EN BANC
Agenda of
Item No. 74
G.R.
No. 171101 HACIENDA LUISITA, INC., ET AL., petitioners
v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, ET AL., respondents.
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SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
In the Courts Decision dated July 5, 2011, the crucial questions that the Court resolved were: (1) whether the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) has the power to revoke or recall its approval of a stock distribution option entered into between a corporate landowner and its farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs), under Section 31 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL); and (2) whether the PARC has a ground to revoke or recall the stock distribution plan (SDP) between petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated (HLI) and its FWBs.
The Court was unanimous in declaring that the PARCs express power to approve the plan for stock distribution of corporate landowners, under Section 31 of the CARL, includes the implied power to revoke its approval. In the case of HLI, the majority of the Court, myself included, found that the PARC has solid bases to revoke its approval of HLIs SDP.[1]
In view of this ruling, the corollary
issue of the effects of the
revocation arose, and it was
at this point that I diverged from the majoritys position. The majority speaking through Justice
Velasco found it equitable to recognize the existence of certain operative
facts, notwithstanding the revocation of the SDP. Hence, the majority gave the qualified FWBs
the option of choosing whether or not to remain as HLI stockholders. On the same principle, the majority
authorized the FWBs to retain all benefits received under the SDP. The dispositive of the
1. the qualified FWBs, totaling 6,296, are given the option to choose whether to remain as stockholders of HLI or not. Should they choose to remain, they are entitled to 18,804.32 shares each; otherwise, they are entitled to land distribution. The non-qualified FWBs totaling 4,206, however, are not given this option, but are allowed to retain the shares already received;
2. all the 10,502 FWBs are entitled to retain the following items they received on account of the SDP:
a. salaries and benefits,
b. 3% production share,
c. 3% share of the proceeds of the sale of the 500 hectares of converted land and the 80-hectare Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) lot, and
d. 6,886.5-square meter homelots that each FWB received;
3. From the 4,915.75 hectares of agricultural land shall be segregated:
a. the 500 hectares of converted land acquired by Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO)/Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC);
b. the 80 hectares of land expropriated by the government for the SCTEX; and
c. the aggregate area of homelots of FWBs who choose to remain as HLI stockholders.[2]
After segregation, the remaining areas shall be turned over by HLI to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for land distribution to qualified FWBs who prefer land distribution over stock ownership.
4. HLI is directed to turn over the consideration of
a. P500
million from the sale of the 200 hectares of converted land to LRC,
b. P750
million from the sale of the 300 hectares of converted land to Centennary
Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), and
c. P80
million from the expropriation of 80 hectares for the SCTEX.
From
the sum total of P1.33 billion shall be deducted
a. the 3% production share,
b. the 3% share in the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and expropriation of the 80-hectare land,
c. the taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of titles, and
d. the expenditures incurred by HLI for legitimate corporate purposes.
The remaining balance shall be distributed among the qualified FWBs, and
5. HLI shall be paid just compensation for the agricultural land that will be subject to land distribution, the amount of which shall be determined by the DAR.
I dissented from the majoritys determination of the effects of the revocation, objecting primarily to their application of the operative fact doctrine to justify the option given to the FWBs on whether or not to remain as HLI stockholders. I opined that the revocation of the PARCs approval of the SDP carried with it the nullification of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) between HLI and the qualified FWBs. As a consequence of the nullification, restitution should take place, and the parties are to account and restore what they received from one another. Subject to certain adjustments, I maintain the same view regarding the inapplicability of the operative fact doctrine to the present case. Based on this perspective, I propose to dispose of the case as discussed below.
The application of the Operative
Fact Doctrine to Executive Acts
The ponencia misapplies the operative fact doctrine. I maintain the view that the doctrine is applicable only in considering the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of a law (a generic term that includes statutes, rules and regulations issued by the executive department and are accorded the same status as a statute). The doctrines limited application is apparent from a review of its origins.
The doctrine of
operative fact is of American origin, first discussed in the 1940 case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States
Bank.[3] Chicot Country sought to resist the Baxter
States Banks claim by raising a debt readjustment decree issued by a district
court pursuant to a law enacted by the
[T]he effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must
be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination,
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private
and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult
of those which have engaged the attention of courts x x x and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. [italics and emphasis
ours]
Notably, Chicot
and the numerous cases that followed its lead applied the operative fact
doctrine only in considering the effects of a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a statute.
