Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee,
- versus - RODRIGO SALCEDO alias “DIGOL,” Appellant. |
G.R. No. 178272 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR.,* PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: March 14, 2011 |
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PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00113, affirming with modifications the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of
The
Information against the appellant reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th
day of November 1994, in the Municipality of Jordan, Province of Guimaras,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to
kill, taking advantage of his superior strength and the darkness of the night,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and
stab with a knife one Analyn Elevencione, who is
pregnant at the time, hitting said Analyn Elevencione at the vital parts of her
body which caused her instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Appellant was arraigned on
The evidence of the prosecution follows:
Geraldino Galido (Geraldino) testified that at
Efren, live-in partner of Analyn, testified that
appellant is known as “Digol” in their place. At
Dr. Edgardo Jabasa testified that he conducted
an autopsy on the body of Analyn. He
found nine (9) stab wounds in the body of Analyn. Two of the stab wounds penetrated the heart,
making it impossible for the victim to survive. He also testified that Analyn's uterus was
enlarged at 6 to 7 months gestation with a dead male fetus. He further testified that the wounds appear to
have been inflicted by a single sharp bladed and pointed instrument.
Upon the other hand, the defense adduced the
testimonies of the appellant, Felimon Salcedo, Marcelina Lecta and Mario
Manatoc. Appellant's main defense is alibi.
Felimon Salcedo, father of the appellant,
testified that in the evening of
Marcelina Lecta testified that the appellant is
her younger brother. She said that at around
Mario Manatoc testified that he was a detainee
at the Municipal Jail of Jordan. At
around
Appellant testified that in the afternoon of
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is rendered finding the accused RODRIGO SALCEDO alias
“DIGOL” GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Said accused is
penalized to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to forty (40) years of Reclusion
Perpetua, together with all accessory penalties attached thereto.
Said accused is directed
to pay the heirs of Analyn Elevencione the amount of:
PhP50,000.00
– for the death of Analyn Elevencione;
PhP10,000.00
– as reimbursement for burial expenses;
PhP40,000.00
– as moral damages;
or a total of PhP100,000.00.
The detention of the accused during the pendency of the case shall
be credited in his favor.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
and the case was elevated to this Court for review. However, pursuant
to this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,[6] the case was
transferred to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision dated
On
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF EFREN GALIDO AND GERALDINO GALIDO.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
In the main, appellant put in issue the credibility of Efren
and Geraldino. He contends that the testimonies of said witnesses did not
establish his guilt for murder.
The Court affirms the appellant's conviction.
There is no cogent reason to disturb the finding of guilt made by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA anent the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who
testified during the trial of the case. The
Court gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of a
witness, because it had the opportunity to observe the facial expression,
gesture, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, thus, making it in a
better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling the truth.[7]
Geraldino’s testimony was
categorical, convincing and unequivocal. He positively identified the
appellant as the author of the crime. This witness declared, thus:
Public Prosecutor Rolando Nielo:
Q. While you were there in your house, did you hear anything
unusual?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that, that came to your attention?
A. I heard three (3)
shouts.
Q. What was the nature of that shout that you heard?
A. Three (3) shouts
for help.
Q. What did you do when you heard those shouts for help?
A. We jumped out of our house and went to the place where
the shouts came from.
Q. Where did the shout came (sic) from, if you know?
A. At the house of Efren Galido.
Q. How far is this house of Efren Galido from your own house?
A. About 100 meters.[8]
x
x x x
Q. Were you able to reach the place where those shouts came
from?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you witness or what did you see when you reached
the place where the shouts came from?
A. I have seen Digol Salcedo stabbing Analyn Elevencione.[9]
x
x x x
Q. How did you happen to see Rodrigo Salcedo stabbed Analyn
Elevencione since it was already
A. Because the women from our house were carrying torch and
I was following them that is why I saw Analyn Elevencione.
Q. You were able to know Analyn Elevencione and Rodrigo
Salcedo from that light coming from that torch?
A. Yes, sir.[11]
x
x x x
Q. And you said you saw Analyn Elevencione stabbed by
Rodrigo Salcedo. How many times [did] you saw (sic) this Rodrigo Salcedo
stabbed Analyn Elevencione?
A. Only twice.
Q. What was the position of Analyn Elevencione when you saw
her being stabbed by the accused?
A. She was lying on her back.[12]
x
x x x
Geraldino on cross examination by Atty. Padilla.
Q. How about you? When you saw the accused stabbed Analyn
Elevencione, how far were you from Analyn Elevencione and the accused.
