Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Respondent. |
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A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2621-RTJ) Present: CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, ABAD,
VILLARAMA,
JR., PEREZ,* SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated: June 7, 2011 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This case
stemmed from (1) the undated letter[1]
of Ramon Ona-Ligaya (Ligaya) of
For the antecedent factual background
of the charges, we refer to the report of Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco
Flores (Dy-Liacco Flores) of the Court of Appeals, who was later tasked by the
Court to investigate the present administrative matter against Judge Aguilar. Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores found
that:
Sometime
on P120,000.00. [Atty.
Aguilar] acceded. Later, Sison and
Cuevas returned with a different document.
It was obviously the same real estate mortgage contract between the
parties but the amount of the loan was now raised to P140,000.00. The parties explained that this is the real
agreement between them. [Atty. Aguilar]
notarized it in replacement of the previous document, deeming the first
cancelled. Hence, the second document
carried the same entries like document number, book number and the like as the
first document. Either by oversight or
inattentiveness, the secretary of Atty. Aguilar put the two documents together.
Sometime in 2002, Arnel Sison, the son of mortgagor Lourdes Sison, discovered the existence of the two documents with different amounts but one notarial document number. Furious, he went to see then Atty. Aguilar. She explained to him the circumstances under which both documents were notarized. Unappeased, Arnel Sison filed complaints for Falsification of Public Document, Perjury and Estafa against Atty. Aguilar and Angelina Cuevas before (1) the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor of Bataan AND (2) the Office of the Ombudsman.[4]
The complaint for Falsification of
Public Document, Perjury and Estafa against Atty. Aguilar and Angelina Cuevas was
filed by Arnel Sison before the Regional State Prosecutor, and was docketed as
I.S. Nos. 03-S-2282 to 03-S-2284. After
preliminary investigation, Angelito V. Lumabas, Acting City Prosecutor of
Olongapo City, issued a Resolution[5]
dated
Meanwhile, proceedings on Arnel Sisons
complaint for Dishonesty and Misconduct against Atty. Aguilar, filed before the
Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0718-G, continued. Atty. Aguilar filed her
counter-affidavit therein on October 2, 2003.
Following
her retirement as City Legal Officer of Olongapo City effective December 13,
2003, Atty. Aguilar, through a letter[6]
dated September 3, 2004, addressed to the JBC Chairman, applied for the
position of judge, preferably at the RTC Branch 71, of Iba, Zambales. In support of her application, Atty. Aguilar accomplished
and submitted a Personal Data Sheet (PDS), which consisted of four pages. Question No. 23 of the PDS asked: Is there any pending civil, criminal or
administrative (including disbarment) case or complaint filed against you
pending before any court, prosecution office, any other office, agency or
instrumentality of the government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?[7]
In answer to said question, Atty.
Aguilar wrote None.[8]
The PDS was notarized in September 2004.
Atty.
Aguilar was appointed as RTC Judge of
After her
appointment to the Judiciary, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon rendered a Decision[9] in
OMB-L-A-03-0718-G on November 29, 2005, finding no liability on Atty. Aguilars
part for dishonesty but only for misconduct, as follows:
After
a careful evaluation of the facts and evidence adduced by both parties, the
undersigned finds [Atty. Aguilar] guilty of misconduct. Records disclose that two (2) deeds of Real
Estate Mortgage were notarized on
For her misconduct, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon imposed upon Atty. Aguilar the penalty of one month
suspension. Atty. Aguilar filed a motion
for reconsideration, arguing that she could no longer be held administratively
liable as she had already retired from her position as Legal Officer of
Atty.
Aguilar assumed her judicial position on February 8, 2006. She accomplished another PDS for submission to
the Supreme Court on
37. a.
Have you ever been formally charged?
b. Have you ever been guilty of any
administrative offense?
38. Have
you ever been convicted of any crime or violation of any law, decree, ordinance
or regulation by any court or tribunal?[13]
Judge
Aguilar answered No[14]
to all the aforequoted questions.
On March 6,
2006, the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) received Ligayas undated letter,
bringing to the attention of said office two criminal cases still pending against
Judge Aguilar, particularly: (1) Criminal Case No. 523-04, for Estafa thru
Falsification, pending before the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 74; and (2)
Criminal Case No. 844-04, for Falsification, pending before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Olongapo City. Ligaya
sought the recall of Judge Aguilars appointment. Then Chief Justice Panganiban endorsed Ligayas letter to the
JBC.[15]
Given Atty. Aguilars retirement as
City Legal Officer of Olongapo City and her subsequent appointment as RTC
judge, the Office of the City Legal Officer of Olongapo City believed that it
no longer had the authority to implement the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzons
Decision dated November 29, 2005 and Order dated January 31, 2006 in
OMB-L-A-03-0718-G against now Judge Aguilar.
