Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
gemma ong a.k.a. maRIA teresa gemma catacutan, Petitioner, - versus
- people of the philippines, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 169440
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO,* LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, DEL
CASTILLO, and PERLAS-BERNABE,**
JJ.
Promulgated: November 23, 2011 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before Us is a
petition for review on certiorari,
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to set aside and reverse the June
16, 2005 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 28308, which affirmed the September 23, 2003 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 24 in Criminal Case No. 00-184454.
On July 28,
2000, petitioner Gemma Ong a.k.a. Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan
(Gemma) was charged before the RTC for Infringement under Section 155 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property
Code. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That
sometime in September 25, 1998 and prior thereto at Sta. Cruz, Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there, knowingly, maliciously, unlawfully and feloniously engage in
the distribution, sale, [and] offering for sale of counterfeit Marlboro
cigarettes which had caused confusion, deceiving the public that such
cigarettes [were] Marlboro cigarettes and those of the Telengtan Brothers and
Sons, Inc., doing business under the style of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarettes
Factory, the exclusive manufacturer of Marlboro Cigarette in the Philippines
and that of Philip Morris Products, Inc. (PMP7) the registered owner and
proprietor of the MARLBORO trademark together with the devices, including the
famous-Root Device, to their damage and prejudice, without the accused seeking
their permit or authority to manufacture and distribute the same.[3]
On August 1,
2000, Judge Rebecca G. Salvador of RTC Manila, Branch 1, issued a warrant of
arrest against Gemma, but lifted[4]
and set aside[5] the
same after Gemma
voluntarily surrendered on August 4, 2000, and filed a cash bond for ₱12,000.00.
Gemma
pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment on October 17, 2000.[6] After the pre-trial conference on February
13, 2001,[7]
trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution called to the
witness stand the following: Roger Sherman
Slagle, the Director of Operations of Philip Morris Malaysia, and Philip Morris
Philippines, Inc.s (PMPI) product/brand security expert, to testify that
according to his examination, the products they seized at the subject premises
were counterfeit cigarettes;[8]
as well as Jesse
Lara, who, as then Senior Investigator III at the Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR) Unit of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB),
Department of Finance, led the
investigating team, to testify on the events that led to the arrest of Gemma.[9] The prosecution also presented the billing
accountant of Quasha Ancheta Pea & Nolasco Law Office (Quasha Law Office),
Juliet Flores, to show that PMPI, being one of Quasha Law Offices clients,
paid the amount of $4,069.12 for legal services rendered.[10] The last witness for the prosecution was
Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta, a senior law partner at Quasha Law Office, who
testified that as the duly appointed Attorney-in-Fact of PMPI, he was in charge
of the EIIB search operation in the subject premises. Atty. Ancheta said that while he was not personally
present during the implementation of the search warrant, he sent Atty. Leonardo
Salvador, who constantly reported the developments to him.[11]
The facts, as
succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On
September 10, 1998, Jesse S. Lara, then Senior Investigator III at the
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Unit of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Department of Finance, received reliable
information that counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes were being distributed and
sold by two (2) Chinese nationals, Johnny Sia and Jessie Concepcion, in the
areas of Tondo, Binondo, Sta. Cruz and Quiapo, Manila. A mission team formed by EIIB, including
Lara, conducted surveillance operation to verify the report. EIIB agents Leonardo Villanueva and Jigo
Madrigal did a test-buy on the
different sari-sari stores of Manila
located in Quiapo, Tondo, Sta. Cruz and Blumentritt areas and took samples of
Marlboro cigarettes sold therein.
During the surveillance, the container van delivering the Marlboro
packed in black plastic bags was seen parked at 1677 Bulacan corner Hizon
Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila [(the subject premises)]. Upon inquiry from the Barangay Chairman, they
also learned that the place is owned by a certain Mr. Jackson Ong.
The
EIIB team coordinated with officers of Philip Morris, Inc., owner of the
trademark Marlboro Label in the Philippines duly registered with the Philippine
Patents Office and subsequently with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO)
since 1956. Initial examination made by
Philip Morris, Inc. on those random sample purchases revealed that the
cigarettes were indeed fake products unauthorized by the company. With official indorsement by the EIIB, Senior
Investigator Lara filed an application for search warrant before the Regional
Trial Court of Dasmarias, Cavite, Branch 90.
