EN
BANC
|
RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO,
Petitioner, - versus - CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC), THE CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ARIEL G. RONQUILLO,
J. WALDEMAR V. VALMORES, JOSE F. ERESTAIN, JR., and KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID,
ALL NAMED INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR CAPACITY AS OFFICERS OF THE CSC, RICARDO
BARIEN, INOCENCIO M. NAVALLO, LIGAYA M. GANDO, LEA MOLLEDA, FE R. VETONIO,
PRIMO V. BABIANO, PATIGA J., JOSE TAEZA, G. DELOS SANTOS, LOSBAÑES, W., AVE
PEDIGLORIO and CRESENCIA ROQUE, Respondents. |
|
G.R.
No. 180141 Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,* LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: May 31,
2011 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner
SPO1 Rimando A. Gannapao appeals the Decision[1] dated
The
facts are as follows:
On
December 22, 1995, respondents Ricardo Barien, Inocencio M. Navallo, Ligaya M.
Gando, Lea Molleda, Fe R. Vetonio, Primo V. Babiano, Patiga J., Jose Taeza, G.
Delos Santos, Losbañes, W., Ave Pediglorio and Cresencia Roque (Barien,
et al.) who are stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport
Corp. (UWTC), filed a verified complaint before the PNP Inspectorate Division
at
Barien,
et al. further alleged that upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses regularly
driven by them and other stockholders/drivers/workers were confiscated by a
“task force” composed of former drivers, conductors and mechanics led by
petitioner. Armed with deadly weapons
such as guns and knives, petitioner and his group intimidated and harassed the
regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses. Petitioner is not authorized to use his
firearm or his authority as police officer to act as bodyguard of Atty.
Gironella and to intimidate and coerce the drivers/stockholders and the bus
passengers. Barien, et al. thus prayed
for the preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm
and his termination after due hearing.
The
complaint passed a pre-charge investigation with The Inspector General,
Internal Affairs Office (TIG-IAO) of the PNP, and petitioner filed his Answer[5] on
Subsequently,
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Memorandum Circular No. 96-010[7] dated
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Headquarters
finds respondent SPO1 RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO GUILTY of the charge of serious
irregularities in the performance of duties, thus, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the police service
without pay.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the Resolution[12] dated
Aggrieved,
petitioner brought his case to the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG). In an Order[14] dated
Petitioner
then appealed to the CSC claiming that he had been denied due process in the
proceedings before the Office of the Legal Service. He also sought to set aside the penalty of
three months suspension.
On
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Rimando A. Gannapao is hereby
DISMISSED. However, the Order dated
Petitioner
thus filed with the CA a Petition for Review with an Urgent Motion for Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. The CA issued a TRO on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED. The assailed Resolution No.
020487 dated
SO ORDERED.[19]
On
Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner
contends that he was denied due process in the proceedings before the Office of
the Legal Service of the PNP since no notice and summons were issued for him to
answer the charges and no hearing was conducted. He claims that his dismissal was not proper
and legal as there was no introduction and presentation of evidence against him
and he was not given the opportunity to defend his side. Also, petitioner assails the penalty of
dismissal imposed upon him by the CSC, alleging that it was improperly imposed
considering the mitigating circumstance of his length of service (14 years at
the time the decision of the PNP Director General was rendered[20]).
On
the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public
respondent CSC, maintains that petitioner was not denied due process. The OSG points out that petitioner answered
the complaint during the pre-charge investigation and when the case was heard
at the Office of the Legal Service, petitioner was given the opportunity to
answer the charges or to submit his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit,
but he instead moved for the dismissal of the case. Atty. Sierra, the hearing
officer of the Office of the Legal Service, also issued a subpoena for
petitioner to appear on
The
Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) whether petitioner was
denied due process, and (2) whether the CA correctly affirmed the CSC decision
modifying the penalty of petitioner from three months suspension to dismissal
from the service.
The
petition must fail.
