Republic of the
Supreme
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FIRST
DIVISION
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MAKILITO B. MAHINAY, |
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G.R. No. 165338 |
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Petitioner, |
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HON. IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR., |
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Presiding Judge, Regional Trial |
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Court, Branch 5, |
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and JOCELYN B. SORENSEN, |
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Respondents. |
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JOCELYN B. SORENSEN, |
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G.R. No. 179375 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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BERSAMIN, |
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VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
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MAKILITO B. MAHINAY, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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November 28, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O
N
These
consolidated petitions pertain to a legal tug-of-war between persons trying to
wrest possession of a coveted
In G.R. No. 165338, Makilito B.
Mahinay (Mahinay), thru a petition for certiorari[1] directly
filed with this Court, seeks to nullify the December 12, 2003 Resolution[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-16335. The questioned RTC Resolution denied
Mahinays motion to compel Jocelyn B. Sorensen (Sorensen) to produce and turn
over to him the owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 117531.[3] In the same petition, Mahinay also charges respondent
Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. (Judge Gako) with gross ignorance of the law, abdication
of judicial duty, and failure to resolve a motion within the period prescribed
by law.
Mahinay
likewise assails the July 20, 2004 Order[4] of the
RTC denying his Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
In G.R.
No. 179375, Sorensen on the other hand seeks to reverse and set aside the April
24, 2007 Resolution[6]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed her Petition for Certiorari[7] in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02193. Sorensen filed
said certiorari petition after Judge
Gako volte faced and issued an Order[8] dated
September 1, 2006 ordering her to surrender to Mahinay TCT No. 117531.
Sorensen
likewise challenges the August 3, 2007 Resolution[9] of the
CA denying her Motion for Reconsideration.[10]
Factual Antecedents
Constantina H. Sanchez,
Josefina H. Lopez and Susan Honoridez are the registered owners (the owners) of
a 406-square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5 located in
In said complaint, Mahinay
alleged that in an earlier case[12] he
filed against the owners, the parties therein arrived at a Compromise Agreement
wherein the owners gave him preferential right to buy a 200-square meter portion
of Lot 5 on condition that he will withdraw said case. On February 8, 1993, the trial court thus issued
a Judgment[13]
based on said Compromise Agreement.
On
November 9, 1993, however, the owners sold the entire P300,000.00 without first offering the same to Mahinay.
According to Mahinay, said transaction violated his preferential right to buy
as he was willing and capable of buying the property. To bolster his claim, Mahinay attached to his
second complaint the February 8, 1993 Judgment in the earlier case and a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale[14] dated
November 9, 1993 between the owners and Suarez.
During
the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-16335, Mahinay filed an Ex-Parte
Manifestation and Motion[15]
informing the RTC that he caused the annotation of an adverse claim and then a Notice
of Lis Pendens[16] on TCT
No. 117531 on August 17, 1994.
In traversing Mahinays
allegations, the owners asserted that they did not violate Mahinays
preferential right to buy as the transaction between them and Suarez was
actually an equitable mortgage, and not a sale.
In support of their defense of equitable mortgage, the owners averred
that they remained the occupants and registered owners of
Mahinay
riposted, postulating that the Deed of Absolute Sale he attached to his
Complaint sufficiently confutes the owners defense of equitable mortgage. Besides, the owners and Suarez failed to deny
under oath the authenticity and due execution of said Deed of Absolute Sale. [19]
On June
7, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision[20]
debunking the owners theory of equitable mortgage. It held that the notarized documents Mahinay
presented, particularly the Deed of Absolute Sale, outweigh the owners
evidence consisting of private documents.
Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, this [C]ourt declares [Mahinay]
as being entitled to redeem Lot No. 5 from defendant Felimon Suarez.
