Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST
DIVISION
|
COL. FRANCISCO DELA MERCED, substituted by his heirs namely, LUIS
CESAR DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA DELA MERCED nee
MACATANGAY, and MARIA OLIVIA M. PAREDES, |
|
G.R. No. 167140 Present: |
|
Petitioners, |
|
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
|
|
|
BERSAMIN, |
|
- versus - |
|
|
|
|
|
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
|
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and Spouses VICTOR and
MILAGROS MANLONGAT, |
|
Promulgated: |
|
Respondents. |
|
November 23, 2011 |
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D E C I S
I O N
A transferee pendente lite of registered land, whose
title bears a notice of a pending litigation involving his transferors title
to the said land, is bound by the
outcome of the litigation, whether it be for or against his transferor. Given this principle, the modification of the final decision
against the transferor in order to include the transferee pendente lite
does not violate the doctrine of immutability of final judgments. His inclusion does not add to or change the
judgment; it is only a legal consequence of the established doctrine that a
final judgment binds the privy of a litigating party.
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review[1]
assailing the validity of the February 9, 2005 Order[2]
of Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Conformably with Section 8, Rule
39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, execution in this case can only be
implemented as far as what has been decreed in the decision dated September 11,
2001, qualified by the Order of this Court dated January 20, 2003 with respect [to]
the payment of attorneys fees.
In view thereof, plaintiffs
motion for supplemental writ of execution is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The
September 11, 2001 Decision referred to in the assailed Order was rendered by
this Court in G.R. No. 140398, entitled Col.
Francisco Dela Merced, substituted by his heirs, namely, BLANQUITA E. DELA
MERCED, LUIS CESAR DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED (nee MACATANGAY), and
MARIA OLIVIA M. PAREDES, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and
SPOUSES VICTOR and MILAGROS MANLONGAT.[5] The fallo
of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision of the P50,000.00,
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
G.R. No. 140398 has long attained finality[7] but could not be executed
because of the objections raised by the Register of Deeds (RD) and respondent
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
These objections, which the trial court found insurmountable in its
assailed February 9, 2005 Order, are now presented to us for resolution.
Factual antecedents
This
case involves five registered parcels of land located within the Antonio
Subdivision, Pasig City Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8
(subject properties). These lots were
originally owned by, and titled in the name of, Jose C. Zulueta (Zulueta), as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26105.[8] TCT No. 26105 contains several lots, other
than the subject properties, within the Antonio Subdivision.
Later, the Zulueta spouses mortgaged[9]
several lots contained in TCT No. 26105 to the GSIS, which eventually
foreclosed on the mortgaged properties, including the subject properties. Upon
consolidation of GSISs ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas name was
cancelled, and TCT No. 23554[10]
was issued in GSISs name.[11]
Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners
predecessor, Francisco Dela Merced (Dela Merced) filed a complaint[12]
praying for the nullity of the GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties (Lots
6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8) on the ground that he, not the
Zuluetas, was the owner of these lots at the time of the foreclosure. Dela
Merced also impleaded Victor and Milagros Manlongat,[13]
who were claiming
Dela Merced caused the annotation of lis pendens[15]
on GSISs TCT No. 23554 on September 21, 1984 in order to protect his interests
in the subject properties. Dela Merced
died in 1988 and was substituted by his heirs, the petitioners in the instant
case.
After a protracted litigation, the case reached this
Court as G.R. No. 140398. On September
11, 2001, a Decision[16]
was rendered in petitioners favor. The
Court nullified GSISs foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots
were never part of its mortgage agreement with the Zulueta spouses. The dispositive portion of said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the petition is granted.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside. The decision of the P50,000.00,
and to pay the costs.[17]
Judgment was entered on
April 23, 2002.[18]
Pursuant to the finality of
the above Decision, petitioners filed a Motion for Execution[19]
with Branch 160 of the RTC of Pasig City.
First obstacle:
GSISs alleged exemption from execution
GSIS opposed the motion for execution, citing as basis Section
39 of Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291),
also known as the GSIS Act of 1997. The
said provision allegedly exempts GSIS funds and properties from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy and other court processes.[20]
On January 20, 2003, the trial court granted petitioners
motion for execution; but held in abeyance the execution of the award of
attorneys fees, pending clarification before the higher courts of the issue of
GSISs exemption under Section 39 of RA 8291.
