Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ,
ORLANDITO A. ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO,
FELIPE ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N.
ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P.
ANCORDA, TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D.
ANTINO, DOMINGO ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, MARCELO
S. AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G.
ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R. ASTRALABIO,
RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE, MAXIMO
M. BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI, HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO
BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR
BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN,
FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO M.
BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO
C. CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY
A. CALISO, NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, VICTORIANO
CANETE, DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, VICTORINO S. CARLOS,
VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, JAIME S. CASTAŅARES, FLAVIANO C. CASTAŅARES,
ELPIDIO CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B. CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS,
CIRILO G. CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO,
CESAR CORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ,
ROGER CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS DAMBAAN,
ELISEO DAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P. DEANG,
CARMELINO P. DEANG, DIOSDADO P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG,
JR., JULIETO S. DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL
DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE P. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL,
ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZO DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO
DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO,
DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG, FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C. ECHIVERE,
AQUILLO M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS, ANICETO
ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D. ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO, FORTUNATA
ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY, RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO
A. ESPAŅOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO,
GREGORIO S. FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO M. FLORES,
REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V.
GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA, BERNARDO P. GENTOBA, EDUARDO
P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO, ROLANDO V. GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO
GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M.
GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO,
TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, HERMIE L.
JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C. JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S.
JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T. JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D.
LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D.
LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J. LAS PEŅAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO
G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS
BAŅEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO
LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L.
MADULIN, JOSEPH D. MAGALLON, PEDRO P. MAGLASANG, MARIO G. MALAGAMBA, JAIME B.
MAMARADLO, PANFILO A. MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI,
ALBERTO T. MANGGA, ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P.
MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIA
MATABANG, ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI C. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIO
R. MESA, RENATO N. MILLADO, ANTONIO L.
MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA,
RICARDO MONTAŅO, RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUŅEZ, CRESENCIO
NARCISO, PANFILO C. NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G.
NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SR., TEODORO B.
OCRETO, BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M. OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M. ORACION,
ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA,
NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., FRNACISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P.
PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B.
PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO, EDGAR M. PEŅARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO,
ANTONIO C. PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEŅOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN
G. PRIETO, ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR
QUIJARDO, WILLIAM U. QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, MARCELINO M.
RELIZAN, RAUL A. REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS,
RODULFO RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO
ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN G. SALIGONAN,
VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO J. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A.
SAMELIN, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN, ROMEO A.
SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO
SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO
S. SIMTIM, SERAFIN T. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. SOLOMON,
JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT,
PEDRO A. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL T. SUPAS,
WILFREDO A. TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO
TAHITIT, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD,
SAMUEL S. TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G. TINAY,
ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO
Y. TUCLAOD, JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E.
VALENZUELA, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAŅE, DANTE
VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA,
JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGAR
A. YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, ROMEO P.
YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA and GRACIANO ZAMORA, Petitioners, - versus - HON. TEODORO
A. DIZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, General
Santos City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP.,
STANDARD FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC.,
DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT
CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and
OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Petitioners, - versus - BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO
P. ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A. ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN
M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO,
LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA,
RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO,
ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGO ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO
AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO
ARCE, RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R.
ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO
BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI, HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO
B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO
A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR BAYANI, BENIGNO BESARES, RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A.
BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, FERNANDO B. BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS
P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTE P. BURGOS, MARCELINO J. CABALUNA,
DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA, BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C.
CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO, NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, CELESTINO
CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, VICTORIANO CANETE, DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO
P. CARBAJOSA, VICTORINO S. CARLOS, VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, JAIME S.
CASTAŅARES, FLAVIANO C. CASTAŅARES, ELPIDIO CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B. CAUSANG,
BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILO G. CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M.
CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESAR CORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ,
SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGER CRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ,
CANUTO M. DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEO DAPROZA, VIRGILIO
P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINO P. DEANG,
DIOSDADO P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG, JR., JULIETO S. DELA
CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL DEMONTEVERDE, FELIPE
P. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZO
DIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE
DIZON, VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO, DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR
DUMALAG, FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C. ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL
EMNACE, RIO T. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA,
RUBENTITO D. ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY,
RODOLFO M. ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A. ESPAŅOLA, EULOGIO M.
ETURMA, PRIMO P. FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO,
VICENTE P. FERRER, MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO M. FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA,
NORBERTO J. FUENTES, RICARDO C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F.
GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA, BERNARDO P. GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO
B. GIDO, ROLANDO V. GIMENA, EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G.
GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, AMADO J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G.
HALILI, NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V. HERMONDO, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S
ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A. JALBUNA, HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO
B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C. JAVINAS, ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO
T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T. JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY, ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS C.
LABAY, AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY, NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J.
LAS PEŅAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA, CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO
LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTON LOS BAŅEZ, CONCISO L.
LOVITOS, ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN, PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR.,
EMILIO S. MABASA, JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L. MADULIN, JOSEPH D.
MAGALLON, PEDRO P. MAGLASANG, MARIO G. MALAGAMBA, JAIME B. MAMARADLO, PANFILO
A. MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI, ALBERTO T. MANGGA,
ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P. MANSANES, ALCIO P.
MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIA MATABANG, ARNELO
N. MATILLANO, HERNANI C. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIO R. MESA, RENATO
N. MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO,
ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P. MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA, RICARDO
MONTAŅO, RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO MUNAR, RODOLFO E. MUŅEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO,
PANFILO C. NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR, MOISES P. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. NICOLAS,
ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL, SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO,
BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M. OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M. ORACION, ALAN E.
ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA, NELSON G.
PADIOS, SR., FRANCISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P. PALOMAR,
VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B. PASTERA,
VICENTE Q. PEDAZO, EDGAR M. PEŅARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, ANTONIO C.
PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEŅOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G. PRIETO,
ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO,
WILLIAM U. QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, MARCELINO M. RELIZAN,
RAUL A. REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO
RIVAS, BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO
ROSARIO, ROMEO L. SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN B. SALIGONAN,
VICTORINO SALOMON, GENEROSO M. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A.
SAMELIN, EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN, ROMEO A.
SARAOSOS, RUDIGELIO S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO
SERDONCILLO, RODOLFO C. SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO
S. SIMTIM, SERAFIN T. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. SOLOMON,
JAIME B. SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT,
PEDRO A. SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL T. SUPAS,
WILFREDO A. TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO
TAHITIT, PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD,
SAMUEL S. TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G. TINAY,
ANTONIO TOLEDO, ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO
Y. TUCLAOD, JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E.
VALENZUELA, SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAŅE, DANTE
VILLALVA, PERIGRINO P. VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA,
JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C. VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGAR
A. YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA, EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, ROMEO P.
YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N. ZABALA, and GRACIANO ZAMORA, Respondents. x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO
AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO,
CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE
ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO
L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA,
REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS
A. BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO
BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS
BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES,
CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO
CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M.
COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO
C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ,
QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA,
ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L.
GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO
GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M. GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG,
LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA,
DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO,
VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO
B. LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P.
LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, DIOSDADO
MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO
A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO
MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C.
NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M.
OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA,
JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M.
PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO
PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON,
DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO
RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR
SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON,
AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON,
ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR,
JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE
VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, Petitioners, - versus - THE HON. ROMEO D. MARASIGAN,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, SHELL OIL
CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD FRUIT CO.,
STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT
CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA
BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A.
and DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., Petitioners, - versus - THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCHES
16 AND 13, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO
ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA,
LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA,
GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL,
SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO
L. BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, MARCIANO
NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO,
MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L.
BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A.
CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO
CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M.
COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO
C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ,
QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA,
ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L.
GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO
GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M. GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG,
LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA,
DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO,
VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO,
LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO
P. LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD,
DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO
MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO
MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H.
NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ,
JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA,
JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M.
PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO
PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON,
DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO
RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA,
SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO
TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E.
TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO,
PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO
P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., and
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioners, - versus - HON. ANITA ALFELOR-ALAGABAN,
in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City,
Branch 13, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO
ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA,
FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITO
R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON
ASUAL, SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA,
ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A.
BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO
BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS
BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C.
CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R.
CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F.
COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME,
FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G.
DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE
DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG,
JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA,
RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M. GODELOSAO,
HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO
INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A.
LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO
LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON,
ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO
LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G.
MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR MONAPCO,
SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO
H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO
NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA,
JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M.
PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO
PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON,
DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO
RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA,
SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO
TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E.
TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO,
PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO
P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 125078 G.R. No. 125598 G.R. No.
126654 G.R. No.
127856 G.R. No.
128398 Present: Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PERALTA,* and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: May
30, 2011 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court
are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which arose out of two civil cases that were
filed in different courts but whose factual background and issues are closely
intertwined.
The petitions in
G.R. Nos. 125078[1]
and 125598[2] both
assail the Order[3] dated
May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
On the other
hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654,[6] 127856,[7]
and 128398[8] seek
the reversal of the Order[9]
dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No.
24,251-96, which also dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
G.R.
Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the Resolutions
dated February 10, 1997,[10] April
28, 1997[11] and March
10, 1999.[12]
The
factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:
Proceedings before the
Beginning
1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different
In
a Memorandum and Order dated July 11,
1995, the
Delgado,
Jorge Carcamo,
(1)
participated
in expedited discovery in the
(2)
either
waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional
defense within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order in any
action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the
country in which his injury occurred.
Any plaintiff desiring to bring such an action will do so within 30 days
after the entry of this Memorandum and Order;
(3)
waived
within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order any limitations-based
defense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts
of
(4)
stipulated
within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order that any discovery
conducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign
proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings
initiated there; and
(5)
submitted
within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order an agreement
binding them to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a
foreign court.
x x x
x
Notwithstanding
the dismissals that may result from this Memorandum and Order, in the event
that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in
his home country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may
return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume
jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for [forum non conveniens].[13]
Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of
In
accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City (the
petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed a Joint Complaint[14]
in the RTC of General Santos City on August 10, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5617. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil
Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole
Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and
Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands,
Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively
referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine
Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are
hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.)
Navida, et
al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries
to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their
exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among
others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to
the early 1980s when they used the same in the banana plantations where they
worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such
chemical was used. Navida, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the
fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced,
sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing
products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed
to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have
known, were highly injurious to the formers health and well-being.
Instead of
answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filed
their Motions for Bill of Particulars.[15] During the pendency of the motions, on March
13, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint Complaint,[16] excluding
Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd., Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac
Chemical Corp. as party defendants.
