EN BANC
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE G.R. No. 166471
COOPERATIVE,
Petitioner, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,
JJ.
LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Promulgated:
Respondent. March 22, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The petition1 challenges the 1 October 2004
Judgment2 and 6 November 2004 Order3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878.
The Facts
Tawang
Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the
Cooperative Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic water
services in Barangay Tawang,
La Trinidad, Benguet.
La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for
domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet.
On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate
and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that,
under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section
47 states that:
Sec. 47. Exclusive
Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or
agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district
or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution,
however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.
In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved
TMPC’s application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision,4
the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially
qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system. NWRB stated that:
With respect to LTWD’s opposition, this Board observes that:
1. It is a substantial reproduction of
its opposition to the application for water permits previously filed by this
same CPC applicant, under WUC No. 98-17 and 98-62 which was decided upon by
this Board on April 27, 2000. The issues being raised by Oppositor
had been already resolved when this Board said in pertinent portions of its
decision:
“The authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is not Exclusive. While Barangay Tawang is within their territorial jurisdiction, this does
not mean that all others are excluded in engaging in such service, especially,
if the district is not capable of supplying water within the area. This Board
has time and again ruled that the “Exclusive Franchise” provision under P.D.
198 has misled most water districts to believe that it likewise extends to be
[sic] the waters within their territorial boundaries. Such ideological
adherence collides head on with the constitutional provision that “ALL WATERS
AND NATURAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE STATE”. (Sec. 2, Art. XII) and that “No franchise, certificate or authorization for the
operation of public [sic] shall be exclusive in character”.
x x x x
All the foregoing premises all considered, and finding that Applicant is
legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system;
that the said operation shall redound to the benefit of the
homeowners/residents of the subdivision, thereby, promoting public service in a
proper and suitable manner, the instant application for a Certificate of Public
Convenience is, hereby, GRANTED.5
LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002
Resolution,6
the NWRB denied the motion.
LTWD appealed to the RTC.
The RTC’s Ruling
In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside the NWRB’s 23 July
2002 Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision and cancelled TMPC’s CPC. The RTC
held that Section 47 is valid. The RTC stated that:
The Constitution uses the term “exclusive in character”. To give effect
to this provision, a reasonable, practical and logical interpretation should be
adopted without disregard to the ultimate purpose of the Constitution. What is
this ultimate purpose? It is for the state, through its authorized agencies or instrumentalities,
to be able to keep and maintain ultimate control and supervision over the
operation of public utilities. Essential part of this control and supervision
is the authority to grant a franchise for the operation of a public utility to
any person or entity, and to amend or repeal an existing franchise to serve the
requirements of public interest. Thus, what is repugnant to the Constitution is
a grant of franchise “exclusive in character” so as to preclude the State
itself from granting a franchise to any other person or entity than the present
grantee when public interest so requires. In other words, no franchise of
whatever nature can preclude the State, through its duly authorized agencies or
instrumentalities, from granting franchise to any person or entity, or to
repeal or amend a franchise already granted. Consequently, the Constitution
does not necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face,
meaning, that the grantee shall be allowed to exercise this present right or
privilege to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set
up its exclusive franchise against the ultimate authority of the State.7
TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6 November 2004 Order,
the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
Issue
TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in
holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This
rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws
would be illusory.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,8
the Court held that, “What one cannot do directly, he cannot do indirectly.”9
In Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino,10 quoting Agan,
Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,11
the Court held that, “This Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal
maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.”12
In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,13 the Court held that, “No one is
allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.”14
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises
for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation
of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other
entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such
franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or
for a longer period than fifty years. (Empahsis
supplied)
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions are clear — franchises for the operation of a public utility
cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
expressly and clearly state that, “nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character.”
There is no exception.
When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to
apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. In Security
Bank and Trust Company v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61,15 the Court held that:
Basic is the rule of statutory
construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left
with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language.
As we have held in the case of Quijano v.
Development Bank of the Philippines:
“x x x We
cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and
unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court had
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being
called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of
interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law
peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made
in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It
must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.”16
(Emphasis supplied)
In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co.,
Inc.,17
the Court held that, “The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of
a public utility shall not be exclusive.”18
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission,19 the Court held that, “Neither
Congress nor the NTC can grant an exclusive ‘franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization’ to operate a public utility.”20
In National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals,21
the Court held that, “Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by this Court such that in most, if not all, grants
by the government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights,
privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee.”22
In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission,23
the Court held that, “The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be
exclusive in nature.”24
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and
the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the
President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are
exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district
and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that
are exclusive in character.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character
by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD
and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.