Consequently, in its 1st Indorsement dated
Atty. Wilhelmina D. Geronga
(Geronga), OCA Chief of Staff, directed Judge Aguilar to comment on why she failed
to disclose in her PDS the pendency of OMB-L-A-03-0718-G. Attached to the OCA directive was a copy of
the Order dated January 31, 2006 of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0718-G,
denying Judge Aguilars motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated
November 29, 2005.
In her Comment, Judge Aguilar avers that
she only learned that her motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated November
29, 2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0718-G was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in
an Order dated January 31, 2006, when she was furnished a copy of said order by
the OCA on June 1, 2007. Judge Aguilar would
have wanted to challenge the decision and order of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Judge Aguilar further explains in her
Comment that when she notarized the real estate mortgage contracts between
Lourdes Sison and Angelina Cuevas, she was merely performing her duty to give
free legal services to the people of Olongapo City who have no resources to
avail themselves of the services of lawyers; and maintains that she did not
charge or receive any consideration from the parties for the notarization.
Finally, Judge Aguilar apologizes for
the inaccuracies in her PDS and promises to be more circumspect and accurate in
her future submissions.
On
As
Atty. Geronga recommended, Court Administrator Lock directed Judge Aguilar to
manifest whether she wanted to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings or to have the matter formally investigated.[17] In her letter[18]
dated August 7, 2007, Judge Aguilar informed the OCA that she opted for a
formal investigation of the charges against her.
On
The Court, in a Resolution[20]
dated
Upon the recommendation[21]
of succeeding Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, the administrative matter
was referred to the Court of Appeals on March 4, 2008, to be raffled among the
Associate Justices for investigation, report, and recommendation. It was raffled to Investigating Justice
Dy-Liacco Flores on
During
the preliminary conference on
After consideration of the documents
and testimonies of the parties, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores
submitted her report, pertinent portions of which read:
The undersigned Investigator finds [Judge Aguilar] guilty of dishonesty.
x x x x
[Judge Aguilar] explained that she thought her retirement as Legal Officer of Olongapo City on December 13, 2003 rendered functus officio the administrative case filed by Arnel Sison against her and the unusual penalties attendant to the administrative charges such as removal, suspension or censure had been mooted by her retirement. She claims that even if such belief is wrong, it is not entirely baseless.
[Judge Aguilars] explanation fails to
persuade. When she made said entry, she was not an ordinary layman ignorant of
the intricacies of the law but an experienced lawyer who had served as City
Legal Officer for more than sixteen (16) years. Also, [Judge Aguilar] always
graduated at the top of her class in law school and in her liberal arts degree
at a prestigious university. Thus, she is deemed to know the import of a simple
question: Is there any pending civil, criminal or administrative (including
disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending before any Court,
prosecution office, or any other office, agency or instrumentality of the government
or the Republic of the
The simplicity of the question would have dawned on her right away that her belief about the effect of her resignation is irrelevant to the question. At any rate, in the case of Pagano vs. Nazarro, et al., the Supreme Court stated thus:
(T)he
precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from service does not render moot the administrative
case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative
liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public
servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which
he or she shall still be answerable.
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic despite petitioners [Judge Aguilar] separation from service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
[Judge Aguilars] plea of good faith is controverted by the fact that the misrepresentation is so palpable that it could not have been missed or overlooked by a brilliant mind like that of [Judge Aguilar]. As a City Legal Officer for a long time, she must have known that a truthful revelation of the pendency of her administrative case could derail her application to the bench. Her desire to avoid the risk explains that misrepresentation.[22]
Ultimately, Investigating Justice
Dy-Liacco Flores recommended as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned Investigator recommends the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits except earned leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.[23]
The Court referred the foregoing report
and recommendation of Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores to the OCA for
evaluation, report, and recommendation.
On May 6, 2009, the OCA, through then
Court Administrator, now Associate Justice of this Court, Jose P. Perez,
submitted its report, concurring with the findings of Investigating Justice
Dy-Liacco Flores and recommending thus:
In
view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted for the consideration of
the Honorable Court the recommendations that Judge Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70,
The Court agrees with the reports of the
OCA and Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores adjudging Judge Aguilar guilty
of dishonesty in filling out her PDS, but modifies the recommended penalty of
dismissal to suspension of six (6) months given the attendant circumstances.
Judge Aguilar admitted that in two of
her PDS one accomplished in September 2004,
attached to her application for judgeship position, and the other accomplished
on March 6, 2006, upon her
assumption as RTC Judge of Burgos, Pangasinan Judge Aguilar answered that she
had no pending administrative case against her; and that she had not been
formally charged nor found guilty of any administrative charge. All the while, Arnel Sisons administrative
complaint against Judge Aguilar, OMB-L-A-03-0718-G, was pending before the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in a Decision dated
November 29, 2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0718-G,
found Judge Aguilar guilty of misconduct and imposed upon her the penalty of
one month suspension; and in an Order dated January 31, 2006, denied Judge Aguilars motion for reconsideration,
but modified the penalty imposed by converting it to a fine equivalent to one
month salary.