Again, the remaining
defendant companies filed their various Motions for Bill of Particulars.[17] On May 15, 1996, DOW filed an Answer with
Counterclaim.[18]
On May 20, 1996,
without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos
City issued an Order dismissing the
complaint. First, the trial court
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, to wit:
THE
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE DISMISSED
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
x x x x
The substance of the cause of action as stated in
the complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites activity on their
part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
territorial domain of the
Accordingly,
the subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to
the present case, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by
foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the
jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present Regional Trial Court.[19]
Second, the RTC
of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged by Navida, et al., in their complaint is a tort category that is not
recognized in Philippine laws. Said the trial court:
THE
TORT ASSERTED IN THE PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT FOREIGN COMPANIES IS
NOT WITHIN THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BECAUSE
IT IS NOT A TORT CATEGORY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW
The specific tort asserted against
defendant foreign companies in the present complaint is product liability
tort. When the averments in the present
complaint are examined in terms of the particular categories of tort recognized
in the Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark clear that such averments
describe and identify the category of specific tort known as product
liability tort. This is necessarily
so, because it is the product manufactured by defendant foreign
companies, which is asserted to be the proximate cause of the damages sustained
by the plaintiff workers, and the liability of the defendant foreign companies,
is premised on being the manufacturer of the pesticides.
It is clear, therefore, that the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present case, if and only if the
Civil Code of the Philippines, or a suppletory special law prescribes a product
liability tort, inclusive of and comprehending the specific tort described in
the complaint of the plaintiff workers.[20]
Third, the RTC
of General Santos City adjudged that Navida,
et al., were coerced into submitting
their case to the Philippine courts, viz:
FILING OF CASES IN
THE
The Court views that the plaintiffs
did not freely choose to file the instant action, but rather were coerced to do
so, merely to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order dated July 11, 1995,
and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the
U.S. District Court.[21]
Fourth,
the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the
defendant companies therein, thus:
THE DEFENDANTS
SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT IS ILLUSORY
Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept
service of summons/processes in the
The
appointment of agents by the defendants, being subject to a suspensive
condition, thus produces no legal effect and is ineffective at the moment.[22]
Fifth,
the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the
Philippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. The trial
court expounded:
THE
JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING
This court frowns upon the fact that
the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of
the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in this
court when they are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum, violates
the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. x x x.
x x x x
THE FILING OF THE CASE IN
Moreover,
the filing of the case in the
x
x x x
THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE
OF LITIS PENDENCIA
Furthermore,
the case filed in the
In fine, the trial court held that:
It
behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case.
For to continue with these proceedings, would be violative of the
constitutional provision on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing speedy disposition
of cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution). The court has no other choice. To insist on further proceedings with this
case, as it is now presented, might accord this court a charming appearance. But the same insistence would actually thwart
the very ends of justice which it seeks to achieve.
This
evaluation and action is made not on account of but rather with due
consideration to the fact that the dismissal of this case does not necessarily
deprive the parties especially the plaintiffs of their possible
remedies. The court is cognizant that
the Federal Court may resume proceedings of that earlier case between the
herein parties involving the same acts or omissions as in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing considerations, this case is now considered DISMISSED.[24]
On
June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued an Order,[25]
dismissing DOWs Answer with Counterclaim.
In
an Order[29]
dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already
lost its jurisdiction over the case as it took into consideration the Manifestation
of the counsel of NAVIDA, et al.,
which stated that the latter had already filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
CHIQUITA
and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration[30] of the above order.
On
July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari in
order to assail the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996, which was docketed as G.R. No. 125078.
The
RTC of General Santos City then issued an Order[31]
dated August 14, 1996, which merely noted the incidents still pending in Civil
Case No. 5617 and reiterated that it
no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
On
August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari,[32] challenging
the orders of the RTC of General Santos City dated May 20, 1996, June 4, 1996
and July 9, 1996. Their petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 125598.
In
their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General Santos City
erred in ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
as well as the persons of the defendant companies.
In
a Resolution[33]
dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with
G.R. No. 125078.
CHIQUITA
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[34]
which sought the reversal of the RTC Orders dated May 20, 1996, July 9, 1996
and August 14, 1996. The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 126018. In a
Resolution[35] dated
November 13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid petition for failure of
CHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. CHIQUITA filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[36]
but the same was denied through a Resolution[37]
dated January 27, 1997.
Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC
of
Another joint complaint for damages
against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was filed before
Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in G.R. No.
126654, hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et
al.) amended their Joint-Complaint on May 21, 1996.[38]
Similar
to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al., ABELLA,
et al., alleged that, as workers in the
banana plantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made
to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which contained
the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in
serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to,
sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.[39] ABELLA, et
al., claimed that the defendant companies manufactured, produced, sold,
distributed, used, and/or made available in commerce, DBCP without warning the
users of its hazardous effects on health, and without providing instructions on
its proper use and application, which the defendant companies knew or ought to
have known, had they exercised ordinary care and prudence.
Except for DOW, the other defendant
companies filed their respective motions for bill of particulars to which ABELLA,
et al., filed their opposition. DOW and DEL MONTE filed their respective Answers
dated May 17, 1996 and June 24, 1996.