Defendant
Felimon Suarez, his heirs, successors and assigns are hereby directed to
execute the Deed of Conveyance, such papers and documents necessary for the
transfer of the title of the said lot to [Mahinay] upon the deposit before this
Court of the same consideration as stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale of the
same lot between defendant Suarez and the other defendants.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.[21]
The owners and Suarez moved for
reconsideration.[22] On November 22, 1996, however, the RTC denied
the same.[23]
Unhappy, they appealed to the
CA.[24] Finding no reversible error therefrom, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC in a Decision[25] dated
December 29, 2000, which became final and executory on February 8, 2001.[26]
About a year later, Mahinay and
Suarez filed a Joint Manifestation[27]
informing the RTC that in compliance with its Decision, Suarez executed a Deed
of Conveyance[28]
in favor of Mahinay, who, in turn, deposited with the RTC the amount of P300,000.00.[29]
Thereafter,
to pave the way for the complete implementation of the RTCs final Decision and
have
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendants Susan
Honoridez, Constantina Sanchez and Josefina Lopez are directed to turn over the
Owners Duplicate Copy of the Certificate of Title of Lot 5 to [Mahinay], and
to vacate the premises thereof in favor of the latter within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this resolution.[32]
Pursuant
to said Resolution, the branch sheriff placed Mahinay in actual and physical
possession of the entire
Whereupon,
Mahinay filed a Motion to Issue an Order Directing Sorensen to Turn Over TCT
No. 117531[34]
to him. This drew Sorensens Opposition,[35] to
which Mahinay tendered his Reply.[36]
On
December 12, 2003, Judge Gako issued the assailed Resolution[37] in G.R.
No. 165338 denying Mahinays motion, the pertinent portions of which read:
The court indeed believes that a
mortgage lien is superior to a Notice of Lis Pendens pursuant to Article 2126
of the Civil Code, which provides that the mortgage directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed to the fulfilment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted. Article 2129 also provides that the creditor
may claim from a third person in possession of the mortgaged property, the
payment of the part of the credit secured by the property which said person
possesses. In short, not even a sale or
transfer of the mortgaged property can affect or release the mortgage because
the purchasers are necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance
of a recorded real estate mortgage, whether the sale or transfer to them be
with or without the consent of the mortgagee.
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, [Mahinays] Motion to Direct Jocelyn B. Sorensen to
turn over Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117531 to the sheriff is hereby
denied.
On January 12, 2004, Mahinay
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[38] of the December
12, 2003 Resolution followed by a Supplemental Arguments in Support of the
Motion for Reconsideration.[39] Sorensen opposed[40] the
motion and to which opposition, on January 20, 2004, Mahinay replied.[41]
Raring
to end his decade long legal battle, Mahinay filed on April 19, 2004 an Ex-parte Motion for Early Resolution.[42] A month later, Mahinay filed a Second Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution,[43] furnishing the Court Administrator a copy thereof with
express reservation of making the same as his formal administrative complaint
in the future.
On July
20, 2004, what seemed to be an interminable wait for Mahinay finally ended,
albeit with unwanted result on his part Judge Gako came up with a one-page
Order[44] denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved yet still refusing to
concede defeat, Mahinay directly went to this Court on October 8, 2004 by
filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against Sorensen and Judge Gako. He raises
the following matters for consideration of this Court:
I.
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTION AND ORDER DATED
DECEMBER 12, 2003 AND JULY 20, 2004 (ANNEXES A AND B RESPECTIVELY), WHEREBY,
ASIDE FROM REFUSING TO PERFORM A MINISTERIAL DUTY TO IMPLEMENT THE FINAL AND
EXECUTORY DECISION IN CEB-16335, HE AMENDED THE SAME AND MADE ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, INDICATIVE OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW CHARACTERIZED WITH
DISHONESTY, FRAUD AND BAD FAITH.
II.
RESPONDENT JUDGE IS GUILTY OF VIOLATING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING JUDGES TO DECIDE PENDING INCIDENTS WITHIN
NINETY (90) DAYS FROM DATE OF SUBMISSION.
III.
THAT PETITIONER HAS NO APPEAL [OR] OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY
AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AGAINST THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION AND ORDER OF
During the pendency of G.R. No.
165338, or on August 29, 2006, Mahinay filed with the RTC a Reiteratory Motion
to Compel Jocelyn Joy B. Sorensen to Surrender Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. 117531.[46] In persuading Judge Gako to reconsider his
earlier position, Mahinay alleged that in a related case[47] filed
by the owners which eventually reached the Supreme Court and docketed as G.R.