On
September 24, 1998, Executive Judge Dolores L. Espaol issued a search warrant after
finding probable cause to believe that Mr. Jackson Ong has in his
possession/control in the premises located at 1675-1677 Bulacan St. cor. M.
Hizon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, the following properties:
Substantial number of fake
locally made and imported fake cigarettes bearing the Marlboro brand, together
with the corresponding labels, cartons, boxes and other packaging as well as
receipts, invoices and other documents relative to the purchase, sale, and
distribution of the aforesaid fake Marlboro cigarettes.
On
September 25, 1998, the EIIB team led by Senior Investigator Lara implemented
the search warrant, together with SPO2 Rommel P. Sese of the Western Police
District (WPD) as representative of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Barangay Chairman Ernesto Traje, Sr., Barangay Kagawad Vivian V. Rallonza and
Atty. Leonardo P. Salvador who was sent by [Quasha Pea & Nolasco Law
Office,] the law firm engaged by Philip Morris, Inc. They proceeded to the subject premises but
Jackson Ong, the alleged owner, was not there.
It was accused, who is supposedly either the spouse or common-law wife
of Jackson Ong, who entertained them. At
first, accused refused to allow them entry into the premises but eventually the
team was able to search the premises and found Marlboro cigarettes stocked in
several boxes containing fifty (50) reams inside each box which were packed in
black plastic sacks like in balikbayan boxes.
The Inventory and Certification In the Conduct of Search were duly
accomplished and signed by the members of the EIIB and the other
representatives present during the actual search (SPO2 Sese, Jess Lara, Traje,
Sr., Henry Mariano, Isidro Burgos and Atty. Salvador). Accused signed her name in the said documents
as Gemma Ong, as the Owner/Representative, while a certain employee, Girlie
Cantillo, also signed as witness.
On
September 28, 1998, a Return of Search Warrant was submitted by the EIIB to the
issuing court stating that the articles seized pursuant to the warrant were
stored in the premises of the EIIB and requesting that EIIB be granted
temporary custody of the goods. Acting
on the Urgent Motion To Transfer Custody of Confiscated Articles filed by
Philip Morris Products, Inc. (PMPI) of Virginia, U.S.A., Executive Judge
Dolores L. Espaol ordered the custody of the seized goods transferred from
EIIB to PMPI c/o Quasha Ancheta Pea and Nolasco Law Office, the
Attorney-in-Fact of PMPI. Judge Espaol
subsequently also issued an order dated October 15, 1998 authorizing PMPI to
secure and take out samples of the unauthorized products from the confiscated
cartons/boxes of Marlboro cigarettes which are stored at Four Winds Phils. Inc.
warehouse located at No. 2241 Pasong Tamo Extension, Makati City under the
direct and personal control and supervision of Sheriff IV Tomas C. Azurin. PMPI had earlier sought such order from the
court for the purpose of laboratory analysis and scientific testing of the
samples from the confiscated cigarettes.