The said Order is reproduced below:
Acting on the Motion for
Execution filed by the plaintiff herein together with the opposition of
defendant GSIS, and considering that the judgment has already become final and
executory, the same is hereby Granted.
As prayed for, let a writ of execution
issue to enforce the judgment of this court.
However, with respect to the
payment of attorneys fees in the increased amount of P50,000.00 which
has to be paid jointly and severally by the GSIS and Sps. Manlongat, the same
is held in abeyance as far as GSIS is concerned pending clarification by the
GSIS before the Supreme Court on the issue of whether its funds and assets are
exempt from execution pursuant to Section 39, R.A. 8291, otherwise known as the
GSIS Act of 1997.
SO ORDERED.[21]
A writ of execution was issued on July 24, 2003.[22]
Eventually, GSIS filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the trial courts implementation of the writ of execution
against it.[23] The petition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87821, presented the issue whether the trial judge
gravely abused her discretion in ordering execution against GSIS funds and
properties despite their alleged express and absolute exemption from execution,
garnishment, and other court processes under Section 39 of RA 8291.[24]
In
its October 28, 2005 Decision, the CA dismissed GSISs petition and held that execution may be enforced against it.[25] The ratio
of the appellate court is reproduced in part:
Public respondent court
presided by Hon. Amelia A. Fabros did not commit grave abuse of discretion when
it issued the Writ of Execution dated 24 July 2003. It must be considered that the properties
which (Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 of Antonio
Subdivision) were the subject of the writ of execution in the instant case are
not the properties of petitioner GSIS.
In the court a quos Decision dated October 23, 1987 and
reiterated in the Honorable Supreme Courts Decision dated September 11, 2001,
it declared inter alia that the
certificates of title issued to petitioner GSIS pertaining to Lot Nos. 6, 7, 8,
and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 are null and void and further directed inter alia the Register of Deeds of
Pasig City to cancel all the present certificates of title in the name of
petitioner GSIS. x x x[26]
x x x x
[P]etitioner
GSIS has no interest over the subject properties and x x x had never validly
acquired ownership thereof. x x x[27] Therefore, any and all [rights] that
petitioner GSIS may have on the subject properties were non-existent from the
very beginning. Verily, the court a quo was right then in issuing the
writ of execution dated 24 July 2003 and that petitioner GSIS claim that it
should be exempted from execution has no basis in fact and in law.[28]
x x x x
We lay stress that the
pronouncement made in the abovementioned SC circular and in the case of
Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego, cited in the Armovit case find
no application in the case at bar. It
must be noted that the properties referred to therein are those owned by
government which could not be seized under writ of execution to satisfy such
judgment because to do so, there is a necessity for the corresponding
appropriation of public funds by Congress before the same could be disbursed. In this instant case, it has already been
settled that the herein properties involved are not owned by petitioner GSIS;
hence, there is no prohibition that the same could be executed and that there
is no public funds involved which require the corresponding appropriation
thereof. x x x[29]
x x x x
In fine, the execution of the
subject properties is proper for to assert otherwise, would be depriving
private respondents dela Merced and Paredes of their properties without due
process of law as it had been clearly established on record that they really
owned the subject properties. To sustain
petitioner GSIS view that it should be exempt from execution would be putting
the subject properties beyond the reach of the rightful owners thereof x x x. Likewise, to uphold petitioner GSIS theory
would inevitably lead to a disastrous consequence and lend imprimatur to
deprivation of property without due process of law. Additionally, to grant petitioner GSIS
prayer that the subject properties be exempt from execution without any factual
and legal basis thereof would resultantly remain the same in the custody or
control of petitioner GSIS which unjustly enriches itself at the expense of
private respondents dela Merced and Paredes and who the latter could be deprived
of the beneficial use/ownership thereof when in the very first place they were
able to establish the ownership thereof.
Every person who through an act or performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.[30]
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant PETITION FOR CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Writ of Execution dated 24
July 2003 and the Order dated 16 September 2004 both rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 stand.
