Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
THERON V. LACSON,
Petitioner, - versus - THE HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY,
and TEODORICO C. TAGUINOD, in his capacity as General Manager and Chief
Executive Officer of the Public Estates Authority, Respondents. x
--------------------------------------- x JAIME R. MILLAN and
BERNARDO T. VIRAY,
Petitioners, - versus - THE HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, and the PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. Nos. 165399 and
165475 G.R. Nos. 165404 and
165489 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION,* ABAD, SERENO,* JJ. Promulgated: May 30, 2011 |
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
seeking to set aside the June 8, 2004 Decision and the September 20, 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78749 and CA-G.R. SP No.78290.[1]
The Facts
Petitioners Theron V. Lacson (Lacson), Jaime R. Millan (Millan)
and Bernardo T. Viray (Viray) were non-presidential appointees and
career service officials of respondent Philippine Estates Authority (PEA),
holding the positions of Deputy General Manager for Finance, Legal and
Administration; Assistant General Manager; and Department General Manager,
respectively.[2]
On P600,000,000.00,
the contract for the construction of the Central Boulevard Project (the
Project), otherwise known as the President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard.[3]
Acting on the complaint, the Ombudsman proceeded with the investigation
of both the criminal and the administrative aspects of the case.[4] The criminal case, docketed as
OMB-C-C-02-0667-J and entitled “Sulficio
O. Tagud Jr., et al. v. Ernesto Villareal, et al.,” charged petitioners for
committing an act in violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080. The administrative
case, docketed as OMB-C-A-02-0523-K, on the other hand, charged them with
Dishonesty, Serious Misconduct and Acts Inimical to the Interest of the Public
Service in violation of Section 52A (1), (3) and (20) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases.[5]
Meanwhile,
on
In its Letter-Reply dated
This has reference to your letter dated
The Office takes the opportunity to
confirm the fact that the case filed with this Office on
Subsequently, on November 12, 2002, a formal complaint was filed by the
Investigation Office of PAGC charging several employees of PEA, including petitioners,
with acts and/or omissions contrary to: (1) Item 1B2 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1594, as amended;
(2) Section 3(i), (g) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended; (3) Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. No. 3019, as amended; (4) Articles
8.1 and 8.2 of the Construction Agreement signed on April 10, 2000 between PEA
and J.D. Legaspi Construction; and (5) Section 46 (a) and (b) of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 292, as amended, in
particular Item (B), Nos. 3, 4 and 27, in relation to R.A. No. 3019, as
amended.[8]
On the same date, PAGC issued an order
requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavit/verified answer (not a
motion to dismiss or motion for bill of particulars) within a non-extendible
period of 10 days from receipt of the order.
Preliminary conference was set on
During the preliminary conference, petitioners raised several
jurisdictional issues, particularly the following: the absence of certification
of non-forum shopping in the complaint; the primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate them; the lack of jurisdiction of PAGC over the
complaint against them considering that they were not presidential appointees
and there was no allegation that they had conspired with the presidential
appointees who were charged with them; the futility of any investigation by PAGC
as the same would have no bearing on the case filed with the Ombudsman; and the
fatally defective complaint which was not based on personal knowledge of the
complainant who, as an officer of PAGC, was merely a nominal party and was
never privy to the project subject of the investigation.[10]
PAGC directed petitioners to file their memoranda to formalize their
arguments.[11]
On
In a letter dated December 16, 2002, the Office of the President, through
the Executive Secretary, informed the PEA Chairman and Members of the Board
that the President approved the recommendation of PAGC in its November 28, 2002
Resolution dismissing the petitioners from PEA and imposing upon them the accessory
penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from employment
in the government service, and directed them to take the necessary actions to
effect the instructions of the President. [13]
On
After securing a copy of the PAGC Resolution, petitioners Millan and
Viray, together with Manuel R. Beriña, Jr. (Beriña) filed a motion for reconsideration[15]
dated January 2, 2003 with the Office of the President assailing the November
28, 2002 Resolution and Recommendation of the PAGC.
This motion was
not acted upon.[16]
On
Aggrieved, Beriña, Millan and Viray filed their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 with the CA on
Lacson, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
order[19] in
a letter dated
On
Finally, in a consolidated decision
dated
On
Hence, these petitions.