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked
Civil Case No. 24,251-96 in its Order dated October 1, 1996, which, in
its entirety, reads:
Upon a thorough review of the Complaint and Amended
Complaint For: Damages filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants Shell Oil
Company, DOW Chemicals Company, Occidental Chemical Corporation, Standard Fruit
Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE Food Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit Company,
Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands International, Del Monte Fresh Produce,
N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign corporations with
Philippine Representatives, the Court, as correctly pointed out by one of the
defendants, is convinced that plaintiffs would have this Honorable Court
dismiss the case to pave the way for their getting an affirmance by the Supreme
Court (#10 of Defendants Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical
Fruit Co., Reply to Opposition dated July 22, 1996). Consider these:
1)
In
the original Joint Complaint, plaintiffs state that: defendants have no
properties in the Philippines; they have no agents as well (par. 18);
plaintiffs are suing the defendants for tortuous acts committed by these
foreign corporations on their respective countries, as plaintiffs, after having
elected to sue in the place of defendants residence, are now compelled by a
decision of a Texas District Court to file cases under torts in this
jurisdiction for causes of actions which occurred abroad (par. 19); a
petition was filed by same plaintiffs against same defendants in the Courts of
Texas, USA, plaintiffs seeking for payment of damages based on negligence, strict liability,
conspiracy and international tort theories (par. 27); upon defendants Motion
to Dismiss on Forum non [conveniens], said petition was provisionally dismissed
on condition that these cases be filed in the Philippines or before 11 August
1995 (Philippine date; Should the Philippine Courts refuse or deny jurisdiction,
the U. S. Courts will reassume jurisdiction.)
11. In the Amended
Joint Complaint, plaintiffs aver that: on 11 July 1995, the
The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case
at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the opinion
of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special
report Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility, to wit:
1.
Former
Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient
forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since the
causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine
laws. There has been no decided case in
Philippine Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This
means there is no available evidence which will prove and disprove the relation
between sterility and DBCP.
2.
Retired
Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento opined that while a class suit is
allowed in the
3.
Retired
High Court Justice Rodolfo Nocom stated that there is simply an absence of
doctrine here that permits these causes to be heard. No product liability ever filed or tried
here.
Case
ordered dismissed.[40]
Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition for review, filed on November 12,
1996 by ABELLA, et al., assails before
this Court the above-quoted order of the RTC of Davao City.
ABELLA,
et al., claim that the RTC of Davao
City erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
According
to ABELLA, et al., the RTC of Davao
City has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since Articles 2176
and 2187 of the Civil Code are broad enough to cover the acts complained of and
to support their claims for damages.
ABELLA,
et al., further aver that the dismissal
of the case, based on the opinions of legal luminaries reported in a newspaper,
by the RTC of Davao City is bereft of basis.
According to them, their cause of action is based on quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. They
also maintain that the absence of jurisprudence regarding the award of damages
in favor of those adversely affected by the DBCP does not preclude them from
presenting evidence to prove their allegations that their exposure to DBCP
caused their sterility and/or infertility.
SHELL,
DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their respective motions for reconsideration of
the Order dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. DEL MONTE also filed its motion for
reconsideration, which contained an additional motion for the inhibition of the
presiding judge.
The
presiding judge of Branch 16 then issued an Order[41]
dated December 2, 1996, voluntarily inhibiting himself from trying the
case. Thus, the case was re-raffled to
Branch 13 of the RTC of Davao City.
In
an Order[42]
dated December 16, 1996, the RTC of Davao City affirmed the Order dated October
1, 1996, and denied the respective motions for reconsideration filed by
defendant companies.
Thereafter,
CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997, questioning the
Orders dated October 1, 1996 and December 16, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. This case was docketed as G.R. No. 128398.
In
its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing
the case motu proprio as it acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as over the persons of
the defendant companies which voluntarily appeared before it. CHIQUITA also claims that the RTC of Davao
City cannot dismiss the case simply on the basis of opinions of alleged legal
experts appearing in a newspaper article.
Initially,
this Court in its Resolution[43]
dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the petition filed by CHIQUITA for submitting a
defective certificate against forum shopping.
CHIQUITA, however, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted
by this Court in the Resolution[44]
dated October 8, 1997.
On
March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review on certiorari before this Court assailing
the above-mentioned orders of the RTC of Davao City. Its petition was docketed as G.R. No. 127856.
DEL
MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 24,251-96, as defined under the law
and that the said court already obtained jurisdiction over its person by its
voluntary appearance and the filing of a motion for bill of particulars and,
later, an answer to the complaint. According
to DEL MONTE, the RTC of Davao City, therefore, acted beyond its authority when
it dismissed the case motu proprio or
without any motion to dismiss from any of the parties to the case.
In
the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March 10, 1999,
this Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398.
The Consolidated
Motion to Drop DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL as Party-Respondents filed by NAVIDA,
et al. and ABELLA, et al.
On
September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed before this Court a Consolidated Motion (to Drop
Party-Respondents).[45] The plaintiff claimants alleged that they had
amicably settled their cases with DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL sometime in July
1997. This settlement agreement was
evidenced by facsimiles of the Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold
Harmless Agreement, which were attached to the said motion. Pursuant to said agreement, the plaintiff
claimants sought to withdraw their petitions as against DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
DOLE,
DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, as well as the settlement
entered into between the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
The Memoranda of
the Parties
Considering
the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the parties, this Court, in a
Resolution dated June 22, 1998,[46]
required all the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
CHIQUITA
filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998;[47] SHELL
asked to be excused from the filing of a memorandum alleging that it had
already executed a compromise agreement with the plaintiff claimants.[48] DOLE
filed its Memorandum on October 12, 1998[49]
while DEL MONTE filed on October 13, 1998.[50] NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., filed
their Consolidated Memorandum on February 3, 1999;[51]
and DOW and OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum on December 23, 1999.[52]
The Motion to
Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598
On
July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for
Review in G.R. No. 125598, [53] explaining
that the said petition is already moot and academic and no longer presents a
justiciable controversy since they have already entered into an amicable
settlement with NAVIDA, et al. DOW and OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully
complied with their obligations set forth in the 1997 Compromise
Agreements.