Time
and again, we have held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.[21] In the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but
the denial of the opportunity to be heard.[22] As long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.[23]
Reviewing
the records, we find that petitioner was afforded due process during the proceedings
before the Office of the Legal Service of the PNP. The pertinent provisions of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 prescribe the following procedure:
x x x x
D. Pre-Charge Investigation
SECTION 1. Procedure.
–
4.01 Within
three (3) days from the receipt of the complaint, the Command/Unit Inspector,
upon directive from the Disciplinary Authority concerned, shall conduct a
preliminary inquiry/pre-charge investigation wherein both the complainant and
the respondent and their witnesses, if any shall be summoned to appear. x x x
After the inquiry, the Command/Unit Inspector shall submit to the Disciplinary Authority concerned his Report of
Investigation, together with his recommendation x x x:
x x x x
E. Summary
Hearing
SECTION 1. Notification of Charges/Complaint Order to
Answer.
5.01 After it
has been determined from the results of the pre-charge investigation that the
complaint is a proper subject of summary hearing, the respondent PNP member
shall be furnished with a copy of the complaint or charges filed against him to
include copies of affidavits of witnesses and other documents submitted by the
complainant should there be any, and he shall be directed to submit an answer
within five (5) days from receipt of the complaint, attaching therewith
pertinent documents or evidence in support of his defense.
x x x x
As
records bear out, petitioner was adequately apprised of the charges filed
against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was
still under a pre-charge investigation.
When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the
complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given
an opportunity to explain his side.
Extant on the records, particularly in the Resolution[24] dated
Having elevated this case to the Summary Dismissal
Authority of the C,(sic) PNP through the Office of the Legal Service, a hearing
was set by P/SInsp. Eduardo T[.] SIERRA, the Hearing Officer, on
On
x x x x
On
Petitioner’s
claim that he did not file an answer since no subpoena was issued to him thus
deserves scant consideration. Petitioner
had ample opportunity to present his side during the hearing and he was even
advised by the hearing officer that he may file a supplemental answer or a
counter affidavit until
Petitioner’s
assertion that the complainants/witnesses against him have not been
cross-examined by him, is likewise bereft of merit. While the right to cross-examine is a vital
element of procedural due process, the right does not necessarily require an
actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this right if
desired by the party entitled to it.[27] In this case, while Memorandum Circular
No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall take the
place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination, petitioner
missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for
the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the
hearing officer considered the case submitted for decision. And even with the grant of his subsequent
motion to be furnished with copy of complaint and its annexes, he still failed
to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a motion
to dismiss reiterating the previous recommendation for dismissal made by Atty.
Casugbo. Moreover, after the PNP
Director General rendered his decision, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. He was
also able to appeal from the decision of the PNP Director General to the DILG
Secretary, and eventually to the CSC. We
have held that the fact that a party filed motions for reconsideration and
appeals with the tribunals below, in which she presented her arguments and
through which she could have proffered her evidence, if any, negates her claim
that she was denied opportunity to be heard.[28]
As
to the second issue, we hold that the CA did not err in affirming the CSC
ruling which modified the penalty imposed by the PNP Director General as
affirmed by the DILG Secretary, from three months suspension to dismissal.
Under
Memorandum Circular No. 93-024 (Guidelines
in the Application of Penalties in Police Administrative Cases), the
following acts of any member of the PNP are considered Grave Offenses:
x x x x
C. The
following are Grave Offenses:
x x x x
Serious
Irregularities in the Performance of Duties. This is incurred by any member of the PNP who shall:
x x x x
c. act as bodyguard or security guard for
the person or property of any public official, or private person unless approved by the proper authorities concerned;
x x x x (Emphasis
ours.)