SO ORDERED. [31]
GSISs motion for
reconsideration of the above Decision was denied in the June 30, 2006
Resolution of the appellate court.[32] GSIS appealed the CA Decision to this Court[33] but the petition was denied in a Resolution dated
February 12, 2007,[34] which denial was entered
in the Book of Judgments on October 2, 2007.[35]
Second obstacle:
Alleged inadequacy of the fallo
After
the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption, petitioners encountered more
problems with the execution of the September 11, 2001 Decision in G.R. No.
140398. According to the RD of Pasig
City, Policarpio Espenesin, he could not enforce the Decision in G.R. No.
140398 as worded.
The
order to cancel the titles of GSIS over Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 allegedly could
not be enforced because GSIS no longer had title over these two lots. GSIS had
already conveyed these lots in 1985 and 1988 to Diogenes Bartolome (Lot 8) and
Antonio Dimaguila [Dimaguila] (
The RD
also found difficulty in implementing the order to cancel GSISs titles over
Lot 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 and to issue new ones in petitioners
name because no such individual titles exist in his records. The RD posited
that these two lots must still be included in GSISs mother title, TCT No.
23554. The RD opined that he cannot
cancel GSISs mother title, even if it contains Lot 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of
Block 8 because it would affect other lots that might still be included
therein.
The RD
further lamented that assuming he could cancel
GSISs mother title with respect to Lot 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8,
there is still no way that he could issue new titles over these lots in
petitioners name. This is because his
office has no information regarding the technical descriptions for these two
lots. The RD thus suggested that the
parties provide him with these relevant information before he can proceed.
In
order to address these difficulties, petitioners filed before the trial court a
Motion for Supplemental Writ of Execution.[39] They
prayed for a supplemental writ ordering the RD to cancel the titles over Lots 7
and 8 of Block 2 in GSISs name or in the name of other subsequent transferees;
and directing the GSIS and the Bureau of Lands to supply the RD with the technical
descriptions of Lot 10, Block 2, and
GSIS opposed the issuance of a supplemental
writ of execution.[41]
On February 9, 2005, Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued the
assailed order denying petitioners motion for supplemental writ of execution.
Respondents arguments
The Manlongats could not be served with
copies of the Courts resolutions; hence the Court dispensed with their
comment.[42]
GSIS argues that petitioners motion was properly denied because it seeks
to modify a final and
executory Decision. The September 11,
2001 Decision in G.R. No. 140398 only ordered the cancellation of GSISs titles
over the subject properties. It did not
order the cancellation of all derivative titles of GSISs transferees; nor did
it order the GSIS to perform acts such as providing the RD with the technical
descriptions for Lot 10, Block 2 and
Further, GSIS argues that the inclusion of derivative
titles in the September 11, 2001 Decision in G.R. No. 140398 would deprive the
holders of these derivative titles their day in court. GSIS opines that the holders of the
derivative titles are not bound by the judgment against GSIS because these
holders are strangers to the action between GSIS and petitioners.
Lastly,
GSIS again raises its earlier argument that the September 11, 2001 Decision in G.R. No. 140398 cannot be enforced
because of GSISs exemption from court processes under RA 8291.
Petitioners arguments
Petitioners
counter that the September 11, 2001 Decision in G.R. No. 140398 can be enforced against GSISs transferees pendente lite because these transferees
were given notice of the pendency of the case by virtue of the notice of lis pendens that had been inscribed on
GSISs TCT No. 23554 as early as September 21, 1984. In fact, when TCT No. 23554 was cancelled
with respect to Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 in order to issue new titles in Dimaguilas
and Victorinos names, this notice was carried over to their respective titles.
Moreover, the conveyance of these lots to Victorino and Dimaguila transpired in
1985 and 1988, respectively; clearly during the pendency of the case and with
notice of the questions surrounding GSISs ownership over these
properties.
As
transferees pendente lite, Dimaguilas
and Victorinos titles are proper subjects of writs of execution even if they
were not actual parties to the case.
Petitioners cite Voluntad v.
Spouses Dizon[43] as their authority.[44]
With
regard to the issuance of new titles for Lot 10, Block 2 and
Petitioners
maintain that execution of the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 should not be
confined to the literal terms contained only in the fallo or the dispositive portion.[46]
As regards GSISs alleged exemption, petitioners posit that the GSIS can
no longer raise the issue of exemption from execution given that the CA had
already rendered its Decision on that question in CA-G.R. SP No. 87821. The said Decision was affirmed by this Court
in G.R. No. 173391 through our February 12, 2007 Resolution[47] and entry of judgment in
that case was made on October 2, 2007.[48]
Issues
Can GSIS still raise the issue of exemption?