Upon motion of the OSG, on behalf of respondents Executive Secretary and
PAGC, the Court issued a resolution ordering the consolidation of the petitions
in G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489 with the petitions in G.R. Nos. 165399 and
165475.[27]
ISSUES
In their respective petitions for review, petitioners assigned the
following errors, to wit:
I.
Respondents erred when they issued the
questioned memoranda and ordered the dismissal of Petitioners allegedly on the
basis of the recommendation of the respondent PAGC, in that:
A. Under
the constitution and the laws applicable, it is the ombudsman which has the
jurisdiction to investigate and recommend the dismissal of career service
officers such as petitioners herein.
b. it
is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the investigation and
removal of Petitioners and not Respondent PAGC.
c. Executive
Order No. 12, series of 2002, which grants Respondent PAGC the authority to
investigate and recommend the dismissal of public officers and employees within
the civil service who are non-presidential appointees as petitioners herein is
unconstitutional and invalid for being contrary to law.
D. The
direct action of Respondents in dismissing the PetitionerS from the service
without the head of respondent PEA having conducted any investigation at all is
contrary to law.
II.
Respondents erred in dismissing the
Petitioners from Respondent PEA and public office in that:
a. Petitioners’
dismissal was violative of their right to due process of law, petitioners
having been deprived of a formal investigation which they are entitled to under
the rules of procedure of the ombudsman and the uniform rules on administrative
cases in the civil service.
b. The
Petitioners’ dismissal was violative of their right to security of tenure as
they were terminated from service upon a mere presidential directive.
iii.
Respondents engaged in prohibited forum
shopping by the filing of multiple administrative complaints against
Petitioners for the same cause; hence, the instant charge against petitioners
should be dismissed.[28]
These alleged errors in G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475 and G.R. Nos. 165404
and 165489 can be categorized into two principal issues:
(1) Whether it is the Ombudsman who should conduct the
investigation on the charge of overpricing of the Project against petitioners;
and
(2) Whether
the Court can still review the dismissal ordered by PEA.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
similarly authorized agencies
Petitioners argue that because they are not presidential appointees, it
is only the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over them.
In this regard, the petitioners are not correct. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not
exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government in relation to the offense charged. [29] Therefore, with respect to
petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its authority to conduct an investigation
concerning administrative charges against them with other agencies.
At any
rate, this issue is
already moot and academic as the Ombudsman has terminated its investigation of
petitioners. This can be gleaned from
the certified true copies of the Ombudsman’s May 30, 2008 Decision as well as
the July 3, 2008 Review and Recommendation which the petitioners submitted in
compliance with the November 22, 2010 Resolution requiring them to inform the
Court of the status of their cases before the Ombudsman. It appears therefrom
that the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative case against the petitioners
because the charges had already been passed upon by PAGC.[30]
Having been dismissed by PEA, petitioners
should have appealed to the Civil Service Commission
Despite the
claim of petitioners that the decision to dismiss them was upon orders of the
President or upon undue pressure exerted by the Office of the President to
implement the PAGC recommendations, still the undeniable fact is that the
dismissal of petitioners was actually made and effected by PEA.
Granting
that PEA committed an error, whether substantial or procedural, petitioners should
have appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Title I, Book V of E.O. No.
292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), to wit:
(1) The Commission
shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly
with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any
department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the
investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action
to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or
office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed
to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same
shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same
shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.”[Emphasis
Supplied]
It is only
after appealing the case to the CSC that it can be elevated to the CA via
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. From there, said case can be appealed to the
Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Unfortunately,
petitioners chose the wrong remedy.
Instead of appealing their dismissal by the PEA to the CSC, they chose
to question it before the CA.
For their failure
to appeal to the proper forum, the decision of the PEA dismissing them has
become final and executory. It should be
emphasized that “the right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who
seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the
law. Failure to do so, the right to
appeal is lost.”[31]
As
petitioners’ dismissal has become final and executory, the Court no longer has
the power to review and act on the matter.
There was no violation of
petitioners’ right to due process and security of tenure
Even
granting that this Court can still review the PEA action to terminate the
petitioners, they have not shown that their right to due process and security
of tenure was violated.
