Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
CLAY & FEATHER
INTERNATIONAL, INC., RAUL O. ARAMBULO, and ADAM E. JIMENEZ III (for
themselves and for Clay and Feather
Intl., Inc., Petitioners,
-
versus - ALEXANDER T. LICHAYTOO and
CLIFFORD T. LICHAYTOO, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 193105
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: May 30, 2011 |
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before
the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]
dated February 26, 2010 and the Resolution[2]
dated July 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111007.
The
facts of the case are, as follows:
Petitioners
Raul Arambulo (Arambulo) and Adam E. Jimenez III (Jimenez) and respondents Alexander
T. Lichaytoo (Alexander) and Clifford Lichaytoo (Clifford) are stockholders and
incorporators of Clay & Feather International, Inc. (CFII), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of marketing guns and ammunitions.
Petitioner Arambulo is the President of CFII, while petitioner Jimenez is a
member of the Board of Directors. On the other hand, respondent Alexander is
the Corporate Secretary of CFII, while respondent Clifford is its Chief Finance
Officer/Treasurer. Petitioners own fifty percent (50%) of the shares of stock
of CFII, and respondents own the remaining 50%.[3]
In
a complaint-affidavit dated April 4, 2008, petitioners charged respondents before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati with the crime of five (5) counts
of Qualified Theft, defined and penalized under Article 310, in relation to
Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code.[4]
Petitioners
alleged that sometime in February 2006 to November 2007, respondents, by virtue
of their positions in CFII and with grave abuse of confidence, intentionally,
maliciously, and feloniously, with intent to gain and to profit thereby, took
several firearms owned by CFII without the knowledge and consent of the
corporation and its stockholders. The firearms taken are, as follows:
|
Source of Firearms |
Kind |
Make |
Caliber |
Serial No. |
Date Taken |
Amount |
|
1. C & F |
Shotgun |
Beretta DT10 Skeet |
12ga |
AG0222B |
February 2006 |
Euro 3,577.00 |
|
2. C & F |
Shotgun |
Beretta DT10 LTD Trap |
12ga |
AF9670B |
February 2006 |
Euro 3,894.00 |
|
3. C & F |
Shotgun |
Beretta DT10L Trap |
12ga |
AF6715B |
November 2007 |
Euro 5,091.00 |
|
4. C & F |
Shotgun |
Beretta |
20ga |
AA311917 AB315666 |
June 2007 |
Euro 590 |
|
5. C & F |
Shotgun |
Beretta |
12ga |
C15987B |
November 2006 |
Euro 12,066.00 |
|
TOTAL AMOUNT |
|
|
|
|
|
Euro 25,218.00* |
*Philippine
Currency equivalent is One Million Six Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand One Hundred
Seventy Pesos (P1,639,170.00) at the rate of Sixty-Five Pesos per Euro (P65/Euro).[5]
In
their counter-affidavit dated May 5, 2008, respondents sought the dismissal of
the criminal complaint, and stressed that petitioners filed the same as a form
of harassment intended to divest respondents of their interests in CFII, as
well as in retaliation of the criminal complaint for Qualified Theft that they
previously filed against petitioner Arambulo. They argued that there was no
basis for petitioners to charge them with Qualified Theft, as the subject
firearms were purchased by them, and were, in fact, already paid in full. They
averred that since CFII does not maintain a Euro bank account, all foreign
exchange payments for the company’s purchases of guns and ammunitions were
deposited in respondents’ Euro bank accounts with Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. Like all corporate financial transactions of
CFII, the payments for the subject firearms described in items 1, 2, and 5 were
deposited in the Euro accounts of respondents. As payments for the firearms
described in items 1 and 2, which cost Euro 3,577.00 and Euro 3,894.00,
respectively, respondents deposited the total amount of Euro 7,471.00 in the
Euro bank account under the name “Clifford/Alexander Lichaytoo.” As to the
firearm described in item 5, the amount of Euro 12,066.00 was debited from the
Euro account under the name “Clifford/Melissa Lichaytoo.” Respondents claimed
that even petitioner Arambulo did this practice when he himself purchased guns
from CFII.[6]
Respondents
further claimed that the firearms described in items 3 and 4 were paid by way of
offsetting against advances made by respondent Alexander for CFII’s importation
of 2,000 Beretta 92s pistols. They alleged that these transactions were fully
accounted for and disclosed to the auditor, who was chosen by petitioners
themselves, and that petitioner Arambulo was aware of the offsetting for the
firearms described in items 3 and 4, since he was closely monitoring the
payments made by CFII to respondent Alexander.[7]
On
May 9, 2008, petitioners filed a reply-affidavit, refuting the arguments of
respondents. They admitted that CFII does not have a Euro bank account in its
name, and that the corporation uses the Euro bank accounts of respondents to
send payments in Euros to their suppliers. However, petitioners stressed that
respondents cannot claim ownership of the funds, which were sent to the
suppliers of the firearms, since the foreign currency (Euro) was purchased from
currency dealers using CFII funds generated from its corporate funds and orders
paid in advance by its customers. Thus, petitioners argued that this fact does
not indicate that the funds used and deposited by respondents in paying for the
firearms under items 1,2, and 5 were respondent Alexander’s personal funds. In
the same manner, the remittances to CFII suppliers withdrawn from the Euro bank
accounts of petitioners do not show to which supplier and to what particular
firearms the deposits and payments pertain. No concrete proof was shown that
the firearms under items 3 and 4 were indeed the subject of offsetting from the
advances made by respondent Alexander to CFII’s purchase of the 2,000 Beretta
92s pistols. The petty cash vouchers attached to the counter-affidavit of
respondents were too general, there being no particular breakdown and official
receipts presented to correlate the same to the alleged offsetting.[8]
After
the submission of the rejoinder-affidavit of respondents and of the
sur-rejoinder affidavit of petitioners, and after the requisite preliminary
investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a
Resolution[9] on
July 7, 2008, the fallo of which
reads:
Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondents Clifford T. Lichaytoo and Alexander T. Lichaytoo for the crime of Qualified Theft be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.[10]
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a petition for review before the Office of the Secretary of
the Department of Justice. On June 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution,[11]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati dated July 7, 2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati is hereby ordered to file the necessary information/s against [respondents] Alexander and Clifford Lichaytoo and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from the receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the
same was denied in a resolution[13]
dated August 20, 2009. Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. On
February 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision,[14]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
June 2, 2009 and August 20, 2009 of public respondent Secretary of Justice are ANNULLED. Accordingly, the Resolution
dated July 7, 2008 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City
dismissing the complaint for Qualified Theft is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 150,
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 21, 2010, the CA issued a
Resolution[16] denying
the said motion. Hence, the instant petition.
The
sole issue for resolution is whether the CA committed reversible error in
ordering the dismissal of the information for 5 counts of Qualified Theft
against respondents. The resolution of the issue requires a determination of
the existence of probable cause, in order to indict respondents for Qualified Theft.
We
rule in favor of petitioners.
Probable
cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances, which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average
person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, but it
requires less than evidence that would justify a conviction.[17]
A
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.[18] The
term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A trial is intended precisely for the
reception of prosecution evidence in support of the charge. The court is tasked
to determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented by
the parties at a trial on the merits.[19]
To
constitute the crime of Theft, defined and penalized under Article 308[20]
of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must be established that: (1)
there be taking of personal property; (2) said property belongs to another; (3)
the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) the taking be done without the consent
of the owner; and (5) the taking be accomplished without use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[21]
Theft
is qualified under Article 310[22]
of the Revised Penal Code under the following circumstances: (1) if the theft
is committed by a domestic servant; (2) if the theft is committed with grave
abuse of confidence; (3) if the property stolen is a (a) motor vehicle, (b)
mail matter, or (c) large cattle; (4) if the property stolen consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) if the property is fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery; or (6) if property is taken on the occasion
of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident, or civil disturbance.
In
the instant case, the affidavit-complaint and the pleadings petitioners filed
with the Office of the City Prosecutor sufficiently show all the elements of
theft. The evidence on hand sufficiently shows that, more likely than not, the
crime of Qualified Theft has been committed and the same was committed by
respondents. There was unlawful taking by respondents of the subject firearms
that incontestably belonged to CFII. The taking was without the consent of the
owner CFII and was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things. Furthermore, the subject firearms were taken
with grave abuse of confidence in as much as respondents could not have taken
the subject firearms if not for the positions that they held in the company.
This last circumstance qualifies the offense charged. However, our pronouncement as to the
existence of probable cause does not delve into the merits of the case; neither
do we pronounce that the evidence is sufficient to secure a conviction.
The
counter-allegations of respondents essentially delve on evidentiary matters
that are best passed upon in a full-blown trial. The issues upon which the
charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out
conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a
trial for the presentation of prosecution's evidence in support of the charge.[23] The
presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and
is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits. The validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 26, 2010 and the Resolution dated July 21, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
dated June 2, 2009 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring; rollo, pp. 52-74.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon C. Garcia, with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring; id. at 77-78.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Edna J. Conde, with the approval of City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi; id. at 217-221.
[10]
[11] Penned by Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez; id. at 129-137.
[12]
[13] Penned by Acting Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera; id. at 138-139.
[14] Supra note 1.
[15]
[16] Supra note 2.
[17] Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, 491 Phil. 704-705, 719-720 (2005).
[18] Atty. Rison v. Hon. Desierto, 484 Phil. 63, 71 (2004).
[19]
[20] Art.
308. Who are liable for theft.–; Theft
is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1.
Any person who,
having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2.
Any person who,
after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3.
Any person who
shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.
[21] Valenzuela
v. People of the
[22] Art.
310. Qualified Theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse
of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consist of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
[23] Quiambao v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149069, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 496-497, 508.
[24] Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 40, 52.