No. 153762,[48]
this Court held that the Decision in Civil Case No. CEB-16335 had long become
final and executory, thereby erasing any doubt that the transaction between the
owners and Suarez was indeed a contract of sale. For Mahinay, this Courts ruling in G.R. No.
153762 is a supervening event which would justify Judge Gako to reconsider his
earlier position on the matter of directing Sorensen to hand over to him the
owners copy of TCT No. 117531. He also
suggested that if Judge Gako would grant his motion, the administrative charge
of gross ignorance of the law against the good judge would become moot.
Apparently
persuaded by Mahinays formulations, Judge Gako granted his Reiteratory Motion
on September 1, 2006.[49]
It thus
became Sorensens turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration.[50] She contended that Mahinay violated the rule
against forum shopping as the relief sought in aforesaid Reiteratory Motion is
the same relief prayed for in G. R. No. 165338.
She also pointed out that Judge Gako gravely abused his discretion in
granting said motion for he effectively pre-empted the action of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 165338. With regard to
the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 153762, Sorensen argued that the same is
not conclusive as to whether she cannot remain in possession of the disputed
TCT.
After
Mahinay filed his Opposition,[51] Judge
Gako issued an Order[52] dated
September 18, 2006 denying Sorensens Motion for Reconsideration.
Sorensen
thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari[53]
assailing Judge Gakos September 1, 2006 Order granting Mahinays Reiteratory
Motion. In said petition, she gave her
version of the story as follows
In October 1994, [the owners]
approached [Sorensen] in order to obtain a loan from her. So the former offered Lot No. 5, Block 68 of
the Subdivision Plan, now subject of this case, as a security or collateral to
said loan. In procuring said loan, the
said [owners] showed to [Sorensen] a true copy of their title over said property,
T.C.T. No. 11753.
After
some negotiation[s], [Sorensen], in utmost good faith, relying on the fact that
there [is] no adverse annotation at the back of said title, agreed to extend to
them a loan. As a matter of fact,
[Sorensen] released to said mortgagors a loan of P709,827.00. Thereafter,
a real estate mortgage was executed by said mortgagors in favor of [Sorensen]
as mortgagee to said loan.
[Sorensen],
in good faith, received the owners duplicate original copy of said T.C.T. No.
117531 from [the owners] which when presented and shown to [Sorensen], the same
did not contain any adverse claim over the property to be mortgaged to her;
and, until now, the said owners duplicate original copy of said title is in
actual custody of [Sorensen];
Upon
default of [the owners] in the payment of said loan, [Sorensen] instituted an
extra-judicial foreclosure over the said mortgaged property.
During
the public auction of said mortgaged property, [Sorensen] became the lone and
highest bidder. Consequently, the Court
Sheriff issued the said certificate of sale dated November 12, 2004 in favor of
[Sorensen] stating therein that [Sorensen] was the lone and highest bidder over
the land sold in public auction for P3,362,633.00.
With
the issuance of said certificate of sale, [Sorensen] became entitled to possess
the mortgaged property which she acquired in a public auction;
It
is at this juncture, when [Mahinay] asked the Honorable public respondent Judge
to compel [Sorensen] to surrender the said owners duplicate original copy of
T.C.T. 117531 but the latter in its order dated July 20, 2004 denied said
motion. A motion for reconsideration was
filed but the same was denied.
Subsequently,
[Mahinay] filed a petition for certiorari
dated September 21, 2004 with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 165338
entitled Makilito B. Mahinay vs. Hon. Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr., Presiding Judge of
RTC-Branch 5, Cebu City and Jocelyn B. Sorensen questioning the propriety of
the issuance of said order dated January 6, 2004 which denied the motion to
compel petitioner to surrender T.C.T No. 117531.
Despite
the fact that the said petition for certiorari
is still pending and not yet resolved by the Supreme Court until the present,
the Honorable public respondent Judge issued the questioned order dated
September 1, 2006 directing herein petitioner to surrender T.C.T. No. 117531
which virtually sets aside his previous order dated January 6, 2004 which is
now the subject of said petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. [54]
In a
Resolution[55]
promulgated on April 24, 2007, however, the CA outrightly dismissed Sorensens
petition for her failure to state that the allegations in her petition are true
and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but also based on authentic
records.
