G.R. No. 171101

G.R. No. 171101 Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated (petitioner); Luisita Industrial Park Corporation and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (petitioners-in-intervention) versus Presidential Agrarian Reform Council; Secretary Nasser Pangandaman of the Department of Agrarian Reform; Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita, Rene Galang, Noel Mallari and Julio Suniga and his Supervisory Group of the Hacienda Luisita, Inc. and Windsor Andaya.

Promulgated:

November 22, 2011

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

CORONA, C.J.:

The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential to a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority .... Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.[1]

The fundamental standard of agrarian reform is Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution:

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied)

It is against this standard that the following provision of Section 31 of RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) should be tested:

SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners. - Corporate landowners may voluntarily transfer ownership over their agricultural landholdings to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Section 20 hereof or to qualified beneficiaries, under such terms and conditions consistent with this Act, as they may agree upon, subject to confirmation by the DAR.

Upon certification by the DAR, corporations owning agricultural lands may give their qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the companys total assets, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by them. In no case shall the compensation received by the workers at the time the shares of stocks are distributed be reduced. The same principle shall be applied to associations, with respect to their equity or participation.

Corporations or associations which voluntarily divest a proportion of their capital stock, equity or participation in favor of their workers or other qualified beneficiaries under this section shall be deemed to have complied with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the following conditions are complied with:

a) In order to safeguard the right of beneficiaries who own shares of stocks to dividends and other financial benefits, the books of the corporation or association shall be subject to periodic audit by certified public accountants chosen by the beneficiaries;

b) Irrespective of the value of their equity in the corporation or association, the beneficiaries shall be assured of at least one (1) representative in the board of directors, or in a management or executive committee, if one exists, of the corporation or association;

c) Any shares acquired by such workers and beneficiaries shall have the same rights and features as all other shares; and

d) Any transfer of shares of stocks by the original beneficiaries shall be void ab initio unless said transaction is in favor of a qualified and registered beneficiary within the same corporation.

If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned above is not made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act.

Courts Duty to Confront

The Constitutional Question

Where a provision of a statute goes against the fundamental law, specially if it impairs basic rights and constitutional values, the Court should not hesitate to strike it down as unconstitutional. In such a case, refusal to address the issue of constitutionality squarely is neither prudence nor restraint but evasion of judicial duty and abdication of the Courts authority.

With this in mind, I register my dissent to the ponencias resolution of the motions for reconsideration of the July 5, 2011 decision in this case.

The ponencia persists to reject an inquiry into the constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657 on two grounds: the issue of constitutionality is not the lis mota of the case and the issue is already moot.

The Court should not decline to test the constitutional validity of Section 31 of RA 6657 on the basis of either the requirement of lis mota or the doctrine of mootness.

The requirement of lis mota does not apply where the question of constitutionality was raised by the parties and addressing such question is unavoidable.[2] It cannot be disputed that the parties-in-interest to this case presented the question of constitutionality. Also, any discussion of the stock distribution plan of petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) necessarily and inescapably involves a discussion of its legal basis, Section 31 of RA 6657. While the said provision enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, that presumption has precisely been challenged. Its inconsistency with the fundamental law was raised specifically as an issue.

More importantly, considerations of public interest render the issue of the constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657 inevitable. Agriculture is historically significant in Philippine society and economy and agrarian reform is historically imbued with public interest. Our constitutional history and tradition show that agrarian reform has always been a pillar of social justice. Relevantly, the records of the Constitutional Commission show that Hacienda Luisita has always been viewed as an acid test of genuine agrarian reform.[3]

Furthermore, the Constitution recognizes the primacy of the right of farmers and farmworkers to directly or collectively own the lands they till. Any artificial or superficial substitute such as the stock distribution plan diminishes the right and debases the constitutional intent. If this Court has the authority to promulgate rules that protect and enforce constitutional rights,[4] it also has the duty to render decisions that ensure constitutional rights are preserved and safeguarded, not diminished or modified.