DOLE
filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004,[54]
interposing no objection to the withdrawal of the petition, and further stating
that they maintain their position that DOW and OCCIDENTAL, as well as other
settling defendant companies, should be retained as defendants for purposes of
prosecuting the cross-claims of DOLE, in the event that the complaint below is
reinstated.
NAVIDA,
et al., also filed their Comment
dated September 14, 2004,[55]
stating that they agree with the view of DOW and OCCIDENTAL that the petition
in G.R. No. 125598 has become moot and academic because Civil Case No. 5617 had
already been amicably settled by the parties in 1997.
On
September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review Filed by Petitioners in G.R. No. 125598,[56]
stating that it has no objections to the withdrawal of the petition filed by
DOW and OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.
In
a Resolution[57] dated
October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among others, the motion to withdraw
petition for review filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL.
THE ISSUES
In their Consolidated Memorandum,
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., presented the following issues
for our consideration:
IN REFUTATION
I.
THE
COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
a) The court did not simply dismiss
the case because it was filed in bad faith with petitioners intending to have
the same dismissed and returned to the
b) The court dismissed the case
because it was convinced that it did not have jurisdiction.
IN
SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
II.
THE
TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
a. The acts complained of occurred
within Philippine territory.
b. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of
the
c. Assumption of jurisdiction by the
U.S. District Court over petitioner[s] claims did not divest Philippine [c]ourts
of jurisdiction over the same.
d. The Compromise Agreement and the
subsequent Consolidated Motion to Drop Party Respondents Dow, Occidental and
Shell does not unjustifiably prejudice remaining respondents Dole, Del Monte
and Chiquita.[58]
DISCUSSION
On
the issue of jurisdiction
Essentially, the
crux of the controversy in the petitions at bar is whether the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case Nos. 5617
and 24,251-96, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.
Remarkably, none of the
parties to this case claims that the courts a
quo are bereft of jurisdiction to determine and resolve the above-stated
cases. All parties contend that the RTC
of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over the
action for damages, specifically for approximately P2.7 million for each
of the plaintiff claimants.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of
defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure to DBCP
that was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the stream of commerce
by defendant companies happened in the
DOLE similarly
maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict,
which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In addition, DOLE states that if there were
no actionable wrongs committed under Philippine law, the courts a quo should have dismissed the civil
cases on the ground that the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against the defendant companies. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no
positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable
wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to
render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case,
applying the customs of the place and, in the absence thereof, the general
principles of law. DOLE posits that the
Philippines is the situs of the tortious
acts allegedly committed by defendant companies as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which occurred in the Philippines, as
the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system problems that they
allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds
that the RTC of Davao City gravely erred in relying upon newspaper reports in
dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 given that newspaper articles are hearsay
and without any evidentiary value.
Likewise, the alleged legal opinions cited in the newspaper reports were
taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the parties. DOLE, however, opines that the dismissal of
Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was proper, given that plaintiff claimants
merely prosecuted the cases with the sole intent of securing a dismissal of the
actions for the purpose of convincing the U.S. Federal District Court to
re-assume jurisdiction over the cases.
In
a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed
before them. The Amended
Joint-Complaints sought approximately P2.7 million in damages for each
plaintiff claimant, which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the
place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging,
distribution, sale, etc., of the said
chemical. This is in consonance with the
lex loci
delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the
law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the
action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant
companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making
voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of
the proceedings. None of the defendant
companies ever objected to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts a quo over their persons. CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand of Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of
General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao
City have jurisdiction over Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively
The rule
is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.[59] Once vested by law, on a particular court or
body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot
be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of
a law.
At
the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil
cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x x
(8) In all other cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro
Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).[60]
Corollary
thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
2. The exclusion of the term damages of
whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8)
and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
Here,
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., sought in their similarly-worded
Amended Joint-Complaints filed before the courts a quo, the following prayer:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs ordering the defendants:
a)
TO PAY EACH
PLAINTIFF moral damages in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,500,00.00);
b)
TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF nominal damages in the amount
of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) each;
c)
TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF exemplary damages in the
amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00);
d)
TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF attorneys fees of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
e)
TO PAY THE COSTS of the suit.[61]
From the
foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action
and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7
million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General
Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
fall within the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Moreover,
the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that:
THE CAUSES OF ACTION
4. The
Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, used, AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN
COMMERCE nematocides containing the chemical dibromochloropropane, commonly
known as DBCP. THE CHEMICAL WAS USED
AGAINST the parasite known as the nematode, which plagued banana plantations,
INCLUDING THOSE in the
5. The plaintiffs were exposed to DBCP in the
1970s up to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they used this product in the banana plantations
WHERE they were employed, and/or (b) they resided within the agricultural area
WHERE IT WAS USED. As a result of
such exposure, the plaintiffs suffered serious and permanent injuries TO THEIR
HEALTH, including, but not limited to, STERILITY and severe injuries to their
reproductive capacities.
