Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC., Petitioner, - versus - JOCELYN CATUBIG, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 175512 Present: Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PERALTA,* and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: May
30, 2011 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decision[1]
dated November 17, 2005 and the Resolution[2]
dated November 16, 2006 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815, which modified
the Decision[3] dated January
26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, in
Civil Case No. 11360, an action for recovery of damages based on Article 2180,
in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code, filed by respondent Jocelyn
Catubig against petitioner Vallacar Transit, Inc. While the RTC dismissed respondent’s claim
for damages, the Court of Appeals granted the same.
The undisputed facts are as
follows:
Petitioner is engaged in the
business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed
as a regular bus driver of petitioner.
On January 27, 1994, respondent’s
husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete
City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado
(Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the
motorcycle. While approaching a curve at
kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo
truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the
Ceres Bulilit bus driven by
Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction.
When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado were thrown from
the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot
where he was thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital.
On
Thereafter, respondent filed before
the RTC on July 19, 1995 a Complaint for Damages against petitioner, seeking
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, in the total amount of P484,000.00,
for the death of her husband, Catubig, based on Article 2180, in relation to
Article 2176, of the Civil Code. Respondent
alleged that petitioner is civilly liable because the latter’s employee driver,
Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving the bus which collided with
Catubig’s motorcycle.
Petitioner, in its Answer with
Counterclaim, contended that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision,
which resulted in the deaths of Catubig and Emperado, was the sole negligence
of Catubig when he imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and
traversed the opposite lane of the road. As a special and affirmative defense,
petitioner asked for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for not being
verified and/or for failure to state a cause of action, as there was no
allegation that petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision of its
employee driver.
In the Pre-Trial Order[4]
dated June 10, 1997, the parties stipulated that the primary issue for trial
was whether or not petitioner should be held liable for Catubig’s death. Trial then ensued.
Police Officer (PO) 2 Robert B. Elnas
(Elnas),[5]
Emilio Espiritu (Espiritu),[6]
Dr. Norberto Baldado, Jr. (Dr. Baldado),[7]
Peter Cadimas (Cadimas),[8]
and respondent[9] herself testified
in support of respondent’s complaint.
PO2 Elnas conducted an investigation
of the collision incident. According to
PO2 Elnas, the bus was running fast, at a speed of 100 kilometers per hour, when
it collided with the motorcycle which was trying to overtake a truck. The collision occurred on the lane of the bus.
Catubig was flung 21 meters away, and
Emperado, 11 meters away, from the point of impact. The motorcycle was totaled; the chassis broke
into three parts, and the front wheel and the steering wheel with the shock
absorbers were found 26 meters and 38 meters, respectively, from the collision
point. In contrast, only the front
bumper of the bus suffered damage.
Cadimas personally witnessed the
collision of the bus and the motorcycle.
He recalled that he was then waiting for a ride to
Espiritu was the photographer who
took photographs of the scene of the accident.
He identified the five photographs which he had taken of Catubig lying
on the ground, bloodied; broken parts of the motorcycle; and the truck which
Catubig tried to overtake.
Dr. Baldado was the medico-legal
doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination of Catubig’s body. He reported that Catubig suffered from the
following injuries: laceration and fracture of the right leg; laceration and fracture
of the left elbow; multiple abrasions in the abdominal area, left anterior chest
wall, posterior right arm, and at the back of the left scapular area; and contusion-hematoma
just above the neck. Dr. Baldado
confirmed that Catubig was already dead when the latter was brought to the
hospital, and that the vehicular accident could have caused Catubig’s
instantaneous death.
Respondent herself testified to
substantiate the amount of damages she was trying to recover from petitioner
for Catubig’s death, such as Catubig’s earning capacity; expenses incurred for the
wake and burial of Catubig, as well as of Emperado; the cost of the motorcycle;
and the costs of the legal services and fees respondent had incurred.
Respondent’s documentary exhibits
consisted of her and Catubig’s Marriage Contract dated August 21, 1982, their
two children’s Certificate of Live Births, Catubig’s College Diploma dated
March 24, 1983, the list and receipts of the expenses for Catubig’s burial, the
sketch of the collision site prepared by PO2 Elnas, the excerpts from the
police blotter, the photographs of the collision,[10]
and the Post Mortem Report[11]
on Catubig’s cadaver prepared by Dr. Baldado.
In an Order[12]
dated October 6, 1998, the RTC admitted all of respondent’s aforementioned
evidence.
On the other hand, Rosie C. Amahit
(Amahit)[13] and
Nunally Maypa (Maypa)[14] took
the witness stand for petitioner.
Amahit was a Court Stenographer at
the MCTC who took the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in Criminal Case
No. M-15-94 against Cabanilla. Amahit verified
that the document being presented by the defense in the present case was a true
and correct copy of the TSN of the preliminary investigation held in Criminal
Case No. M-15-94 on May 25, 1994, and another document was a duplicate original
of the MCTC Resolution dated December 22, 1994 dismissing Criminal Case No.