On
the basis of the results of the examination conducted by PMPI on the samples
obtained from the confiscated boxes of cigarettes bearing the Marlboro brand,
which confirmed the same to be unauthorized products and not genuine Marlboro
cigarettes, the EIIB filed a case for Violation of Sections 155 and 168 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293 against Jackson Ong who is not
an authorized distributor of Marlboro products in the Philippines.[12]
After the
prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence,[13]
which the RTC denied on March 26, 2003.[14] The defense moved for a reconsideration of
this order but the same was denied on April 22, 2003.[15]
Gemma,
as the lone witness for the defense, then took the witness stand. She said that she is married to Co Yok Piao,
a Chinese national, but she still uses her maiden name Catacutan.[16] She denied that she is the Gemma Ong accused
in this case. She testified that she was
arrested on August 4, 2000, without the arresting officers asking for her name. She said that when she pleaded to be
released, she was instructed to post a cash bond, which she did in the amount
of ₱12,000.00. Gemma averred that when she posted her bond and signed
her certificate of arraignment, she did so under her real name Maria Teresa
Gemma Catacutan, as opposed to the signatures in the Inventory and
Certification in the Conduct of Search (search documents), which she denied
signing. She claimed that she was not
able to bring up her defense of mistaken identity early on as she did not know
when the proper time to raise it was. She
avowed that she was not interrogated by the police prior to her arrest, despite
the two-year gap between it and the search of the subject premises. She alleged that she did not know Jackson Ong
and that the prosecution witnesses, whom she first saw during her trial,
couldnt even point to her as the person present during the raid when they
testified in court. Gemma further
asseverated that while she could not remember where she was on September 25,
1998, she was sure that she was not at the subject premises on that date. Gemma presented her Identification Card
issued by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to show that she is a
dentist by profession, although she claimed that she is a businessperson in
practice. She said that she used to buy
and sell gear fabrics, t-shirts, truck materials, and real estate[17]
under the business name Fascinate Trading based in Bulacan Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila, but that it had ceased operations in February 1998.[18] Gemma denied ever having engaged in the
manufacture and sale of any kind of cigarettes and claimed that she could not even
distinguish between a fake and a genuine Marlboro cigarette.[19]
On September 30,
2003, the RTC convicted Gemma of the crime as charged. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:
Accordingly,
this Court finds accused Gemma Catacutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293
and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years
and to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos.
Accused
is further directed to indemnify private complainant the sum of US$4,069.12 or
its peso equivalent, as actual damages.
The
records of the case as against Jackson Ong is hereby ordered archived pending
his arrest.
With
costs against accused Gemma Catacutan.[20]
In resolving the case, the RTC
narrowed down the issue to whether Gemma Catacutan was the same accused
identified as Gemma Ong. The RTC
answered this in the affirmative as it found Gemmas defense of mistaken
identity as untenable, especially since she claimed to be a professional. The RTC explained:
Ranged
against the positive and forthright declaration of the prosecution witnesses,
the mere uncorroborated and self-serving denials of the accused cannot
stand. (People vs. Hortaleza, 258 SCRA
201)
We
note in disbelief that it was only in the hearing of November 26, 2001, that
accused[s] former lawyer manifested that accused is known as Gemma Catacutan
never as Gemma Ong (tsn, November 26, 2001, p. 3) and as admitted by her, she
never revealed her true identity when arrested, when she posted her bail bond
and even during her arraignment.
She
could have protested at the time of her arrest that they were arresting the
wrong person but this she did not do.
She proceeded to post a bond for her provisional liberty, hired a lawyer
to defend her but failed to divulge the very information that could have led to
an early dismissal of the case, if true.
Her
pretensions of ignorance as to the proper stage of when to explain (tsn, May
26, 2003), p. 13 can hardly be given credit.
A dentist by profession, it is utterly incredible that she remained meek
all through-out her arrest and the posting of her bail bond.[21]
The
RTC also unfurled the fact that while Gemma claimed to have never engaged in
the sale and manufacture of Marlboro cigarettes, the address of her business
Fascinate Trading is registered as 1677 Bulacan Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the
same property raided by the EIIB that contained the counterfeit cigarettes.[22]
Aggrieved,
Gemma appealed the RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals based on the
following grounds:
I
THE LOWER
COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING DR. MARIA TERESA GEMMA CATACUTAN GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS LAW DESPITE UTTER
LACK OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE
LOWER COURT IN CONVICTING DR. MARIA TERESA GEMMA CATACUTAN ON THE BASIS OF
SURMISE (sic), CONJECTURES AND
GUESSWORK COMMITTED GRAVE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE.
III
THE LOWER
COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WHO HAD NOT BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND PINPOINTED AS MANUFACTURER NOR (sic) DISTRIBUTOR OF FAKE MARLBORO
PRODUCT.
IV
THE LOWER
COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT GIVING THE SLIGHTEST CREDENCE
TO THE UNCONTRADICTED, UNREFUTED AND CANDID TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT,
BUT INSTEAD, CONVICTED HER ON [T]HE BASIS OF EXTRAPOLATED EVIDENCE NOT BORNE BY
THE RECORDS.