On the other hand, the invocation of the doctrine of mootness does not provide Section 31 of RA 6657 an unpierceable veil that will prevent the Court from prying into its constitutionality. Indeed, the mootness doctrine admits of several exceptions.[5] I have amply discussed why this case falls under the exceptions in my dissent to the July 5, 2011 decision in this case:

First, a grave violation of the Constitution exists. Section 31 of RA 6657 runs roughshod over the language and spirit of Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution.

The first sentence of Section 4 is plain and unmistakeable. It grounds the mandate for agrarian reform on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the land they till. The express language of the provision is clear and unequivocal agrarian reform means that farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless should be given direct or collective ownership of the land they till. That is their right.

Unless there is land distribution, there can be no agrarian reform. Any program that gives farmers or farmworkers anything less than ownership of land fails to conform to the mandate of the Constitution. In other words, a program that gives qualified beneficiaries stock certificates instead of land is not agrarian reform.

Actual land distribution is the essential characteristic of a constitutional agrarian reform program. The polar star, when we speak of land reform, is that the farmer has a right to the land he tills. Indeed, a reading of the framers intent clearly shows that the philosophy behind agrarian reform is the distribution of land to farmers, nothing less.

MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of the phrase to own directly, we mean the principle of direct ownership by the tiller?

MR. MONSOD. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of collectively, we mean communal ownership, stewardship or State ownership?

MS. NIEVA. In this section, we conceive of cooperatives; that is farmers cooperatives owning the land, not the State.

MR. NOLLEDO. And when we talk of collectively, referring to farmers cooperatives, do the farmers own specific areas of land where they only unite in their efforts?

MS. NIEVA. That is one way.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because I understand that there are two basic systems involved: the moshave type of agriculture and the kibbutz. So are both contemplated in the report?

MR. TADEO. Ang dalawa kasing pamamaraan ng pagpapatupad ng tunay na reporma sa lupa ay ang pagmamay-ari ng lupa na hahatiin sa individual na pagmamay-ari directly at ang tinatawag na sama-samang gagawin ng mga magbubukid. Tulad sa Negros, ang gusto ng mga magbubukid ay gawin nila itong cooperative or collective farm. Ang ibig sabihin ay sama-sama nilang sasakahin.

MR. BENNAGEN. Madam President, nais ko lang dagdagan iyong sagot ni Ginoong Tadeo. xxxx

Kasi, doon sa collective ownership, kasali din iyong communal ownership ng mga minorya. Halimbawa sa Tanay, noong gumawa kami ng isang pananaliksik doon, nagtaka sila kung bakit kailangan pang magkaroon ng land reform na kung saan ay bibigyan sila ng tig-iisang titulo. At sila nga ay nagpunta sa Ministry of Agrarian Reform at sinabi nila na hindi ito ang gusto nila; kasi sila naman ay magkakamag-anak. Ang gusto nila ay lupa at hindi na kailangan ang tig-iisang titulo. Maraming ganitong kaso mula sa Cordillera hanggang Zambales, Mindoro at Mindanao, kayat kasali ito sa konsepto ng collective ownership.

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MR. VILLACORTA. xxx Section 5 gives the opportunity for tillers of the soil to own the land that they till; xxx

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MR. TADEO. xxx Ang dahilan ng kahirapan natin sa Pilipinas ngayon ay ang pagtitipon-tipon ng vast tracts of land sa kamay ng iilan. Lupa ang nagbibigay ng buhay sa magbubukid at sa iba pang manggagawa sa bukid. Kapag inalis sa kanila ang lupa, parang inalisan na rin sila ng buhay. Kaya kinakailangan talagang magkaroon ng tinatawag na just distribution. xxx

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MR. TADEO. Kasi ganito iyan. Dapat muna nating makita ang prinsipyo ng agrarian reform, iyong maging may-ari siya ng lupa na kaniyang binubungkal. Iyon ang kauna-unahang prinsipyo nito. xxx

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MR. TINGSON. xxx When we speak here of to own directly or collectively the lands they till, is this land for the tillers rather than land for the landless? Before, we used to hear

land for the landless, but now the slogan is land for the tillers. Is that right?