Sorensen
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[56] and to
remedy the defect in her petition submitted an Amended Petition[57] with corrected verification. But the CA was not moved by Sorensens
subsequent compliance and, consequently, denied her motion in a Resolution[58] dated
August 3, 2007. Hence, the petition for
review on certiorari in G.R. No.
179375 where Sorensen advances the following arguments:
First Reason/Argument
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR FAILING TO
STATE IN ITS VERIFICATION PORTION THE PHRASE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AS
REQUIRED IN SECTION 4, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE AS AMENDED
BY AM NO. 00-2-10-SC [E]SPECIALLY SO WHEN PETITIONER HAD ALREADY FILED AN
AMENDED PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE CORRECTED VERIFICATION PORTION THIS
TIME CONTAINING THE PHRASE BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS;
Second Reason/Argument
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER COMMITTED A
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE
ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE DISMISSED PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS MORE THAN ENOUGH
REASON TO LIBERALIZE THE STRINGENT REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION OF A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO SECTION 4, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
AS AMENDED BY AM No. 00-2-10-SC;[59]
In a Resolution[60] dated
July 21, 2008, this Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 165338 and
179375.
Parties Arguments
In G.R. No. 165338, Mahinay
argues that the final and executory Decision[61] dated June 7, 1996 in Civil Case No. CEB-16335
pronounced in no uncertain terms that the November 9, 1993 transaction between
the owners and Suarez was a contract of sale.
Hence, said owners could not have validly mortgaged
Mahinay
also contends that Judge Gako committed serious and egregious error in ruling
that the mortgage is superior to the previously annotated adverse claim and Notice
of Lis Pendens. He continues that Judge Gako is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, evident bad faith, fraud, and dishonesty. Mahinay asserts that it is an elementary rule
which ought to be known by lawyers and judges that a final and executory
judgment is unalterable. However, Judge
Gako deliberately ignored such basic rule and even feigned ignorance of the common rules on adverse claim and lis pendens.
Lastly, Mahinay
accuses Judge Gako of unjustifiably sitting on his Motion for Reconsideration. He claims that he filed his Motion for
Reconsideration on January 12, 2004 while Sorensen filed her opposition thereto
on January 20, 2004. The issues raised
in said motion are not difficult to resolve, yet Judge Gako issued his single-page
Order denying said motion only on July 20, 2004. What is more, Judge Gako did not report to
the Supreme Court that he had a pending motion which remained unresolved beyond
the constitutionally mandated 90-day period for resolving motions.
For her
part, Sorensen stands by the RTC and argues that a mortgage lien is superior to
a notice of lis pendens; that she is
not bound by the Decision in Civil Case No. CEB-16335 as she is not a party
thereto; and, that she is an innocent mortgagee for value entitled to remain in
possession of TCT No. 117531. Sorensen
also points out that the delay in the resolution of Mahinays motion only shows
that Judge Gako meticulously studied the case.
Sorensen
claims that in filing his Reiteratory Motion, Mahinay violated the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
She argues that the proper remedy to obtain unlawfully withheld
duplicate certificate of title is to file a case in accordance with Section 107[62] of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[63]
Lastly,
Sorensen calls our attention to the Comment/Manifestation[64] Suarez
filed in G.R. No. 153762 wherein he affirmed that the
transaction between him and the owners was a mere mortgage; that he received
the amount of P419,500.00 from Sorensen as redemption price for the
mortgaged property; and, that he in turn gave to her the owners duplicate copy
of TCT No. 117531.
Our
Ruling
The grant of Mahinays Reiteratory Motion rendered G.R.
No. 165338 moot.
In G.R.