V
THE LOWER
COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE THE UTTER AND PATHETIC LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE PROSECUTIONS
LAME, SHALLOW AND UNCONFOUNDED THEORY OF GUILT.[23]
The Court of Appeals found Gemmas
appeal to be unmeritorious. It said that
Gemma was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the woman who
entertained them during the search of the subject premises on September 25,
1998, and the woman who signed the Certification in the Conduct of Search and
Inventory. The Court of Appeals agreed
with the RTCs rejection of Gemmas defense of mistaken identity, as she should
have raised it at the earliest opportunity, which was at the time of her
arrest, the posting of her bail bond, or during her arraignment. The Court of Appeals held that the amendment
of the prosecution witnesses affidavits was explained during the hearing, and
although the original affidavits were the ones marked during the pre-trial, the
amended ones provided the basis for the filing of the Information against Gemma
and her co-accused Jackson Ong. The
Court of Appeals also noted that the March 20, 2000 Resolution of the State
Prosecutor specifically mentioned that the search warrant was served on Gemma
Ong. The Court of Appeals then
proclaimed that in the hierarchy of evidence, the testimony of the witness in
court commands greater weight than his written affidavit.[24]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of Gemma for trademark infringement under Section 155 of Republic
Act No. 8293, as the counterfeit goods seized by the EIIB were not only found
in her possession and control, but also in the building registered under her
business, Fascinate Trading. The Court
of Appeals said that the prosecution had satisfactorily proven Gemmas
commission of the offense since the unauthorized use of the trademark Marlboro,
owned by PMPI, was clearly intended to deceive the public as to the origin of
the cigarettes being distributed and sold, or intended to be distributed and
sold. The Court of Appeals further sustained
the penalty and damages imposed by the RTC for being in accord with the law and
facts.[25]
Gemma is now before this Court with
the following assignment of errors:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES IDENTIFYING
PETITIONER AS PRESENT AT THE TIME AND PLACE WHEN THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE TOOK
PLACE.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES THAT THEY SAW
PETITIONER SIGN HER NAME AS GEMMA ONG AS OWNER/CLAIMANT/REPRESENTATIVE (OF
THE ARTICLES SEIZED) ON THE SEARCH WARRANT (EXH. A), CERTIFICATION IN THE
CONDUCT OF SEARCH (EXH. B) AND INVENTORY OF THE S[E]IZED ARTICLES AT THE TIME
OF THE SEARCH (EXH. D).
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT PETITIONERS SIGNATURE IN EXHIBITS A, B AND C ARE NOT HERS
BUT WERE FORGED, BEING COMPLETELY AND PATENTLY DISSIMILAR TO HER TRUE AND REAL
SIGNATURE AS SHOWN IN HER OFFICIAL I.D AS PROFESSIONAL DENTIST.
D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHICH DID NOT
MENTION PETITIONERS PRESENCE AT THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE SEARCH CANNOT TAKE
PRECEDENCE OVER THEIR CONTRARY TESTIMONIES IN COURT THAT SHE WAS PRESENT AND IN
FACT THE OCCUPANT AND OWNER OF THE PREMISES FROM WHICH SHE INITIALLY BLOCKED
THEIR ENTRY INTO.
E.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT [PETITIONER] WAS THE VERY SAME PERSON WHO WAS CAUGHT IN
POSSESSION AND CONTROL OF THE PREMISES WHERE THE COUNTERFEIT ARTICLES WERE
SEIZED BECAUSE SHE ALLEGEDLY NEVER PROTESTED BEING WRONGFULLY ACCUSED AT THE
TIME OF HER ARREST ON 4 AUGUST 2000, WHEN SHE POSTED HER CASH BOND AND WHEN SHE
EVEN SIGNED HER NAME AS MA. TERESA GEMMA CATACUTAN IN THE WAIVER, UNDERTAKING
AND CERTIFICATE OR ARRAIGNMENT, ALL IN THE NAME OF THE ACCUSED AS GEMMA ONG,
a.k.a. MA. THERESA CATACUTAN.