Petitioners
argue that they were denied due process because their order of dismissal was
not accompanied by any justification from the PEA Board of Directors who merely
relied on the findings of PAGC.
This
argument, however, deserves scant consideration.
As conversely
pointed out by respondents, petitioners cannot claim that their dismissal was
unattended by the requisite due process because they were given the opportunity
to be heard in the course of PAGC’s investigation.
Indeed, as career
service officers, the petitioners enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed under
the 1987 Constitution.[32]
This is further reiterated in Section 36(a) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise
known as the Civil Service Decree of the
The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both
procedural and substantive due process.
Procedural due process requires that the dismissal, when warranted, be
effected only after notice and hearing.
On the other hand, substantive due process requires, among others, that
the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate to and effect the
administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a member of and
must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the
rights and interests of the public.[33]
Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure is not tantamount to
immunity from dismissal. Petitioners
cannot seek absolute protection from this constitutional provision. As long as their
dismissal is for a legal cause and the requirements of due process were met,
the law will not prevent their removal from office.
Per records of the case, the exercise of disciplinary action against
petitioners was justified because (1) they committed acts punishable under the
anti-graft laws; and (2) their conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.[34] Thus, their removal from office was for a legal
cause.
Anent the alleged failure of respondents to observe due process,
well-established is the rule that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense.[35] The
demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.[36] In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[37]
this Court laid down the cardinal and primary rights to be observed and
respected in administrative proceedings:
(1) The
right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The
tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The
decision must have some evidence to support a finding or conclusion;
(4) The
evidence must be substantial (that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind accepts as adequate to support a conclusion);
(5) The
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The
tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the view of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision; and
(7) The
tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved
and the reasons for the decisions rendered.[38]
In this
regard, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings before PAGC where
they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions through their memoranda. The essence of due process is the right to be
heard and this evidently was afforded to them. Thus, petitioners’ assertion
that their dismissal was unattended by the requisite due process cannot be
sustained.
In sum, the removal from office of petitioners was valid. PEA dismissed
them for cause and in accordance with the requisites of due process. Petitioners, as PEA officers and employees,
are under the disciplining
authority of the PEA Board, pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. No. 1084,
the Charter of the Public Estates
Authority,[39]
which states that:
Section 11. Appointment, control and discipline
of personnel. The Board, upon
recommendation of the General Manager of the Authority, shall appoint the officers and employees of
the Authority and its subsidiaries; fix their compensation, allowances and benefits,
their working hours and such other conditions of employment as it may deem
proper; grant them leaves of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate; discipline and/or
remove them for cause; and
establish and maintain a recruitment and merit system for the Authority and its
affiliates and subsidiaries. (Emphases supplied)
At any rate, as earlier stated, as the petitioners did not appeal the
decision of the PEA to dismiss them to the CSC, it has become final and
executory and the Court can no longer review it.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARIA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T
A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional members in lieu of
Associate Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura and Diosdado M. Peralta, per
Raffle dated
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate
Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Edgardo F.
Sundiam.
[2] Rollo (G.R.
Nos. 165404 and 165489), pp. 39-40.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489), p. 201.
[19] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475), p.
256.
[20]
[21]
[22] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489), p.
48.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489), p. 61.
[27] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475), p.
540.
[28] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 165404 and 165489), pp.
12-13; rollo (G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475), pp. 26-28.
[29] Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 65 citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226, 240; Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1993, 227 SCRA 627, and Aguinaldo v. Domagas, G.R. No. 98452, September 26, 1991.
[30] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475), p. 1028.
[31] Acena
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 90780, February 6, 1991, 193 SCRA
623, 629, citing Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil. 428 (1989).
[32] Article IX-B, Sec. 2, par. 3.
[33] Tria
v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 85670,
[34] P.D.
No. 807, Civil Service Decree of the
[35] Larin v. Executive Secretary, 345 Phil. 962, 977 (1997), citing Midas Touch Food Corp. v. NLRC, 382 Phil. 1033 (1996).
[36] Medina v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
176478, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 684, 696, citing Montemayor v. Bundalian,
453 Phil. 158, 165 (2003).
[37] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[38]
[39]