M-15-94.
Maypa is the Administrative and
Personnel Manager at the Dumaguete branch of petitioner. He started working for petitioner on
While he was still an Administrative
Assistant, Maypa was responsible for the hiring of personnel including drivers
and conductors. Maypa explained that to
be hired as a driver, an applicant should be 35 to 45 years old, have at least
five years experience in driving big trucks, submit police, court, and medical
clearances, and possess all the necessary requirements for driving a motor
vehicle of more than 4,500 kilograms in gross weight such as a professional
driver’s license with a restriction code of 3.
The applicant should also pass the initial interview, the actual driving
and maintenance skills tests, and a written psychological examination involving
defensive driving techniques. Upon
passing these examinations, the applicant still had to go through a 15-day
familiarization of the bus and road conditions before being deployed for work. Maypa, however, admitted that at the time of
his appointment as Administrative Assistant at the Dumaguete branch, Cabanilla was
already an employee driver of petitioner.
Maypa further explained the
investigation and grievance procedure followed by petitioner in cases of
vehicular accidents involving the latter’s employee drivers. Maypa related that Cabanilla had been put on
preventive suspension following the vehicular accident on January 27, 1994
involving the bus Cabanilla was driving and the motorcycle carrying Catubig and
Emperado. Following an internal
investigation of said accident conducted by petitioner, Cabanilla was declared
not guilty of causing the same, for he had not been negligent.
Lastly, Maypa recounted the
expenses petitioner incurred as a result of the present litigation.
The documentary exhibits of
petitioner consisted of the TSN of the preliminary investigation in Criminal
Case No. M-15-94 held on May 25, 1994 before the MCTC of
Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of Negros Oriental; Resolution dated
December 22, 1994 of the MCTC in the same case; and the Minutes dated February 17,
1994 of the Grievance Proceeding conducted by petitioner involving Cabanilla.[15]
The RTC, in its Order[16]
dated November 12, 1999, admitted all the evidence presented by petitioner.
On
After trial, the RTC concluded:
WHEREFORE,
finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the [herein petitioner] that the [herein
respondent’s] husband is the reckless and negligent driver and not the driver
of the [petitioner], the above-entitled case is hereby ordered dismissed.
[Petitioner’s]
counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit.[18]
Respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals. In its Decision dated November 17, 2005, the appellate court held that
both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in driving their respective
vehicles. Catubig, on one hand, failed
to use reasonable care for his own safety and ignored the hazard when he tried
to overtake a truck at a curve.
Cabanilla, on the other hand, was running his vehicle at a high speed of
100 kilometers per hour. The Court of
Appeals also brushed aside the defense of petitioner that it exercised the
degree of diligence exacted by law in the conduct of its business. Maypa was not in a position to testify on the
procedures followed by petitioner in hiring Cabanilla as an employee driver considering
that Cabanilla was hired a year before Maypa assumed his post at the Dumaguete
branch of petitioner.
Thus, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE,
based on the foregoing, the assailed decision of the trial court is
modified. We rule that [herein
petitioner] is equally liable for the accident in question which led to the
deaths of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and Teddy Emperado and hereby award to the heirs
of Quintin Catubig, Jr. the amount [of] P250,000.00 as full compensation
for the death of the latter.[19]
The Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner in a Resolution dated November 16,
2006.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Petitioner asserts that respondent’s
complaint for damages should be dismissed for the latter’s failure to verify
the same. The certification against
forum shopping attached to the complaint, signed by respondent, is not a valid
substitute for respondent’s verification that she “has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of her personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.”[20] Petitioner cited jurisprudence in which the
Court ruled that a pleading lacking proper verification is treated as an
unsigned pleading, which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court.
Petitioner also denies any
vicarious or imputed liability under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176,
of the Civil Code. According to
petitioner, respondent failed to prove the culpability of Cabanilla, the
employee driver of petitioner. There are
already two trial court decisions (i.e.,
the Resolution dated December 22, 1994 of the MCTC of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon
of the Province of Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 and the Decision
dated January 26, 2000 of the RTC in the instant civil suit) explicitly ruling
that the proximate cause of the collision was Catubig’s reckless and negligent
act. Thus, without the fault or negligence
of its employee driver, no liability at all could be imputed upon petitioner.
Petitioner additionally argues,
without conceding any fault or liability, that the award by the Court of
Appeals in respondent’s favor of the lump sum amount of P250,000.00 as
total death indemnity lacks factual and legal basis. Respondent’s evidence to prove actual or
compensatory damages are all self-serving, which are either inadmissible in
evidence or devoid of probative value. The
award of moral and exemplary damages is likewise contrary to the ruling of the
appellate court that Catubig should be equally held liable for his own death.