F.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING [PETITIONER] FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[26]
Gemma
argues that if it were true that she was in the subject premises when it was
raided on September 25, 1998, then her name and presence would have been
mentioned in the respective affidavits of Slagle and Atty. Ancheta; and the EIIB
agents who conducted the search would have confronted, investigated, or
arrested her. Gemma insists that the
fact that her name was only mentioned for the first time in the amended
affidavits yields to the conclusion that she was not in the subject premises
when it was searched and that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
perjured.[27]
Gemma
further claims that the courts below were wrong in finding that she never
protested that she was mistakenly identified.
She claims that she was arrested without the benefit of a preliminary
investigation and all she wanted to do at that point was to get out [of] the
clutches of overzealous and eager beaver policemen who were exuberant in
arresting an innocent party like[28]
her. Gemma also explains that her
non-protest during her arraignment was upon the advice of her former lawyer,
who said that he would correct it in the proper time during the trial.
Respondent
People of the Philippines, in its comment,[29]
avers that there are only two issues to be resolved in this case, to wit:
1. THE
INSTANT PETITION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE AS IT RAISES QUESTIONS OF FACT WHICH ARE
NOT PROPER FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
2. THE
COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 155 IN RELATION TO SECTION 170 OF R.A. 8293 (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES).[30]
Respondent claims that a perusal of
the issues in Gemmas petition readily discloses that only questions of fact have
been raised, which are not reviewable in an appeal by certiorari.[31] Respondent asseverates that Gemmas
conviction was warranted as the prosecution had sufficiently established her
presence during the search of the subject premises where she signed the search
documents as Gemma Ong. Moreover, the
respondent avers, Gemma failed to timely protest her arrest and raise her claim
that she is not Gemma Ong.[32]
Issues
A study of the
pleadings filed before this Court shows that the only issues to be resolved are
the following:
1.
Whether or not accused-appellants petition
for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is fatally defective as it raises questions of fact;
and
2.
Whether or not Gemmas
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt in light of her alleged mistaken
identity.
This
Courts Ruling
Procedural
Issue
As this case reached this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the basic rule is that factual
questions are beyond the province of this Court, because only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review.[33] However, in exceptional cases, this Court has
taken cognizance of questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, such as
when there was palpable error or a grave misapprehension of facts by the lower
court.[34] In Armed
Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[35]
we said that although submission of issues of fact in an appeal by certiorari taken to this Court is
ordinarily proscribed, this Court nonetheless retains the option in the
exercise of its sound discretion, taking into account the attendant
circumstances, either to decide the case or refer it to the proper court for
determination.[36] Since the determination of the identity of Gemma
is the very issue affecting her guilt or innocence, this Court chooses to take
cognizance of this case in the interest of proper administration of justice.
Gemma
is guilty of violating
Section
155 in relation to Section 170 of
Republic
Act No. 8293
Gemma was charged and convicted of
violating Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, or
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.
Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. - Any person who shall, without the consent
of the owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark or
the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary
to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;
or
155.2. Reproduce,
counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature
thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation
to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil
action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set
forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated
in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether
there is actual sale of goods or services using the infringing material.
(Sec. 22, R.A. No 166a)
Section 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and
administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment
from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (₱50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), shall be
imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts
mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188 and 189,
Revised Penal Code.) (Emphases supplied.)
A mark is any visible sign
capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of
an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods.[37]
In McDonalds Corporation and McGeorge Food Industries, Inc. v. L.C. Big
Mak Burger, Inc.,[38] this Court held:
To establish
trademark infringement, the following elements must be shown: (1) the validity
of plaintiffs mark; (2) the plaintiffs ownership of the mark; and (3) the use
of the mark or its colorable imitation by the alleged infringer results in
likelihood of confusion. Of these, it
is the element of likelihood of confusion that is the gravamen of trademark
infringement.
A mark is valid if it is
distinctive and not barred from registration.
