Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
people of the philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- nenita legaspi y lucas, Accused-Appellant. |
G.R.
No. 173485
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: November 23, 2011 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Challenged in
this appeal is the January 16, 2006 Decision[1]
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 01209, which affirmed in
toto the Judgment[2]
of conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 rendered
by the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 164, in Criminal Case No. 12351-D.
On April 23,
2003, accused-appellant Nenita Legaspi y Lucas (Legaspi), also known as Nita,
was charged before the RTC for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
The
Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Nenita Legaspi y Lucas a.k.a. Nita
with the crime of violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, committed
as follows:
On or about April 22, 2003, in
Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
not being lawfully authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver
and give away to Police Officer Arturo San Andres, a police poseur buyer, one
(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance weighing sixteen (16) decigrams (0.16 grams), which was found
positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous
drug, in violation of said law.[3]
Upon arraignment[4]
on July 14, 2003, Legaspi pleaded not guilty to the charge against her. After the pre-trial conference[5]
held on the same day, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution
evidence, upon which the RTC anchored its finding of guilt, consisted of the
testimonies of two of the operatives involved in the buy-bust operation, Police
Officer (PO) 2 Arturo San Andres and PO1 Janet A. Sabo.[6] Their version of the incident leading to
Legaspis arrest is summarized as follows:
San Andres and
Sabo were assigned to the Mayor Special Action Team (MSAT), Pasig City Police
Station. On April 22, 2003, at around
4:00 p.m., a certain informant, whose identity remained confidential,
approached San Andres to report about the rampant incidence of drug abuse at
Centennial Village, Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City and about the drug pusher who was
identified as Legaspi. After gathering
all the necessary details, San Andres immediately informed his superior, Police
Inspector Villaruel, who instructed him, Sabo, PO1 Aldrin Mariano, and PO1
Roland Panis to conduct a buy-bust operation.
Villaruel designated San Andres to act as the poseur-buyer and gave him two
pieces of one hundred-peso (₱100.00) bills to be used as buy-bust money. Mariano was tasked to be the team leader, and
he, along with the rest of the team, served as San Andress backup. At around 5:15 p.m., the team reached
Centennial Village, where after a briefing on their operations, San Andres,
together with the informant, proceeded to Legaspis house, while the others
strategically placed themselves in the entrapment area, keeping San Andres
within their view. Upon seeing Legaspi,
who was just outside her house, the informant introduced San Andres to her as a
scorer.[7] Legaspi asked them how much they wanted to
score, to which San Andres replied ₱200.00 panggamit
lang.[8] After San Andres gave Legaspi the buy-bust
money, which he had previously marked with his initials ABS, Legaspi reached
into her pocket and gave him one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing the
suspected shabu. As soon as San Andres got the sachet, he scratched
his head, to signal to his team that the transaction was over. He thereafter introduced himself as a police
officer, informed Legaspi of her rights, and marked the sachet he had received
from her with his initials. The team
then brought Legaspi to Rizal Medical Center for a check-up, and then to the
police station wherein they filed the appropriate charges against her. Meanwhile, San Andres sent the sachet to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and requested for an examination to
determine the nature of its contents.[9]
Annalee R.
Forro, a PNP forensic chemist at the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory,
examined the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings EXH A ABS
04/22/03 containing 0.16 gram white crystalline substance[10]
on the same day. In her Chemistry Report
No. D-727-03E, she stated the following:
FINDINGS:
Qualitative
examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
x x x x
CONCLUSION:
Specimen
A contains Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug.[11]
This report,
along with the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance bought from
Legaspi, and the two ₱100.00
bills used as marked money,[12]
were presented in court.
After the
prosecution had rested its case, Legaspi was called to the witness stand to
relay her version of the events. Legaspi
primarily denied the charges against her.
