THIRD
DIVISION
|
CIRTEK EMPLOYEES
LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS Petitioner, - versus - CIRTEK ELECTRONICS,
INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 190515 Present: CARPIO
MORALES, J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA,
JR., and SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated:
June 6, 2011 |
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R
E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This resolves the motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by respondent,
Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Courts Decision dated November 15, 2010.
Respondent-movant
avers that petitioner, in filing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
availed of the wrong remedy, hence, the Court should have dismissed the
petition outright. It goes on to aver
that the Court erred in resolving a factual issue whether the August 24, 2005
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was validly entered into , which is not the
office of a petition for certiorari.
Respondent-movant
further avers that the MOA[1] signed
by the remaining officers of petitioner Union and allegedly ratified by its members
should have been given credence by the Court.
Furthermore, respondent-movant
maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a ruling beyond the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties; and that, as early as February 5, 2010, petitioner
Union had already filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
resolution of disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers resulting in
the latters lack of personality to represent the workers in the present case.
The motion is bereft of merit.
Respondent indeed availed of the
wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65.
Due, however, to the nature of the case, one involving workers wages
and benefits, and the fact that whether the petition was filed under Rule 65 or
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 it was filed within 15 days (the
reglementary period under Rule 45) from petitioners receipt of the resolution
of the Court of Appeals Resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration, the Court resolved to
give it due course. As Almelor v. RTC of Las Pias, et al. [2] restates:
Generally, an appeal taken either to the
Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
This is to prevent the party from benefiting from ones neglect and mistakes. However,
like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of
procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respecting the attribution of error to
the Court in ruling on a question of fact, it bears recalling that a QUESTION
OF FACT arises when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts,[3] while a QUESTION
OF LAW exists when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain set of facts.
The present case presents the
primordial issue of whether the Secretary
of Labor is empowered to give arbitral awards in the exercise of his authority
to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.
Ineluctably, the issue involves a
determination and application of existing law, the provisions of the Labor Code,
and prevailing jurisprudence. Intertwined
with the issue, however, is the question of validity of the MOA and its
ratification which, as movant correctly points out, is a question of fact and
one which is
not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The
rule, however, is not without exceptions, viz:
This rule provides
that the parties may raise only questions of law, because the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and
weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are
not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized
exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court;
(8) When
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(9) When
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In
the present case, the findings of the Secretary of Labor and the appellate
court on whether the MOA is valid and binding are conflicting, the former
giving scant consideration thereon, and the latter affording it more weight.
As found by the Secretary of Labor,
the MOA came about as a result of the constitution, at respondents behest, of
the Labor-Management Council (LMC) which, he reminded the parties, should not
be used as an avenue for bargaining but
for the purpose of affording workers to
participate in policy and decision-making.
Hence, the agreements embodied in the MOA were not the proper subject of the LMC deliberation or
procedure but of CBA negotiations and, therefore, deserving little weight.
The appellate court, held, however, that
the Secretary did not have the authority to give an arbitral award higher than
what was stated in the MOA. The
conflicting views drew the Court to re-evaluate the facts as borne by the
records, an exception to the rule that only questions of law may be dealt with
in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
As discussed in the Decision under
reconsideration, the then Acting Secretary of Labor Manuel G. Imson acted well
within his jurisdiction in ruling that the wage increases to be given are P10
per day effective January 1, 2004 and P15 per day effective January 1,
2005, pursuant to his power to assume jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g)[4] of
the Labor Code.
While an arbitral award cannot per
se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties
because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the
Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the award can be considered as an approximation of a collective
bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the
parties. Hence, it has the force and
effect of a valid contract obligation between the parties.[5]
In determining arbitral awards then, aside
from the MOA, courts considered other factors and documents including, as in
this case, the financial documents[6]
submitted by respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and
financial outlook and improvements as stated in its own website.[7]
The
appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the Pahayag and the minutes of the meeting which were not verified and
notarized would violate the rule on parol evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like other rules on
evidence, should not be strictly applied in labor cases. Interphil
Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. [8]
teaches:
On the contention that the MOA should
have been given credence because it was validly entered into by the parties,
the Court notes that even those who signed it expressed reservations thereto. A CBA (assuming in this case that the MOA can
be treated as one) is a contract imbued with public interest. It must thus be given a liberal, practical
and realistic, rather than a narrow and technical construction, with due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose for which
it is intended.[9]
As for the contention that the alleged disaffiliation
of the Union from the FFW during the pendency of the case resulted in the FFW
losing its personality to represent the Union, the same does not affect the
Courts upholding of the authority of
the Secretary of Labor to impose arbitral awards higher than what was
supposedly agreed upon in the MOA. Contrary
to respondents assertion, the unavoidable issue of disaffiliation bears no
significant legal repercussions to warrant the reversal of the Courts Decision.