Section 47 states:
Sec. 47. Exclusive
Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or
agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the
district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the
board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly
adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the
Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the
Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which
all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the
Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.
In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,25
the Court held that, “It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has
no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no
act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.”26
In Sabio v. Gordon,27
the Court held that, “the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is
the ‘basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform.’”28
In Atty. Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,29
the Court held that, “The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.”30 In Manila Prince Hotel v.
Government Service Insurance System,31
the Court held that:
Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution
that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes
is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.”32
(Emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly prohibit the
creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. They uniformly command
that “nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character.” This constitutional
prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception. On the other hand, PD No.
198, as amended, allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, “No franchise shall be granted
to any other person or agency x x x
unless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents thereto
x x x subject to review
by the Administration.” Section 47 creates a glaring exception to the
absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently
unconstitutional.
Section 47 gives the BOD and the LWUA the authority to make an exception
to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. In short, the BOD and the LWUA
are given the discretion to create franchises that are exclusive in character.
The BOD and the LWUA are not even legislative bodies. The BOD is not a
regulatory body but simply a management board of a water district. Indeed,
neither the BOD nor the LWUA can be granted the power to create any exception
to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution, a power that Congress itself
cannot exercise.
In Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala,33
the Court categorically declared Section 47 void. The Court held that:
Nonetheless, while the prohibition
in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the
reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with
Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on
January 17, 1973 — the constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May
25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads:
“SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character
or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or
right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so requires. The State
shall encourage equity participation in public utiltities
by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing
body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in the capital thereof.”
This provision has been
substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution,
including the prohibition against exclusive franchises.
x x x x
Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which
vests an “exclusive franchise” upon public utilities, is clearly repugnant to
Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, it is unconstitutional and may not, therefore, be relied
upon by petitioner in support of its opposition against respondent’s
application for CPC and the subsequent grant thereof by the NWRB.
WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198
is unconstitutional.34
(Emphasis supplied)
The dissenting opinion declares Section 47 valid and constitutional. In
effect, the dissenting opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can create
indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character; (2) the BOD can create
directly franchises that are exclusive in character; (3) the LWUA can create
directly franchises that are exclusive in character; and (4) the Court should
allow the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character.
Stated differently, the dissenting opinion holds that (1) President
Marcos can violate indirectly the Constitution; (2) the BOD can violate
directly the Constitution; (3) the LWUA can violate directly the Constitution;
and (4) the Court should allow the violation of the Constitution.
The dissenting opinion states that the BOD and the LWUA can create
franchises that are exclusive in character “based on reasonable and legitimate
grounds,” and such creation “should not be construed as a violation of the constitutional
mandate on the non-exclusivity of a franchise” because it “merely refers to
regulation” which is part of “the government’s inherent right to exercise
police power in regulating public utilities” and that their violation of the
Constitution “would carry with it the legal presumption that public officers
regularly perform their official functions.” The dissenting opinion states
that:
To begin with, a government agency’s
refusal to grant a franchise to another entity, based on reasonable and legitimate
grounds, should not be construed as a violation of the constitutional mandate
on the non-exclusivity of a franchise; this merely refers to regulation, which
the Constitution does not prohibit. To say that a legal provision is
unconstitutional simply because it enables a government instrumentality to
determine the propriety of granting a franchise is contrary to the government’s
inherent right to exercise police power in regulating public utilities for the
protection of the public and the utilities themselves. The refusal of the local
water district or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other franchises would
carry with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform
their official functions.
The dissenting opinion states two “reasonable and legitimate grounds”
for the creation of exclusive franchise: (1) protection of “the government’s
investment,”35 and (2) avoidance of “a situation
where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in
poor and remote areas.”36
There is no “reasonable and legitimate” ground to violate the
Constitution. The Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong,
the President, Congress, the Court, the BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to
follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it
violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.
In Social Justice Society,37
the Court held that, “In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands
of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.”38
In Sabio,39
the Court held that, “the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is
‘the basic and paramount law to which x x x all persons, including the highest officials of the land,
must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it
conflicts with the Constitution.’”40
In Bengzon v. Drilon,41
the Court held that, “the three branches of government must discharge their
respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the
Constitution.”42 In Mutuc
v. Commission on Elections,43
the Court held that, “The three departments of government in the discharge
of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to
yield obedience to [the Constitution’s] commands. Whatever limits
it imposes must be observed.”44
Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution.
