Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
FIRST DIVISION
|
DANILO
L. PAREL, Petitioner, -
versus - HEIRS
OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 192217 Present: VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: March
2, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assails the February 4, 2010 Decision[1]
and April 22, 2010 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105709, which affirmed the Orders
dated February 15, 2008 and July 31, 2008, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 60 in Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 2493-R for recovery of
possession and damages.
The Facts
A
complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed by Simeon Prudencio
(Simeon) against Danilo Parel (Danilo) with the RTC in
Simeon
alleged that he was the owner of a two-story house at No. 61 Forbes Park
National Reservation in
In
November 1985, Simeon needed the whole house back and thus informed Danilo and
his parents that they had to vacate the place. Danilo’s parents acceded to
Simeon’s demand. Danilo, however, remained in the house with his family despite
repeated demands on him to surrender the premises. This development drove
Simeon to institute an action for recovery of possession and damages.[4]
Danilo offered a different version of
events. He maintained that the land on which Simeon’s house was constructed was
in his father Florentino’s name. He explained that his father Florentino, who
had by then passed away, did not have enough funds to build a house and thus made
a deal with Simeon for them to just contribute money for the construction of a
house on Florentino’s land. Florentino and Simeon were, thus, co-owners of the
house of which Simeon claims sole ownership.[5]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On December 15, 1993, the RTC ruled in favor
of Danilo. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
declares that the house erected at [No.] 61 DPS Compound,
Likewise,
the plaintiff is ordered to:
(a) pay the defendant in the total sum of P20,000.00 for
moral and actual damages;
(b) pay the defendant P20,000.00 in Attorney’s fees and
P3,300 in appearance fees;
(c) pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On March 31, 2000, the CA, on Simeon’s
appeal, rendered a Decision[7]
reversing the RTC Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring
plaintiff-appellant as the new owner of the residential building at 61 Forbes
Park National Reservation, near DPD Compound, Baguio City; appellee is ordered
to surrender possession of the ground floor thereof to appellant immediately.
Further,
appellee is hereby ordered to pay appellant P2,0000/month [sic] for use or
occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same,
and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. And costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Danilo challenged the CA Decision
before this Court via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
On April 19, 2006, this Court issued
its Decision[8] in G.R.
No. 146556, affirming the CA Decision.
On May 9, 2007, Simeon sought to
enforce this Court’s April 19, 2006 Decision and thus filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution.[9]
On June 19, 2007, Danilo filed his
Comment[10] on
Simeon’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. He prayed that the PhP 2,000 monthly rental he was ordered to pay
be computed from April 1988 to March 1994 only since he had vacated the
premises by April 1994.
On
February 15, 2008, the RTC ruled as quoted below:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a Writ of
Execution be issued to enforce the decision of the Court in the above-entitled
case.[11]
A Motion for
Reconsideration of the February 15, 2008 RTC Order was filed by Danilo.
On July 31, 2008, the RTC issued another
Order[12]
denying the motion. The dispositive
portion of the Order is quoted below:
WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit. Let a Writ of Execution be
issued to enforce the decision of the Court in the above-entitled case.
SO
ORDERED.
On
February 5, 2009, the RTC ordered the following:
Furthermore, the decision in the above-entitled case
has already become final and executory. To reiterate, this Court, much less the
defendant, cannot modify the decision of the higher courts which has now become
final and executory. The defendant is bound by the said decision and he cannot
alter the same nor substitute his own interpretation thereof.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
Motion filed by the defendant is DENIED. The Court reiterates its order dated
July 31, 2008 for the issuance of a Writ of Execution to enforce the decision
of the Court in the instant case.
SO ORDERED.[13]
On February 23, 2009, Danilo filed a Supplemental Petition
with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing the judgment against
Danilo for him to pay PhP 2,000 in monthly rentals from April 1994 onwards.
On August 23, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring
Simeon to file his Comment on Danilo’s Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On
October 28, 2010, Simeon filed his Comment before Us. He argued that the RTC
and CA correctly ruled that the prayer for a reduction of back rentals should be
denied, since Danilo never turned over possession of the subject premises to
him.
The Issues
I
Whether the CA committed an error of law in upholding
the RTC Order dated February 15, 2008.
II
Whether the Court of Appeals committed an error of law
in upholding the RTC Order dated July 31, 2008
The Ruling of This Court
Danilo
questions the following order of the CA:
Further,
appellee is hereby ordered to pay appellant P2,0000/month [sic] for use or
occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same,
and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. And costs of suit.[14]
We
resolve to grant the petition.