De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank (PNB),[7] promulgated in this
jurisdiction in 1971, was the first instance when the operative fact doctrine
was extended to consider the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of
an executive act. The ponencia cites De Agbayani (as well as subsequent cases that echoed the operative
fact principle) to support its position, but this reliance proceeds from a
misreading of the context in which De
Agbayani used the term executive act.
The executive act referred to
in De Agbayani was Executive Order
No. 32 (EO 32) issued by then
President Sergio Osmea in March 10, 1945, which imposed a debt
moratorium. Since the Court (in the case
of Rutter v. Esteban[8]) already declared EO 32
unconstitutional, Francisco de Agbayani contended that the PNBs action for
foreclosure against him had already prescribed.
The Court was then confronted with the issue of whether to give effect
to EO 32 prior to the declaration of its unconstitutionality. The Court, per Justice Enrique Fernando, resolved the issue in this manner:
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any
legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being
to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code
[Article 7] puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.[]
Administrative or executive acts, orders
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
of the Constitution. It is understandable
why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any
legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of
simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of
doubt that prior to the declaration of
nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in
force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience
and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their
positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation
regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was
in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be
reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of
fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication.[9]
When these paragraphs are read together, the
phrase such challenged legislative or executive act quite obviously pertains
to the administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations mentioned in Article 7 of the Civil Code. Thus, the
context in which the term executive act was used in De Agbayani referred to only executive issuances (acts, orders,
rules and regulations) that have the force and effect of laws; it was not used
to refer to any act performed by the
Executive Department. De Agbayanis extension of the operative
fact doctrine, therefore, more properly refers only to the recognition of the
effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of executive issuances, and not to
all executive acts as the ponencia
loosely construes the term. The limited
construction of an executive act, i.e.,
executive issuances, is actually more consistent with the rationale behind the
operative fact doctrine: the presumption of constitutionality of laws. Accordingly, it is only to this kind of
executive action that the operative fact doctrine can apply.
In my separate opinion to the
With the
application of the operative fact doctrine, said benefits, homelots and the 3% production share and the 3% share from
the sale of the 500-hectare and SCTEX lots shall be respected with no
obligation to refund or return them.
The receipt of these things is an operative fact that can no longer be
disturbed or simply ignored.[10] (emphasis
ours)
Because of this continued (and mistaken) reliance on the operative fact doctrine, I
regretfully have to register my continued objection to the manner by which the ponencia proposes to dispose of this
case.
Indeed, much of the confusion
that arose in the disposition of this case stemmed from the varying
perspectives taken by the members of the Court on what are the effects of the
revocation and when these effects
should accrue. The revocation of the
SDP amounts to the nullification of the SDOA, and the logical and legal
consequence of this should be the restoration of the parties to their respective situations prior to the execution
of the nullified agreement. There
should be no question that the PARCs revocation of the approval of the SDP
carried with it the nullification of the SDOA because the PARCs approval is
necessary to the validity of the SDOA[11]; accordingly, the effects
of the revocation should be deemed to have taken place on November 21, 1989, the date when PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2
approving the SDP was issued. To
consider any other date (either at the time PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01, revoking
its approval of the SDP, was issued or at the time this Courts decision becomes
final) is not only iniquitous for the parties but also preposterous under the
law. Hence, to accomplish a complete, orderly,
and fair disposition of the case, we have to consider the effects of the
revocation to accrue from
Treatment of the
Since
the effects of the revocation are deemed to have taken place on
Considering that the 500-hectare converted land, as well as
the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot, should have been included in the compulsory coverage
were it not for their conversion and
valid transfers, then it is only but proper that the price received for
the sale of these lots should be given to the qualified FWBs. In effect, the proceeds from the sale shall
take the place of the lots.
x x x x
x x x. We maintain that the date of taking is November 21, 1989, the
date when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of
the fact that this is the time that the FWBs
were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita.
To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that
is,
To reconcile these inconsistent positions, I
venture to guess that what the ponencia
perhaps meant was that, on account of the revocation, the entire 4,915.75
hectares were deemed placed under compulsory coverage on November 21, 1989;
however, despite the inclusion, portions of the land (specifically, the 500 hectares
of converted land and the 80 hectares of the SCTEX land) can no longer be distributed among the qualified FWBs
under Section 22 of the CARL[16] because of the valid transfers
made in favor of third parties. Thus, it
was not the conversion of the 500-hectare land that exclude it from compulsory coverage as it was already
deemed included in the compulsory
coverage since 1989; it was the recognition of the valid transfers of these
lands to third parties that excluded them from the actual land distribution among the qualified FWBs.