Police power is the plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant
to the Constitution. This rule is basic.
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc.,45
the Court held that, “Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution.”46
In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,47
the Court held that, police power “is ‘the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to the constitution.’”48
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,49
the Court held that, “police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is
the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances
x x x not repugnant to
the Constitution.”50
There is no question that the effect of Section 47 is the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 expressly allows the BOD
and the LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character.
The dissenting opinion explains why the BOD and the LWUA should be
allowed to create franchises that are exclusive in character — to protect “the
government’s investment” and to avoid “a situation where ruinous competition
could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas.” The
dissenting opinion declares that these are “reasonable and legitimate grounds.”
The dissenting opinion also states that, “The refusal of the local water
district or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other franchises would carry
with it the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their
official functions.”
When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio,51 the Court held that, “A statute
may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative
power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles.”52
The effect of Section 47 violates the Constitution, thus, it is void.
In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock
Securities Limited,53
the Court held that, “This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution.”54 In Bengzon,55 the Court held that, “The
Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate
what it decrees.”56 In Mutuc,57
the Court held that:
The concept of the Constitution as
the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public
act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is
a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule
of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the
legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the
restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended.
The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it
ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding
cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by
the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the
validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication
is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is
paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its
mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being
the supreme law.58
Sustaining the RTC’s ruling would make a dangerous precedent. It will
allow Congress to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. In order to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition on franchises that are exclusive in
character, all Congress has to do is to create a law allowing the BOD and the
LWUA to create franchises that are exclusive in character, as in the present
case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE
Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET
ASIDE the 1 October 2004 Judgment and 6 November 2004 Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet,
in Civil Case No. 03-CV-1878 and REINSTATE the 23 July 2002 Resolution
and 15 August 2002 Decision of the National Water Resources Board.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
|
Consistent with my position
in Metropolitan Cebu…. v. Adala, I concur CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
I join the dissent of
Justice Brion TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
I dissent: See Opinion ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
|
See Concurring Opinion ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice |
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice
1
Rollo, pp. 9-19.
2
Id. at 22-40. Penned by Judge Fernando P. Cabato.
3
Id. at 41-44.
4 Id. at 45-49.
5 Id. at 47-49.
6 Id. at 50-52.
7 Id. at 35.
8 G.R. Nos. 162243,
164516 and 171875, 3 December 2009, 606 SCRA 444.
9 Id. at 485.
10 G.R. No. 170516,
16 July 2008, 558 SCRA 468.
11 450 Phil. 744
(2003).
12 Supra note 10 at 540.
13 487 Phil. 531
(2004).
14 Id. at 579.
15 G.R. No. 113926,
23 October 1996, 263 SCRA 483.
16 Id. at 488.
17 424 Phil. 372
(2002).
18 Id. at 400.
19 457 Phil. 101
(2003).
20 Id. at 117.
21 345 Phil. 9
(1997).
22 Id. at 34.
23 234 Phil. 443
(1987).
24 Id. at 451.
25 G.R. Nos. 157870,
158633 and 161658, 3 November 2008, 570 SCRA 410.
26 Id. at 422-423.
27 G.R. No. 174340,
17 October 2006, 504 SCRA 704.
28 Id. at 731.
29 453 Phil. 586
(2003).
30 Id. at 631.
31 335 Phil. 82
(1997).
32 Id. at 101.
33 G.R. No. 168914,
4 July 2007, 526 SCRA 465.
34 Id. at 479-482.
35 Id. at 13.
36 Id.
37 Supra note 25.
38 Id. at 423.
39 Supra note 27.
40 Id. at 731.
41 G.R. No. 103524,
15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133.
42 Id. at 142.
43 146 Phil. 798
(1970).
44 Id. at 806.
45 G.R. Nos. 170656
and 170657, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 341.
46 Id. at 362.
47 G.R. No. 166494,
29 June 2007, 526 SCRA 130.
48 Id. at 144.
49 496 Phil. 83 (2005)
50 Id. at 91-92.
51 Supra note 27.
52 Id. at 730.
53 G.R. Nos. 178158
and 180428, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 413.
54 Id. at 528.
55 Supra note 41.
56 Id. at 142.
57 Supra note 43.
58 Id. at 806-807.