The
CSC found that petitioner indeed worked for Atty. Gironella as the latter’s
bodyguard -- at least during the
relevant period, from April 1995 up to December 1995 when Barien, et al. filed
their verified complaint before the Inspectorate Division on the basis of the
following:
1)
Certification of
the San Jose Del Monte Police Station and the police blotter entries Nos. 6050-95
and 6051-95 dated November 22, 1995 as certified by SPO2 Rafael delos Reyes;
2)
A document reflecting the
payment made to SPO1 Rimando Gannapao as security signed by Atty. Gironella;
3)
A document
changing the name of the payee to “Reynaldo” instead of “Rimando” signed by
Atty. Gironella; and
4)
Affidavits of
Primo Babiano, Ricardo Barien, Cresencia Roque and Jocelyn Evangelista.[29]
On the other hand, petitioner
presented the Certification[30] dated
Petitioner reiterates that it was his
twin brother Reynaldo whom Barien, et al. encountered during the incident when
their buses were confiscated by armed men in October 1995. He submitted a photograph of his twin brother
but this was not given credence by the CSC. Before the CA, petitioner also
attached a photograph of himself together with his alleged twin brother
Reynaldo, as well as birth certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
Salcedo, Ilocos Sur stating their similar dates of birth and parents, and the
affidavit of Reynaldo Gannapao.[31] However, there was no certification issued by
UWTC that Reynaldo Gannapao was indeed employed therein for the period relevant
to this case, nor any document evidencing receipt of his wages or salary from UWTC.
Also, the police blotter entries[32] dated October 13,
1995 and November 22, 1995 tend to support the claim of Barien, et al. that
Atty. Gironella threatened them when they complained of his mismanagement of
company funds and that in this conflict, petitioner had used his firearm and
authority as police officer to lead in the taking of the MMTC buses from UWTC
drivers and conductors. Thus, even
assuming that petitioner in fact had a twin brother by the name of Reynaldo, Barien,
et al. in their sworn statements categorically pointed to him, not his twin
brother, as the one leading the armed group sent by Atty. Gironella to
confiscate their buses and acted as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella. Barien, et al. positively identified him as
the police officer with officially issued
firearm who actively assisted Atty. Gironella and committed acts of
harassment which were narrated in the verified complaint and sworn statements
executed by respondents Primo Babiano, Ricardo C. Barien, Cresencia Roque and
Jocelyn Evangelista. Consequently, no error was committed by the CSC in giving
more weight to the positive declarations of Barien, et al. than the denials of
petitioner.
In his motion for reconsideration of
the decision rendered by PNP Director General Sarmiento, petitioner attached
the alleged affidavits of desistance executed by Babiano, Roque and Avelino
Pediglorio. Director Aliño, however, in
denying the motion found these insignificant and not credible considering that
Babiano’s signature in the April 12, 1996 retraction[33] was starkly
different from his original January 2, 1996 sworn statement[34] while the
supposed affidavit of desistance of Roque[35] dated October 14,
1997 should have already been alleged or submitted by him before Director
General Sarmiento rendered his decision on November 26, 1997.[36]
The CSC, on appeal, likewise gave
scant weight to the alleged retraction of some of the respondents. It noted that respondents Inocencio M.
Navallo, Ligaya Gando, Lea Molleda, Fe R. Vetonio,
Jose Taeza, among others did not desist from pursuing the case. Before the CA, petitioner submitted a joint
affidavit of desistance dated
As a rule, administrative agencies’
factual findings that are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are conclusive on
the parties and not reviewable by this Court,[41]
except only for very compelling reasons.[42]
Where the findings
of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such
findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on
this Court. It is not for the reviewing
court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence.[43]
We find no cogent reason to deviate from the general rule in this case.
As mentioned, acting as private
bodyguard without approval of the proper authorities is classified as a grave
offense. Memorandum Circular No.
93-024 (Guidelines in the Application
of Penalties in Police Administrative Cases)[44] provides for the
following schedule of penalties:
SEC. 2. Schedule
of Penalties. - The penalties for light, less grave, and
grave offenses shall be made in accordance with the following schedule:
x x x x
C. For
Grave Offenses:
a.
Maximum suspension
imposable (minimum period);
b.
Forced
Resignation/Demotion of not more than one (1) rank (medium period);
c.