Once registered, not only the marks validity, but also the registrants
ownership of the mark is prima facie
presumed.[39]
The prosecution was able to
establish that the trademark Marlboro was not only valid for being neither
generic nor descriptive, it was also exclusively owned by PMPI, as evidenced by
the certificates of registration issued by the Intellectual Property Office of
the Department of Trade and Industry.[40]
Anent the element of confusion,
both the RTC and the Court of Appeals have correctly held that the counterfeit
cigarettes seized from Gemmas possession were intended to confuse and deceive
the public as to the origin of the cigarettes intended to be sold, as they not
only bore PMPIs mark, but they were also packaged almost exactly as PMPIs
products.[41]
Regarding
the Claim of Mistaken Identity
Despite all these findings, Gemma
has posited only a single defense, from the RTC all the way up to this Court: that
she is not the Gemma Ong named and accused in this case. She bases this claim on the alleged discrepancies
in the prosecution witnesses original affidavits vis--vis the amended ones, which discrepancies, according to her,
strongly suggest her innocence.
This Court has time and again held
that between an affidavit executed outside the court, and a testimony given in
open court, the latter almost always prevails.
Discrepancies
between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the
acquittal of an accused. Such
discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are often
incomplete. They do not purport to
contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the
affiant. Thus, our rulings generally
consider sworn statements taken out of court to be inferior to in court testimony.
x x x.[42]
A reading of the
original affidavits[43]
executed by Slagle and Atty. Ancheta, readily reveals that they concentrated on
the facts and events leading up to the search and seizure of the contraband
materials from the subject premises.
They not only failed to mention Gemma Ongs presence there, but they
also failed to mention the other witnesses names and presence there as
well. Although this might appear to be a
mistake on the part of a known and established law firm like the Quasha Law
Office, the firm immediately sought to rectify this by having the affidavits of
Slagle, Atty. Ancheta, and Lara amended.
If it were true
that Gemma was not at the subject premises at all on September
25, 1998, then she should have grabbed every chance to correct this notion and
expose this mistake before she was arrested.
She could have brought up her defense of mistaken identity or absence at
the raid in the preliminary investigation conducted prior to the issuance of her
warrant of arrest; but instead, she chose to ignore her subpoena and disregard
the preliminary investigation. Even then,
Gemma had the opportunity to raise the fact that she was
not Gemma Ong; not only during her arrest, but also during the posting of the cash
bond for her bail, and more importantly, during her arraignment, when she was asked if she understood the
charges against her. Gemma also knew
that the Information was filed against her on the basis of the amended
affidavits, thus, she could have filed a motion to quash the information before
she entered her plea, or asked that a reinvestigation be conducted. However, all these Gemma failed to do.
We agree with the RTC that it is highly unlikely that a person of her
stature and educational attainment would be so meek and timid that she failed
to protest against her being wrongly identified, accused, arrested, and
potentially imprisoned. If what she says
were true, she would not have agreed to post bail or to be arraigned without at
the very least, bringing up the fact that she was not the Gemma Ong the police officers
were looking for. In addition, her own
lawyer, Atty. Maglinao, brought up the fact that she was not Gemma Ong, only
for the purpose of correcting the Information, and not to contest it, to wit:
WITNESS ROGER SHERMAN SLAGLE
UNDER THE SAME OATH FOR CONTINUATION OF DIRECT EXAMINATION BY:
ATTY. ERESE:
With
the kind permission of the hon. court.
COURT: Proceed.
ATTY.
MAGLINAO:
I
would just want to be on record that my client, Gemma Catacutan has never been
known as Gemma Ong because her real name is Gemma Catacutan.
COURT: Do you have any
objection to the amendment of the information?
ATTY.
