Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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Harpoon Marine Services, Inc. and Jose |
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G.R. No. 167751 |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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VELASCO, JR., |
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- versus - |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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Fernan H. Francisco, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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March 2, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
Satisfactory evidence of a valid or
just cause of dismissal is indispensably required in order to protect a
laborer’s right to security of tenure. In
the case before us, the employer presented none despite the burden to prove clearly
its cause.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction[1]
assails the Decision[2]
dated January 26, 2005 and Resolution[3]
dated April 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79630,
which affirmed the Decision[4]
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 31, 2003, as well
as the NLRC modified Decision[5]
dated June 30, 2003, declaring petitioners Harpoon Marine Services, Incorporated
(Harpoon) and Jose Lido T. Rosit (Rosit) solidarily liable to pay respondent
Fernan H. Francisco (respondent) separation pay, backwages and unpaid
commissions for illegally dismissing him.
Factual
Antecedents
Petitioner Harpoon, a company
engaged in ship building and ship repair, with petitioner Rosit as its
President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), originally hired respondent in
1992 as its Yard Supervisor tasked to oversee and supervise all projects of the
company. In 1998, respondent left for
employment elsewhere but was rehired by petitioner Harpoon and assumed his
previous position a year after.
On P70,000.00, which represents his
commissions for the seven boats[7]
constructed and repaired by the company under his supervision. In a letter-reply dated September 28, 2001,[8]
petitioners denied that it owed respondent any commission, asserting that they
never entered into any contract or agreement for the payment of commissions. Hence, on October 24, 2001, respondent filed
an illegal dismissal complaint praying for the payment of his backwages,
separation pay, unpaid commissions, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.
Petitioners presented a different version
of the events and refuted the allegations of respondent. They explained that petitioner Rosit indeed
talked to respondent on June 15, 2001 not to dismiss him but only to remind and
warn him of his excessive absences and tardiness, as evinced by his Time Card
covering the period June 1-15, 2001.[9]
Instead of improving his work behavior,
respondent continued to absent himself and sought employment with another
company engaged in the same line of business, thus, creating serious damage in
the form of unfinished projects. Petitioners
denied having terminated respondent as the latter voluntarily abandoned his
work after going on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) beginning June 22,
2001. Petitioners contended that when respondent’s absences persisted, several
memoranda[10] informing
him of his absences were sent to him by ordinary mail and were duly filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on August 13, 2001. Upon respondent’s continuous and deliberate failure
to respond to these memoranda, a Notice of Termination dated July 30, 2001[11]
was later on issued to him.
Respondent,
however, denied his alleged tardiness and excessive absences. He claimed that the three-day absence
appearing on his time card cannot be considered as habitual absenteeism. He claimed that he incurred those absences
because petitioner Rosit, who was hospitalized at those times, ordered them not
to report for work until he is discharged from the hospital. In fact, a co-worker, Nestor Solares (Solares),
attested that respondent always goes to work and continued to report until June
20, 2001.[12] Respondent further denied having received the
memoranda that were allegedly mailed to him, asserting that said documents were
merely fabricated to cover up and justify petitioners’ act of illegally
terminating him on June 15, 2001. Respondent
absolved himself of fault for defective works, justifying that he was illegally
terminated even before the company projects were completed. Finally, respondent denied petitioners’ asseveration
that he abandoned his job without any formal notice in 1998 as he wrote a
resignation letter which petitioners received.
As regards the
commissions claimed, respondent insisted that in addition to his fixed monthly salary
of P18,200.00, he was paid a commission of P10,000.00 for every
ship repaired or constructed by the company. As proof, he presented two check vouchers[13]
issued by the company showing payment thereof.
Petitioners, on
the other hand, contended that respondent was hired as a regular employee with
a fixed salary and not as an employee paid on commission basis. The act of giving additional monetary benefit
once in a while to employees was a form of recognizing employees’ efforts and
cannot in any way be interpreted as commissions. Petitioners then clarified
that the word “commission” as appearing in the check vouchers refer to
“additional money” that employees receive as differentiated from the usual
“vale” and is written for accounting and auditing purposes only.