Whether a final and executory judgment against GSIS
and Manlongat can be enforced against their successors-in-interest or holders
of derivative titles
Whether an order to cancel title to a particular
property includes an order to provide technical descriptions and segregate it
from its mother title
Our Ruling
On the issue of
GSISs exemption
The issue of GSISs alleged exemption under RA 8291 had
been finally decided against GSIS in G.R. No. 173391, when this Court denied
GSISs petition for review. The denial
rendered the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 87821 final and executory. GSISs attempt to resurrect the same issue by
interjecting the same in this proceeding is barred by the principle of law of
the case, which states that determinations
of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its
subsequent stages where such determination has already been made on a prior
appeal to a court of last resort.[49] The Decision in G.R. No. 173391 allowing the
execution of the judgment against GSIS is the law of the case and controls
the proceedings below which are already in the execution stage.
Enforcement
of judgment against transferees pendente lite
A notice of lis pendens is an announcement
to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving
as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the
result of the litigation over the said property.[50] The effect of the annotation of lis pendens on future transactions over
the subject property is discussed by an authority on land titles and
registration:
Once
a notice of lis pendens has been duly
registered, any cancellation or issuance of the title of the land involved as
well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same, would have to be subject
to the outcome of the litigation. In
other words, upon the termination of the litigation there can be no risk of
losing the property or any part thereof as a result of any conveyance of the
land or any encumbrance that may be made thereon posterior to the filing of the
notice of lis pendens.[51]
It is not
disputed that petitioners caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 23554, which covers Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2,
as early as September 21, 1984.[52] On July 29, 1985 and August 24, 1998, TCT No.
23554 was cancelled with respect to Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 and new individual
titles were issued to Victorino and Dimaguila. Both titles had the notice of lis pendens which was carried over from
TCT No. 23554. Ineluctably, both Victorino and Dimaguila had
notice of the litigation involving GSISs ownership over the subject
properties, and were bound by the outcome of the litigation. When a transferee pendente lite takes property with notice of lis pendens, such transferee undertakes to respect the outcome of
the litigation. As held in Selph v. Vda. de Aguilar,[53] an order to cancel the transferors
title may be enforced against his transferee, whose title is expressly subject
to the outcome of the litigation by the fact of the annotation of lis pendens.
The existence of these entries on Dimaguilas
and Victorinos titles bars any defense of good faith[54]
against petitioners and effectively makes Dimaguila and Victorino mere privies
of GSIS and subject to whatever rights GSIS might have in the subject
properties, which (as it turns out) is none at all. What Dimaguila and Victorino possess are
derivative titles of the GSISs title over Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2, which this
Court has finally adjudicated to be null and void. Given the legal maxim that a spring cannot
rise higher than its source, it follows that Dimaguilas and Victorinos
titles, or any other title over the subject properties that are derived from
TCT No. 23554 of the GSIS, are likewise null and void. As explained by this Court in another case,
the title obtained by the transferee pendente
lite affords him no special protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a
purchaser in good faith and cannot acquire better rights than those of his
predecessor-in-interest.[55]
In Voluntad v. Spouses
Dizon,[56] the
Court allowed the issuance of an alias
writ of execution against the transferees pendente lite, who had knowledge of the
pending litigation on the basis of the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on their titles. The Court clarified therein that there was no
need for the victorious [parties] to file a separate action to enforce their
right to recover the property as against the new registered owners.[57]
In Associated
Bank v. Pronstroller,[58]
the Court affirmed the judgments of the trial and appellate courts cancelling
the titles of the spouses Vaca, who were transferees pendente lite of Associated Bank, despite the fact that the spouses
Vaca were not parties to the case between Associated Bank and the
Pronstrollers. The Court explained
therein:
Admittedly, during the pendency
of the case, respondents timely registered a notice of lis pendens to warn the
whole world that the property was the subject of a pending litigation.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in
a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.
Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the
properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation. x x x
The filing of a notice of lis
pendens has a twofold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation
within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent
the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the
land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will
promulgate subsequently.