The ponencia itself recognizes this legal reality by citing the valid
transfers of the land as basis for exclusion.
Yet, this is precisely what is lacking in LRCs case. By failing to
intervene in this case, LRC was unable to present evidence supporting its good
faith purchase of the 200-hectare converted land. The ponencias
conclusion that there was a valid transfer to LRC of the 200 hectares of
converted land, therefore, lacks both factual and basis.
Thus, I propose, as I did in my separate opinion to the July
5, 2011 Decision, that LRC be given full opportunity to present its case
before the DAR x x x the failure of [LRC] to actively intervene at the PARC
level and before this Court does not really affect the intrinsic validity of
the transfer made in its favor if indeed
it is similarly situated as LIPCO and RCBC.
x x x [A] definitive ruling on the transfer of the 200 hectares to
[LRC] is premature to make. The FWBs
right to the 200-hectare converted land itself or only to the proceeds of the
sale (amounting to P500 million[17]) can be determined only after
LRC has presented its case before the DAR.
On the other hand, LIPCO/RCBCs
acquisition in good faith has been adequately proven. Thus, although the 300-hectare
converted land should belong to the FWBs on account of the revocation of the
SDP, the valid transfer to LIPCO/RCBC entitles them only to the proceeds of the
sale. The ponencia, however, decrees
that the entire P750 million paid for the 200-hectare converted land should
be paid to the FWBs.
I disagree with this position,
as it fails to take into account that it was HLI which invested in and caused
the conversion of the land from agricultural to commercial/industrial:
Since the sale
and transfer of these acquired lands came after the compulsory CARP coverage
had taken place, the FWBs are entitled to be paid for the 300 hectares of land
transferred to LIPCO based on its value in 1989, not on the P750 million selling price paid by LIPCO
to HLI [through its subsidiary, Centennary] as proposed by the ponencia. This outcome recognizes the reality that the
value of these lands increased due to the improvements introduced by HLI,
specifically HLIs move to have these portions reclassified as industrial land
while they were under its possession.
Thus, unless it is proven that the P750 million is equivalent to the value of the land as of
[November 21, 1989] and excludes the value of any improvements that may have
been introduced by HLI, I maintain that the lands 1989 value, as determined by
the DAR, should be the price paid to the FWBs for the lands transferred to
LIPCO/RCBC.[18]
In case the LRC is able to prove its good faith
purchase of the 200-hectare converted land before the DAR, the treatment of the
proceeds of the sale of this land shall be the same as those of LIPCO/RCBCs
300-hectare converted land the FWBs will be entitled only to the lands value
as of November 21, 1989, and the balance shall be for the HLI as compensation
for any improvements introduced.
With
respect to the proceeds of the sale of the 80-hectare land to the government
for the SCTEX, the FWBs are entitled to be paid the full amount of just
compensation that HLI received from the government for the 80 hectares of
expropriated land forming the SCTEX highway.
What was transferred in this case was a portion of the HLI property that
was not covered by any conversion order.
The transfer, too, came after compulsory CARP coverage had taken place
and without any significant intervention from HLI. Thus, the whole of the just compensation paid
by the government should accrue solely to the FWBs as owners.[19]
Amounts to be Deducted from the Proceeds of
the Sale of the Lands
HLI
claimed that it had already paid out 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the
lands to the FWBs. This amount should thus
be deducted from the total proceeds that should be returned to the qualified FWBs. The taxes and expenses related to the
transfer of titles should likewise be deducted, since the same amounts will be
incurred regardless of the seller (HLI or the FWBs). The ponencia
proposes that the 3% production share and the expenditures incurred by HLI and
Centennary for legitimate corporate purposes should also be deducted from the
total proceeds of the sale.
In proposing that the 3%
production share be deducted from the total proceeds of sale to be returned to
the FWBs, the ponencia has
effectively reversed its own insistent declaration that all the benefits
received by the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return
them.[20] Its reliance on the operative fact doctrine
to authorize the FWBs retention of all the benefits would thus be for naught; what
the ponencia has given with its right hand, it takes away with its left hand.