Ruling of the
Labor Arbiter
On May 17, 2002, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision[14]
holding that respondent was validly dismissed due to his unjustified absences
and tardiness and that due process was observed when he was duly served with
several memoranda relative to the cause of his dismissal. The Labor Arbiter also found respondent
entitled to the payment of commissions by giving credence to the check vouchers
presented by respondent as well as attorney’s fees for withholding the payment
of commissions pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the dismissal of complainant Fernan H. Francisco legal;
ordering respondents Harpoon Marine Services Inc., and Jose Lido T. Rosit, to
pay complainant his commission in the sum of PHP70,000.00; as well as
attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) thereof; and dismissing all other claims
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Proceedings
before the National Labor Relations Commission
Both parties appealed to the NLRC.
Petitioners alleged that the Labor Arbiter erred in ruling that respondent is
entitled to the payment of commissions and attorney’s fees. They questioned the authenticity of the check
vouchers for being photocopies bearing only initials of a person who remained unidentified.
Also, according to petitioners, the vouchers
did not prove that commissions were given regularly as to warrant respondent’s
entitlement thereto.[16]
Respondent, on
the other hand, maintained that his dismissal was illegal because there is no
sufficient evidence on record of his alleged gross absenteeism and tardiness. He likewise imputed bad faith on the part of
petitioners for concocting the memoranda for the purpose of providing a
semblance of compliance with due process requirements.[17]
In its Decision
dated March 31,
2003,[18]
the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s award
of commissions in favor of respondent for failure of petitioners to refute the
validity of his claim. The NLRC,
however, deleted the award of attorney’s fees for lack of evidence showing
petitioners’ bad faith in terminating respondent.
As the NLRC only resolved
petitioners’ appeal, respondent moved before the NLRC to resolve his appeal of
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.[19]
For their part, petitioners filed a
Verified Motion for Reconsideration[20]
reiterating that there was patent error in admitting, as valid evidence, photocopies
of the check vouchers without substantial proof that they are genuine copies of
the originals.
The NLRC, in its Decision dated June
30, 2003,[21] modified
its previous ruling and held that respondent’s dismissal was illegal. According to the NLRC, the only evidence
presented by the petitioners to prove respondent’s habitual absenteeism and
tardiness is his time card for the period covering June 1-15, 2001. However, said time card reveals that
respondent incurred only three absences for the said period, which cannot be
considered as gross and habitual. With
regard to the award of commissions, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter because
of petitioners’ failure to question the authenticity of the check vouchers in
the first instance before the Labor Arbiter. It, nevertheless, sustained the deletion of
the award of attorney’s fees in the absence of proof that petitioners acted in
bad faith. Thus, for being illegally dismissed, the NLRC granted respondent
backwages and separation pay in addition to the commissions, as contained in
the dispositive portion of its Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated
1. Backwages =
P218,066.33
(
a)
Salary – P18,200.00 x 11.06 months = P201,292.00
b) 13th month pay: P201,292.00/12 = 16,774.33
----------------
2.
Separation
Pay of one month salary for
every year of service
(October 1999 – 17 May 2002)
P18,200.00
x 3 yrs. =
54,600.00
3. Commission = 70,000.00
TOTAL P342,666.33
The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by complainant and respondents are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[22]
Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[23]
with the CA, which on January 26, 2005, affirmed the findings and conclusions
of the NLRC. The CA agreed with the NLRC
in not giving any probative weight to the memoranda since there is no proof
that the same were sent to respondent. It
also upheld respondent’s right to the payment of commissions on the basis of
the check vouchers and declared petitioners solidarily liable for respondent’s
backwages, separation pay and accrued commissions.
Petitioners moved for
reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Issues
WHETHER The Court of Appeals committed error in
rendering its Decision and its Resolution dismissing and denying the Petition
for Certiorari a quo when it failed to rectify and correct the findings
and conclusions of the NLRC (and of the Labor Arbiter a quo), which were
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In particular:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REVERSE THE FINDINGS OF THE NLRC AND OF THE
LABOR ARBITER A QUO BECAUSE THESE FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE[;] ARE CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY; GROUNDED UPON SPECULATION,
CONJECTURES, AND ASSUMPTIONS; [AND] ARE MERE CONCLUSIONS FOUNDED UPON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AMONG OTHERS.