This registration, therefore,
gives the court clear authority to cancel the title of the spouses Vaca, since
the sale of the subject property was made after the notice of lis pendens. x x x[59]
Upon Associated Banks MR,
the spouses Vaca filed a motion to intervene arguing that they had a real
interest in assailing the July 14, 2008 Decision, which ordered the
cancellation of their title. The Court
denied the intervention. It was held
that the interests of the spouses Vaca in the subject property were properly
represented in the action by their transferor/vendor Associated Bank, which was
already a party thereto. As transferees pendente lite, the spouses Vaca stand
exactly in the shoes of their predecessor-in-interest, Associated Bank.[60]
The Court cannot accept GSISs theory that the
dispositive portion of the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is enforceable only
against GSISs title because it does not contain the phrase and all its
derivative titles. GSISs narrow interpretation would render
nugatory the principle that a final judgment against a party is binding on his
privies and successors-in-interest. We
cannot sustain this interpretation. In Cabresos v. Judge Tiro,[61]
the Court upheld the respondent judges issuance of an alias writ of execution
against the successors-in-interest of the losing litigant despite the fact that
these successors-in-interest were not mentioned in the judgment and were never
parties to the case. The Court explained that an action is binding on the privies
of the litigants even if such privies are not literally parties to the action. Their inclusion in the writ of execution does
not vary or exceed the terms of the judgment.
In the same way, the inclusion of the derivative titles in the writ of
execution will not alter the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 ordering the
cancellation of GSISs title.
Cancellation of
title
The RD claimed that it cannot execute the order to cancel
the GSISs titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and
GSIS refused to turn over the needed documents and
information, claiming that these acts go beyond what were ordered in the Decision
in G.R. No. 140398. GSISs protestations ring
hollow.
The order contained in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is
for the RD to cancel GSISs titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and
A
similar predicament was ruled upon by the Court in Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[62] In that case, the Court
declared that Republic Mines had no right to the property involved but during
the execution, the RD refused to cancel the TCT in Republic Mines name on the
ground that the dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision did not order
the RD to cancel the title and to revive the old title in favor of the
victorious party. The Court held that
the missing order to cancel and revive should be deemed implied in the trial
courts decision. Speaking through
Justice Feliciano, the Court explained thus:
What is involved here is
not what is ordinarily regarded as a clerical error in the dispositive part of
the decision of the Court of First Instance, which type of error is perhaps
best typified by an error in arithmetical computation. At the same time, what
is involved here is not a correction of an erroneous judgment or dispositive
portion of a judgment. What we believe is involved here is in the nature of an
inadvertent omission on the part of the Court of First Instance x x x, of what
might be described as a logical follow-through of something set forth both in
the body of the decision and in the dispositive portion thereof: the inevitable
follow-through, or translation into, operational or behavioral terms, of the
annulment of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, from which
petitioners' title or claim of title embodied in TCT 133153 flows. The
dispositive portion of the decision itself declares the nullity ab initio of
the simulated Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage and instructed the
petitioners and all persons claiming under them to vacate the subject premises
and to turn over possession thereof to the respondent-spouses. Paragraph B of
the same dispositive portion, confirming the real estate mortgage executed by
the respondent-spouses also necessarily assumes that Title No. 133153 in the
name of petitioner Republic Mines is null and void and therefore to be
cancelled, since it is indispensable that the mortgagors have title to the real
property given under mortgage to the creditor (Article 2085 [2], Civil Code).[63]
x x x x
There are powerful
considerations of an equitable nature which impel us to the conclusions we
reach here. Substantial justice cannot be served if the
When a judgment calls for the issuance of a new title
in favor of the winning party (as in the instant case), it logically follows
that the judgment also requires the losing party to surrender its title for
cancellation. It is the only sensible
way by which the decision may be enforced.
To this end, petitioners can obtain a court order requiring the
registered owner to surrender the same and directing the entry of a new
certificate of title in petitioners favor.[65] The trial court should have granted petitioners
motion for supplemental writ of execution as it had authority to issue the
necessary orders to aid the execution of the final judgment.[66]
GSISs objection that these orders cannot be
enforced because they do not literally appear in the Decision in G.R. No.
