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ISABELO L.
GALANG, Petitioner, - versus - LAND BANK OF
THE
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 175276
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x- - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x LAND BANK OF THE
Petitioner, -
versus - ISABELO L. GALANG,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 175282 Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,* LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, SERENO,
JJ.
Promulgated: May
31, 2011 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
These are two consolidated petitions
for review on certiorari[1]
filed by Isabelo L. Galang and Land Bank of the
The facts of the case are undisputed.
On June 20, 1988, Isabelo L. Galang,
the Branch Manager of Land Bank Baliuag, Bulacan was charged with Dishonesty,
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Gross
Neglect of Duty, Violation of Rules and Regulations, and Receiving for Personal
Use a Fee, Gift or Other Valuable Thing in the Course of Official Duties or in
Connection Therewith when such Fee is Given by Any Person in the Hope or
Expectation of Receiving a Favor or Better Treatment than that Accorded Other
Persons or Committing Acts Punishable Under the Anti-Graft Laws. The case was docketed as Administrative Case
No. 88-002.[7]
Allegedly, Galang demanded
money from four borrowers of the bank, namely, Ceferino Manahan, Gregorio
Modelo, Sotero Santos and Feliza de Vera, in return for a reduction of interest
rates and condonation of penalty charges on their overdue loans. The complaint
further accuses Galang of making unauthorized disbursements for the repair of
the company car. Along with Galang, the
borrowers also charged Conrado Ocampo, a Project Analyst in the same branch,
for his alleged participation in soliciting money from them.
On
On
In a Decision[9]
dated March 8, 1991, the MSPB sustained the penalty imposed upon Galang and
Ocampo but found them liable only for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and Receiving for Personal Use
a Fee, Gift or Other Valuable Thing in the Course of Official Duties or in
Connection Therewith when such Fee is Given by Any Person in the Hope of Receiving
a Favor or Better Treatment than that Accorded Other Persons. The MSPB, however, absolved Galang of the
charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Violation of Rules and Regulations. Galang and Ocampo filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied in a Decision[10]
dated
Before the CSC, Galang and Ocampo’s
appeal was dismissed for lack of merit through Resolution No. 93-1001[11]
dated
Galang alone filed a petition for certiorari[13]
with the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the
CSC. In a Resolution[14]
dated
On
Subsequently, Galang filed a Motion for
Clarification and/or Reconsideration[17]
with a prayer for the CA to order his reinstatement and the payment of his back
wages, bonuses and other fringe benefits reckoned from the date of his
dismissal. Land Bank, likewise, moved
for reconsideration.
In a Resolution[18]
dated
Consequently, Galang filed a Motion to
Effect Entry of Judgment.[19] On
In a Resolution[21]
dated
In the meantime, Galang was reinstated
in the payroll on
In a letter[24]
dated
On
9.1 Whether Respondent is entitled to Meal and Rice Allowances, Representation and Travel Allowance and Housing Allowance, and the basis thereof;
9.2 Whether the payment of Provident Fund is limited to five (5) years only;
9.3 The basis for computing the 5-year backwages;
9.4
Whether Respondent should have been reinstated since
On
On May 15, 2003, Galang filed a Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution[30]
with the CSC to enforce the November 21, 1996 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37791, which ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his backwages for
five years.
The Commission denied said motion in
Resolution No. 040894 dated
On
In the assailed Decision dated
Hence, on
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE COMPUTATION OF PETITIONER’S BACKWAGES SHOULD BE BASED ON HIS CURRENT SALARY LEVEL; AND
II.
THE HONORABLE
COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AS EARLY
AS
For its part, Land Bank filed a petition
for review on certiorari on
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT [PERSONNEL] ECONOMIC RELIEF ALLOWANCE (PERA) AND REPRESENTATION AND [TRANSPORTATION] ALLOWANCE (RATA) SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PAYMENT OF RESPONDENT’S BACKWAGES.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS LIKEWISE COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT GALANG IS STILL ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF
MEAL ALLOWANCE AND RICE SUBSIDY.[33]
In order to resolve these twin
petitions, the Court must address the following questions: (1) When should
Galang be reinstated? (2) What should be the basis of computing his back
salaries? and (3) Is he entitled to PERA, RATA, Meal Allowance and Rice
Subsidy?
Citing the case of Cristobal v.
Melchor,[34]
Galang contends that his back wages should be computed based on the rate of his
salary at reinstatement. He argues that
since Land Bank availed of the wrong remedy, his reinstatement should be
reckoned from
Land Bank, on the other hand, disputes
Galang’s demand for PERA and RATA. It
reasons that since the five-year period for which Galang shall receive back
salaries is from July 1990 to June 1995, he is not entitled to PERA, a benefit
which employees of the Land Bank started receiving only in 1997. As to RATA, Land Bank maintains that the
nature of such benefit precludes Galang from claiming it since he did not incur
expenses for representation and transportation while he was not allowed to
work. Finally, it claims that it had
already paid Galang’s Rice Subsidy and Meal Allowance.