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS AN ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IN THE
SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT OF FERNAN H. FRANCISCO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
HE WAS HABITUALLY ABSENT, SUBSEQUENTLY WENT ON AWOL, AND HAD ABANDONED HIS WORK
AND CORRELATIVELY, WHETHER HE IS ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY.
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT FERNAN H. FRANCISCO IS ENTITLED TO COMMISSIONS
IN THE AMOUNT OF P70,000 EVEN THOUGH NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS SHOWN
TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM.
IV
WHETHER THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF PETITIONER
ROSIT EVEN THOUGH NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO PROVE THIS AND
CORRELATIVELY, WHETHER PETITIONER ROSIT CAN BE HELD SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH
PETITIONER HARPOON.[24]
Petitioners submit that there was no
basis for the CA to rule that respondent was illegally dismissed since more
than sufficient proof was adduced to show his habitual absenteeism and abandonment
of work as when he further incurred additional absences after June 15, 2001 and
subsequently went on AWOL; when he completely ignored all the notices/memoranda
sent to him; when he never demanded for reinstatement in his September 24, 2001
demand letter, complaint and position paper before the Labor Arbiter; when it
took him four months before filing an illegal dismissal complaint; and when he
was later found to have been working for another company.
Petitioners also
question the veracity of the documents presented by respondent to prove his
entitlement to commissions, to wit: the two check vouchers[25]
and the purported list[26]
of vessels allegedly constructed and repaired by the company. Petitioners insist that the check vouchers neither
prove that commissions were paid on account of a repair or construction of a
vessel nor were admissible to prove that a regular commission is given for
every vessel that is constructed/repaired by the company under respondent’s
supervision. The list of the vessels, on the other hand, cannot be used as
basis in arriving at the amount of commissions due because it is self-serving,
unsigned, unverified and merely enumerates a list of names of vessels which
does not prove anything. Therefore, the award of commissions was based on
unsupported assertions of respondent.
Petitioners also
insist that petitioner Rosit, being an officer of the company, has a
personality distinct from that of petitioner Harpoon and that no proof was
adduced to show that he acted with malice or bad faith hence no liability, solidary
or otherwise, should be imposed on him.
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Respondent was illegally
dismissed for failure of petitioners to prove the existence of a just cause for
his dismissal.
Petitioners reiterate that
respondent was a habitual absentee as indubitably shown by his time card for
the period covering June 1-15, 2001,[27]
payroll[28]
for the same period as well as the
memoranda[29] enumerating his absences subsequent to
June 15, 2001.
Respondent belies
these claims and explained that his absence for three days as reflected in the
time card was due to petitioner Rosit’s prohibition for them to report for work
owing to the latter’s hospitalization.
He claims that he was illegally terminated on June 15, 2001 and was
subsequently prevented from entering company premises. In defense, petitioners
deny terminating respondent on June 15, 2001, maintaining that petitioner Rosit
merely reminded him of his numerous absences.
However, in defiance of the company’s order, respondent continued to
absent himself, went on AWOL and abandoned his work.
We find no merit
in petitioners’ contention that respondent incurred unexplained and habitual absences
and tardiness. A scrutiny of the time card and payroll discloses that
respondent incurred only three days of absence and no record of tardiness. As
aptly held by the NLRC, the time card and payroll presented by petitioners do
not show gross and habitual absenteeism and tardiness especially since
respondent’s explanation of his three-day absence was not denied by petitioners
at the first instance before the Labor Arbiter. No other evidence was presented
to show the alleged absences and tardiness. On the other hand, Solares, a
co-worker of respondent has stated under oath that, as their supervisor,
respondent was diligent in reporting for work until June 20, 2001 when they
heard the news concerning respondent’s termination from his job.
Likewise, we are
not persuaded with petitioners’ claim that respondent incurred additional
absences, went on AWOL and abandoned his work. It is worthy to note at this
point that petitioners never denied having offered respondent his separation
pay. In fact, in their letter-reply dated September 28, 2001,[30]
petitioners intimated that respondent may pick up the amount of P27,584.37
any time he wants, which amount represents his separation and 13th
month pays. Oddly, petitioners deemed it
fit to give respondent his separation pay despite their assertion that there is
just cause for his dismissal on the ground of habitual absences. This
inconsistent stand of petitioners bolsters the fact that they wanted to
terminate respondent, thus giving more credence to respondent’s protestation
that he was barred and prevented from reporting for work.