No. 165338, Mahinay essentially seeks to nullify the December 12, 2003
Resolution[65]
of Judge Gako which denied his motion to compel Sorensen to turn over to him TCT
No. 117531. During the pendency of G.R. No. 165338, however, Mahinay filed his
Reiteratory Motion with the same objective to compel Sorensen to surrender to
him the coveted TCT. On September 1,
2006, Judge Gako issued an Order[66] granting
Mahinays Reiteratory Motion and directing Sorensen to turn over to him subject
TCT. Sorensen moved for a
reconsideration which Judge Gako denied until, eventually, Sorensen came to this
Court. Such a change of heart on the
part of Judge Gako negated Mahinays contention that the honorable magistrate committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to compel Sorensen to turn over
to him TCT No. 117531. It also effectively
mooted his petition. Thus, we have no other recourse but to dismiss G.R. No. 165338. In Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment,[67]
this Court pronounced that
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that
courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction
of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would
be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
At this
point it may not be amiss to add (though no longer contested in these petitions)
that Mahinay further continued to pursue his quest at the trial court level to
have TCT No. 117531 in his possession.
On November 14, 2007, he filed a motion[68] praying
for the issuance of a writ of possession directing the sheriff to take
possession of the owners copy of TCT No. 117531. This was granted by the RTC in an Order[69] dated
March 26, 2008. After serving the writ,
the sheriff made a return[70]
informing the RTC that Sorensen refused to surrender the certificate of title.
Mahinay
then changed tack and filed a motion to declare the title in Sorensens possession
as null and void and in lieu thereof to issue a new one under his name.[71] In an Order[72] dated
September 5, 2008, the RTC granted the motion, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to declare
as null and void the owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 117531, dated 5 August 2008, filed by plaintiff, is granted.
The
title of Lot No. 5, Block 68, is ordered transferred to the name of plaintiff,
MAKILITO B. MAHINAY, pursuant to the Deed of Conveyance, attached as Annex A
to the Motion, without the need of surrendering the owners duplicate copy of
the said title, TCT No. 117531.
The
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 117531 is declared null and void, and the
Register of Deeds,
Notify
all the parties concerned of this order and the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Cebu City, for its compliance.
SO
ORDERED.[73]
This
sequence of events which transpired during the pendency of G.R. No. 165338 all
the more rendered it moot.
The administrative charges of gross ignorance of the law
and abdication of a judicial duty lack merit; the administrative charge of
failure to resolve a motion within the prescribed period should be referred to
the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action.
Mahinay accuses Judge Gako,
among others, of gross ignorance of the law and abdication of judicial
duty. From the facts of these cases as
set out above, however, it is quite obvious that Mahinay would not have accused
Judge Gako of such charges had the judge ruled in his favor. It should be recalled that Mahinay first
cocked the gun, so to speak, when he filed his Second Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution[74]
intimating to Judge Gako that he was contemplating on filing an administrative
charge against the magistrate before the Office of the Court
Administrator. Then he filed his Rule 65
petition in G.R. No. 165338 incorporating therein aforesaid administrative
charges against Judge Gako. Yet during
the pendency of said petition Mahinay filed with the RTC his Reiteratory Motion
alleging that
THE GRANT OF THIS REITERATORY MOTION, IT IS BELIEVED,
WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF RENDERING MOOT AND ACADEMIC THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE
AGAINST THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. No. 153762 [sic].[75]
Indubitably, Mahinays
allegations of gross ignorance of the law and abdication of judicial duty are
not based on his sincere and strong belief that Judge Gako should be disciplined. They are mere ploys calculated to induce
Judge Gako to grant his motion. We
cannot countenance such lamentable scheme of Mahinay. It is settled that disciplinary proceedings
against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies. Administrative complaints are not intended to
coerce judges to rule in complainants favor.
Fittingly, we reiterate our pronouncement in Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis:[76]
Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal
remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such
review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge,
without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not
be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be
recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for
acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that
exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if there be a final
declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of
malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the
judge in rendering said judgment or order x x x.
Indeed, unless it can be shown
that their acts are tainted with bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, judges
cannot be held administratively liable for rendering an erroneous judgment[77] simply because
they are not infallible.[78]
Instead of threatening Judge
Gako with administrative charges, Mahinay could have simply awaited the
resolution of G.R. No. 165338.
Unfortunately, as earlier discussed, his own impatience mooted G.R. No.
165338.