A. About 7 to 8
meters.[13]
Clearly, Geraldino positively identified the
appellant as the author of the crime. He testified that with the aid of the
light cast by the torch carried by the women near him, he was able to see the
appellant stab Analyn twice while she was lying on her back. Thus, even if the
crime was committed during the night, it was not totally dark, as a torch
illuminated the place where Analyn was stabbed by the appellant. The Court has
consistently held that the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a
flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight in proper situations is
considered sufficient to allow the identification of persons.[14]
Appellant’s allegation that there were
inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, as Geraldino could
not have seen the appellant stabbing Analyn because his brother Efren said in
his testimony that Analyn was alone when he saw her lying on the ground.[15]
The Court finds no inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Efren and Geraldino. The CA correctly explained the events that
transpired on the fateful night:
It could be gleaned from
[the] records that when the Galidos heard the shouts coming from their niece
Ivy Jean Borra, they went outside and Efren went directly to his house to check
his family. Geraldino and his other companions were not far behind him. When
they reached the crime scene, Geraldino witnessed appellant (petitioner herein)
stabbed (sic) Analyn Elevencione twice, then he tried to follow the perpetrator
until the latter reached a dark place. So, when Efren arrived to (sic) the
place coming from his house, he did no (sic) longer see the aggressor but was
able to ask his live-in partner who her assailant was.[16]
x x x x
It could be understood
that when Efren was still inside his house, that was the time Geraldino saw
appellant (petitioner herein) stabbed the victim.x x x[17]
Clearly, Geraldino, after witnessing the
incident was no longer at the scene of the crime when Efren arrived because he
tried to pursue the appellant. That is
the reason why Efren saw Analyn alone as she laid on the ground.
Appellant also averred that the alleged dying
declaration of Analyn was merely concocted in order to pin the blame upon
herein appellant. Appellant argued that there is no chance for Efren to have
talked to Analyn since he became hysterical[18] when he saw Analyn lying prostrate
on the ground. The appellant's arguments are unavailing.
Appellant misconstrued the correct sequence of
events that transpired that night. Efren testified as follows:
Public Prosecutor Rolando Nielo:
Q. What did you do when you heard your niece Ivy Jean Borra
shouting for help?
A. I ran immediately towards my house.
Q. And, were you able to reach your house?
A. Yes, I reached my house and I only found my son sleeping.
Q. What did you do when you found your son sleeping, when
you reached your house?
A. I placed him near the door and went down.
Q. What did you do after you went downstairs?
A. I went to the road where I met my sister-in-law holding a
torch.
Q. Who is that sister-in-law of yours whom you met?
A. Melanie Galido.
Q. What kind of torch was she holding?
A. A torch made of a pocket size whisky bottle.
Q. What did you do when you met Melanie Galido, your
sister-in-law having a torch there?
A. I also got a torch to look for my wife.
Q. Where did you get that torch you used?
A. From my sister-in-law.
Q. And then, after that, when you got the torch were you
able to see your wife?
A. Yes. When I got the torch, I went ahead then I later on
saw her near the side of the road, she was moaning.[19]
x x x x
Q. You said you saw Analyn Elevencione. Where was she lying
when you saw her?
A. On the grass beside the road.[20]
x x x x
Q. What did you do when you saw Analyn lying? What was her
position when you saw your wife?
A. She was lying on the ground.
Q. What did you do when you saw her lying on the ground?
A. I lifted her and asked her who did it.
Q. What was the condition of Analyn your wife when you
lifted her?
A. She was moaning and the blood is coming out of her
wounds.
Q. Have you seen the wounds where the blood was oozing from?
A. Yes, sir. It was coming from below her breast because her
breast was open.[21]
x x x x
Q. Did your wife say anything to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did your wife tell you if any?[22]
x x x x
A.
I asked her who stabbed her, and she
answered, “Digol.”
Q. That was all that your wife said?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. After that, what did you do?
A. I laid her down and ran.
Q. What was your purpose in putting her down and ran (sic)?
A. To run after the person who did it to her.
Q. Did you have a specific person in mind to run after when
your wife told you about the statement?
A. Yes, but I was restrained by my brother not to go to
their house.[23]
Clearly, before Efren became hysterical and was
restrained by Geraldino,[24] he was able to talk to Analyn, who
identified the appellant as the person who stabbed her. As correctly found by the CA:
When Efren went to the
crime scene, Analyn was still alive and she was able to utter the name of her
attacker. But when Efren came back after he failed to catch her aggressor, she
was already dead and that was the time he became hysterical.[25]
Having established that Analyn indeed uttered the name of her assailant,
the question to be resolved is whether her statement can be considered as a
dying declaration.
Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
provides:
The declaration of
a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending death, may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence
of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
Generally,
witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own perception. A
recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying person's
declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the
subject of inquiry in the case.[26]
In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four
requisites must concur: first, the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; second, at the
time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of
an impending death; third, the
declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth,
the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.[27]
All the requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently
met. First, the statement of
the deceased concerned the cause and circumstances surrounding her death. When
asked who stabbed her, Analyn uttered the name of the appellant. Further, as
proven during trial, appellant was the only person referred to as “Digol” in
their place. Second, the victim must
have been fully aware that she was on the brink of death, considering her
bloodied condition and the gaping wounds on her chest when Efren saw her. True,
she made no express statement showing that she was conscious of her impending
death, however, the degree and seriousness of the wounds and the fact that
death occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that
the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that she was in a
dying condition.[28] Third, the declarant, at the time she
uttered the dying declaration, was competent as a witness. Fourth, the victim's statement was being
offered in a criminal prosecution for her murder. Thus, Analyn's condemnatory ante mortem statement naming appellant
as her assailant deserves full faith and credit and is admissible in evidence
as a dying declaration.
The dying
declaration is given
credence, on the premise that no one who knows of one's impending death will
make a careless and false accusation.[29]
Going now to the appellant's main defense of
alibi, appellant claims that at the time of the incident he was at the house of
his sister Marcelina. Marcelina corroborated appellant's testimony, while
Felimon alleged that before he left Marcelina's house at around
Aside from the foregoing testimonies of the
defense witnesses, the defense was unable to show that it was physically
impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule
that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime. Physical
impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was
when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places.[30] Where
there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the
defense of alibi must fail.[31]
During the trial of the case, Marcelina
testified that Analyn's house, which is near the crime scene, is one (1)
kilometer away from her house.[32] In People v. Cristobal,[33] the Court ruled out alibi
when it was proven that the appellant was only three kilometers from where the
crime was committed, “a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.” Thus, it was not physically impossible
for the appellant to be at the locus criminis at the time of the
incident.
Further, the Court gives less
probative weight to a defense of alibi when it is corroborated by friends and
relatives. One can easily fabricate an alibi and ask friends and relatives to
corroborate it. When a defense witness is a relative of an accused whose
defense is alibi, courts have more reason to view such testimony with
skepticism.[34] In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi
and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and
categorical.[35] Given
the positive identification of the appellant by Geraldino, who is a credible
witness, and the lack of physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of the killing, the defense of alibi must fail.
Appellant insisted that Efren and Geraldino's
failure to immediately disclose the appellant's identity to the authorities
show that they do not know the identity of the perpetrator. The argument does
not hold water. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not
necessarily impair the credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily
explained.[36]
In his testimony,[37] Efren explained that he did not
inform the police of the identity of the appellant because he feared that the
appellant might escape.[38] In
his sworn statement executed before the police, Geraldino explained that he did
not inform the police of the identity of the appellant because it might result
in the escape of the appellant.[39] Apparently,
Geraldino thought it best to wait for the right time to reveal to the police
authorities that he saw the appellant stab the victim, so as not to alarm the
appellant, who may not know that Geraldino saw him stab Analyn. Otherwise, the
immediate revelation might compromise appellant's arrest.
Appellant also cites the testimony of Mario
Manatoc that when he asked Efren, in the early morning of
Further, there was no
considerable delay in reporting the incident to the police. As testified to by
Mario, Efren went to the police station to seek assistance because his wife was
killed.[41] After reporting the incident, Efren
and the policemen went to look for the perpetrator,[42] and later on, the police arrested the appellant.[43]
Additionally, one thing which bolsters the
prosecution witnesses' credibility is the fact that they had no motive to lie
against the appellant. Where there is no evidence to indicate that the
prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that
they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled to full faith
and credit.[44] In
the present case, there was no shred of evidence to indicate that the witnesses
for the prosecution were impelled by improper motives to implicate appellant in the crime.
The testimonies of Mario and
appellant that the latter was forced to admit the killing of Analyn deserve scant
consideration. As found by the trial court, the prosecution did not present
evidence to show that the appellant admitted having killed the victim. The
appellant interposed the defense of alibi.[45]
Appellant further argued that the
trial court erred in ruling that the crime committed is murder. The fact that
the victim is a woman and seven months pregnant cannot be considered as
qualifying or an aggravating circumstance.
Abuse of superiority is determined by the
excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of the victim, considering
the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense,
although not annulling it. The aggressor
must have taken advantage of his natural strength to insure the commission of
the crime.[46]
In the present case, the Court
finds that there was abuse of superior strength employed by the appellant in
committing the killing. The evidence shows that the victim was a sixteen (16)-year-old
female,[47] who
is 6 to 7 months pregnant.[48] The victim was also stabbed by the
appellant with a sharp bladed and pointed instrument while she was lying on her
back. The victim was also unarmed when she was attacked. The Court has
consistently held that an attack made by a man
with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in
the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself.[49] The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was,
therefore, correctly appreciated by the CA, as qualifying the offense to
murder.