We find the petition partly
meritorious.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292[35]
and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws define reinstatement as the issuance
of an appointment to a person who has been previously appointed to a position
in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been
separated therefrom, or to the restoration of one who has been exonerated of
the administrative charges filed against him.
In the present case, Galang was
absolved of the administrative charges against him in the CA Decision dated
It is settled that an illegally
terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to
a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal
termination up to his reinstatement.[36]
Hence, in Galang’s case, he is entitled to back salaries from July 1990 to June
1995. This is not disputed by the
parties. Rather, the uncertainty centers
on when he should be reinstated.
The records show that Galang was
reinstated in Land Banks’s payroll on
Galang’s position on the effective date
of his reinstatement is correct.
Well-entrenched is that a judgment or
order becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal, without an appeal
being perfected or a motion for reconsideration being filed.[37]
In this case, Land Bank received notice
of the CA Resolution dated
However, an original action for certiorari is an independent
action and is neither a continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the
judgment complained of. It does not
interrupt the course of the original action if there was no writ of injunction,
even if in connection with a pending case in a lower court.[38] Section 7, Rule 65 on certiorari
provides:
SEC.
7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting
the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings. The petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
public respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, the petition for certiorari
filed by Land Bank in G.R. No. 131186 did not suspend the running of the
prescriptive period to appeal. Besides,
no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction was issued in
its favor that could effectively toll the running of the prescriptive
period.
It is true that there are instances
where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower
court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial
courtesy. The principle of judicial
courtesy, however, remains to be the exception rather than the rule.[39] Unfortunately for Land Bank, this is not a
proper case for the operation of the said principle.
Land Bank’s failure to interpose an
appeal within fifteen (15) days from its receipt on September 15, 1997 of the
Resolution dated September 5, 1997, rendered the same final and executory on
October 1, 1997. Galang’s reinstatement therefore
must be reckoned, not from
Concomitant with reinstatement is the
payment of back salaries. Section 59(e)
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service on the
effect of exoneration on certain penalties provides that in case the penalty
imposed is dismissal, he shall immediately be reinstated without loss of
seniority rights with payment of back salaries.
It was enunciated in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Salas[40] that:
When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held.
In this case, the second issue for
resolution pertains to the base figure to be used in computing Galang’s back
salaries.
Galang invokes the 1980 case of Cristobal
v. Melchor[41]
as authority in saying that the computation of his back wages should be based
on his salary at reinstatement. However,
we find Galang’s reliance on said case misplaced.
In Cristobal v. Melchor, Jose C.
Cristobal was reinstated as an Assistant in the Office of the President, a
position different from his position as Private Secretary I which he held when
he was terminated. Upon being
reinstated, he was paid the salary corresponding to that of a Private Secretary
I at the rate when he was wrongfully dismissed fifteen (15) years back. The Court ruled therein that Cristobal must
be given a position and compensation commensurate and comparable to that which
he held, taking into account the increases in salary during the fifteen (15)-year
period preceding his reinstatement. To
stress this point, the Court fixed his compensation at the rate prevailing at
the time of his reinstatement inclusive of allowances, benefits and increases
in salary. Moreover, it ordered the
respondents therein to pay Cristobal the differential between the current rate
of the salary, for a position commensurate to a Private Secretary I, and the
old rate from the time he “reported for duty”[42]
that is, from the time he was reinstated.
Clearly, what was in issue in Cristobal v. Melchor was the rate of
Cristobal’s compensation upon his reinstatement, not the rate of his back
salaries. In fact, he did not dispute
the payment of his back salaries for five years computed at the rate when he
was dismissed.[43]
The controlling rule on the rate at
which back salaries shall be paid was laid down by the Court as early as
Be that as it may, we cannot apply the foregoing
rule in the computation of Galang’s back salaries from
Apart from back salaries, Galang
demands payment of RATA, PERA, Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy from Land Bank.
Back wages represent the compensation
that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust
dismissal.[50] This includes other monetary benefits[51]
attached to the employee’s salary following the principle that an illegally
dismissed government employee who is later reinstated is entitled to all the
rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held.
Pertinent to this case, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6758,[52]
otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
was enacted on
SEC. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. - All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by the incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the National Government.
Section 17 of the Act, however, exempts
incumbent government officials and employees from the operation of Section 12,
thus:
SEC. 17. Salaries of Incumbents. - Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall receive in the future.
The transition allowance referred to herein shall be treated as part of the basic salary for purposes of computing retirement pay, year-end bonus and other similar benefits.
x x x x
Being an incumbent at the time, Galang
would have continued to receive RATA, Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy, separate
from his salary, had he not been illegally dismissed from service.