Respondent maintains that the Court
of Appeals correctly adjudged petitioner to be liable for Catubig’s death and
that the appellate court had already duly passed upon all the issues raised in
the petition at bar.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, we find no procedural defect that
would have warranted the outright dismissal of respondent’s complaint.
Respondent filed her complaint for
damages against petitioner on July 19, 1995, when the 1964 Rules of Court was
still in effect. Rule 7, Section 6 of
the 1964 Rules of Court provided:
Sec. 6. Verification.—A
pleading is verified only by an affidavit stating that the person verifying has
read the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own
knowledge.
Verifications based on
"information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and
belief," shall be deemed insufficient.
On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure
took effect. The foregoing provision was
carried on, with a few amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, viz:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise
specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is
verified by an affidavit that the affiant
has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of
his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required
to be verified which contains a verification based on
“information and belief,” or upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”
The same provision was again amended by A.M. No.
00-2-10, which became effective on
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except
when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by
an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be
verified which contains a verification based on “information and belief” or
upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior
to its amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly provides that a pleading lacking
proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no
legal effect. However, it also just as
clearly states that “[e]xcept when otherwise specifically required by law
or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.” No such law or rule specifically
requires that respondent’s complaint for damages should have been verified.
Although parties would often submit a joint
verification and certificate against forum shopping, the two are
different.
In Pajuyo v.
Court of Appeals,[21]
we already pointed out that:
A
party’s failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different
from the party’s failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be
signed by the party, and not by counsel.
The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.
On the
other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a
jurisdictional requisite. It is intended
simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith.
The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any
person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may
sign the verification.[22]
In the case before us, we stress that as a general
rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule
specifically requiring the same.
Examples of pleadings that require verification are: (1) all pleadings
filed in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; (2)
petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising
only questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2; (3) petition for review of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, Section
1; (4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45, Section 1; (6) petition for annulment of judgments or final
orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; (7) complaint for injunction
under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for appointment of a receiver
under Rule 59, Section 1; (10) application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition for certiorari against the judgments, final
orders or resolutions of constitutional commissions under Rule 64, Section 2;
(12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1;
(14) complaint for expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for
indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court;
(16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate controversies under
the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies; (17) complaint
or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim
Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation; and (18) petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages as well
as petition for summary proceedings under the Family Code.
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications,
and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a certificate against
forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which
took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Court. It is not disputed
herein that respondent’s complaint for damages was accompanied by such a
certificate.
In addition, verification, like in most cases
required by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere
speculation. When circumstances warrant,
the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it
and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice
may thereby be served.[23]
We agree with petitioner, nonetheless, that
respondent was unable to prove imputable negligence on the part of petitioner.
Prefatorily, we restate the time
honored principle that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions
of law may be raised. It is not our
function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the
proceedings below, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing only errors of law
that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect. A question of law which we may
pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.[24]
The above rule, however, admits of
certain exceptions. The findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive but may be reviewed when: (1)
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures; (3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate
court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7)
the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth
by the petitioner are not disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[25]
The issue of negligence is
basically factual.[26] Evidently, in this case, the RTC and the
Court of Appeals have contradictory factual findings: the former found that
Catubig alone was negligent, while the latter adjudged that both Catubig and
petitioner were negligent.
Respondent based her claim for
damages on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which
read:
Art.
2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art.
2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those
persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x
Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x
The
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
There is merit in the argument of
the petitioner that Article 2180 of the Civil Code – imputing fault or
negligence on the part of the employer for the fault or negligence of its
employee – does not apply to petitioner since the fault or negligence of its
employee driver, Cabanilla, which would have made the latter liable for
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, has never been established
by respondent. To the contrary, the
totality of the evidence presented during trial shows that the proximate cause
of the collision of the bus and motorcycle is attributable solely to the
negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.
Proximate cause is defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively,
the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.[27]
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly
concluded that Catubig’s overtaking of a slow-moving truck ahead of him, while
approaching a curve on the highway, was the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision which led to his own death, to wit:
Based on the evidence on record,
it is crystal clear that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision is
the reckless and negligent act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not because the
Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if
the Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the
collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a
cargo truck and encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while
approaching a curve. As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin
Catubig, Jr. has not observed reasonable care and caution in driving his
motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver would have done under the
circumstances. Recklessness on the part
of Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo truck
while approaching a curve in Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental. Overtaking is not allowed
while approaching a curve in the highway (Section 41(b), Republic Act [No.]