6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE AT FAULT OR WERE
NEGLIGENT IN THAT THEY MANUFACTURED, produced, sold, and/or USED DBCP and/or
otherwise, PUT THE SAME into the stream of commerce, WITHOUT INFORMING THE
USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND/OR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS
PROPER USE AND APPLICATION. THEY
allowed Plaintiffs to be exposed to, DBCP-containing materials which THEY knew,
or in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence ought to have known, were highly
harmful and injurious to the Plaintiffs health and well-being.
7. The
Defendants WHO MANUFACTURED, PRODUCED, SOLD, DISTRIBUTED, MADE AVAILABLE OR PUT
DBCP INTO THE STREAM OF COMMERCE were negligent OR AT FAULT in that they, AMONG
OTHERS:
a.
Failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs of the
dangerous characteristics of DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates
to so warn plaintiffs;
b.
Failed to provide plaintiffs with information as to
what should be reasonably safe and sufficient clothing and proper protective
equipment and appliances, if any, to protect plaintiffs from the harmful
effects of exposure to DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do
so;
c.
Failed to place adequate warnings, in a language
understandable to the worker, on containers of DBCP-containing materials to
warn of the dangers to health of coming into contact with DBCP, or to cause
their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
d.
Failed to take reasonable precaution or to exercise
reasonable care to publish, adopt and enforce a safety plan and a safe method
of handling and applying DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to
do so;
e.
Failed to test DBCP prior to releasing these
products for sale, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so; and
f.
Failed to reveal the results of tests conducted on
DBCP to each plaintiff, governmental agencies and the public, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliate to do so.
8. The
illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also due to the FAULT or
negligence of defendants Standard Fruit Company, Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Dole
Food Company, Inc., Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International,
Inc. in that they failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent each
plaintiffs harmful exposure to DBCP-containing products which defendants knew
or should have known were hazardous to each plaintiff in that they, AMONG
OTHERS:
a.
Failed to adequately supervise and instruct
Plaintiffs in the safe and proper application of DBCP-containing products;
b.
Failed to implement proper methods and techniques
of application of said products, or to cause such to be implemented;
c.
Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards of
exposure to said products or to cause them to be so warned;
d.
Failed to
test said products for adverse health effects, or to cause said products to be
tested;
e.
Concealed from Plaintiffs information concerning
the observed effects of said products on Plaintiffs;
f.
Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs exposed
to said products;
g.
Failed to place adequate labels on containers of
said products to warn them of the damages of said products; and
h.
Failed to use substitute nematocides for said
products or to cause such substitutes to [be] used.[62]
(Emphasis supplied and words in brackets ours.)
Quite
evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or
omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses,
specifically to their reproductive system.
Thus,
these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff
claimants a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or
omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides:
Article
2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
As
specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
point to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing,
producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of
commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, without informing the users of its
hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on its proper use and
application. [63]
Verily,
in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals,[64]
this Court has always reminded that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein. The
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court
is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly
then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies
constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of
approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously
falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover,
the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al.,
allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were
employed in the banana plantations located in the
It
is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had
occurred outside and beyond the
territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e.,
the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their
distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming
part of the stream of commerce,[65]
and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly,
the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be
determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal
civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court
allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any
of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.[66]
In
a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA,
et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the
The RTC of
It is well to stress again that none
of the parties claims that the courts a
quo lack jurisdiction over the cases filed before them. All parties are one in asserting that the RTC
of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies in the action
below. All parties voluntarily,
unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that [t]he defendants voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. In this connection, all the defendant
companies designated and authorized representatives to receive summons and to
represent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant
companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary
appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating
during the course of the proceedings below.
In
line herewith, this Court, in Meat
Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,[68]
held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons. Furthermore,
the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an
invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution
of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or
bodys jurisdiction.[69]
Thus,
the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the
subject matter of the instant case. What
is more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested on the
courts a quo, continues until the
termination of the proceedings.
It may also be pertinently stressed
that jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the
decision rendered therein. Accordingly,
where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the
subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an
exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error
that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an
error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much
less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.[70]
Plaintiffs
purported bad faith in filing the subject civil cases in Philippine courts
Anent
the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad
faith merely to procure a dismissal of the same and to allow them to return to
the forum of their choice, this Court finds such argument much too speculative
to deserve any merit.
It
must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported
by evidence on record. This Court does
not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not
exist at all. This Court deals with
facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. When this Court acts on appearances instead
of realities, justice and law will be short-lived.[71] This is especially true with respect to
allegations of bad faith, in line with the basic rule that good faith is always
presumed and bad faith must be proved.[72]
In
sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaints
filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., and that the courts a quo have also acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of all the defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this Court
to order the remand of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.
On the issue of the
dropping of DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL as respondents in view of their amicable
settlement with NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
are further praying that DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL be dropped as respondents in
G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. The non-settling defendants allegedly
manifested that they intended to file their cross-claims against their
co-defendants who entered into compromise agreements. NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., argue
that the non-settling defendants did not aver any cross-claim in their answers
to the complaint and that they subsequently sought to amend their answers to
plead their cross-claims only after the settlement between the plaintiff
claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were executed. NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al.,
therefore, assert that the cross-claims are already barred.