En passant, whether there was a valid
disaffiliation is a factual issue. Besides,
the alleged disaffiliation of the Union from the FFW was by virtue of a
Resolution signed on February 23, 2010 and submitted to the DOLE Laguna Field
Office on March 5, 2010 two months after the present petition was filed on
December 22, 2009, hence, it did not affect FFW and its Legal Centers
standing to file the petition nor this Courts jurisdiction to resolve the
same.
At all events, the issue of
disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved in a different
forum in an action at the instance of
either or both the FFW and the Union or a rival labor organization, not
the employer.
An intra-union dispute refers to any conflict
between and among union members, including grievances arising from any
violation of the rights and conditions of membership, violation of or
disagreement over any provision of the unions constitution and by-laws, or
disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order
No. 40-03, Series of 2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as
inter/intra-union disputes, viz:
RULE XI
INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES
AND
OTHER RELATED LABOR
RELATIONS DISPUTES
Section 1.
Coverage. - Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:
(a) cancellation
of registration of a labor organization filed by its members or by another
labor organization;
(b) conduct
of election of union and workers association officers/nullification of
election of union and workers association officers;
(c) audit/accounts
examination of union or workers association funds;
(d) deregistration
of collective bargaining agreements;
(e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or
disaffiliation;
(f) validity/invalidity of
acceptance/non-acceptance for union membership;
(g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion of
union and workers association officers and members;
(h) validity/invalidity
of voluntary recognition;
(i) opposition
to application for union and CBA registration;
(j) violations
of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers association
constitution and by-laws;
(k) disagreements over chartering or registration
of labor organizations and collective bargaining agreements;
(l) violations of the rights and conditions of
union or workers association membership;
(m) violations of the rights of legitimate labor
organizations, except interpretation of collective bargaining agreements;
(n) such other disputes or conflicts involving
the rights to self-organization, union membership and collective bargaining
(1) between and
among legitimate labor organizations;
(2) between and
among members of a union or workers association.
Section 2.
Coverage. Other related labor relations disputes shall include any conflict
between a labor union and the employer or any individual, entity or group that
is not a labor organization or workers association. This includes: (1)
cancellation of registration of unions and workers associations; and (2) a
petition for interpleader.[10]
(emphasis supplied)
Indeed, as respondent-movant itself
argues, a local union may disaffiliate
at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing that the same is
prohibited under its constitution or rule.
Such, however, does not result in it losing its legal personality
altogether. Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila Bay Spinning Mills At
J.P. Coats[11] enlightens:
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Whether then,
as respondent claims, FFW went against the will and wishes of its principal
(the member-employees) by pursuing the case despite the signing of the MOA, is
not for the Court, nor for respondent to determine, but for the Union and FFW
to resolve on their own pursuant to their principal-agent relationship.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of
this Courts Decision of November 15, 2010 is DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] DOLE records, pp. 251-289.
[2] G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008.
[3] Vide
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Monillas,
G.R. No.
167098, March 28, 2008.
[4] (g) When, in
his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to
the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the
assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return-to-work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission
may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
x x x
[5] Vide
Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598, February 22, 2000, citing Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service,
Inc. v. Confesor, 338 Phil. 671.
[6] DOLE records, pp. 303-305; 129-250; 32-48.
[7] DOLE records, pp. 306-307.
[8] G.R.
No. 142824, December 19, 2001.
[9] Davao
Integrated Port Services v. Abarquez, G.R. No. 102132. March 19, 1993.
[10] Employees Union of Bayer
Philippines, et. al v. Bayer Philippines, et. al.,
G.R. No. 162943, December
6, 2010.
[11] G.R.
No. 118562 July 5, 1996.