From all of the foregoing, we
hold that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
qualified by abuse of superior strength.
The penalty of murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Article 63 (2) of the same Code states that when the law prescribes a
penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
lesser penalty shall be imposed. Since the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength already qualified the killing to murder, it can no longer be
used to increase the imposable penalty. We note that while other aggravating
circumstances, i.e., evident premeditation, treachery and nighttime,
were alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to
support the presence of these circumstances. Hence, the RTC and CA correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It must be stressed that under R.A. No. 9346,
appellant is not eligible for parole.[50]
The award of civil indemnity is mandatory
and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.[51] The
Court affirms the award of civil indemnity given by the trial court and the CA
in the amount of PhP50,000.00.
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in
cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of
the victim.[52] The CA correctly awarded moral damages in the
amount of PhP50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim and the
resultant grief to her family.[53]
Further, the CA correctly awarded exemplary
damages. The award of exemplary damages is warranted because of the presence of
the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength in the
commission of the crime.[54] The amount of PhP25,000.00 granted by the trial court
and the CA should, however, be increased to PhP30,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence on the matter.[55]
The CA deleted the award of burial expenses for
failure of the prosecution to substantiate the same with receipts. Although temperate damages may be awarded when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty,[56] the Court is inclined to deny the
award of temperate damages. Efren
testified that he did not spend any amount for the burial of Analyn, as the
expenses were shouldered by his employer and by other people he knew.[57]
On a final note, the prosecution should have
been more prudent in determining the proper crimes that should have been filed
against the appellant. Clearly, at the time of the death of the woman, she was
carrying a 6 to 7-month-old fetus which probably died because of the stabbing
incident. If indeed the fetus died at the time the woman was stabbed, then the
crime of murder, defined in and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, complexed with unintentional abortion, defined in and penalized
under Article 257 of the same Code, should have been filed against the
appellant. Had this been done, the
penalty of Death, which is the maximum penalty for the gravest offense among
the two crimes committed as provided under Article 48[58]of the Revised Penal Code, should
have been the proper penalty. Although, the penalty of death cannot be imposed
in light of Republic Act No. 9346,[59] and that the same penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua should be imposed, like in the present case,[60] the heirs of the victim should
have been entitled to a higher civil indemnity and moral damages at
PhP75,000.00[61] each.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00113, dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
*
Designated as an additional
member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special
Order No. 933 dated
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with
Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo,
pp. 4-18.
[2] Records, p. 1.
[3]
[4] TSN,
[5] Records, pp. 297-317.
[6] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[7] People v. Pillas, 458 Phil. 347, 369 (2003).
[8] TSN,
[9]
[10] The correct date should be
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13]
[14] Marturillas v. People, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 273, 301; People v. Escote, G.R. No. 151834, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 345, 351; People v. Caraang, 463 Phil. 715, 744 (2003).
[15] TSN,
[16] Rollo, p. 10.
[17]
[18] Prosecutor Nielo to Geraldino:
Q. How about your brother Efren?
What did he do if he did anything?
A. He became hysterical and I restrained him. TSN,
[19] TSN, June 23, pp. 9-10.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] TSN,
[25] Rollo, p. 11.
[26] Marturillas v. People, supra note 14, at 305.
[27] People of the Philippines v. Jonel Fabrica Serenas and Joel Lorica Labad, G.R. No. 188124, June 29, 2010.
[28] People v. Tañeza, 389 Phil. 398, 411 (2000).
[29] Marturillas v. People, supra note 14, at 306.
[30] People v. Delim,
G.R. No. 175942,
[31] People v. Felipe Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173,
[32] TSN,
[33] 322 Phil. 551, 563 (1996).
[34] People v Sumalinog, Jr., 466 Phil. 637, 651 (2004).
[35] People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 Phil. 407, 425 (2003).
[36] People v. Lovedorial, 402 Phil. 446, 460 (2001).
[37] Records, p. 8.
[38] TSN,
[39] Records, p. 7.
[40] TSN,
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44] Vidar
v. People, G.R. No. 177361,
[45] Records, p. 315.
[46] People v. Loreto, 446 Phil. 592, 611 (2003).
[47] Records, p. 9.
[48] TSN,
[49] People
v.
[50]
R.A. 9346, Section 3. Person convicted of an offense punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
[51] People
v. Molina, G.R. No. 184173,
[52]
[53] People
v. Balais, G.R. No. 173242,
[54]
[55] People
of the
[56] People
v. Delima, Jr., G.R. No. 169869,
[57] TSN,
[58] Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
[59] An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the
[60] R.A. No. 9346, Section 2.
[61] People
v. Lopez, G.R. No. 179714,