacto de retro sale was in
all likelihood made by someone who has not even seen the customary signature of
Garcia.
Furthermore,
the falsity of the signature on the pacto
de retro sale was affirmed by two persons present when the instrument was
signed, one of which is the very person who notarized the same. An examination of their testimonies reveals
that the trial court had disregarded their statements for very flimsy reasons.
The trial
court was unconvinced by the testimony of the notary public Atty. Mediante on
account of his admission that he could not describe or remember all the persons
appearing before him for notarization and his statement that he had seen the
alleged impostor Marcelino Garcia sitting at the Cagayan de Oro Divisoria for
two weeks. The trial court found it incredulous
that Atty. Mediante could have been observing the whereabouts of the alleged impostor
for two weeks.[23] These circumstances, however, were clearly
explained by Atty. Mediante, who testified that two weeks prior to the signing
of the document, he had been approached by the impostor Marcelino Garcia who
was asking for help to secure a loan of P200,000.00 using his title as
collateral. Atty. Mediante informed the
impostor Garcia that his client, Tony Uy, had already stopped lending. It was after this event, and before the
signing of the pacto de retro sale
that Atty. Mediante observed the impostor Garcia in Divisoria. Certainly, while Atty. Mediante could not
remember all of the parties in the 25 to 30 documents he notarized every month,
he would remember the person who asked him to broker a loan for P200,000.00
and would probably recognize said person when he encountered him every now and then in a public place.
As
regards Babano, the trial court found it unbelievable that an impersonator
would show a stranger important documents such as the title to a property. We disagree with this observation. On the contrary, this Court is of the opinion
that it would be highly suspicious for such an impersonator to withhold the
title of the property being sold from a person signing as a witness to the
sale. It was precisely the presentation
of the title that would convince others that the impostor was the owner of the
real property involved in the sale.
Neither
did it escape this Courts attention that the person who signed the pacto de retro sale used a residence
certificate with the wrong middle initial of respondent Garcia. As the respondents full name is Marcelino de
Claro Garcia, his middle initial should be either D or C. It surely causes doubt when a person does not
know his own middle initial.
All
things considered, Garcias statement that he and his wife could have easily
paid the P80,500.00 but refused in principle to pay an account that is
not theirs[24]
is certainly believable. It is difficult
to conceive that Garcia would sell their 6,951-square meter land at the heart
of the city of Cagayan de Oro for only P80,500.00 (or P11.58 per
square meter). Garcia estimates the
value of the property at P4.5 million.
While Garcia failed to present evidence on such market value in 1992, it
can be ascertained that it is worth at least more than the P170,000.00
mortgage to China Banking Corporation which had been previously annotated and
subsequently cancelled at the back of the title of the property.[25] If the property could be mortgaged to a bank
for P170,000.00, it is unlikely that a person needing money would
instead opt to sell the same for a much smaller amount.
Petitioner
likewise argues that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to appreciate that
the notarized deed of pacto de retro
sale was entitled to the presumption of regularity and should be given great
weight. It is settled that while a
notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized
is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents.[26] The presumption of regularity of notarized
documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.[27]
Irregularities
in the notarization of the document may be established by oral evidence of
persons present in said proceeding. Thus,
in Eulogio v. Apeles,[28]
where the party insisting on the presumption of regularity of a notarized deed
of sale admitted that the same was notarized without his presence, this Court
held that such fact alone overcomes the presumption of regularity, since a
notary public is enjoined not to notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.[29] In the case at bar, even more convincing
evidence of the irregularity was presented as it was the notary public himself
who testified that the person who appeared before him was not respondent Garcia. Since the very official who attested to the
crucial facts in the notarization i.e.,
that the persons who personally appeared before him are the same persons who
executed the deed of conveyance admitted in open court the falsity of said manifestation,
the reliability of the Acknowledgment that clothes the document with a
presumption of regularity is completely shattered. We, therefore, agree with the Court of
Appeals that the presumption of regularity of the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale was sufficiently
overcome by the testimony of Atty. Mediante.
At this
point, however, we should clarify that the proper basis for the nullity of the
forged pacto de retro sale is not
Article 1409[30]
(which enumerates examples of void contracts) in relation to Article 1505[31]
(which refers to an unenforceable contract and is applicable only to goods) of the Civil Code as stated by
the Court of Appeals, but Article 1318 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the
essential requisites of a valid contract:
Article 1318.
There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1)
Consent of the contracting parties;
(2)
Object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract;
(3)
Cause of the obligation which is established.
There are
two types of void contracts: (1) those where one of the essential requisites of
a valid contract as provided for by Article 1318 of the Civil Code is totally
wanting; and (2) those declared to be so under Article 1409 of the Civil Code.[32] [C]onveyances by virtue of a forged
signature x x x are void ab initio. The absence of the essential [requisites] of
consent and cause or consideration in these cases rendered the contract
inexistent. x x x.[33]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 55408 dated September 26, 2006 and its Resolution dated
August 9, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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[1] Rollo, pp. 32-40; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with
Associate Justices Sixto C. Marella, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez, concurring.
[2] Id. at 42-43.
[3] Records (Civil Case No. 94-097), pp. 7-8.
[4] Records (Civil Case No. 93-610), pp. 9-10.
[5] Id. at 5-7.
[6] Id. at 2-3.
[7] Id. at 15-16.
[8] Records (Civil Case No. 94-097), pp. 2-6.
[9] Id. at 39.
[10] Id. at 9; Exhibits C, E and F.
[11] TSN, October 24, 1995, pp. 15-29.
[12] TSN, October 25, 1996, pp. 4-21.
[13] Rollo, p. 53.
[14] Id.
at 39.
[15] Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding
x x x x
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; x x x.
[16] Rollo, pp. 144-145.
[17] 462 Phil. 723 (2003); subsequently cited in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127857, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 325, 336.
[18] Id. at 733.
[19] G.R. No. 159585, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 261.
[20] Id. at 269-270.
[21] G.R. No. 156249, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 668.
[22] Id. at 675.
[23] Records (Civil Case No. 93-610), p. 80.
[24] Rollo, p. 176.
[25] Records (Civil Case No. 94-097), p. 7 (back).
[26] Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil.
707, 725 (2000); San Juan v. Offril, G.R.
No. 154609, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA
439, 445-446.
[27] Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364,
April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 298, 309; San
Juan v. Offril, id. at 446; Potenciano
v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 406 (2003).
[28] G.R.
No. 167884, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 561.
[29] Id.
at 571.
[30] Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
[31] Article 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the sellers authority to sell.
Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:
(1) The provisions of any factors acts, recording laws, or any other provision of law enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner thereof;
(2) The validity of any contract of sale under statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) Purchases made in a merchants store, or in fairs, or markets, in accordance with the Code of Commerce and special laws.
[32] Francisco v. Herrera, 440 Phil. 841, 849-850 (2002).
[33] Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569, 578-579 (2003), citing Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70263, May 14, 1990, 185 SCRA 352, 363364; Vda. de Portugal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 242 Phil. 709, 716 (1988); Garanciang v. Garanciang, 138 Phil. 237, 239 (1969); Lacsamana v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 526, 533534 (1998).