With regard to Judge Gakos alleged
tardiness in resolving the Reiteratory Motion, it cannot escape our attention,
however, that he was never given a chance to comment or answer the complaint
against him. Thus, we cannot resolve the
administrative charge of failing to resolve the motion on time without trifling
with his constitutionally enshrined right to due process.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation
of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The
violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of
the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.[79]
For the expeditious and orderly
conduct of proceedings, therefore, we find it appropriate to refer said
administrative charge to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate
action.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Sorensens
petition for certiorari.
With
regard to G.R. No. 179375, Sorensen admits that due to inadvertence she failed
to state in the verification portion of her petition that the allegations therein
are true and correct based on authentic records. Nonetheless, such omission, according to Sorensen,
does not justify the outright dismissal of her petition. She posits that the purpose of verification
is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct. Thus, the requirement that a petition for certiorari
be verified is not an absolute necessity where the material facts alleged are a
matter of records and all the questions raised are mainly of law,[80]
just like in her CA petition. After
all, the absence of verification is a mere formal, not jurisdictional,
defect.
Sorensen misses the point.
The rule
requiring certain pleadings to be verified is embodied in Section 4, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court. It reads:
SEC.
4. Verification.
Except when otherwise specifically required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified
or accompanied by affidavit.
A
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A
pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
information and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of
any legal importance. It is intended to secure
an assurance that the allegations contained in the pleading are true and
correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good
faith.[81] A pleading may be verified by stating that
the pleaders have read the allegations in their petition and that the same are
true and correct based either on their personal knowledge or authentic
records, or based both on their personal knowledge and authentic
records. While the rule gives the
pleaders several ways of verifying their pleading, the use of the phrase personal
knowledge or authentic records is not without any legal
signification and the pleaders are not at liberty to choose any of these
phrases fancifully. Hun Hyung Park v.
Eung Won Choi[82]
teaches us when to properly use authentic records in verifying a
pleading:
[A]uthentic records as a
basis for verification bear significance in petitions wherein the greater
portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the
court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the personal
knowledge of the petitioner. To
illustrate, petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his personal
knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his petition before the CA that
at the pre-trial conference respondent admitted having received the letter of
demand, because he (petitioner) was not present during the conference. Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the
records to confirm its veracity.
In her CA petition, Sorensen questioned the September 1, 2006
and September 18, 2006 Orders of Judge Gako which respectively granted
Mahinays Reiteratory Motion and denied her Motion for Reconsideration. In addition to said Orders and Motions, and
to support the allegations in her petition, Sorensen also attached copies of the
August 12, 2005 Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 153762 and other material
portions of the records of Civil Case No. CEB-16335. Quite obviously, Sorensen had no participation
in the preparation and execution of these documents although they constitute
the main bulk of her evidence. Hence, it
was necessary for Sorensen to state in the verification that the allegations in
her petition are true and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but
also based on the information she gathered from authentic records.[83] The CA is, therefore, correct in its
observation that Sorensens verification is insufficient.
Nonetheless,
the Rules[84]
and jurisprudence on the matter have it that the court may allow such deficiency
to be remedied. In Altres v. Empleo,[85]
this Court pronounced for the guidance of the bench and the bar that non-compliance
x x x or a defect [in the verification] does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the needs of justice may be served thereby.
Pitted against this test, we sustain the CA for not taking a liberal stance in resolving Sorensens
petition for certiorari as the dismissal thereof did not impair or
affect her substantive rights.
No circumstances were present in Sorensens petition
which would warrant the liberal application of the rules to serve the needs of justice.
In claiming that the CA erred in dismissing her petition,
Sorensen alleges that the appellate court glossed over the merits of her certiorari
petition. She maintains that as an
innocent mortgagee for value, she has the superior right to remain in custody
of the owners copy of TCT No. 117531. She
insists that she merely relied on the four corners of said TCT which at the
time of the transaction did not contain any annotation of lis pendens.
We are not impressed. True, when a mortgagee relies upon what
appears on the face of a Torrens title and lends money in all good faith on the
basis of the title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that
the latters title was defective, being thus an innocent mortgagee for value,
his or her right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and
protected.[86] The rationale for this ruling is, if the rule
were otherwise public confidence in the certificate of title would be impaired
as everyone dealing with property registered under the
Such is not the case in the present controversy
however. As borne out by the records, Mahinays
Notice of Lis Pendens was duly annotated on the original copy of TCT No.