MR. TADEO. Ang prinsipyong umiiral dito ay iyong land for the tillers. Ang ibig sabihin ng directly ay tulad sa implementasyon sa rice and corn lands kung saan inaari na ng mga magsasaka ang lupang binubungkal nila. Ang ibig sabihin naman ng collectively ay sama-samang paggawa sa isang lupain o isang bukid, katulad ng sitwasyon sa Negros.

x x x x x x x x x

MR. BENNAGEN. Maaari kayang magdagdag sa pagpapaliwanag ng primacy? Kasi may cultural background ito. Dahil agrarian society pa ang lipunang Pilipino, maigting talaga ang ugnayan ng mga magsasaka sa kanilang lupa. Halimbawa, sinasabi nila na ang lupa ay pinagbuhusan na ng dugo, pawis at luha. So land acquires a symbolic content that is not simply negated by growth, by productivity, etc. The primacy should be seen in relation to an agrarian program that leads to a later stage of social development which at some point in time may already negate this kind of attachment. The assumption is that there are already certain options available to the farmers. Marahil ang primacy ay ang pagkilala sa pangangailangan ng magsasaka ang pag-aari ng lupa. Ang assumption ay ang pag-aari mismo ng lupa becomes the basis for the farmers to enjoy the benefits, the fruits of labor. xxx (678)

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MR. TADEO. xxx Kung sinasabi nating si Kristo ay liberating dahil ang api ay lalaya at ang mga bihag ay mangaliligtas, sinabi rin ni Commissioner Felicitas Aquino na kung ang history ay liberating, dapat ding maging liberating ang Saligang Batas. Ang magpapalaya sa atin ay ang agrarian and natural resources reform.

The primary, foremost and paramount principles and objectives are contained [i]n lines 19 to 22: primacy of the rights and of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. Ito ang kauna-unahan at pinakamahalagang prinsipyo at layunin ng isang tunay na reporma sa lupa na ang nagbubungkal ng lupa ay maging may-ari nito. xxx (695-696)

The essential thrust of agrarian reform is land-to-the-tiller. Thus, to satisfy the mandate of the constitution, any implementation of agrarian reform should always preserve the control over the land in the hands of its tiller or tillers, whether individually or collectively.

Consequently, any law that goes against this constitutional mandate of the actual grant of land to farmers and regular farmworkers must be nullified. If the Constitution, as it is now worded and as it was intended by the framers envisaged an alternative to actual land distribution (e.g., stock distribution) such option could have been easily and explicitly provided for in its text or even conceptualized in the intent of the framers. Absolutely no such alternative was provided for. Section 4, Article XIII on agrarian reform, in no uncertain terms, speaks of land to be owned directly or collectively by farmers and regular farm workers.

By allowing the distribution of capital stock, not land, as compliance with agrarian reform, Section 31 of RA 6657 directly and explicitly contravenes Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. The corporate landowner remains to be the owner of the agricultural land. Qualified beneficiaries are given ownership only of shares of stock, not the lands they till. Landless farmers and farmworkers become landless stockholders but still tilling the land of the corporate owner, thereby perpetuating their status as landless farmers and farmworkers.

Second, this case is of exceptional character and involves paramount public interest. In La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc., the Court reminded itself of the need to recognize the extraordinary character of the situation and the overriding public interest involved in a case. Here, there is a necessity for a categorical ruling to end the uncertainties plaguing agrarian reform caused by serious constitutional doubts on Section 31 of RA 6657. While the ponencia would have the doubts linger, strong reasons of fundamental public policy demand that the issue of constitutionality be resolved now, before the stormy cloud of doubt can cause a social cataclysm.