Representation and Transportation
Allowance or RATA is a fringe benefit distinct from salary. Unlike salary which
is paid for services rendered, RATA belongs to a basket of allowances to defray
expenses deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, it is paid only to certain officials
who, by the nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation
expenses.[53] The Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Manual on Position Classification and Compensation discusses the nature
of the RATA and qualifies the entitlement of reinstated government employees
thereto in certain fiscal years:
The pertinent general provisions of the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) prior to FY 1993 and in the FY 1999 GAA provided that the officials listed therein and those of equivalent ranks as may be determined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) are to be granted monthly commutable RATA. Hence, prior to FY 1993 and in FY 1999, RATA were allowances attached to the position.
The pertinent provisions of the FYs 1993 to 1998 GAAs and in the FY 2000 GAA provided that the officials listed therein and those of equivalent ranks as may be determined by the DBM while in the actual performance of their respective functions are to be granted monthly commutable RATA. This provision was reiterated in the pertinent general provisions of the subsequent GAAs. Hence, in FYs 1993 to 1998 and beginning FY 2000 and up to the present, the actual performance of an official’s duties and responsibilities was a pre-requisite to the grant of RATA.
The rationale behind the qualifying phrase, “while in the actual performance of their respective functions,” is to provide the official concerned with additional funds to meet necessary expenses incidental to and connected with the exercise or the discharge of the functions of the office. Thus, if the official is out of office, whether voluntary or involuntary, the official does not and is not supposed to incur expenses. There being no expenses incurred, there is nothing to reimburse.
Since RATA are privileges or benefits in the form of reimbursement of expenses, they are not salaries or part of basic salaries. Forfeiture or non-grant of the RATA does not constitute diminution in pay. RATA may be spent in variable amounts per work day depending on the situation. Entitlement thereto should not be proportionate to the number of work days in a month, inclusive of regular and special holidays falling on work days. (Emphasis supplied.)
For emphasis, the five-year period
covered in the computation of Galang’s back salaries and other benefits is from
July 1990 to June 1995. Also, he shall
receive back salaries and other benefits for the period during which he should
have been reinstated from
On the other hand, Personnel Economic
Relief Allowance (PERA) is a P500 monthly allowance authorized under the
pertinent general provision in the annual GAA.
It is granted to augment the pay of government employees due to the
rising cost of living.
On
In his Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution, Galang acknowledges receipt of “Rice Allowance, which was monetized
based on the value of a sack of rice within the period from July 1990 to June
As to Meal Allowance, Land Bank
concedes Galang’s entitlement thereto, albeit, it claims that it had
already paid the same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the burden
of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer. The rationale for this rule was explained
in G & M Philippines, Inc. v. Cuambot[57]:
x
x x [O]ne who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The reason for the
rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and
other similar documents - which will show that overtime, differentials, service
incentive leave, and other claims of workers have been paid - are not in the
possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the
employer. Thus, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation
has been discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the
rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. x x x[58]
To prove payment of
Galang’s meal allowance for 1988 and July 1990 to P34,860.00,
Land Bank annexed Disbursement Order No. 02-02-0170[59]
dated February 8, 2002 to its Comment[60]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91910. However, said disbursement
order lacks the signature of Galang as recipient. Verily, we cannot take such document as
conclusive proof that Galang has been paid his meal allowance. Taking into account our determination that
Galang ought to be reinstated earlier, Land Bank shall likewise be liable to
pay his Meal Allowance from
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated P34,860.00; and (g) Meal
Allowance and Rice Subsidy for October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
(On leave) ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
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(No Part) MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
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JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
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MARIA Associate Justice |
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C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
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RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice |
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* On
leave.
**
No part.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 175276), pp. 10-33; Rollo (G.R. No. 175282), pp. 20-34.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 175282), pp. 35-47. Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
CA rollo, pp. 110-112.
[11]
[12]
Rollo (G.R. No. 175282), pp.
115-116.
[13]
[14]
CSC records, p. 468.
[15] Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgments or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.
[16] Rollo (G.R. No. 175282), pp. 338-363.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] G.R. No. 124678,
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 175282), pp. 435-445.
[27]
[28]
[29] Supra note 22.
[30]
[31]
[32]
Rollo (G.R. No. 175276), p. 21.
[33]
Rollo (G.R. No. 175282), pp.
24-25.
[34] No. L-43203,
[35] Instituting the “Administrative Code of
[36] Yenko v. Gungon, G.R. Nos. 165450 &
165452,
[37] Philippine Veterans Bank v. Solid Homes,
Inc., G.R. No. 170126,
[38]
[39] De Leon v. Public Estates Authority,
G.R. Nos. 181970 & 182678,
[40] G.R. No. 138756,
[41] Supra note 34.
[42]
[43]
[44] No. L-40490,
[45]
[46] No. L-41717-33,
[47] No. L-46585,
[48] G.R. No. 87420,
[49] G.R. No. 112513,
[50] Malig-on v. Equitable General Services, Inc., G.R. No. 185269, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 326, 332.