The accomplishment of the PDS is a
requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations for employment in the
government. Since truthful completion of
PDS is a requirement for employment in the Judiciary, the importance of
answering the same with candor need not be gainsaid.[25]
With respect to Judge Aguilars
supposed omission in her PDS submitted with her judgeship application, we are
guided by the ruling in Plopinio v. Zabala-Cario,[26]
wherein we clarified that a person shall be considered formally charged in
administrative cases only upon a finding of the existence of a prima facie case by the disciplining
authority, in case of a complaint filed by a private person. However, Judge
Aguilars failure to disclose OMB-L-A-03-0718-G in her PDS filed upon her
assumption of office when she already had notice of the adverse decision
therein constitutes dishonesty, considered a grave offense under the Administrative
Code of 1987, as well as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (Civil Service Rules), with the corresponding penalty of dismissal from
service even for the first offense.
Nonetheless, Rule IV, Section 53 of
the Civil Service Rules also provides that in the determination of the
penalties to be imposed, extenuating, mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be
considered. Among the circumstances that may be allowed to modify
the penalty are (1) length of service in the government, (2) good faith, and
(3) other analogous circumstances.
In several jurisprudential precedents, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual administrative penalties prescribed by law or regulation in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent's length of service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent's advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the determination by the Court of the imposable penalty. For equitable and humanitarian reasons, the Court reduced the administrative penalties imposed in the following cases:
The Court had the occasion to rule in Office of the Court Administrator v. Flores,[27] wherein the respondent legal researcher was charged with dishonesty for her failure to disclose her suspension and dismissal from her previous employment in her PDS, that:
This Court has in the past punished similar infractions pertaining to making untruthful statements in the PDS with the severe penalty of dismissal such as failing to state previous employment and the fact of separation for cause therefrom, falsely declaring passing the career service professional examination when in fact one did not, and neglecting to declare the pendency of a criminal case.
x x x x
While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the first instance, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the presence of mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the government and being a first time offender.
Since respondent has been in the service for fourteen (14) years and since this is her first offense during employment in the judiciary, the Court deems it proper to impose the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay.[28] (Emphases supplied. Citations omitted.)
Similar considerations were applied in other
cases involving administrative charges of dishonesty. In Concerned
Employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan v. Larizza
Paguio-Bacani, Branch Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan,[29] respondent Paguio-Bacanis act of
falsifying her Daily Time Records (DTRs) amounted to dishonesty, which under
the Civil Service Rules carried the penalty of dismissal from the service even
for a first offense. Even though
dishonesty through falsification of DTRs is punishable by dismissal, such an
extreme penalty was not imposed on the errant employee where there exist
mitigating circumstances which could alleviate her culpability. Paguio-Bacani had
been Branch Clerk of Court for about ten years and this was the first
administrative complaint against her.
Thus, Paguio-Bacani was suspended from the service for one year without
pay, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.
Respondent Valentin, in Concerned Employee v. Roberto Valentin,
Clerk II, Records Division, Office of the Court Administrator,[30] was found guilty of dishonesty for
claiming to have rendered overtime service for 12 days, receiving overtime
allowance for the same, when he could not have actually been at the office
since he served as an umpire at table tennis matches held on the same
dates. Instead of the penalty of
dismissal, Valentin was suspended from the service for six months without pay,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Valentin had been in the
government service for almost eight years and had performed his assigned tasks
satisfactorily. These two circumstances
were considered mitigating and, therefore, decreased the imposable penalty upon
Valentin.
Respondents Ting and Esmerio, in Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty
Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Secretary I, and Angelita C. Esmerio, Clerk III,
Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division,[31] were
likewise found guilty of dishonesty in deliberately failing to use the
Chronolog Time Recorder Machine to register their actual time of arrival in the
office and making it appear in their Daily Report of Attendance and Tardiness
that they had always arrived on time.
The Court, for humanitarian considerations, in addition to various
mitigating circumstances in Tings and Esmerios favor, imposed the penalty of
six months suspension, instead of the most severe penalty of dismissal from
service. The following circumstances
convinced the Court to extend mercy and indulgence to Ting and Esmerio: (1) their long years of service in the
judiciary, ranging from 21 to 38 years; (2) their acknowledgement of their
infractions and feelings of remorse; (3) the importance and complexity of the
nature of their duties; (4) their very satisfactory performance rating; and
(5) their family circumstances.
In Reyes-Domingo v.