At the risk of being repetitive, agrarian reform is fundamentally imbued with public interest and the implementation of agrarian reform at Hacienda Luisita has always been of paramount interest. Indeed, it was specifically and unequivocally targeted when agrarian reform was being discussed in the Constitutional Commission. Moreover, the Court should take judicial cognizance of the violent incidents that intermittently occur at Hacienda Luisita, solely because of the agrarian problem there. Indeed, Hacienda Luisita proves that, for landless farmers and farmworkers, the land they till is their life.

The Constitution does not only bestow the landless farmers and farmworkers the right to own the land they till but also concedes that right to them and makes it a duty of the State to respect that right through genuine and authentic agrarian reform. To subvert this right through a mechanism that allows stock distribution in lieu of land distribution as mandated by the Constitution strikes at the very heart of social justice. As a grave injustice, it must be struck down through the invalidation of the statutory provision that permits it.

To leave this issue unresolved is to allow the further creation of laws, rules or orders that permit policies creating, unintentionally or otherwise, means to avoid compliance with the foremost objective of agrarian reform to give the humble farmer and farmworker the right to own the land he tills. To leave this matter unsettled is to encourage future subversion or frustration of agrarian reform, social justice and the Constitution.

Third, the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public. Fundamental principles of agrarian reform must be established in order that its aim may be truly attained.

One such principle that must be etched in stone is that no law, rule or policy can subvert the ultimate goal of agrarian reform, the actual distribution of land to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. Agrarian reform requires that such landless farmers and farmworkers be given direct or collective ownership of the land they till, subject only to the retention limits and the payment of just compensation. There is no valid substitute to actual distribution of land because the right of landless farmers and farmworkers expressly and specifically refers to a right to own the land they till.

Fourth, this case is capable of repetition, yet evading review. As previously mentioned, if the subject provision is not struck down today as unconstitutional, the possibility of passing future laws providing for a similar option is ominously present. Indeed, what will stop our legislators from providing artificial alternatives to actual land distribution if this Court, in the face of an opportunity to do so, does not declare that such alternatives are completely against the Constitution?

Moreover, the requirement of lis mota and the mootness doctrine are not constitutional requirements but simply prudential doctrines of justiciability fashioned by the Court in the exercise of judicial restraint. For if the said grounds have been imposed by the Constitution itself, no exception could have been carved by courts (for either ground) as courts only apply and interpret the Constitution and do not modify it.

Judicial review is particularly important in enjoining and redressing constitutional violations inflicted by all levels of government and government officers.[6] Thus, this Court may not be hampered in the performance of its essential function to uphold the Constitution by prudential doctrines of justiciability.

Indeed, in this case, to avoid the constitutional question would be to ignore a violation of the Constitution and to disregard the trampling of basic rights and constitutional values.

Constitutional Infirmity of Section 31 of RA 6657

I maintain my stance that Section 31 of RA 6657 is invalid. Agrarian reforms underlying principle is the recognition of the rights of farmers and farmworkers who are landless to own, directly or collectively, the lands they till. Under the Constitution, actual land distribution to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries is mandatory. Anything that promises something other than land must be struck down for being unconstitutional.

By allowing corporate landholders to continue owning the land by the mere expedient of divesting a proportion of their capital stock, equity or participation in favor of their workers or other qualified beneficiaries, Section 31 defeats the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, under Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, to own directly or collectively the lands they till. Section 31 of RA 6657 does not therefore serve the ends of social justice as envisioned under the agrarian reform provisions of the Constitution.

Section 31 of RA 6657 as implemented under the stock distribution option agreement merely entitles farmworker-beneficiaries of petitioner HLI to certificates of stocks which represent equity or interest in the corporate landowner, petitioner HLI, not in the land itself. Under Section 31 of RA 6657, the corporate landowner retains ownership of the agricultural land while the farmworker-beneficiaries become stockholders but remain landless. While farmworker-beneficiaries hold a piece of paper that represents interest in the corporation that has owned and still owns the land, that paper actually deprives them of their rightful claim which is ownership of the land they till. Thus, Section 31 unduly prevents the farmworker-beneficiaries from enjoying the promise of Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution for them to own directly or collectively the lands they till.