4136, as amended). Passing another
vehicle proceeding on the same direction should only be resorted to by a driver
if the highway is free from incoming vehicle to permit such overtaking to be
made in safety (Section 41(a), Republic Act [No.] 4136). The
collision happened because of the recklessness and carelessness of [herein
respondent’s] husband who was overtaking a cargo truck while approaching a
curve. Overtaking another vehicle
while approaching a curve constitute reckless driving penalized not only under
Section 48 of Republic Act [No.] 4136 but also under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Court
commiserate with the [respondent] for the untimely death of her husband. However, the Court as dispenser of justice
has to apply the law based on the facts of the case. Not having proved by preponderance of
evidence that the proximate cause of the collision is the negligence of the
driver of the Ceres bus, this Court has no other option but to dismiss this
case.[28]
(Emphases supplied.)
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Cadimas and PO2 Elnas that Cabanilla was driving the bus at a reckless speed when
the collision occurred lack probative value.
We are unable to establish the
actual speed of the bus from Cadimas’s testimony for he merely stated that the
bus did not stop when he tried to flag it down because it was “running very
fast.”[29]
PO2 Elnas, on the other hand, made
inconsistent statements as to the actual speed of the bus at the time of the
collision. During the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the MCTC, PO2 Elnas refused
to give testimony as to the speed of either the bus or the motorcycle at the
time of the collision and an opinion as to who was at fault.[30] But during the trial of the present case
before the RTC, PO2 Elnas claimed that he was told by Cabanilla that the latter
was driving the bus at the speed of around 100 kilometers per hour.[31]
As the RTC noted, Cadimas and PO2
Elnas both pointed out that the motorcycle encroached the lane of the bus when
it tried to overtake, while nearing a curve, a truck ahead of it, consistent
with the fact that the point of impact actually happened within the lane
traversed by the bus. It would be more
reasonable to assume then that it was Catubig who was driving his motorcycle at
high speed because to overtake the truck ahead of him, he necessarily had to
drive faster than the truck. Catubig
should have also avoided overtaking the vehicle ahead of him as the curvature on
the road could have obstructed his vision of the oncoming vehicles from the
opposite lane.
The evidence shows that the driver
of the bus, Cabanilla, was driving his vehicle along the proper lane, while the
driver of the motorcycle, Catubig, had overtaken a vehicle ahead of him as he
was approaching a curvature on the road, in disregard of the provision of the
law on reckless driving, at the risk of his life and that of his employee,
Emperado.
The presumption
that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from
the negligence of their employees.[32] Having adjudged that the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision resulting in Catubig’s death was his own negligence,
and there was no fault or negligence on Cabanilla’s part, then such presumption
of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanilla’s employer, does
not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary
to delve into the defense of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
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JOSE Associate Justice |
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* Per Special Order No. 994 dated May 27, 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 58-68; penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Pampio A. Abarintos, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 69-70.
[5] TSN, August 19, 1997.
[6] TSN, December 9, 1997, pp. 1-14.
[7] Id. at 14-22.
[8] TSN, August 18, 1998.
[9] TSN, July 28, 1997.
[10] Records, pp. 119-147.
[11] Id. at 7.
[12]
[13] TSN, October 20, 1998.
[14] TSN, December 7, 1998 and December
17, 1998.
[15] Records, pp. 192-215.
[16]
[17] Id. at 90.
[18] Rollo, p. 102.
[19] Id. at 67-68.
[20] Id. at 23.
[21] G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430
SCRA 492.
[22] Id. at 508-509.
[23] Jimenez vda. De Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals, 332 Phil.
157, 165 (1996).
[24] Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Monet’s Export and Manufacturing Corporation, 493 Phil. 327, 338 (2005).
[25] Id. at 338-339.
[26] Pestaño v. Sumayang, 400 Phil. 740, 749 (2000).
[27] Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 184905, August 28,
2009, 597 SCRA 526, 535-536.
[28] Rollo, p. 101.
[29] TSN,
August 18, 1998, p. 3.
[30] Excerpts from the TSN dated May 25, 1994, in Criminal Case No. M-15-94, are as follows:
Q (To the witness) The sketch which you made is only a representation of what you actually saw at the place of the incident, is that true?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q You cannot therefore testify as to the speed of the two (2) vehicles at the time that they collided?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q You can’t also form an opinion as to who was at fault, is that correct?
A Yes. (Records, p. 205.)
[31] Pertinent portion of TSN dated August 19, 1997, pp. 21-22, are quoted as follows,:
Q: Did
you ask the driver of the Ceres bus its speed immediately before the collision?
A: Yes.
Q: What was the answer of the driver of
the Ceres bus?
A: As
far as I could remember, he was [running] very fast, a speed of around 100
kilometers per hour.
Q: That
is the speed of the Ceres bus?
A: Yes.
Q: Why
is it that that is not reflected in your police blotter?
A: Because
we were busy with the deceased persons and the sketching of the place of the
incident.
[32] McKee v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R.
No. 68102, July 16, 1992, 211 SCRA 517, 544.