Jurisprudence
provides for two essential requirements for abandonment of work to exist. The “failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason” and “clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship x x x manifested by some overt acts” should both
concur.[31]
Further, the employee’s deliberate and
unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention of returning
should be established and proven by the employer.[32]
Petitioners failed to prove that it
was respondent who voluntarily refused to report back for work by his defiance and
refusal to accept the memoranda and the notices of absences sent to him. The CA correctly ruled that petitioners failed
to present evidence that they sent these notices to respondent’s last known
address for the purpose of warning him that his continued failure to report
would be construed as abandonment of work. The affidavit of petitioner Harpoon’s liaison
officer that the memoranda/notices were duly sent to respondent is insufficient
and self-serving. Despite being stamped
as received, the memoranda do not bear any signature of respondent to indicate
that he actually received the same. There
was no proof on how these notices were given to respondent. Neither was there
any other cogent evidence that these were properly received by respondent.
The fact that respondent never
prayed for reinstatement and has sought employment in another company which is
a competitor of petitioner Harpoon cannot be construed as his overt acts of
abandoning employment. Neither can the
delay of four months be taken as an indication that the respondent’s filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal is a mere afterthought. Records show that respondent first attempted
to get his separation pay and alleged commissions from the company. It was only after his requests went unheeded
that he resorted to judicial recourse.
In fine, both the NLRC and the CA
did not commit manifest error in finding that there was illegal dismissal. The
award of backwages and separation pay in favor of respondent is therefore proper.
Respondent is not entitled to the
payment of commissions since the check vouchers and purported list of vessels
show vagueness as to sufficiently prove the claim.
The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the
CA unanimously held that respondent is entitled to his accrued commissions in
the amount of P10,000.00 for every vessel repaired/constructed by the
company or the total amount of P70,000.00 for the seven vessels
repaired/constructed under his supervision.
The Court,
however, is inclined to rule otherwise. Examination of the check vouchers
presented by respondent reveals that an amount of P30,000.00 and P10,000.00
alleged as commissions were paid to respondent on June 9, 2000 and September
28, 2000, respectively. Although the veracity and genuineness of these
documents were not effectively disputed by petitioners, nothing in them provides
that commissions were paid to respondent on account of a repair or construction
of a vessel. It cannot also be deduced
from said documents for what or for how many vessels the amounts stated therein
are for. In other words, the check vouchers contain very scant details and can
hardly be considered as sufficient and substantial evidence to conclude that
respondent is entitled to a commission of P10,000.00 for every vessel
repaired or constructed by the company. At
most, these vouchers only showed that respondent was paid on two occasions but were
silent as to the specific purpose of payment. The list of vessels supposedly
repaired/constructed by the company neither validates respondent’s monetary
claim as it merely contains an enumeration of 17 names of vessels and nothing
more. No particulars, notation or any
clear indication can be found on the list that the repair or complete
construction of seven of the seventeen boats listed therein was supervised or
managed by respondent. Worse, the list
is written only on a piece of paper and not on petitioners’ official stationery
and is unverified and unsigned. Verily, its patent vagueness makes it unworthy
of any credence to be used as basis for awarding respondent compensations as
alleged commissions. Aside from these documents, no other competent evidence
was presented by respondent to determine the value of what is properly due him,
much less his entitlement to a commission. Respondent’s claim cannot be based
on allegations and unsubstantiated assertions without any competent document to
support it. Certainly, the award of commissions in favor of respondent in the
amount of P70,000.00 should not be allowed as the claim is founded on
mere inferences, speculations and presumptions.
Rosit could not be held
solidarily liable with Harpoon for lack of substantial evidence of bad faith
and malice on his part in terminating respondent.
Although we find no error on the
part of the NLRC and the CA in declaring the dismissal of respondent illegal,
we, however, are not in accord with the ruling that petitioner Rosit should be
held solidarily liable with petitioner Harpoon for the payment of respondent’s
backwages and separation pay.
As held in the case of MAM Realty
Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[33]
“obligations incurred by [corporate officers], acting as such corporate agents,
are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they
represent.”[34]
As such, they should not be generally held jointly and solidarily liable with
the corporation. The Court, however, cited circumstances when solidary
liabilities may be imposed, as exceptions:
1.
