DATU ZALDY
UY AMPATUAN, G.R. No. 190259
ANSARUDDIN
ADIONG, REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government and alter-ego of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
and anyone acting in his stead and on
behalf of the President of the
ARMED FORCES OF THE
(AFP), or any of their units operating in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim
NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their Promulgated:
units operating in ARMM,
Respondents. June
7, 2011
x
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x
ABAD, J.:
On
November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women,
including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
1946,[1]
placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Three days later or on November 27,
President Arroyo also issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273)[2]
transferring supervision of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
from the Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG). But, due to issues raised over the
terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO
273-A) amending the former, by delegating instead of transferring supervision
of the ARMM to the DILG.[3]
Claiming
that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners
Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM
officials,[4]
filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation
and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and seize
the regional governments powers, in violation of the principle of local
autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the
Constitution. The President gave the DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not
merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since the latter
could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.[5]
Petitioner
ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a
state of emergency, especially in the
In its comment for the respondents,[7] the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued Proclamation
1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order
in subject places.[8] She issued the proclamation pursuant to her calling
out power[9] as
Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. The determination of the
need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.[10] She must use her judgment based on
intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to call
out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever
these reared their ugly heads.
On the other hand, the President
merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the ARMM
to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. These orders did not authorize a take over of
the ARMM. They did not give him blanket
authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials.[11] The
delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.[12] Further,
the assailed proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the
exercise of emergency powers.[13]
Although
normalcy has in the meantime returned to the places subject of this petition, it
might be relevant to rule on the issues raised in this petition since some acts
done pursuant to Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A could impact on the
administrative and criminal cases that the government subsequently filed
against those believed affected by such proclamation and orders.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether
or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1,
Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act;
2. Whether
or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and
3. Whether
or not the President had factual bases for her actions.
The Rulings of the Court
We dismiss the petition.
One. The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation
and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is anchored
on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG
Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental
powers over the region.
But, in the first place, the DILG
Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor
of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the
ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on
December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII,
Section 12,[14] of RA
9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong
named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner
Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.[15] In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over
the administration or operations of the ARMM.
Two. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully
exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP
personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.[16] But such deployment is not by itself an
exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23.
x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a
national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant
to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President. She did
not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
Three. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides.[17]
SECTION 18.
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may
inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power,[18] it
would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
Zamora,[19] it is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed
forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents
judgment. Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof,
to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then
this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always
accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the
court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such
judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances,
the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call
out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President, as
Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some
of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of
the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be
imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human
lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and
decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.[20]
Here,
petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and
But, apart from the fact that there
was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly explained the factual
bases for the Presidents decision to call out the armed forces, as follows:
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are
prominent families engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It is also
a known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold
elective positions in various parts of the ARMM and the rest of
Considering the fact that the principal
victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and the
main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan
family, both the military and police had to prepare for and prevent reported
retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive measures
from the Ampatuan clan.
x x x x
The Ampatuan forces are estimated to be
approximately two thousand four hundred (2,400) persons, equipped with about
two thousand (2,000) firearms, about four hundred (400) of which have been
accounted for. x x x
As for the Mangudadatus, they have an
estimated one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with about two hundred
(200) firearms. x x x
Apart from their own personal forces, both
clans have Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who support them:
about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three hundred (300) for the
Mangudadatus.
What could be worse than the armed clash of
two warring clans and their armed supporters, especially in light of
intelligence reports on the potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs).
One RAG was reported to have planned an
attack on the forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show support and sympathy
for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the age-old territorial dispute
between the said RAG and the Ampatuan family.
x x x x
On the other hand, RAG faction which is
based in Sultan Kudarat was reported to have received three million pesos (P3,000,000.00)
from Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the procurement of ammunition. The said
faction is a force to reckon with because the group is well capable of
launching a series of violent activities to divert the attention of the people
and the authorities away from the multiple murder case. x x x
In addition, two other factions of a RAG
are likely to support the Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-based faction has
the strength of about five hundred (500) persons and three hundred seventy-two
(372) firearms while the Sultan Kudarat-based faction has the strength of about
four hundred (400) persons and three hundred (300) firearms and was reported to
be moving towards Maguindanao to support the Mangudadatu clan in its armed
fight against the Ampatuans.[22]
In
other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President
issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was
movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans.[23] Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and
stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the
proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Notably,
the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn
the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has been reported[24]
that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still a need to
disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence
of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the
citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite
the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.
Since petitioners are not able to
demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places
and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the Presidents
actions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE
PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 34.
[2]
[3]
[4] Ampatuan, Adiong and Sahali-Generale were, respectively, the Governor, Vice-Governor and Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the ARMM at that time.
[5] Rollo, pp. 14-17.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] SEC. 12. Succession to Regional Governorship in Cases of Temporary Incapacity. In case of temporary incapacity of the regional Governor to perform his duties on account of physical or legal causes, or when he is on official leave of absence or on travel outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines, the Regional Vice-Governor, or if there be none or in case of his permanent or temporary incapacity or refusal to assume office, the Speaker of the Regional Assembly shall exercise the powers, duties and functions of the Regional Governor as prescribed by law enacted by the Regional Assembly or in the absence thereof, by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.
[15]
http://services.inquirer.net/print/print.php?article_id=20100707-279759.
[16] Rollo, p. 22.
[17] See SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 509-510 (2004).
[18] Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78, 93 (2001).
[19] 392 Phil. 618, 635 (2000).
[20]
[21] Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[22]
[23]
[24] http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/video/nation/regions/11/23/10/state-emergency-maguindanao-stays;
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/aquino-state-emergency-maguindanao-stays;
http://www.bomboradyo.com/index.php/news/top-stories/29331-state-of-emergency-sa-c-mindanao-mananatili;
http://www.zambotimes.com/archives/26011-State-of-emergency-in-Maguindanao-
remains.html.