Corporate ownership by the corporate landowner under Section 31 does not satisfy the collective ownership envisioned under Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. Where the farmworker-beneficiaries are neither the collective naked owners nor the collective beneficial owners of the land they till, there can be no valid compliance with the Constitutions objective of collective ownership by farmers and farmworkers. Collective ownership of land under the agrarian reform provisions of the Constitution must operate on the concept of collective control of the land by the qualified farmer and farmworkers.

Here, Section 31 of RA 6657 deprives the farmworker-beneficiaries not only of either naked title to or beneficial ownership of the lands they till. It also prevents them from exercising effective control both of the land and of the corporate vehicle as it simply assures beneficiaries of at least one (1) representative in the board of directors, or in a management or executive committee, if one exists, of the corporation or association, irrespective of the value of their equity in the corporation or association. Thus, while they are given voice in the decision-making process of the corporate landowner with respect to the land, the beneficiaries have no guarantee of control of the lands as they are relegated to the status of minority shareholders.

Concomitant Rights of the Farmworkers and the Landowner

In view of the unconstitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657 and the consequent invalidity of the stock distribution option agreement which was based on the said provision, how should the respective rights of the parties be addressed?

Previously, I grudgingly and qualifiedly joined the majority in applying the operative fact doctrine in this case. On further reflection, however, I believe that the operative fact doctrine should not be applied. The operative fact doctrine is a principle fundamentally based on equity. The basis of the application of the said doctrine in this case was the supposed status of the stock distribution option agreement as having been already implemented. However, equity is extended only to one who comes to court with clean hands. Equity should be refused to the iniquitous and guilty of inequity. For this reason, petitioner HLI may not benefit on the ground of equity from its invalid stock distribution option agreement with the farmworker-beneficiaries as it was found guilty of breach of several material terms and conditions of the said agreement.

As Section 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional, the stock distribution agreement between petitioner HLI and its farmworker-beneficiaries has no leg to stand on and must perforce be annulled. This means that the agricultural land of petitioner HLI should be deemed placed under compulsory coverage of land reform on November 21, 1989, the date the stock distribution option agreement between petitioner HLI and the farmworker-beneficiaries was approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC). While PARC could not have validly approved the stock distribution option agreement for lack of legal basis (Section 31 of RA 6657 being unconstitutional), the action of PARC manifested the intent of the government to subject petitioner HLIs land to the land reform program. In other words, the agricultural land of petitioner HLI was subjected to land reform with respect to petitioner HLI, the farmworker-beneficiaries and the government through PARC on November 21, 1989.

While there could have been no valid approval of the stock distribution agreement, the governments intent to bring the land under the coverage of land reform could nonetheless be deemed implemented by its action as the subject matter of land reform is basically the redistribution of land. The stock distribution option agreement as an invalid means to implement land reform may be considered as simply an accessory to achieving the principal objective of land reform to transfer ownership of land to the farmworker-beneficiaries.

The principal objective and the manifestation of the governments intent to act thereon subsist despite the invalidity of the accessory. Thus, on November 21, 1989, the government should rightly be considered to have pursued the objective of land reform and transferred the ownership of the land to the farmworker-beneficiaries. November 21, 1989 should therefore be deemed as the time of taking of the land from petitioner HLI, as well as the date from which to reckon the just compensation payable to petitioner HLI.

It may, however, be argued that there could have been no taking (in the sense of transferring ownership to the farmworker-beneficiaries) on November 21, 1989 as the land was actually in the possession and control of petitioner HLI. True, petitioner HLI may have continued to possess the land but this did not negate taking and transferring of ownership to the farmworker-beneficiaries on November 21, 1989. From that date, petitioner HLIs status became that of a lawful possessor or one who held the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person,[7] particularly the farmworker-beneficiaries. Moreover, petitioner HLI should be deemed as a possessor in good faith, or one that is not aware of any flaw in his title or mode of acquisition thereof.[8] Its reliance on the validity of Section 31 of RA 6657 and, concomitantly, of its stock distribution option agreement could be considered as a mistake on a difficult question of law, a fact which supports its possession in good faith.