Dismissal
(maximum period).
x x x x
SEC. 4. Qualifying
Circumstances. – In the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered:
The following are mitigating circumstances:
a.
physical illness
b.
good faith
c.
length of service in the government
d.
analogous
circumstances.
x x x x
In refusing to be swayed by petitioner’s
argument that his fourteen (14) years of service in government with no record
of previous administrative offense should have mitigated his liability, the CSC
held:
The Commission finds the act of Gannapao of serving as
a bodyguard of UTWC General Manager Atty. Gironella and harassing the bus
drivers of the said agency so grave that the decision of then DILG Secretary
Alfredo S. Lim, affirming his suspension from the service for three (3) months
is modified to dismissal from the service.
In the case of University
of the
‘We do not agree that private respondent’s length of
service and the fact that it was her first offense shall be taken into account. Respondent Commission failed to consider that
private respondent committed not only one act, but a series of acts which were
deliberately committed over a number of years while respondent was in the
service. These acts were of the gravest
character which strikes at the very integrity and prestige of the University.’
It must be emphasized that the PNP, as an institution,
was organized to ensure accountability and uprightness in the exercise of
police discretion as well as to achieve efficiency and effectiveness of its
members and units in the performance of their functions thus, its leadership
would be well within its right to cleanse itself of wrongdoers.[45]
Public
respondent CSC did not err in not considering length of service as a mitigating
circumstance and in imposing the maximum penalty of dismissal on the
petitioner. Length
of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative
cases is a double-edged sword.[46]
Despite the language of Section 4 of Memorandum
Circular No. 93-024, length of service is not always a mitigating
circumstance in every case of commission of an administrative offense by a
public officer or employee.
Length
of service is an alternative circumstance
which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate the penalty, depending on the
circumstances of the case. Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, grants the
disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in
the imposition of the proper penalty.[47] Said rule provides thus:
SEC. 53. Extenuating,
Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. –
In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
a. Physical
illness
b. Good faith
c. Taking undue
advantage of official position
d. Taking undue
advantage of subordinate
e. Undue
disclosure of confidential information
f. Use of
government property in the commission of the offense
g. Habituality
h. Offense is
committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building
i.
Employment of fraudulent means to
commit or conceal the offense
j.
Length of
service in the government
k. Education,
or
l. Other analogous circumstances (Emphasis ours.)
In University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,[48] cited by CSC, we did not consider
length of service in favor of the private
respondent; instead, we took it against said respondent because her length of service, among other things, helped
her in the commission of the offense.
Where the government employee
concerned took advantage of long years of service and position in public
office, length of service may not be considered in lowering the penalty. This
Court has invariably taken this circumstance against the respondent public
officer or employee in administrative cases involving serious offenses, even if it was the first time said public officer
or employee was administratively charged. Thus, we held in Civil Service Commission v. Cortez[49]:
Petitioner
CSC is correct that length of service should be taken against the
respondent. Length of service is not a
magic word that, once invoked, will automatically be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in favor of the party invoking it.
Length of service can either be a mitigating or aggravating circumstance
depending on the factual milieu of
each case. Length of service, in other
words, is an alternative circumstance.
That this is so is clear in Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which amended the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations dated
x x x x
Moreover, a review of jurisprudence shows that,
although in most cases length of service is considered in favor of the
respondent, it is not considered where the offense committed is found to be
serious. x x x
x x x x
x x x we
cannot also consider length of service in favor of the respondent because of
the gravity of the offense she committed and the fact that it was her length of
service in the CSC which helped her in the commission of the offense.
x x x x
x x x it is
clear from the ruling of the CSC that respondent’s act irreparably tarnished
the integrity of the CSC. x x x
x x x x
The gravity of the offense committed is also the reason why
we cannot consider the “first offense” circumstance invoked by respondent. In several cases, we imposed the
heavier penalty of dismissal or a fine of more than P20,000, considering the
gravity of the offense committed, even if the offense charged was respondent’s
first offense. Thus, in the present
case, even though the offense respondent was found guilty of was her first
offense, the gravity thereof outweighs the fact that it was her first offense.[50] (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioner contends that this case should
be distinguished from University of the
Philippines v. Civil Service Commission[51] because he was “not committing any crime
assuming he served a bodyguard,” “was not in uniform or in the performance of
duty there being no such allegation in the complaint,” and “was not deceiving
or cheating anybody.” Even the ruling in
Civil Service Commission v. Cortez[52] is not
applicable since the respondent therein committed acts of dishonesty.