When
directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation
–
(a)
vote for or
assent to [patently] unlawful acts of the corporation;
(b)
act in bad
faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs;
(c)
are guilty of
conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation, its stockholders or
members, and other persons.
2.
When the
director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stock or who,
having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary
his written objection thereto.
3.
When a
director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold
himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation.
4.
When a
director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally
liable for his corporate action.[35]
The general rule
is grounded on the theory that a corporation has a legal personality separate
and distinct from the persons comprising it.[36]
To warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, the officer’s bad
faith or wrongdoing “must be established clearly and convincingly” as “[b]ad
faith is never presumed.”[37]
In the case at bench, the CA’s basis
for petitioner Rosit’s liability was that he acted in bad faith when he
approached respondent and told him that the company could no longer afford his
salary and that he will be paid instead his separation pay and accrued
commissions. This finding, however, could not substantially justify the holding
of any personal liability against petitioner Rosit. The records are bereft of
any other satisfactory evidence that petitioner Rosit acted in bad faith with
gross or inexcusable negligence, or that he acted outside the scope of his
authority as company president. Indeed, petitioner Rosit informed respondent that
the company wishes to terminate his services since it could no longer afford
his salary. Moreover, the promise of separation pay, according to petitioners,
was out of goodwill and magnanimity. At the most, petitioner Rosit’s actuations
only show the illegality of the manner of effecting respondent’s termination from
service due to absence of just or valid cause and non-observance of procedural
due process but do not point to any malice or bad faith on his part. Besides,
good faith is still presumed. In addition, liability only attaches if the
officer has assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation.
Thus, it was error for the CA to
hold petitioner Rosit solidarily liable with petitioner Harpoon for illegally
dismissing respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 26, 2005 and Resolution dated April 12,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79630 finding respondent Fernan
H. Francisco to have been illegally dismissed and awarding him backwages and
separation pay are AFFIRMED. The
award of commissions in his favor is, however, DELETED. Petitioner Jose
Lido T. Rosit is ABSOLVED from the liability adjudged against
co-petitioner Harpoon Marine Services, Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 52-165.
[2] Annex “A” of the Petition, id. at 166-178; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao.
[3] Annex “B” of the Petition, id. at 180.
[4] Annex “C” of the Petition, id. at 182-185; penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and concurred in by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo.
[5] Annex “D” of the Petition, id. at 187-193; penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and concurred in by Commissioners Ernesto C. Verceles and Tito F. Genilo.
[6] Annex “A” of respondent’s position paper before the Labor Arbiter, CA rollo, p.109.
[7] See Annex “C”, id. at 111.
[8] Annex “B,” id. at 110.
[9] Annex “1” of petitioners’ reply to respondent’s position paper, id. at 99.
[10] Annexes “1”, “2” and “3” of petitioners’ position paper before the Labor Arbiter, id. at 85-87.
[11] Annex “4,” id. at 88.
[12] See Nestor Solares’ Sinumpaang Salaysay, Annex “A” of respondent’s reply, id. at 117.
[13] Check Vouchers dated June 9, 2000 and September 28, 2000, Annexes “B” and “C,” respectively, id. at 118-119.
[14] Annex “E” of the Petition, rollo, pp. 195-206; penned by Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma.
[15]
[16] See Petitioners’
[17] See Respondent’s Memorandum on Appeal; id. at 139-148.
[18] Annex “C” of the Petition, rollo, pp. 182-185.
[19] See Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Resolve Complainant’s Appeal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision Dated June 2, 2002, CA rollo, pp. 62-65.
[20]
[21] Annex “D” of the Petition, rollo, pp. 187-193.
[22]
[23] Annex “F” of the Petition, id. at 207-249.
[24]
[25] Supra note 13.
[26] Supra note 7.
[27] Supra note 9.
[28] Annex “7” of Petitioners’ Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, CA rollo, p. 91.
[29] Supra note 10.
[30] Supra note 8.
[31] Henlin Panay Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 180718, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 362, 369.
[32] Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506, 515 (2003).
[33] 314 Phil. 838 (1995).
[34]
[35]
[36] Petron Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commissions, G.R. No. 154532,
[37] Carag v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 147590,