Also, I do not find any
legitimate basis for allowing HLI to deduct from the proceeds of the sale to be
turned over to the FWBs the amounts it used for legitimate corporate
purposes. It is irrelevant for the ponencia to order the DAR to determine
if the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare land and the 80-hectare SCTEX
lot were actually used for legitimate corporate purposes.[21] The FWBs are entitled to the proceeds of the
sale of the 300-hectare land in lieu of the actual land which they are deemed
to have acquired under the CARL since 1989.
The ponencia never explained
why the FWBs should bear such portion of the proceeds of the sale that HLI used
to finance its operations.
Transferability of Awarded Lands
The ponencia denies the applicability of Section 27 of the CARL, which
states:
Sec. 27. Transferability of
Awarded Lands. - Lands acquired by
beneficiaries under this Act may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except
through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other
qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however,
That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to
repurchase the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2)
years. Due notice of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to
the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is
situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein
provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the
right to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the
DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a
condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself.
Failing compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which
shall give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified
in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate
the beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the latter has already paid,
together with the value of improvements he has made on the land.
The ponencia
opposes the application of the above provision by denying the FWBs the right to
sell the land to third parties, including HLI.
Citing DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1989 (DAR AO 1-89), it states that the
awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed [to third persons] after ten
(10) years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership
award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet
been issued to the qualified FWBs x x x, the 10-year prohibitive period has not
even started.[22]
I
agree with the ponencias declaration,
but only to the extent of prohibiting the qualified FWBs from selling the land directly
to HLI (or other non-qualified purchasers). Properly
construed, the law means that, as a general rule, the FWBs are prohibited from
transferring or conveying the lands within 10 years from the issuance of the
EPs or CLOAs, except if the transfer or conveyance is made in favor of (a) a hereditary
successor, (b) the government, (c) the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), or (d) other qualified
beneficiaries; transfers or conveyances made in favor of any of those
enumerated, even within the 10 years period, are not prohibited by law. A contrary interpretation would prevent the
beneficiarys heir from inheriting the land in the event that the beneficiary
dies within the 10-year period, and put the lands ownership in limbo. Thus, under Section 27 of the CARL, the FWBs
who are no longer interested in owning their proportionate share of the land
may opt to sell it to the government or the LBP, which in turn can sell it to HLI
or the LRC (if it is unable to prove its good faith purchase of the 200-hectare
converted land), in order not to disrupt their existing operations.
Distribution of land to FWBs and payment of
just compensation to HLI
As
a consequence of the revocation of the SDP, the 4,915.75 hectares of
agricultural land subject of the SDP are deemed placed under the CARLs
compulsory coverage since
In
several cases, the Court awarded interests when there is delay in the payment
of just compensation. The underlying rationale for the award is to compensate
the landowner not simply for the delay, but for the income the landowner would
have received from the land had there been no immediate taking thereof by the
government.[24]
This principle, however, does
not apply to the present case because HLI never lost possession and control of
the land; all the incomes that the land generated were appropriated by HLI. No loss of income from the land (that should
be compensated by the imposition of interest on the just compensation due)
therefore resulted. On the contrary, it
is the qualified FWBs who have been denied of income due to HLIs possession
and control of the land since 1989.
Thus, HLI should pay the qualified FWBs rental for the use and
possession of the land up to the time it surrenders possession and control over
these lands. The DAR, as the agency tasked to implement
agrarian reform laws, shall have the authority to determine the appropriate
rental due from HLI to the qualified FWBs.
In recognition, however, of any
improvements that HLI may have introduced on these lands, HLI is entitled to
offset their value from the rents due.
Application of the principle of set-off
The
consequence of the revocation of the SDP, as I have repeatedly stated, is the
restoration of the parties to their respective conditions prior to its
execution and approval thus, they are bound to restore whatever they received
on account of the SDP. However, this
does not prevent the application of the principle of set-off or
compensation. The retention, either by
the qualified FWBs or the HLI, of some of the benefits received pursuant to the
revoked SDP is based on the application of the principle of compensation, not on
the misapplication of the operative fact doctrine.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Accordingly,
I maintain my vote to DENY HLIs petition and AFFIRM the PARCs Resolution Nos.
2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01 revoking the SDP.
The entire 4,915.75 hectares
of land are deemed PLACED UNDER COMPULSORY COVERAGE of the CARL AS OF
a.
the 300 hectares of converted
land acquired by LIPCO/RCBC; and
b.
the 80 hectares of
land expropriated by the government for the SCTEX.