In
their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., since the latters Amended Complaints cited several
instances of tortious conduct that were allegedly committed jointly and
severally by the defendant companies. This
solidary obligation on the part of all the defendants allegedly gives any
co-defendant the statutory right to proceed against the other co-defendants for
the payment of their respective shares. Should
the subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
be granted, and the Court subsequently orders the remand of the action
to the trial court for continuance, CHIQUITA and DOLE would allegedly be
deprived of their right to prosecute their cross-claims against their other
co-defendants. Moreover, a third party
complaint or a separate trial, according to CHIQUITA, would only unduly delay
and complicate the proceedings. CHIQUITA
and DOLE similarly insist that the motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
to drop DOW, SHELL and OCCIDENTAL as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and
126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, be denied.
Incidentally,
on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their respective memoranda, DEL
MONTE filed a Manifestation and Motion[73]
before the Court, stating that similar settlement agreements were allegedly executed
by the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA sometime in 1999. Purportedly included in the agreements were Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. Attached
to the said manifestation were copies of the Compromise Settlement, Indemnity,
and Hold Harmless Agreement between DEL MONTE and the settling plaintiffs, as
well as the Release in Full executed by the latter.[74] DEL MONTE specified therein that there were
only four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are claiming against the
Del Monte parties[75]
and that the latter have executed amicable settlements which completely
satisfied any claims against DEL MONTE. In
accordance with the alleged compromise agreements with the four plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 5617, DEL MONTE sought the dismissal of the Amended Joint-Complaint
in the said civil case. Furthermore, in
view of the above settlement agreements with ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated that it no
longer wished to pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and accordingly prayed
that it be allowed to withdraw the same.
Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos.
5617 and 24,251-96 should be remanded to the RTC of General Santos City and the
RTC of Davao City, respectively, the Court deems that the Consolidated Motions
(to Drop Party-Respondents) filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
should likewise be referred to the said trial courts for appropriate
disposition.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code,
[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Like any other contract, an extrajudicial
compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and principles of a
contract. It is a consensual contract,
perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the
offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute
the contract.[76] Judicial approval is not required for its
perfection.[77] A compromise has upon the parties the effect
and authority of res judicata[78] and
this holds true even if the agreement has not been judicially approved.[79] In addition, as a binding contract, a
compromise agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it.[80]
In light of the foregoing legal
precepts, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City should first
receive in evidence and examine all of the alleged compromise settlements involved
in the cases at bar to determine the propriety of dropping any party as a defendant
therefrom.
The
Court notes that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) that was
filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., only pertained to DOW,
OCCIDENTAL and SHELL in view of the latter companies alleged compromise
agreements with the plaintiff claimants.
However, in subsequent developments, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA supposedly
reached their own amicable settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL
MONTE qualified that it entered into a settlement agreement with only four of
the plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617.
These four plaintiff claimants were allegedly the only ones who were
asserting claims against DEL MONTE. However,
the said allegation of DEL MONTE was simply stipulated in their Compromise
Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement and its truth could not be
verified with certainty based on the records elevated to this Court. Significantly, the 336 plaintiff claimants in
Civil Case No. 5617 jointly filed a complaint without individually specifying
their claims against DEL MONTE or any of the other defendant companies. Furthermore, not one plaintiff claimant filed
a motion for the removal of either DEL MONTE or CHIQUITA as defendants in Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
There
is, thus, a primary need to establish who the specific parties to the alleged
compromise agreements are, as well as their corresponding rights and
obligations therein. For this purpose,
the courts a quo may require the presentation
of additional evidence from the parties.
Thereafter, on the basis of the records of the cases at bar and the
additional evidence submitted by the parties, if any, the trial courts can then
determine who among the defendants may be dropped from the said cases.
It
is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two
or more persons who are liable for the same quasi-delict is solidary. A solidary obligation is one in which each of
the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is
entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of
the debtors.[81]
In
solidary obligations, the paying debtors right of reimbursement is provided
for under Article 1217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the
obligation. If two or more solidary
debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share
which corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due,
no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary
debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor
paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in
proportion to the debt of each.
The
above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the corresponding
liability of the co-debtors to reimburse, will only arise, however, if a
solidary debtor who is made to answer for an obligation actually delivers
payment to the creditor. As succinctly
held in Lapanday Agricultural Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[82] [p]ayment,
which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any
other manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact which will entitle
either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which
corresponds to each of the [other] debtors.[83]
In the cases at bar,
there is no right of reimbursement to speak of as yet. A trial on the merits must necessarily be
conducted first in order to establish whether or not defendant companies are
liable for the claims for damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which would
necessarily give rise to an obligation to pay on the part of the defendants.
At the point in time
where the proceedings below were prematurely halted, no cross-claims have been interposed
by any defendant against another defendant. If and when such a cross-claim is made by a
non-settling defendant against a settling defendant, it is within the discretion
of the trial court to determine the propriety of allowing such a cross-claim
and if the settling defendant must remain a party to the case purely in
relation to the cross claim.