MAGLINAO:
No, your
Honor. May we request to correct the
information from Gemma Ong to Gemma Catacutan.[44]
Gemma
further accuses the prosecution witnesses of falsely testifying and of
perjuring themselves just so they can satisfy a big client like PMPI by showing
that somebody had been arrested for counterfeiting its cigarettes. The crimes Gemma is imputing on these witnesses are serious crimes,
and in the absence of concrete and convincing evidence, this Court could not
believe her mere allegations that imply that these people would destroy
someones life just so they can please a client, more so over mere cigarettes. In Principio
v. Hon. Barrientos,[45]
we said:
Bad faith is never presumed while
good faith is always presumed and the chapter on Human Relations of the Civil
Code directs every person, inter alia, to
observe good faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience. Therefore, he who claims bad faith must prove
it. For one to be in bad faith, the same
must be evident. x x x.[46]
The prosecution
witnesses, contrary to Gemmas
claim, had positively identified her as the person who initially refused the
search team entrance, then later acquiesced to the search operations. Slagle explained that even though he
mentioned Gemma only in his amended affidavit, he was sure that she was at the
subject premises on the day that they searched it:
Testimony
of Roger Sherman Slagle
ATTY. MAGLINAO:
Q In this amended
affidavit you mentioned the name, Gemma Catacutan as one of the accused?
A Yes sir.
Q Can you tell the court how you were able to
include the name of Gemma Catacutan in your amended affidavit, when in fact it
did not appear in the first affidavit?
A When
we arrived she was there and she was very nervous and upset.
x x x x
A It is very
clear to me when I arrived there that she was somehow involved.[47]
(Emphases ours.)
Lara on the
other hand, even pointed to her and thus positively identified her to be the
one who had signed the search documents,[48]
as the owner of the subject premises, to wit:
Testimony of Jesse Lara
ATTY. FREZ
Q : Mr.
Witness, do you know this person who
wrote the name Gemma Ong?
A : Yes, sir, Gemma Ong is the owner of the
premises when we served the search warrant and also, she was the one who
refused us to gain entry during the service of the search warrant.
Q : Were
you able to gain entry at the premises?
A : Yes,
sir.
Q : So, as regard to the person whom you
identify as the one who refused you to gain entry, would you be able to
identify this person?
A : Yes, sir, that lady in pink is Mrs.
Gemma Ong.
(As
witness is pointing to the accused Gemma Ong).
Q : Mr. Witness, why do you say that the person
whom you pointed to us is the one who wrote the name Mrs. Gemma Ong?
WITNESS
Because when we served the search warrant she signed
it in our presence and that is her own signature.
x x x x
ATTY.
FREZ
Q : So,
Mr. Witness, in this Inventory, we made some markings during the pre-trial
conference and I see here above the signature (Owner/Representative), there
exist a handwritten name which reads GEMMA ONG and above it, there exist a
signature, are you familiar with this person which appears to be Gemma Ong?
A : Yes, sir, Gemma Ong signed that in my
presence.
Q : Your
Honor, during the pre-trial conference, it was previously marked as Exhibit
D-1. Mr. Witness, I also see here a
Verification but there also exist an entry below the name and I quote
Owner/Claimant/Representative, there appears a handwritten name Gemma Ong and
a signature above it, are you familiar with this person which appears to be
Gemma Ong?
A : Yes, sir, Gemma Ong signed that in my presence.
x x x x
Q : Mr.
Witness, in this document which is the certification in the Conduct of Search
and I have here above the entry (Owner/Representative), a handwritten name
which reads Gemma Ong and there exist a signature above the handwritten name,
can you identify the signature?
A : Yes, sir, this was signed by Gemma Ong in
my presence.[49]
(Emphases ours.)
Lara further attested
to the fact that the search warrant was served on Gemma, who later on
entertained the search team:
ATTY. FREZ
Mr. Witness,
the person to whom you served the search warrant is identified as Mrs. Gemma
Ong, do you know her relationship with the accused Jackson Ong?
ATTY.
FERNANDEZ
Objection,
your honor, the witness would be incompetent . . .
COURT
May answer.
(The
stenographer read back the question).
WITNESS
I am not
familiar with the relationship of Mrs. Gemma Ong with Jackson Ong because
during the service of the search warrant, Mrs. Gemma Ong was there together
with two employees and when I asked where was Jackson Ong, she was the one who
entertained us.
ATTY.
FREZ
So, the
search warrant was served against Gemma Ong?