While the stock distribution option agreement was supposed to cover only 4,195 hectares of petitioner HLIs land, no such term or condition should be deemed imposed on the coverage of land reform as of November 21, 1989. The limitation of the coverage shall be determined subject only to such priorities and reasonable retention limits prescribed by law, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations.[9] The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) shall therefore determine the area properly covered by land reform, guided by the retention limits set by law and taking into account ecological, developmental or equity considerations. Upon determination of the area properly covered by land reform, the DAR should immediately and actually distribute the same to the farmworker-beneficiaries. This shall, however, exclude the portion of converted land transferred to LIPCO and RCBC which shall remain with the said transferees as they were transferees (buyers) in good faith. The land distribution shall also exclude the portion expropriated by the government for the SCTEX.

For the excluded portions, however, the farmworker-beneficiaries shall be entitled to the portion of the proceeds of the sale to LIPCO and RCBC corresponding to the market value thereof as of November 21, 1989. It would be unfair to rule otherwise as any increase in value of the land may reasonably be attributed to the improvements thereon made by petitioner HLI and petitioner HLIs efforts to have the said portion reclassified to industrial land. Moreover, this would be in consonance with the rule that the possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally interrupted.[10]

The amount accruing to the farmworker-beneficiaries shall also be less the 3% of the proceeds already given to them. On the other hand, the proceeds of the portion expropriated for the SCTEX shall accrue to the farmworker-beneficiaries.

Indeed, Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution requires that the landowner be given just compensation. For this purpose, the DAR shall determine the just compensation payable by each farmworker-beneficiary to petitioner HLI as it has jurisdiction in matters involving the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws.[11] The just compensation shall be based on the market value as of November 21, 1989 of the entire portion that may be determined by the DAR as subject to the coverage of land reform. The portion of the proceeds of the portion sold to LIPCO and RCBC as well as the proceeds of the portion expropriated for the SCTEX may be the subject of legal compensation or set off for purposes of the payment of just compensation.

Finally, the farmworker-beneficiaries shall return the shares of stock which they received to petitioner HLI under the invalid stock distribution option agreement.

WHEREFORE, I vote that the Courts July 5, 2011 decision be RECONSIDERED. Section 31 of RA 6657 should be declared NULL and VOID for being unconstitutional. Consequently, the stock distribution plan of petitioner HLI should likewise be declared NULL and VOID for being unconstitutional.

The land of petitioner HLI subject to agrarian reform, as determined by the DAR, should be immediately and actually distributed to the farmworker-beneficiaries, except the (a) portion of converted land transferred to LIPCO and RCBC which shall remain with the said transferees as they were transferees (buyers) in good faith and the (b) portion of land expropriated by the government for the SCTEX.

The farmworker-beneficiaries should return the shares of stock which they received to petitioner HLI under the invalid stock distribution option agreement. Each of them should also be liable to pay petitioner HLI just compensation in the amount to be determined by the DAR based on the fair market value of the land as of November 21, 1989. This may be subject to set-off or legal compensation with the amounts accruing to the farmworker-beneficiaries, namely, (a) the portion of the proceeds of the sale to LIPCO and RCBC corresponding to the market value thereof as of November 21, 1989 and (b) the proceeds of the portion expropriated for the SCTEX shall accrue to the farmworker-beneficiaries.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1] Hamilton, Alexander, The Federalist No. 78 at 521-22, Carl Van Doren ed., 1945.

[2] Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516, 522 (1946).

[3] See Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, pp. 663-664.

[5] See Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183591, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA 402. [T]he moot and academic principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

[6] Chemerinsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 3^rd Edition (2006), p. 52.

[7] Article 525, New Civil Code: The possession or things or rights may be had in one of two concepts: either in the concept of an owner, or that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person.

[8] Article 526, New Civil Code: He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. x x x Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

[11] See Soriano v. Bravo, G.R. No. 152086, 15 December 2010, 638 SCRA 403.