Morales,[32]
respondent Morales, the branch Clerk of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 17, was found guilty of dishonesty in not reflecting his
absences on the 10th and 13th of May 1996 in his DTR,
when he was at Katarungan Village interfering with the construction of the
Sports Complex therein, and at the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-National Capital Region pursuing his personal business. The OCA recommended Moraless dismissal from
the service reasoning that his falsification of his DTRs amounted to
dishonesty. However, the Court merely
imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on Morales, given that this was his first
offense, and his absences could not yet be classified as frequent or habitual.
In
Floria v. Sunga,[33]
Floria, Executive Assistant IV at the Archives Section, Court of
Appeals, was found liable for immorality, since she had an illicit relation
with Badilla, a married man; and for the administrative offense of dishonesty,
because she falsified her childrens birth certificates by stating therein that
she and Badilla were married on P10,000.00, in light
of the following circumstances: the administrative offense of immorality
charged against Floria took place many years ago; it was the first time that
Floria was being held administratively liable in her 29 years of employment at
the Court of Appeals; and Florias children were innocent victims, and
dismissing or suspending their mother from the service would be a heavy toll on
them, a punishment they did not deserve.
The Court, in Concerned Taxpayer v. Norberto Doblada, Jr.,[34]
found that the inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of Doblada, the Sheriff at the
In
De Guzman, Jr. v. Mendoza,[35]
Antonio Mendoza, Sheriff IV of the Makati City Regional Trial Court, Branch
58, was charged with conniving with another in causing the issuance of an alias writ of execution and profiting
from the rentals collected from the subject property.
Drawing
on the same compassion displayed by the Court in the foregoing catena of cases,
the Court should take into consideration the following mitigating circumstances
existent in the case at bar:
a) The criminal complaint for falsification, perjury and estafa against Judge Aguilar was dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for lack of probable cause. The administrative case against Judge Aguilar was already decided by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, suspending Judge Aguilar for one month (later modified to a fine equivalent to one month salary by reason of her voluntary retirement from office) for misconduct but not for dishonesty. Both the dismissed criminal complaint and decided administrative case against Judge Aguilar concern her notarization of private documents that bore no relation to the performance of her functions as City Legal Officer;
b) Judge Aguilar appeared to have believed that she was authorized to notarize said private documents as part of her duties as City Legal Officer, and she neither charged any fee nor received any consideration therefor;
c) Setting aside for the moment her previous administrative case, Judge Aguilar had otherwise strong credentials for her appointment as a judge;[36]
d) Judge Aguilar has rendered more than 20 years of government service;
e) This is Judge Aguilars first and only administrative charge in the Judiciary for which she was found guilty; and
f) Judge Aguilar readily acknowledged her offense, apologized, and promised to be more circumspect and accurate in her future submissions.
Judge Aguilars case should be distinguished from our previous rulings in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Estacion, Jr.,[37] Gutierrez v. Belan[38] and Re: Non-Disclosure before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain[39] (the last two cited in the report of Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores). In Estacion, the respondent judge failed to disclose his pending criminal cases for homicide and attempted homicide when he applied to the Judiciary; while in Belan, the respondent judge failed to previously disclose a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. In Quitain, the previous administrative case which the respondent judge failed to disclose upon his application for judgeship was one for grave misconduct for which he was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of benefits prior to his application to the Judiciary. The seriousness of the case or cases which respondent judges failed to disclose in their PDS or applications for judgeship, and the absence of mitigating circumstances, sufficiently differentiate Estacion, Belan, and Quitain, from the one at bar.
Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of a serious charge, such as dishonesty, may be subjected to any of the following penalties:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is
guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal
from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture
of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine
of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to impose a suspension of six months without pay in light of the above discussed extenuating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Judge Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar is hereby found guilty of dishonesty and is SUSPENDED from the service for six (6) months without pay, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
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ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
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LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice
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MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
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ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
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MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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No part |
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JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE
CATRAL Associate Justice
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MARIA
Associate Justice
* No part.
[1] Rollo, p. 17.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Id.
at 11.
[12] Erroneously
dated as
[13] Rollo, p. 29 (back page).
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Id.
at 132.
[20] Id.
at 133.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Inting
v. Tanodbayan, 186 Phil. 343, 348 (1980); Belosillo v. Rivera, 395 Phil. 180, 191 (2000).
[26] A.M.
No. P-08-2458, March 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 269, 278.
[27] A.M. No. P-07-2366,
[28]
[29] A.M. No. P-06-2217,
[30] 498 Phil. 347 (2005).
[31] 502 Phil. 264 (2005).
[32] 396 Phil. 150 (2000).
[33] 420 Phil. 637 (2001).
[34] 507 Phil. 222 (2005).
[35] 493 Phil. 690 (2005).
[36] Apart from fulfilling the requisite
years of legal practice, Judge Aguilar graduated magna cum laude both in her undergraduate course and from law
school at the
[37] 260 Phil. 1 (1990).
[38] 355 Phil. 428 (1998).
[39] JBC No. 013,