EN BANC
|
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, - versus - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 191618 Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: June
7, 2011 |
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NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal of our Decision[1] in
G.R. No. 191618 dated November 23, 2010, dismissing his petition and declaring
the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as
constitutional.
Petitioner reiterates his arguments on
the alleged unconstitutional creation of the PET:
1. He
has standing to file the petition as a taxpayer and a concerned citizen.
2. He
is not estopped from assailing the constitution of the PET simply by virtue of
his appearance as counsel of former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo before
respondent tribunal.
3. Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the
PET.
4. The
PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
To bolster his arguments that the PET
is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling on the constitutionality of the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC).[2]
Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro
that the PTC is a public office which cannot be created by the President, the
power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits
that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the
PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an
act of legislature.
On the other hand, in its Comment to
the Motion for Reconsideration, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains
that:
1. Petitioner
is without standing to file the petition.
2. Petitioner
is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET.
3. The
constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of
authority to the [Supreme] Court to be the sole judge of all election contests
for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Except for the invocation of our
decision in Louis ‟Barok C. Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010,[3]
petitioner does not allege new arguments to warrant reconsideration of our
Decision.
We
cannot agree with his insistence that the creation of the PET is
unconstitutional. We reiterate that the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting
as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. x x x.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
We
mapped out the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the foregoing
provision and concluded therefrom that:
The mirabile dictu of the grant of jurisdiction to this Court, albeit found in the Article on the executive branch of government, and the constitution of the PET, is evident in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission. On the exercise of this Courts judicial power as sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential election contests, and to promulgate its rules for this purpose, we find the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission most instructive:
MR. DAVIDE. On line
25, after the words "Vice-President," I propose to add AND MAY
PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. This refers to the Supreme Court sitting en
banc. This is also to confer on the Supreme Court exclusive authority to
enact the necessary rules while acting as sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
MR. REGALADO. My
personal position is that the rule-making power of the Supreme Court with
respect to its internal procedure is already implicit under the Article on the
Judiciary; considering, however, that according to the Commissioner, the
purpose of this is to indicate the sole power of the Supreme Court without
intervention by the legislature in the promulgation of its rules on this
particular point, I think I will personally recommend its acceptance to the
Committee.
x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO x x x.
With respect to Sections 10 and 11 on page 8, I understand that the Committee has also created an Electoral Tribunal in the Senate and a Commission on Appointments which may cover membership from both Houses. But my question is: It seems to me that the committee report does not indicate which body should promulgate the rules that shall govern the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments. Who shall then promulgate the rules of these bodies?
MR. DAVIDE. The Electoral Tribunal itself will establish and promulgate its rules because it is a body distinct and independent already from the House, and so with the Commission on Appointments also. It will have the authority to promulgate its own rules.
On another point of discussion relative to the grant of judicial power, but equally cogent, we listen to former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?
MR.
CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest
between two parties. This is a judicial power.
MR.
SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the
right to declare who will be the President of our country, which to me is a
political action.
MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law,
and these are essentially justiciable questions.
MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President.
Echoing the same sentiment and affirming the grant of judicial power to the
Supreme Court, Justice Florenz D. Regalado and Fr. Joaquin Bernas both opined:
MR.
VILLACORTA. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I am not sure whether Commissioner Suarez has expressed his point. On page 2,
the fourth paragraph of Section 4 provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President.
May I seek clarification as to whether or not the matter of determining the
outcome of the contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President is purely a political matter and, therefore,
should not be left entirely to the judiciary. Will the above-quoted provision
not impinge on the doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and
the judicial departments of the government?
MR. REGALADO. No, I really do not feel that would be a problem. This is a
new provision incidentally. It was not in the 1935 Constitution nor in the 1973
Constitution.
MR. VILLACORTA. That is right.
MR. REGALADO. We feel that it will not be an intrusion into the separation
of powers guaranteed to the judiciary because this is strictly an adversarial
and judicial proceeding.
MR.
VILLACORTA. May I know the rationale of the Committee because this supersedes
Republic Act 7950 which provides for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal?
FR. BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary. Election contests are, by
their nature, judicial. Therefore, they are cognizable only by courts. If, for
instance, we did not have a constitutional provision on an electoral tribunal
for the Senate or an electoral tribunal for the House, normally, as composed,
that cannot be given jurisdiction over contests.
So,
the background of this is really the case of Roxas v. Lopez. The
Gentleman will remember that in that election, Lopez was declared winner. He
filed a protest before the Supreme Court because there was a republic act which
created the Supreme Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The question
in this case was whether new powers could be given the Supreme Court by law. In
effect, the conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create two
Supreme Courts and the answer of the Supreme Court was: "No, this did not
involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but precisely we are giving new
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the Constitution.
Congress may allocate various jurisdictions."
Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest between
two presidential candidates or two vice-presidential candidates, no one had
jurisdiction over it. So, it became necessary to create a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what was
statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the
power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the
rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as
petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., who proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to
exercise exclusive authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that
purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized that
the sole power ought to be without intervention by the legislative department.
Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve
presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power
connected thereto.
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment
of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory
before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET
in our country cannot be denied.[4]
Stubbornly,
despite the explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission
to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, they constitutionalize[d]
what was statutory, petitioner continues to insist that the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of
the PET. Petitioner is adamant that the fact that [the provision] does not
expressly prohibit [the] creation [of the PET] is not an authority for the
Supreme Court to create the same.