140398 is unreasonable. GSIS would have
the Court spell out the wheres, whys, and hows of the execution. GSIS wants a dispositive portion that is a
step-by-step detailed description of what needs to be done for purposes of
execution. This expectation is
unreasonable and absurd.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 9, 2005 Order of Branch 160 of
the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The decision of the
The Register of Deeds of Pasig City
is ordered to CANCEL all present certificates of title covering the
above-mentioned properties, whether
contained in individual titles or in a mother title, in the name of
GSIS and Elizabeth Manlongat, or in
the name of their privies, successors-in-interest or transferees pendente lite, and to ISSUE new
certificates of title over the same in the name of petitioners as co-owners
thereof.
GSIS
and the Bureau of Lands are ordered to supply the necessary documents and
information for the proper enforcement of the above orders.
Respondents GSIS and spouses Victor
and Milagros Manlongat are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, attorneys
fees in the increased amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court is ordered
to ISSUE the writ of execution in accordance with the above clarified
dispositive portion.
GSIS is seriously warned not to further delay the execution
of this case.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 167140), pp. 10-30.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Rollo (G.R. No. 140398) at 247-261; penned by Associate
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and concurred in by Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. and Associate Justices Santiago M. Kapunan and Bernardo P. Pardo.
[6] Id.
at 259-260.
[7] Entry
of Judgment was recorded on April 23, 2002 (id. at 300-301).
[8] Records, Vol. II, pp. 268-278.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo
(G.R. No. 140398), pp. 247-260.
[17]
[18]
[19] Records,
Vol. IV, pp. 135-140.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Rollo
(G.R. No. 173391), p. 66.
[25]
[26] Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 87821, p. 9; rollo (G.R. No. 173391), p. 68.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] Rollo (G.R. No. 173391), pp. 76-77.
[33]
[34]
[35] Records, Vol. V, pp. 425-426.
[36]
[37]
[38] Comment
of Policarpio L. Espenesin, rollo (G.R.
No. 140398), p. 349.
[39] Records, Vol. IV, pp. 259-266.
[40] This is the prayer contained in petitioners Motion for Supplemental
Writ of Execution:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully
prayed that the Honorable Court order the issuance of a supplemental writ of
execution:
1. Directing the Register of Deeds of Pasig to CANCEL the Transfer Certificates of
Title covering Lot 8, Block 2 and Lot 7, Block 2 in the name of GSIS and all subsequent and derivative titles
of the same in the name of GSIS or other subsequent transferees including
Zenaida C. Victorino, and Antonio C. Dimaguila and to ISSUE new certificates of title over the same in the name of
plaintiffs;
2. Directing the GSIS and the Bureau of Lands to
supply the Register of Deeds of Pasig with the technical descriptions for Lot
10 Block 2 and Lot 8 Block 8 of the property originally covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 26105 within five (5) days.
Other reliefs just and
equitable are prayed for. (
[41]
[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 167140), p. 104.
[43] 372 Phil. 82 (1999).
[44] Petitioners
Memorandum, pp. 11-12; rollo (G.R.
No. 167140), pp. 132-133.
[45]
[46]
[47] Id.
(G.R. No. 173391), pp. 127-128.
[48] Records, Vol. V, pp. 425-426.
[49] Villa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 87186,
87281, 87466, 87524, April 24, 1992, 208 SCRA 283, 295.
[50] Spouses
[51] Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds
(2008 ed.), p. 482; Juan P. Pellicer
& Co. Inc. v. Philippine Realty Corporation, 87 Phil. 302, 307 (1950).
[52] Petitioners
Memorandum, pp. 10-11; rollo (G.R.
No. 167140), pp. 131-132.
[53] 107
Phil. 443 (1960).
[54] Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897,
901-902 (1995).
[55]
[56] Supra note 43.
[57]
[58] G.R. No. 148444, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA
113.
[59]
[60] Associated
Bank (now United Overseas Bank [Phils.]) v. Pronstroller, G.R. No. 148444, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA
13, 17-18.
[61] 248
Phil. 631 (1988).
[62] 236 Phil. 332 (1987).
[63]
[64]
[65] Selph v. Vda. de
Aguilar, supra note 53.
[66] Rules of Court, Rule 135, Section 5.