She testified that on April 22, 2003, while she was inside her house
taking care of her grandson, San Andres and Mariano peeked through her window
and asked her if she was Nita. Legaspi
alleged that after she answered in the affirmative, the two police officers
pushed the door open and told her to go with them. She claimed that because of the shock the
events had caused her, she was not able to ask the police officers why they
were taking her with them. Legaspi said
that she was brought to the police precinct in Pasig City where she was asked about
her shabu source. Legaspi averred that she told the police officers
that she did not know what they were talking about. She asseverated that she had never been
arrested before and that she had never been involved in any illegal drugs case.[13]
On December 12,
2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
the court finds accused NENITA LEGASPI Y LUCAS a.k.a. Nita GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and hereby
imposes upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), with the accessory
penalties provided under Section 35 thereof.
Moreover,
the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.16 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (Exhibit E-1) is hereby confiscated in
favor of the government and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for destruction in accordance with law.
With
Costs.[14]
In convicting
Legaspi, the RTC stated that it was more convinced with the version of the
prosecution. The RTC held that the
positive testimonies of the two police officers were stronger than Legaspis
negative testimony. The RTC added that aside
from the presumption that the two police officers performed their duties in a
regular manner, there was no showing that they had any ill motive in arresting
Legaspi.
Aggrieved,
Legaspi appealed[15]
her case to this Court. However,
conformably with this Courts Decision in People
v. Mateo,[16]
which modified certain rules on direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme
Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, Legaspis case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.[17]
Legaspi anchored
her appeal on the lone error as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
POLICE INSTIGATED THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST TRANSACTION.[18]
On January 16,
2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, affirming the RTCs
judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 12,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 164 finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is AFFIRMED
en toto.[19]
In its Decision,
the Court of Appeals explained the difference between instigation, which is
deemed contrary to public policy, and entrapment, a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It
then held that the buy-bust operation that led to Legaspis arrest was an
entrapment, and that Legaspi miserably failed to substantiate her allegation of
instigation, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals also said that contrary
to Legaspis assertions, neither prior surveillance nor the presentation of the
informant in court was an indispensable requirement to the successful
prosecution of a drug case.[20]
Undaunted, Legaspi
is once again before this Court, assigning the same error she assigned before
the Court of Appeals.[21]
The Ruling of this Court
Legaspi was
charged and convicted for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly
known as shabu, in violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
or the Dangerous Drugs Law, which provides:
Section 5. Sale,
Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such
transactions.
If the sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires
within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use
minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and
messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the
offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a
dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in
any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty
provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes,
manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities
prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging
from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who
acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under
this Section.
Defense of Instigation
Legaspi contends that she was instigated to commit the
crime, as she was not the one who sought out San Andres to sell him shabu.
She avers that San Andress own testimony clearly shows that he had suggested
the commission of the crime by offering her ₱200.00 for the purchase of shabu. Legaspi claims that
this is supported by her testimony wherein she denied selling shabu to San Andres or to anyone for
that matter. This, she says, is
confirmed by the fact that she has no police or criminal record.[22]
Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, we shall first
distinguish between entrapment and instigation.
Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of
apprehending criminals. Its purpose is
to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Instigation, on the other hand, involves the
inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such a case, the instigators become
co-principals themselves.[23]
Where the
criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to
prosecute him, there is instigation and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates
in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, even after a
person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the
accused an opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was
aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary
to prosecute him, there is no instigation and the accused must be
convicted. The law in fact tolerates the
use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.[24]
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has
proven to be very relevant in anti-narcotics operations. It has become common practice for law
enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other
entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders.[25]
This Court, elaborating on the concept
of a buy-bust operation within the context of entrapment and instigation, has
said:
A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a
crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. Its opposite is
instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused
into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public
policy and considered an absolutory cause. x x x.[26]
Instigation is recognized as a valid defense that can be
raised by an accused. To use this as a
defense, however, the accused must prove with sufficient evidence that the
government induced him to commit the offense.[27] Legaspi claims that she was induced into
committing the crime as charged, as she was the one approached by San Andres,
who was then looking to buy shabu.