In
Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual
Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[84]
the Court had the occasion to state that where there are, along with the
parties to the compromise, other persons involved in the litigation who have
not taken part in concluding the compromise agreement but are adversely
affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from invoking in
the same proceedings an adequate relief therefor.[85]
Relevantly,
in Philippine International Surety Co.,
Inc. v. Gonzales,[86] the Court upheld the ruling of the trial court
that, in a joint and solidary obligation, the paying debtor may file a
third-party complaint and/or a cross-claim to enforce his right to seek
contribution from his co-debtors.
Hence,
the right of the remaining defendant(s) to seek reimbursement in the above
situation, if proper, is not affected by the compromise agreements allegedly
entered into by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., with some of the
defendant companies.
WHEREFORE,
the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions
for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos.
125078, 126654, and 128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and the Order dated
October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, and its
subsequent Order dated December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil Case
No. 24,251-96, and REMAND the
records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for
further and appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to
withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 127856. In view of the previous grant of the motion to
withdraw the petition in G.R. No. 125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are
considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate
Justice
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
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* Per Special Order No. 994 dated May 27, 2011.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, pp. 39-71.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 125598), pp. 10-59.
[3] Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, pp. 72-85; penned by Judge Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr.
[4] Rollo (G.R. No. 125598), pp.
75-76.
[5]
[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 126654), pp. 12-36.
[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 127856), pp. 16-31.
[8] Rollo (G.R. No. 128398), pp. 17-42.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 126654), pp. 34-35; penned by Judge Romeo D. Marasigan.
[10]
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 128398), p. 104.
[12] Rollo
(G.R. No. 127856), p. 238.
[13] Records, Vol. I, pp. 92-98.
[14]
[15] DOLE filed its motion on December 28, 1995 (Records, Vol. I, pp. 527-535). DOW filed a similar motion on January 22, 1996 (id. at 581-586), while SHELL filed its own motion on February 12, 1996 (id. at 669-674). DEL MONTE filed its motion on February 29, 1996 (Records, Vol. II, pp. 699-714) and CHIQUITA filed its motion on February 29, 1996 (id. at 716-719).
[16] Records, Vol. II, pp. 720-735.
[17] SHELL filed a Manifestation with Second Motion for Bill of Particulars on April 3, 1996 (Records, Vol. II, pp. 879-882). On even date, DOW and DOLE also filed their separate Motions for Bill of Particulars (id. at 895-901, 903-911). CHIQUITA filed its motion on April 8, 1996 (id. at 935-938), while DEL MONTE filed its motion on April 12, 1996 (id. at 940-956). OCCIDENTAL filed its motion on May 15, 1996 (id. at 1100-1105).
[18] Records, Vol. II, pp. 1085-1092.
[19] Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, pp. 74A-75.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Records, Vol. III, pp. 1205-1206.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Records, Vol. IV, pp. 2064-2066.
[32] Rollo (G.R. No. 125598), pp. 10-59.
[33]
[34] Records, Vol. IV, pp. 1931-1969.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Jesus Abayon, the first plaintiff named in the original complaint, was dropped in the amended joint complaint.
[39] Rollo (G.R. No. 126654), p. 47.
[40] Id. at 37-38.
[41] Rollo (G.R. No. 128398), p. 81.
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45] Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, pp.
1053-1056.
[46] Rollo (G.R. No. 128398), pp. 238-240.
[47] Rollo
(G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, pp. 1148-1190.
[48] Rollo
(G.R. No. 126654), pp. 777-781.
[49] Rollo
(G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, pp. 2289-2411.
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53] Rollo (G.R. No. 125598), pp. 796-804.
[54]
[55] Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. II, pp.
2901-2903.
[56]
[57] Rollo (G.R. No. 125598), pp. 812-813.
[58] Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, p. 2496.
[59] Barangay Piapi v. Talip, 506 Phil. 392, 396 (2005); Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 62, 66 (2002).
[60] Under Republic Act No. 7691, the jurisdictional amounts in civil cases would later be adjusted as provided in Section 5, to wit:
SEC.
5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional
amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00):
Provided, however, That in the case
of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted
after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00).
[61] Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, pp. 99-100.
[62]
[63] Rollo (G.R. No. 126654), p. 47.
[64] 359
Phil. 719, 727 (1998).
[65] Order dated May 20, 1996 of the General Santos City RTC, Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. I, pp. 72-86; penned by Judge Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr.
[66] Rules of Court, Rule 4, Section 2.
[67] See Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 105 (1998).
[68] 411
Phil. 959 (2001).
[69] Id. at 977-978.
[70] Platinum
[71] ABAKADA Guro Party List Officers Alcantara
&
[72] Andrade v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 30, 43 (2001).
[73] Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. II, pp. 3220-3234.
[74]
[75] The Release In Full bore the names of plaintiffs Leoncio Serdoncillo, Edgar M. Penaranda and Leonardo Burdeos, Jr. The Release in Full under the name of Bernabe Navida [Rollo (G.R. No. 125078), Vol. II, pp. 3390-3404] was attached to DEL MONTEs Supplement to Manifestation and Motion dated April 2, 2007.
[76] Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 150, 163 (1999).
[77] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155, 182 (1997).
[78] Article 2037 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
[79] Santos
Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v.
[80] California Bus Lines, Inc. v. State Investment House, Inc., 463 Phil. 689, 710 (2003).
[81] PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821, 832 (2001).
[82] 381 Phil. 41 (2000).
[83]
[84] Supra note 76.
[85]
[86] 113 Phil. 373, 376-377 (1961).