Petitioner
is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of the provision
itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PETs constitutionality.
We
reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the
Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present
Constitution.
The
explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing
what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase,
line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Suffice
it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the
specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the
constitutionality of the PET.
In
our Decision, we clarified the structure of the PET:
Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc. The following exchange in the 1986 Constitutional Commission should provide enlightenment:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Let me proceed to line 23, page 2, wherein it is provided, and I quote:
The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc[,] shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
Are we not
giving enormous work to the Supreme Court especially when it is directed to sit
en banc as the sole judge of all presidential and vice-presidential
election contests?
MR. SUMULONG. That question will be referred to Commissioner Concepcion.
MR. CONCEPCION. This
function was discharged by the Supreme Court twice and the Supreme Court was
able to dispose of each case in a period of one year as provided by law. Of
course, that was probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not know
how the present Supreme Court would react to such circumstances, but there is
also the question of who else would hear the election protests.
MR. SUAREZ. We are
asking this question because between lines 23 to 25, there are no rules provided
for the hearings and there is not time limit or duration for the election
contest to be decided by the Supreme Court. Also, we will have to consider the
historical background that when R.A. 1793, which organized the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, was promulgated on June 21, 1957, at least three famous
election contests were presented and two of them ended up in withdrawal by the
protestants out of sheer frustration because of the delay in the resolution of
the cases. I am referring to the electoral protest that was lodged by former
President Carlos P. Garcia against our "kabalen" former President
Diosdado Macapagal in 1961 and the vice-presidential election contest filed by
the late Senator Gerardo Roxas against Vice-President Fernando Lopez in 1965.
MR. CONCEPCION. I cannot answer for what the protestants had in mind. But when
that protest of Senator Roxas was withdrawn, the results were already
available. Senator Roxas did not want to have a decision adverse to him. The
votes were being counted already, and he did not get what he expected so rather
than have a decision adverse to his protest, he withdrew the case.
x x x x
MR. SUAREZ. I
see. So the Commission would not have any objection to vesting in the Supreme
Court this matter of resolving presidential and vice-presidential contests?
MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not have any objection.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?
MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power.
MR. SUAREZ. We
know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to
declare who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.
MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and
these are essentially justiciable questions.
MR. SUAREZ. If
the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all
the time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it
considering that they will be going over millions and millions of ballots or
election returns, Madam President.
MR. CONCEPCION. The time consumed or to be consumed in this contest for
President is dependent upon they key number of teams of revisors. I have no
experience insofar as contests in other offices are concerned.
MR. SUAREZ. Although there is a requirement here that the Supreme Court is
mandated to sit en banc?
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. SUAREZ. I see.
MR. CONCEPCION. The
steps involved in this contest are: First, the ballot boxes are opened before
teams of three, generally, a representative each of the court, of the
protestant and of the "protestee." It is all a questions of how many
teams are organized. Of course, that can be expensive, but it would be
expensive whatever court one would choose. There were times that the Supreme
Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the same time working, would classify the
objections, the kind of problems, and the court would only go over the objected
votes on which the parties could not agree. So it is not as awesome as it would
appear insofar as the Court is concerned. What is awesome is the cost of the
revision of the ballots because each party would have to appoint one representative
for every team, and that may take quite a big amount.
MR. SUAREZ. If we
draw from the Commissioner's experience which he is sharing with us, what would
be the reasonable period for the election contest to be decided?
MR. CONCEPCION. Insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned, the Supreme Court
always manages to dispose of the case in one year.
MR. SUAREZ. In one year. Thank you for the clarification.[5]
Judicial
power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under
the doctrine of necessary implication,
the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential
elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. Thus:
Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the process outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of the PET.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We
cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the
explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is
not unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant
of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein,
although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not
specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation
on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of
deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET,
is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.[6]
Next, petitioner still claims that the PET exercises
quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section
12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
We dispose of this argument as we have
done in our Decision, viz.:
The traditional
grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our
presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the
settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned
to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power
was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but
it remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan
trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional
and senatorial - exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC
and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which
are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not
courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests
which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the
explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for
the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the
SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial
review - via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party
- if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond
cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or
vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice
Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels." In fact,
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the
Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent
in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated
to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting
in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional
proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be
among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in
Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices
shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively,
effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in
Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in
Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting
the PET, from the same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an
agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as
intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent,
but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme
Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power
without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise
of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by
the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power
to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's,
should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.[7]
Finally,
petitioners application of our decision in Biraogo
v. Philippine Truth Commission[8] to the present case is an unmitigated
quantum leap.
The
decision therein held that the PTC finds justification under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution. A plain reading of the constitutional provisions,
i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and
Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals that the two
are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the Executive and the
Judicial Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for
the constitution of the PET was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the
Members of the Constitutional Commission during the drafting of the present
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED. Our
Decision in G.R. No. 191618 STANDS.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
|
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice
|
|
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice |
|
ROBERTO A.
ABAD Associate Justice
|
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
|
JOSE
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
MARIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 71-102.
[2] Entitled Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission and Lagman v. Executive Secretary, docketed as G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036, respectively, and promulgated on December 7, 2010.
[3] G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010.
[4] Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Supra note 3.