The LRC shall be entitled to prove before the
DAR that there was valid transfer of the 200 hectares of converted land. If the DAR finds that LRC is a purchaser in
good faith and for value, the 200 hectares of converted land shall likewise be
excluded from the land to be distributed among the qualified FWBs.
The DAR is ORDERED to
determine the amount of just compensation that HLI is entitled to for the
entire 4,915.75 hectares of agricultural land, based on the value at the time
of taking November 21, 1989, and no interest shall be imposed on this
amount. The DAR is FURTHER ORDERED to determine
the amount of RENTALS that HLI must pay to the qualified FWBs for the use and
possession of the land beginning November 21, 1989, until possession is turned
over to the DAR, for distribution (with due adjustment for the portions conveyed
to LIPCO/RCBC, the government for the SCTEX, and, if found by the DAR to be a
valid transfer, LRC). HLI, however, is entitled to DEDUCT from the
rentals due the value of the improvements it made over the land (excluding
those sold to LIPCO/RCBC and LRC, if the DAR finds that there was a valid transfer).
HLI shall PAY to the FWBs the value
of the
a.
300 hectares of
converted land conveyed to LIPCO/RCBC, based on its
b.
if the DAR finds that
there was a valid transfer, 200 hectares of converted land conveyed to LRC.
HLI shall also PAY the qualified FWBs just
compensation received from the government for the 80 hectares of expropriated
land for the SCTEX.
From
the total amount of the proceeds of the sale and the just compensation to be
paid by HLI to the qualified FWBs, the DAR shall DEDUCT the P150
million, representing the 3% production share and the aggregate value of the homelots
that the qualified FWBs received from HLI. The amount of the 3% production share shall
depend on the amount actually received by the FWBs from HLI, to be determined
by the DAR.
All
the FWBs shall return to HLI the 59 million shares of stock. They are, however, entitled to retain all the
salaries, wages and other benefits received as employees of HLI.
[1] The majority ruled that the SDP/Stock Distribution
Option Agreement is contrary to law due to the man days method it adopted in
computing the number of shares that each FWB shall be entitled to, and the
extended period of 30 years to complete the distribution of shares; see July 5,
2011 Decision, pp. 67-72.
[2] The July 5, 2011 Decision, pp. 88-89 referred to the
aggregate area of 6,886.5 square meters of individual lots that each FWB is
entitled to under the CARP had he or she not
opted to stay in HLI as stockholder as among those to be segregated from
the 4,915.75 hectares of land (and thus not subject to compulsory land
distribution). I believe that the ponencia
was referring instead to the homelots of FWBs who opted to remain as
stockholders of HLI, as may be apparent from its subsequent statement that the
aforementioned area composed of 6,886.5-square meter lots allotted to the FWBs
who stayed with the corporation shall form part of the HLI assets.
[3] 308
[4] In particular, the Act of
[5] The void ab
initio doctrine declares that an
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation,
as inoperative as though it had never been passed; infra note 6.
[6] 118 US 425, 442.
[7] No. L-23127,
[8] 93 Phil. 68 (1953).
[9]
[10] Resolution, p. 11.
[11] This is inferable from Section 31 of the CARL, the
relevant portion of which declares, If within two (2) years from the approval
of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned above is not made or
realized or the plan for such stock
distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the agricultural
land of the corporate owners or corporation shall be subject to the compulsory
coverage of this Act.
[12] I have previously declared
[13] The ponencia
(p. 24) said:
the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita, of which
the 200-hectare portion sold to LRC and the 300-hectare portion subsequently
acquired by LIPCO and RCBC were part of, was already subject of the August 14,
1996 DAR Conversion Order. By virtue of the said conversion order, the
land was already reclassified as industrial/commercial land not subject to
compulsory coverage. (emphasis ours)
[14] Conversion from
agricultural to industrial land took place on
[15] Supra note
10, at 27, 29.
[16] Sec. 22. Qualified
Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much
as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence
thereof, landless residents of the same municipality[.]
[17] Supra note
10, at 47.
[18] Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, pp.
40-41.
[19]
[20] Supra note
10, at 11.
[21]
[22]
[23] The value of the 300-hectare land conveyed to
LIPCO/RCBC and the 80-hectare land for SCTEX should not be excluded if the
Court is to rule that the FWBs are entitled to the proceeds of these
conveyances.
[24] See Apo Fruits
Corporation v. Land Bank of the
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but
also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer
the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss.