Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
MILA A. REYES , Petitioner, - versus - VICTORIA T. TUPARAN,
Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 188064 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: June 1, 2011 |
X -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this petition for review is the February 13, 2009 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with
modification the February 22, 2006 Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela City (RTC), in Civil
Case No. 3945-V-92, an action for Rescission of Contract with Damages.
On
In December 1989, respondent leased from petitioner a space on the ground
floor of the
On
1. That the conditional sale
will be cancelled if the plaintiff (petitioner) can find a buyer of said
properties for the amount of ₱6,500,000.00 within the next three (3)
months provided all amounts received by the plaintiff from the defendant (respondent)
including payments actually made by defendant to Farmers Savings and Loan Bank
would be refunded to the defendant with additional interest of six (6%)
monthly;
2. That the plaintiff would
continue using the space occupied by her and drugstore and cosmetics store
without any rentals for the duration of the installment payments;
3. That there will be a lease
for fifteen (15) years in favor of the plaintiff over the space for drugstore
and cosmetics store at a monthly rental of only ₱8,000.00 after full
payment of the stipulated installment payments are made by the defendant;
4. That the defendant will
undertake the renewal and payment of the fire insurance policies on the two (2)
subject buildings following the expiration of the then existing fire insurance
policy of the plaintiff up to the time that plaintiff is fully paid of the
total purchase price of ₱4,200,000.00.[3]
After petitioners verbal acceptance of all the conditions/concessions,
both parties worked together to obtain FSL Banks approval for respondent to
assume her (petitioners) outstanding bank account. The assumption would be part of respondents
purchase price for petitioners mortgaged real properties. FSL Bank approved their
proposal on the condition that petitioner would sign or remain as co-maker for
the mortgage obligation assumed by respondent.
On
Under the Deed of Conditional Sale of Real Properties with Assumption of
Mortgage, respondent was bound to pay the petitioner a lump sum of ₱1.2
million pesos without interest as part of the purchase price in three (3) fixed
installments as follows:
a)
₱200,000.00
due
b)
₱200,000.00
due
c)
₱800,000.00
due
Respondent, however, defaulted in the payment of her obligations on their
due dates. Instead of paying the amounts due in lump sum on their respective
maturity dates, respondent paid petitioner in small amounts from time to time. To
compensate for her delayed payments, respondent agreed to pay petitioner an
interest of 6% a month. As of
Petitioner further averred that despite her success in finding a
prospective buyer for the subject real properties within the 3-month period
agreed upon, respondent reneged on her promise to allow the cancellation of
their deed of conditional sale. Instead, respondent became interested in owning
the subject real properties and even wanted to convert the entire property into
a modern commercial complex. Nonetheless, she consented because respondent
repeatedly professed friendship and assured her that all their verbal side
agreement would be honored as shown by the fact that since December 1990, she
(respondent) had not collected any rentals from the petitioner for the space
occupied by her drugstore and cosmetics store.
On
Since December 1990, respondent had taken possession of the subject real
properties and had been continuously collecting and receiving monthly rental
income from the tenants of the buildings and vendors of the sidewalk fronting
the RBJ building without sharing it with petitioner.
On
Respondents Answer
Respondent countered, among others, that the tripartite agreement
erroneously designated by the petitioner as a Deed of Conditional Sale of Real
Property with Assumption of Mortgage was actually a pure and absolute contract
of sale with a term period. It could not be considered a conditional sale
because the acquisition of contractual rights and the performance of the
obligation therein did not depend upon a future and uncertain event. Moreover, the
capital gains and documentary stamps and other miscellaneous expenses and real
estate taxes up to 1990 were supposed to be paid by petitioner but she failed
to do so.
Respondent further averred that she successfully rescued the properties from
a definite foreclosure by paying the assumed mortgage in the amount of ₱2,278,078.13
plus interest and other finance charges. Because of her payment, she was able
to obtain a deed of cancellation of mortgage and secure a release of mortgage
on the subject real properties including petitioners ancestral residential
property in Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Petitioners claim for the balance of the purchase price of the subject
real properties was baseless and unwarranted because the full amount of the
purchase price had already been paid, as she did pay more than ₱4,200,000.00,
the agreed purchase price of the subject real properties, and she had even introduced
improvements thereon worth more than ₱4,800,000.00. As the parties could no
longer be restored to their original positions, rescission could not be resorted
to.
Respondent added that as a result of their business relationship,
petitioner was able to obtain from her a loan in the amount of ₱400,000.00
with interest and took several pieces of jewelry worth ₱120,000.00. Petitioner
also failed and refused to pay the monthly rental of ₱20,000.00 since
Ruling
of the RTC
On
Finally, the RTC stated that there was
no factual or legal basis to award damages and attorneys fees because there
was no proof that either party acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Allowing the
defendant to pay the plaintiff within thirty (30) days from the finality hereof
the amount of ₱805,000.00, representing the unpaid
purchase price of the subject property, with interest thereon at 2% a month
from
2. Directing the
defendant to allow the plaintiff to continue using the space occupied by her
for drugstore and cosmetic store without any rental pending payment of the
aforesaid balance of the purchase price.
3. Ordering the
defendant, upon her full payment of the purchase price together with interest,
to execute a contract of lease for fifteen (15) years in favor of the plaintiff
over the space for the drugstore and cosmetic store at a fixed monthly rental
of ₱8,000.00; and
4. Directing the
plaintiff, upon full payment to her by the defendant of the purchase price
together with interest, to execute the necessary deed of sale, as well as to
pay the Capital Gains Tax, documentary stamps and other miscellaneous expenses
necessary for securing the BIR Clearance, and to pay the real estate taxes due
on the subject property up to 1990, all necessary to transfer ownership of the
subject property to the defendant.
No pronouncement
as to damages, attorneys fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Ruling
of the CA
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision dated 22 February 2006 and Order dated 22
December 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 in
Civil Case No. 3945-V-92 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
defendant-appellant Victoria T. Tuparan is hereby ORDERED to pay
plaintiff-appellee/appellant Mila A. Reyes, within 30 days from finality of this
Decision, the amount of ₱805,000.00
representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the subject property,
plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from 11 September 1992 up to
finality of this Decision and, thereafter, at the rate of 12% per annum until
full payment. The ruling of the trial court on the automatic rescission of the
Deed of Conditional Sale with Assumption of Mortgage is hereby DELETED. Subject
to the foregoing, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[6]
After the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration and
respondents motion for partial reconsideration, petitioner filed the subject petition
for review praying for the reversal and setting aside of the CA Decision anchored
on the following
ASSIGNMENT
OF ERRORS
B. THE COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING AS GROUND
FOR THE RESCISSION OF THE SUBJECT CONTRACT THE OTHER FRAUDULENT AND MALICIOUS
ACTS COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT AGAINST THE PETITIONER WHICH BY THEMSELVES
SUFFICIENTLY JUSTIFY A DENIAL OF A GRACE PERIOD OF THIRTY (30) DAYS TO THE
RESPONDENT WITHIN WHICH TO PAY TO THE PETITIONER THE ₱805,000.00 PLUS
INTEREST THEREON.
C. EVEN
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RESCISSION OF THE
SUBJECT CONTRACT, THE COURT OF APPEALS STILL SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REDUCING THE INTEREST ON THE ₱805,000.00 TO ONLY 6% PER
ANNUM STARTING FROM THE DATE OF FILING OF THE COMPLAINT ON SEPTEMBER 11, 1992
DESPITE THE PERSONAL COMMITMENT OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES THAT RESPONDENT WILL PAY INTEREST ON THE ₱805,000.00 AT THE RATE
OF 6% MONTHLY STARTING THE DATE OF DELINQUENCY ON DECEMBER 31, 1991.
D. THE COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE APPRECIATION AND/OR
MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS RESULTING INTO THE DENIAL OF THE CLAIM OF PETITIONER
REYES FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES WHICH CORRESPOND TO THE MILLIONS OF PESOS OF
RENTALS/FRUITS OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH RESPONDENT TUPARAN
COLLECTED CONTINUOUSLY SINCE DECEMBER 1990, EVEN WITH THE UNPAID BALANCE OF ₱805,000.00
AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT CONTROVERT SUCH CLAIM OF THE
PETITIONER AS CONTAINED IN HER AMENDED COMPLAINT DATED APRIL 22, 2006.
E. THE COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE APPRECIATION OF
FACTS RESULTING INTO THE DENIAL OF THE CLAIM OF PETITIONER REYES FOR THE ₱29,609.00
BACK RENTALS THAT WERE COLLECTED BY RESPONDENT TUPARAN FROM THE OLD TENANTS OF
THE PETITIONER.
F. THE COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS
EARLIER URGENT MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF A PRELIMINARY MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY
INJUNCTION DATED JULY 7, 2008 AND THE SUPPLEMENT THERETO DATED AUGUST 4,
2008 THEREBY CONDONING THE UNJUSTIFIABLE FAILURE/REFUSAL OF JUDGE FLORO ALEJO
TO RESOLVE WITHIN ELEVEN (11) YEARS THE PETITIONERS THREE (3) SEPARATE
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION/ TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, ACCOUNTING
AND DEPOSIT OF RENTAL INCOME DATED MARCH 17, 1995, AUGUST 19, 1996 AND JANUARY
7, 2006 THEREBY PERMITTING THE RESPONDENT TO UNJUSTLY ENRICH HERSELF BY
CONTINUOUSLY COLLECTING ALL THE RENTALS/FRUITS OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES
WITHOUT ANY ACCOUNTING AND COURT DEPOSIT OF THE COLLECTED RENTALS/FRUITS AND
THE PETITIONERS URGENT MOTION TO DIRECT DEFENDANT VICTORIA TUPARAN TO PAY THE
ACCUMULATED UNPAID REAL ESTATE TAXES AND SEF TAXES ON THE SUBJECT REAL
PROPERTIES DATED
G. THE COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES AGAINST
THE RESPONDENT.
In sum, the crucial issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the
CA was correct in ruling that there was no legal basis for the rescission of
the Deed of Conditional Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
Position of the Petitioner
The petitioner basically argues that
the CA should have granted the rescission of the subject Deed of Conditional
Sale of Real Properties with Assumption of Mortgage for the following reasons:
1. The subject deed of
conditional sale is a reciprocal obligation whose outstanding characteristic is
reciprocity arising from identity of cause by virtue of which one obligation is
correlative of the other.
2. The petitioner was
rescinding not enforcing the subject Deed of Conditional Sale pursuant to
Article 1191 of the Civil Code because of the respondents failure/refusal to pay
the ₱805,000.00 balance of the total purchase price of the petitioners
properties within the stipulated period ending December 31, 1991.
3. There was no slight or
casual breach on the part of the respondent because she (respondent)
deliberately failed to comply with her contractual obligations with the
petitioner by violating the terms or manner of payment of the ₱1,200,000.00
balance and unjustly enriched herself at the expense of the petitioner by
collecting all rental payments for her personal benefit and enjoyment.
Furthermore, the petitioner claims that the respondent is liable to pay
interest at the rate of 6% per month on her unpaid installment of ₱805,000.00
from the date of the delinquency,
Finally, the petitioner asserts that her claim for damages or lost income
as well as for the back rentals in the amount of ₱29,609.00 has been
fully substantiated and, therefore, should have been granted by the CA. Her claim
for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees has been likewise
substantiated.
Position
of the Respondent
The respondent counters that the
subject Deed of Conditional Sale with Assumption of Mortgage entered into
between the parties is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale because
the title of the subject properties still remains with the petitioner as she failed
to pay the installment payments in accordance with their agreement.
Respondent echoes the RTC position
that her inability to pay the full balance on the purchase price may not be
considered as a substantial and fundamental breach of the subject contract and
it would be more equitable if she would be allowed to pay the balance including
interest within a certain period of time. She claims that as early as 1992, she
has shown her sincerity by offering to pay a certain amount which was, however,
rejected by the petitioner.
Finally, respondent states that the subject
deed of conditional sale explicitly provides that the installment payments
shall not bear any interest. Moreover, petitioner failed to prove that she was
entitled to back rentals.
The petition lacks merit.
The Court agrees with the ruling of the courts below that the subject Deed
of Conditional Sale with Assumption of Mortgage entered into by and among the two
parties and FSL Bank on
8. That the title
and ownership of the subject real properties shall remain with the First Party
until the full payment of the Second Party of the balance of the purchase price
and liquidation of the mortgage obligation of ₱2,000,000.00. Pending payment of the
balance of the purchase price and liquidation of the mortgage obligation that
was assumed by the Second Party, the Second Party shall not sell, transfer and
convey and otherwise encumber the subject real properties without the written
consent of the First and Third Party.
9. That upon full
payment by the Second Party of the full balance of the purchase price and the
assumed mortgage obligation herein mentioned the Third Party shall issue the
corresponding Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage and the First Party shall execute
the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Second Party.[7]
Based on the above provisions, the title and ownership of the subject
properties remains with the petitioner until the respondent fully pays the
balance of the purchase price and the assumed mortgage obligation. Thereafter, FSL
Bank shall then issue the corresponding deed of cancellation of mortgage and
the petitioner shall execute the corresponding deed of absolute sale in favor
of the respondent.
Accordingly, the petitioners obligation to sell the subject properties
becomes demandable only upon the happening of the positive suspensive
condition, which is the respondents full payment of the purchase price.
Without respondents full payment, there can be no breach of contract to speak
of because petitioner has no obligation yet to turn over the title. Respondents
failure to pay in full the purchase price is not the breach of contract
contemplated under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code but rather just an event that
prevents the petitioner from being bound to convey title to the respondent. The 2009 case of Nabus v. Joaquin & Julia Pacson[8] is
enlightening:
The Court holds that the contract entered into by the Spouses Nabus and
respondents was a contract to sell, not a contract of sale.
A contract of sale is defined in Article 1458 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of
sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor
a price certain in money or its equivalent.
xxx
a) Consent or meeting of the
minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price;
b) Determinate subject matter;
and
c) Price certain in money or its
equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a
Contract of Sale because the first essential element is lacking. In a contract
to sell, the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to
the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or
consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell
until the happening of an event, which for present purposes we shall take as
the full payment of the purchase price.
What the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his
promise to sell the subject property when the entire amount of the purchase
price is delivered to him. In other words, the full payment of the purchase
price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which prevents
the obligation to sell from arising and, thus, ownership is retained by the
prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer.
xxx xxx xxx
Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition
which is the full payment of the purchase price, the prospective sellers
obligation to sell the subject property by entering into a contract of sale
with the prospective buyer becomes demandable as provided in Article 1479 of
the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and
sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing
for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported
by a consideration distinct from the price.
A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby
the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject
property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to
sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of
the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered
as a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title
to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of
consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a
contingent event which may or may not occur.
If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the
contract of sale is completely abated. However, if the suspensive condition is
fulfilled, the contract of sale is
thereby perfected, such that if there had already been previous delivery of the
property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto automatically
transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be
performed by the seller.
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition
which is the full payment of the purchase price, ownership will not
automatically transfer to the buyer although the property may have been
previously delivered to him. The
prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by
entering into a contract of absolute sale.
Further, Chua v. Court of Appeals, cited this distinction between a
contract of sale and a contract to sell:
In a contract of sale, the title to the
property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a
contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not
to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise
stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and
cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded;
whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full
payment of the price. In the latter
contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of
which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from becoming effective.
It is not the title of the contract, but its express terms or
stipulations that determine the kind of contract entered into by the parties.
In this case, the contract entitled Deed of Conditional Sale is actually a contract to sell. The contract stipulated that as soon as the
full consideration of the sale has been paid by the vendee, the corresponding
transfer documents shall be executed by the vendor to the vendee for the
portion sold. Where the vendor promises to execute a deed of absolute sale
upon the completion by the vendee of the payment of the price, the contract is
only a contract to sell. The aforecited stipulation shows that the vendors
reserved title to the subject property until full payment of the purchase
price.
xxx
Unfortunately for the Spouses Pacson, since the Deed of Conditional
Sale executed in their favor was merely a contract to sell, the obligation of
the seller to sell becomes demandable only upon the happening of the suspensive
condition. The full payment of the
purchase price is the positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach of contract, but
simply an event that
prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force. Thus, for
its non-fulfilment, there is no contract to speak of, the obligor having failed
to perform the suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. With
this circumstance, there can be no rescission or fulfillment of an obligation that is still
non-existent, the suspensive condition not having occurred as yet. Emphasis
should be made that the breach contemplated in Article 1191
of the New Civil Code is the obligors failure to comply with an obligation
already extant, not a failure of a condition to render binding that obligation.
[Emphases
and underscoring supplied]
Consistently,
the Court handed down a similar ruling in the 2010 case of Heirs of Atienza v. Espidol, [9] where it was written:
Regarding the right to cancel the
contract for non-payment of an installment, there is need to initially
determine if what the parties had was a contract of sale or a contract to sell. In a contract of sale, the title to the
property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. In a contract to sell, on the other hand, the
ownership is, by agreement, retained by the seller and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price. In the contract of sale, the buyers
non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition; in the contract to
sell, the buyers full payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition
to the coming into effect of the agreement.
In the first case, the seller has lost and cannot recover the ownership
of the property unless he takes action to set aside the contract of sale. In the second case, the title simply remains
in the seller if the buyer does not comply with the condition precedent of
making payment at the time specified in the contract. Here, it is quite evident
that the contract involved was one of a contract to sell since the Atienzas, as
sellers, were to retain title of ownership to the land until respondent
Espidol, the buyer, has paid the agreed price.
Indeed, there seems no question that the parties understood this to be
the case.
Admittedly, Espidol was unable to pay the second installment of P1,750,000.00
that fell due in December 2002. That
payment, said both the RTC and the CA, was a positive suspensive condition
failure of which was not regarded
a breach in the sense that there can be no rescission of an obligation (to turn over title) that
did not yet exist since the suspensive condition had not taken place. x x x.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
Thus, the Court fully agrees with the CA
when it resolved: Considering, however, that the Deed of Conditional Sale was
not cancelled by Vendor Reyes (petitioner) and that out of the total purchase
price of the subject property in the amount of ₱4,200,000.00, the
remaining unpaid balance of Tuparan (respondent) is only ₱805,000.00, a
substantial amount of the purchase price has already been paid. It is only right and just to allow Tuparan to
pay the said unpaid balance of the purchase price to Reyes.[10]
Granting that a rescission can be permitted
under Article 1191, the Court still cannot allow it for the reason that, considering
the circumstances, there was only a slight or casual breach in the fulfillment
of the obligation.
Unless
the parties stipulated it, rescission is allowed only when the breach of the
contract is substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation.
Whether the breach is slight or substantial is largely determined by the
attendant circumstances.[11] In the case at bench, the subject
contract stipulated the following important provisions:
2. That the purchase price of ₱4,200,000.00
shall be paid as follows:
a) ₱278,078.13 received
in cash by the First Party but directly paid to the Third Party as partial
payment of the mortgage obligation of the First Party in order to reduce the
amount to ₱2,000,000.00 only as of
b) ₱721,921.87 received
in cash by the First Party as additional payment of the Second Party;
c)
₱1,200,000.00
to be paid in installments as follows:
1.
₱200,000.00
payable on or before
2.
₱200,000.00
payable on or before
3.
₱800,000.00
payable on or before
Note: All the installments
shall not bear any interest.
d)
₱2,000,000.00
outstanding balance of the mortgage obligation as of
x x x
3.
That the Third
Party hereby acknowledges receipts from the Second Party P278,078.13 as
partial payment of the loan obligation of First Party in order to reduce the
account to only ₱2,000,000.00 as of November 15, 1990 to be assumed by
the Second Party effective November 15, 1990.[12]
From the records, it cannot be denied that respondent paid to FSL Bank
petitioners mortgage obligation in the amount of ₱2,278,078.13, which
formed part of the purchase price of the subject property. Likewise, it is not disputed
that respondent paid directly to petitioner the amount of ₱721,921.87
representing the additional payment for the purchase of the subject property.
Clearly, out of the total price of ₱4,200,000.00, respondent was able to
pay the total amount of ₱3,000,000.00, leaving a balance of ₱1,200,000.00
payable in three (3) installments.
Out of the ₱1,200,000.00 remaining balance, respondent paid on
several dates the first and second installments of ₱200,000.00 each. She,
however, failed to pay the third and last installment of ₱800,000.00 due
on
Considering that out of the total purchase price of ₱4,200,000.00, respondent
has already paid the substantial amount of ₱3,400,000.00, more or less,
leaving an unpaid balance of only ₱805,000.00, it is right and just to
allow her to settle, within a reasonable period of time, the balance of the
unpaid purchase price. The Court agrees with the courts below that the
respondent showed her sincerity and willingness to comply with her obligation when
she offered to pay the petitioner the amount of ₱751,000.00.
On the issue of interest, petitioner
failed to substantiate her claim that respondent made a personal commitment to
pay a 6% monthly interest on the ₱805,000.00 from the date of delinquency,
Finally, the Court upholds the ruling of the courts below regarding the
non-imposition of damages and attorneys fees. Aside from petitioners
self-serving statements, there is not enough evidence on record to prove that
respondent acted fraudulently and maliciously against the petitioner. In the case of Heirs of Atienza v. Espidol,[13] it
was stated:
Respondents are
not entitled to moral damages because contracts are not referred to in Article
2219 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the cases when moral damages may be
recovered. Article 2220 of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages
in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
However, this case involves a contract to sell, wherein full
payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition, the
non-fulfillment of which is not a breach of contract, but merely an event that
prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. Since
there is no breach of contract in this case, respondents are not entitled to
moral damages.
In the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages,
exemplary damages cannot be granted for they are allowed only in addition to
any of the four kinds of damages mentioned.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F
I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 72-102; penned by Associate Justice Celia
C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
and Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro.
[2]
[3] Paragraph 11 of the
Complaint, id. at 176.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Memorandum for Respondent, id. at 395.
[8] G.R. No. 161318,
[9] G.R. No. 180665,
[10] CA Decision, rollo, p. 100.
[11] GG Sportswear Mfg. Corp. v. World Class
Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 182720, March 2, 2010, 614 SCRA 75, 87.
[12] Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[13] Supra note 9.