WITNESS
Yes, Sir.[50]
Positive
identification of a culprit is of great weight in determining whether an
accused is guilty or not.[51] Gemma, in claiming the defense of mistaken
identity, is in reality denying her involvement in the crime. This Court has held that the defense of
denial is insipid and weak as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to prove; thus,
it cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.[52] The
defense of denial is unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact that
there was positive identification of the accused.[53]
While Gemma
claims she does not know Jackson Ong, the subject premises where the
counterfeit cigarettes were seized was registered under her admitted business
Fascinate Trading.[54] Aside from the bare allegation that she had
stopped operations in the subject premises as early as February 1998, she has neither
proven nor shown any evidence that she had relinquished control of the building
after that date. Gemmas allegation that
she did not sign the search documents, and that the signatures therein did not
match the signature on her PRC identification card, must also be struck down as
she has not shown proof that her PRC signature is the only way she has ever
signed her name. She could have, at the
very least, gotten a handwriting expert to testify on her behalf that there is
no way that the signatures in the search documents and the signature on her PRC
identification card could have been written by one and the same person;
instead, she relied on the flimsy contention that the two signatures were, on
their face, different.
Gemmas defense
consists of her claim of mistaken identity, her denial of her involvement in
the crime, and her accusation against the prosecution witnesses of allegedly
giving false testimonies and committing perjury. These are all weak, unproven, and unfounded
claims, and will not stand against the strong evidence against her.
WHEREFORE,
this Court DENIES the Petition. The June 16, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28308 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice |
* Per raffle dated October 19, 2011.
** Per raffle dated October 19, 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 19-36; penned by Associate
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now Associate Justice of this Court) with
Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now Associate Justice of this Court) and
Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.
[2] Records,
pp. 325-331.
[3] Id. at 1.
[4] Id.
at 30.
[5] Id.
at 28-30.
[6] Id.
at 38.
[7] Id.
at 51-53.
[8] TSN,
November 14, 2001, pp. 3-9.
[9] TSN,
January 22, 2002, pp. 6-25.
[10] TSN,
October 10, 2001, pp. 3-13.
[11] TSN,
April 12, 2002, pp. 3-20.
[12] Rollo, pp. 19-21.
[13] Records,
pp. 229-235.
[14] Id. at 261.
[15] Id. at 282.
[16] TSN, May 26, 2003, pp. 36-37.
[17] Id.
at 39-40.
[18] TSN,
June 9, 2003, pp. 13-15.
[19] TSN,
May 26, 2003, pp. 5-30.
[20] Records,
pp. 330-331.
[21] Id.
at 329-330.
[22] Id.
at 330.
[23] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[24] Id.
at 32-33.
[25] Id.
at 34-35.
[26] Id.
at 47-48.
[27] Id.
at 49-50.
[28] Id.
at 57.
[29] Id.
at 119-139.
[30] Id. at 126-127.
[31] Id.
at 127-128.
[32] Id.
at 127-132.
[33] Hko Ah Pao v.
Ting, G.R. No. 153476, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA
551, 559.
[34] Santos v. People and Sandiganbayan, 400
Phil. 1175, 1201 (2000).
[35] 370
Phil. 150 (1999).
[36] Id.
at 165.
[37] Section
121.1, Republic Act No. 8293.
[38] 480
Phil. 402 (2004).
[39] Id.
at 424-425.
[40] Records
(thin folder), pp. 13-54.
[41] TSN,
November 27, 2001, pp. 3-14.
[42] People v. Minangga and Agando, 388 Phil. 353, 362 (2000).
[43] Records, pp. 158-169.
[44] TSN,
November 26, 2001, pp. 3-4.
[45] 515 Phil. 799 (2005).
[46] Id. at 811.
[47] TSN,
November 27, 2001, pp. 16-17.
[48] Records, pp. 153 and 155.
[49] TSN,
January 22, 2002, pp. 15-22.
[50] TSN,
January 22, 2002, pp. 24-25.
[51] People v. Bihag, Jr. and Hilot, 396 Phil. 289, 296 (2000).
[52] People v. Pangilinan, 443 Phil. 198, 235-236 (2003).
[53] People v. Quimzon, 471 Phil. 182, 203 (2004).
[54] Records, p. 298.