We find, however, that Legaspis defense of instigation
must fail. It is an established rule
that when an accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following
defenses cannot be set up:
(1) that facilities for the
commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or
(2)
that
the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer seeking
to expose his criminal act; or
(3)
that
police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently
assisted in its commission. [28]
The foregoing
are especially true in that class of cases where the offense is the kind that
is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a
course of conduct. Mere deception by the
police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the offense was committed by
him free from the influence or the instigation of the police officer.[29]
In the case at
bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of drug trafficking from
their confidential informant, immediately set-up a buy-bust operation to test
the veracity of the report and to arrest the malefactor if the report proved to
be true. The prosecution evidence
positively showed that Legaspi agreed to sell ₱200.00 worth of shabu
to San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer.
Legaspi was never forced, coerced, or induced to source the prohibited
drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres
did not even have to ask her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely
informed that he was also a scorer; and as soon as she learned that he was
looking to buy, she immediately asked him how much he needed. Under the circumstances, the police officers
were not only authorized but were under an obligation to arrest Legaspi even
without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence.[30]
The RTC was correct in upholding the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and in applying the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty by the police officers, especially since Legaspi failed to
impute on them any motive to falsely testify against her.[31] Unless there is clear and convincing evidence
that the members of the buy-bust operation team were inspired by improper
motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation
deserve full faith and credit.[32]
Furthermore,
when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not
instigation. While instigation is a
positive defense, it partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance.[33] In instigation, the crime is actually
performed by the accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of
the inducer.[34] Thus, it is incompatible with the defense of
denial, where the theory is that the accused did not commit the offense at all. Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be
present concurrently. Besides, this
Court has consistently held that:
[B]are denials are weak forms of
defenses, especially in this case where the accused-appellants testimony was
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The uncorroborated denial by the
accused-appellant cannot prevail over the testimonies of the arresting officer
and the poseur-buyer, who both testified on affirmative matters.
Furthermore,
there is no indication that the arresting team and the other prosecution
witnesses were actuated by improper motives, prevaricating just to cause
damnation to him. Thus, their
affirmative statements proving accused-appellants culpability must be respected
and must perforce prevail.[35]
No Prior Surveillance
Legaspi also argues that the veracity of the buy-bust
operation is suspect as it was conducted without prior surveillance.[36]
This Court has
many times discussed the dispensability of prior surveillance in buy-bust
operations, as it is not a pre-requisite for the validity of an entrapment or
such buy-bust operation. In People v. Eugenio,[37]
we held that the conduct of surveillance prior to a buy-bust operation is not
required especially when the police officers are accompanied to the scene by
their civilian informant. This is so
because there is no rigid or textbook method in conducting buy-bust
operations. Flexibility is a trait of
good police work, and the need for prior surveillance may be dispensed with
when time is of the essence.[38] In People
v. Gonzales,[39]
we said:
The Court has left to the
discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend
drug dealers. Thus, we have refused to
establish on a priori basis what
detailed acts the police authorities might credibly undertake in their
entrapment operations.[40]
Non-presentation of Informant
Legaspi further contends that the failure to
present the informant as a witness in court is very material and relevant in
the case at bar, inasmuch as she had denied having sold shabu to anyone. She also
claims that since the identity of the informant was known to her from the
beginning, there was no reason for the prosecution to not present him in court
as a witness, especially since he is in the best position to establish that she
had indeed been engaged in the sale of shabu
prior to the buy-bust operation against her.[41]
We do not
agree. The presentation of an informant
is not a requisite for the successful prosecution of drug cases. Informants are almost always never presented
in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the
police.