117531 as early as August 17, 1994. On
the other hand, the Real Estate Mortgage upon which Sorensen based her alleged
superior right was executed only on October 27, 1994 and inscribed at the back
of said title only on the following day, October 28, 1994. The prior registration of Mahinays Notice of
Lis Pendens bound the whole
world,[87] including
Sorensen. It charged her with notice that the land being
offered to her as security for the loan is under litigation and that whatever
rights she may acquire by virtue of the Real Estate Mortgage are subject to the
outcome of the case.[88] More importantly, it also gave Mahinay a preferential
right over subsequent liens and encumbrances annotated on the title.[89] It is settled that in this jurisdiction the
maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time
is preferred in right) is followed in land registration.[90] Having registered his instrument ahead of
Sorensens Real Estate Mortgage, Mahinays Notice of Lis Pendens takes
precedence over the said Real Estate Mortgage.
The claim of Sorensen that the
owners copy of TCT No. 117531 does not contain any adverse annotation at the
time the owners transacted with her is of no moment. Being in the nature of involuntary
registration, the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on the original copy of TCT No. 117531 on file with the
Registry of Deeds is sufficient to bind third parties. It affects the whole world even if the
owners copy does not contain the same annotation. The reason for this ruling was
explained in Yu v. Court of Appeals:[91]
The annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original copy of the certificate of
title on file with the Register of Deeds is sufficient to constitute
constructive notice to purchasers or other persons subsequently dealing with
the same property. It is not required that said annotation be also inscribed
upon the owner's copy because such copy is usually unavailable to the
registrant; it is normally in the hands of the adverse party, or as in this
case, in the hands of a stranger to the suit.
x x x x
Third persons like the respondent-spouses should not be
satisfied with merely examining the owner's copy of the certificate of title.
They should examine the original on file with the Register of Deeds for they are
all constructively notified of pending litigations involving real property
through notices of lis pendens
annotated therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No.
165338 is hereby DISMISSED for being
moot. Let the administrative charge of
failure to resolve motion within the prescribed period against Judge Ireneo Lee
Gako, Jr. be referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate
action.
The
petition in G.R. No. 179375 is likewise DENIED
and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 2007 and August 3,
2007 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02193 are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo
(G.R. No. 165338), pp. 5-28.
[2] There are two sets of original records of
Civil Case No. CEB-16335 sent to this Court relative to these petitions one was
forwarded to this Court on September 23, 2011 and the other on December 15,
2006 pursuant to this Courts October 2, 2006 Resolution (Rollo [G.R. No. 165338], p. 215).
For reference purposes, we shall designate the one received by this
Court on December 15, 2006 as Records (G.R. No. 165338) and the other simply
as Records.
Records,
Vol. I, pp. 504-505; penned by Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] CA rollo,
p. 70; penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon and concurred in by
Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Francisco P. Acosta.
[7]
[8] Records (G.R. No. 165338), p. 164.
[9] CA rollo,
pp. 162-163; penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon and concurred in by
Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Francisco P. Acosta.
[10]
[11] Records (G.R. No. 165338), pp 1-4; Records,
Vol. I, pp. 4-7.
[12] Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11086.
[13] Records (G.R. No. 165338), pp. 5-6; Records,
Vol. I, pp. 8-9; penned by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] See Reply
and Answer to Counterclaim, id. at 20-23; records, pp. 26-29.
[20]
[21]
[22] See Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2,
1996, id. at 95-103.
[23] See Order dated November 22, 1996, id. at
111; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Jesus S. Dela Pea.
[24] See Notice of Appeal dated November 29,
1996, id. at 112.
[25] Id. at 115-124; penned by then Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes (later to become Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi
John S. Asuncion and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador.
[26] See Entry of Judgment, id. at 125.
[27] Rollo
(G.R. No. 165338), p. 54.
[28]
[29] See Certification dated February 4, 2002, id.
at 51.