Danilo
argues that he vacated the subject premises in April 1994 and claims that he
stated this fact in his Comment on Simeon’s
Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution dated May 9, 2007 and in his Motion for Reconsideration before this
Court on June 12, 2006. He, thus,
argues that the monthly rentals he should pay should only be from April 1988 to
March 1994. He alleges that the CA committed an error in law in upholding the
RTC Orders dated February 15, 2008 and July 31, 2008.
The questioned February 15, 2008 RTC
Order stated:
x x x The defendant should have filed his comment on
any appropriate pleading before the Court or in the Supreme Court at the time
when he actually vacated the premises, but he did not. Perhaps, still hoping
that the decision of the higher courts would be in his favor. All told, the defendant never intended to
surrender the premises to the plaintiff even after he vacated it in April 1994.
For this reason, he should now suffer the consequences.
It must be reiterated that this Court cannot now
modify the decision of the higher courts which has now become final and executory.[15]
On July 31, 2008, the RTC ruled:
While the alleged supervening facts and circumstances
which changed the situation of the parties in the instant case occurred before
finality of the judgment, as in Morta vs. Bagagnan, the factual backdrop in the
aforecited jurisprudence does not call for its application in the present case.
In the cited case, the complainants have been ousted from the subject premises
pursuant to the decision of the DARAB in two cases involving the same parcel of
lot before the decision of the Supreme Court attained finality. In the case at
bar, defendant claims to have vacated the subject premises as early as April
1994. This allegation however was belied by the fact that he did not turn[over]
the premises to the plaintiff, a fact which has been stipulated by the parties.
Defendant did not effectively and completely relinquish possession of the
subject premises to the plaintiff thereby depriving the latter of effective
possession and beneficial use thereof. To reiterate, defendant never intended
to surrender the premises to the plaintiff even after he vacated it in 1994.
Defendant’s failure to seasonably bring to the attention of either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court of the supposed change in the circumstances of the
parties cannot be excused. Had the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court been
seasonably informed of such fact, the appellate Courts would have considered
the same in their respective decisions. It must be noted that defendant had
more than enough time from April 1994 to June 2006, a total of 12 years, within
which he could have informed the two appellate Courts of the supposed change in
the circumstances of the parties, but he did not. He only belatedly informed
the Supreme Court in its motion for reconsideration after the latter Court
issued it decision, in the hope of reducing the full payment of back rentals.[16]
It
is true that Danilo should have brought to the Court’s attention the date he
actually left the subject premises at an earlier time. The RTC is also correct in ruling that the
judgment involved was already final and executory. However, it would be
inequitable to order him to pay monthly rentals “until he actually vacates”
when it has not been determined when he actually vacated the ground floor of Simeon’s
house. He would be paying monthly rentals indefinitely.
The
RTC should have determined via hearing if Danilo’s allegation were true and
accordingly modified the period Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly
rentals.
Unjustified delay in the enforcement
of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable
controversies with finality.[17] Once a judgment becomes final and executory,
all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All
that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right.[18]
Banaga v. Majaducon,[19] however,
enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed:
1) the writ of execution varies the
judgment;
2)
there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced
against property exempt from execution;
4) it
appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the
court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear
enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or
6)
it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or
that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or
that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was
issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of
justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party
aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation
may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
The instant case falls under one of
the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the property under
dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution
inequitable or unjust.
Moreover, there are exceptions that
have been previously considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the
rules in order to serve substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.[20] We find that Danilo’s situation merits a
relaxation of the rules since special circumstances are involved; to determine
if his allegation were true would allow a final resolution of the case.
Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court states as one of the powers of a court:
Section
5. Inherent powers of the courts.¾Every court shall have power:
x x x
x
(g)
To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice.
Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan:[21]
x x x The
inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court
may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher
interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the
decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it. The
court is also vested with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its
decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want of
jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record. (Emphasis supplied.)
The
writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the
circumstances that merit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a
pending issue regarding the execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded
the parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the period within
which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before issuing the writ of execution in
the instant case. Should Danilo be
unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the premises in April 1994,
the period to pay monthly rentals should be until June 19, 2007, the date he
informed the CA that he had already left the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 105709 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC, Branch 60 in
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO
C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 20-27. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, p. 21.
[4]
[5]
[6] Rollo, p. 22. Penned by Judge Pastor V. de Guzman.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Supra note 7.
[15] Rollo, p. 63.
[16]
[17] Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 354, 382.
[18] National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 580.
[20] PCI
Leasing and Finance v.