[42] In People v. Ho Chua,[43]
we held:
[P]olice authorities rarely, if
ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their
poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they
are presented in court. Moreover, drug
dealers do not look kindly upon squealers and informants. It is understandable why, as much as
permitted, their identities are kept secret. In any event, the testimony of the
informant would be merely corroborative.[44]
Legaspi argues
that it was the civilian informant who reported on her alleged drug-pushing; hence,
only he had personal knowledge of such activities, subject of this case. Contrary to Legaspis claims, the subject
matter of this case is her sale of shabu
to San Andres on April 22, 2003. She was
not charged and convicted for her activities prior to such sale. Since San Andres, who was the poseur-buyer
himself, already testified to the events, which he had personal knowledge of,
the testimony of the informant would be merely corroborative, and can thus be
dispensed with. [45]
Only two
elements are to be proven for the prosecution of illegal sale of regulated or
prohibited drugs:
(1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
The
prosecution had presented evidence that established both elements by the
required quantum of proof, i.e., guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[46]
Legaspi was
positively identified by the prosecutions eyewitnesses as the person who sold
to the poseur-buyer a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. Her identity as the culprit
cannot be doubted, having been caught in
flagrante delicto in an entrapment
operation conducted by the MSAT of Pasig City.
Such positive identification prevails over Legaspis uncorroborated and
weak defense of denial, and unsubstantiated and contradictory defense of
instigation.[47]
The prosecution
also succeeded in establishing with certainty and conclusiveness the corpus delicti of the crime. After Legaspi received the ₱200.00 from San Andres, the poseur-buyer, she
reached into her pocket and handed him one heat-sealed plastic sachet
containing shabu. The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummated the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and
Legaspi.[48]
As the prosecution ably established
Legaspis guilt beyond reasonable doubt, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
did not err in convicting her for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS
the January 16, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01209.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-13; penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 44-48.
[3] Records,
p. 1.
[4] Id.
at 32.
[5] Id.
at 34-35.
[6] TSN,
September 8, 2003.
[7] A
scorer of drugs is a buyer of
drugs (People v. Alejandro, G.R. No.
176350, August 10, 2011).
[8] TSN, September 4, 2003, p. 8-A.
[9] TSN,
September 1, 2003, pp. 3-15.
[10] Records,
p. 53.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
at 9.
[13] TSN,
December 8, 2003, pp. 2-8.
[14] CA
rollo, pp. 47-48.
[15] Records,
p. 70.
[16] G.R.
Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[17] CA
rollo, p. 54.
[18] Id.
at 33.
[19] Rollo, p. 13.
[20] Id.
at 8-12.
[21] Id.
at 20.
[22] CA
rollo, pp. 38-39.
[23] People v. Pacis, 434 Phil. 148, 157-158 (2002).
[24] People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 610 (1999).
[25] Id.
[26] People v. Valencia, 439 Phil. 561, 574 (2002).
[27] People v. Doria, supra note 24 at 612-613.
[28] People v. Gonzales, 430 Phil. 504, 513
(2002).
[29] People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68,
134-135 (2000).
[30] People v. Gonzales, supra note 28.
[31] People v. Valencia, supra note 26 at 568.
[32] Id.
[33] People v. Doria, supra note 24.
[34] People v. Boco, 368 Phil. 341, 367 (1999).
[35] People v. Beriarmente, 418 Phil. 229,
239-240 (2001).
[36] CA
rollo, p. 39.
[37] People v. Eugenio, 443 Phil. 411,
422-433 (2003).
[38] People v. Lacbanes, 336 Phil. 933, 941 (1997).
[39] Supra
note 28.
[40] Id.
at 514.
[41] CA rollo, p. 40.
[42] People v. Domingcil, 464 Phil. 342, 358 (2004).
[43] 364
Phil. 497 (1999).
[44] Id. at 513-514.
[45] People v. Domingcil, supra note 42.
[46] People v. Tiu, 469 Phil. 163, 173
(2004).
[47] People v. De Vera, 341 Phil. 89, 95 (1997).
[48] Id.