[30] Records,
Vol. I, pp. 290-292.
[31]
[32]
[33] See Delivery Receipt dated November 11,
2002, Rollo (G.R. No. 165338), pp. 59-60.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] Supra note 2.
[38] Supra note 5.
[39] Rollo
(G.R. No. 165338), pp. 80-81; Records, Vol. I, pp. 528-529.
[40] See Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, id. at 82-86; id. at 530-534.
[41] See Reply (to the Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration), id. at 87-88; id. at 543-544.
[42]
[43]
[44] Supra note 4.
[45] Rollo (G.R.
No. 165338), pp 16-17.
[46] Records (G.R. No. 165338), pp. 126-131.
[47] A complaint for declaration of nullity of
mortgage and for damages docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-23653 and raffled to
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58,
[48] Entitled Susan
Honoridez, Josefina H. Lopez and Constantina H. Sanchez v. Makilito B. Mahinay,
Jocelyn Joy B. Sorensen and husband name unknown, Arthur Cabigon and Felimon
Suarez, and decided on August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 646.
[49] See Order of even date, supra note 8.
[50] Records (G.R. No. 165338), pp. 171-173.
[51]
[52]
[53] CA rollo,
pp. 12-20.
[54]
[55] Supra note 6.
[56] CA rollo,
pp. 72-73.
[57]
[58] Supra note 9.
[59] Rollo
(G.R. 179375), p. 103.
[60]
[61] Supra note 20.
[62] Section
107. Surrender of withheld duplicate
certificates. Where it is necessary to issue a new certificate of title
pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the
registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the
owners duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a
petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of
Deeds. The court, after hearing, may
order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate
to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum
upon such surrender. If the person
withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the
court, or if for any reason the outstanding owners certificate cannot be
delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the
issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates
thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
duplicate.
[63] Otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
[64] Rollo
(G.R. No. 165338), pp. 161-164.
[65] Supra note 2.
[66] Supra note 8.
[67] 337 Phil. 654, 658 (1997).
[68] See Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
Pursuant to Section 10(e) Rule 39, records, Vol. II, pp. 1049-1050.
[69]
[70] See Sheriffs Return dated July 3, 2008, id.
at 1116.
[71] See Motion To Declare the Owners Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 117531 As Null And Void (With Prayer To Direct the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City To Issue A New Owners Copy and To Transfer The Title of Lot
No. 5, Block 68 to the Name of Plaintiff on the Basis Thereof, id. at
1120-1125.
[72]
[73]
[74] Supra note 43.
[75] Records (G.R. No. 165338), p. 130.
[76] 341
Phil. 299, 313-314 (1997). Citations omitted.
[77] Judge De
Guzman v. Judge Dy, 453 Phil. 214, 220 (2003).
[78] Bautista
v. Abdulwahid, 522 Phil. 390, 396 (2006).
[79] Montoya v. Varilla, G.R. No. 180146,
December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 831, 843; Garcia
v. Molina, G.R. Nos. 157383 and 174137, August 10, 2010, 627 SCRA 540, 554.
[80] See Sorensens Memorandum, rollo (G.R. No. 179375), pp. 483-490 (487-488).
[81] Valmonte
v. Alcala, G.R. No. 168667, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 536, 543-544.
[82] G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA
502, 508.
[83] For a detailed discussion on the matter, see
also Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No.
169918, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 98.
[84] Rules
of Court, Rule 7, Section 3, Third paragraph.
[85] G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA
583, 596.
[86] Penullar
v. Philippine National Bank, 205 Phil. 127, 135-136 (1983), citing Director of Lands v. Abache, 73 Phil.
606 (1942) and Blanco v. Esquierdo,
110 Phil. 494 (1960).
[87] Felix
Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Caada, 247-A Phil. 299, 308 (1988),
citing Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds,
1958 Ed., p. 192.
[88] People
v. Regional Trial Court of Manila, 258-A Phil. 68, 77 (1989).
[89] Cruz
v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429 Phil. 225, 242 (2002).
[90] Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358, 365 (1980) citing Bass v. De la Rama,
73 Phil. 682, 685 (1942).
[91] 321 Phil. 897, 901-903 (1995).