We are not persuaded.
As already pointed out, Serious
Irregularities in the Performance of Duties, like those offenses (e.g., Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service) enumerated under
Section 52 (A) of the Civil Service Law, is a grave offense. Grave offenses have the most deleterious
effects on government service. By acting as a private bodyguard without
approval by the proper authorities for several months, petitioner reneged on
his primary duties to the community in the maintenance of peace and order and
public safety. Such mercenary tendencies
undermine the effectivity and integrity of a national police force committed to
provide protection and assistance to citizens in times of danger and emergency. But what is worse, petitioner allowed himself
to be used in perpetrating violence and intimidation upon ordinary workers
embroiled in a legal conflict with management.
Petitioner apparently failed to grasp
the gravity of his transgression which, not only impacts negatively on the
image of the PNP, but also reflects the depravity of his character. Under the circumstances, the Court cannot
consider in his favor his fourteen (14) years in the police service and his
being a first time offender. The CSC
thus correctly imposed on him the maximum penalty of dismissal. Pursuant to Section 6 of Memorandum
Circular No. 93-024, the penalty of dismissal, which results in the separation
of the respondent from the service, shall carry with it the cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the
disqualification from reemployment in the police service.
WHEREFORE, the
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated
With costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice |
|
||
|
WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
||||
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|||
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
(On leave) ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|||
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
|||
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|||
|
(On official leave) MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
|||
|
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
|||
|
MARIA Associate Justice |
||||
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
|
|
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice |
*
On leave.
** On official leave.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 27-38. Penned by Associate
Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 36-47.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rules and Regulations in the Disposition of Administrative Cases Involving PNP Members Before the PNP Disciplinary Authorities.
[8] CA rollo, p. 94.
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 58-61.
[11]
[12] CA rollo, pp. 115-119.
[13] Rollo, p. 29.
[14] CA rollo, p. 140.
[15] CA rollo, p. 47.
[16]
[17]
[18] Civil
Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159696,
[19] Rollo, p. 37.
[20]
[21] Montoya
v. Varilla, G.R. No. 180146,
[22]
[23] Cayago v. Lina, G.R. No. 149539, January
19, 2005, 449 SCRA 29, 45, citing Rodriguez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134278, August 7, 2002, 386 SCRA 492,
499-500.
[24] CA
rollo, pp. 115-119.
[25]
[26] See Garcia v. Pajaro, G.R. No.
141149,
[27] Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 487, 503.
[28] Batongbakal v. Zafra, G.R. No. 141806,
[29] CA
rollo, pp. 83-84, 109.
[30]
[31]
[32] Rollo, pp. 169-170.
[33] CA
rollo, p. 125.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] CSC
Resolution No. 991936 dated
[39] CA
rollo, pp. 44-45.
[40] Section
2. (1) The civil service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
[41] Miralles v. Go, G.R. No. 139943,
[42] Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 12,
2005, 477 SCRA 339, 355.
[43] Nacu v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 187752, November 23, 2010, p. 16, citing Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001).
[44] Adopted
November 1993.
[45] CA
rollo, pp. 46-47.
[46] Narvasa v. Sanchez, Jr., G.R. No.
169449,
[47] Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Ombudsman v. Campaña, G.R. No.
173865, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 680, 691, citing Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 156253, June 15,
2006, 490 SCRA741, 749; CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, Rule IV, Section
53(J) and Re: Failure of Jose Dante E.
Guerrero to Register His Time In and Out in Chronolog Time Recorder Machine on
Several Dates, A.M. No. 2005-07-SC, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 352, 367.
[48] G.R.
No. 89454,
[49] G.R.
No. 155732,
[50]
[51] Supra
note 48.
[52] Supra
note 49.