SECOND
DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
EDUARDO DAHILIG y AGARAN, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant. June 13, 2011
X - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the October 29, 2008 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01488, which modified
the July 19, 2005 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, Pasig City (RTC), in Criminal
Case No. 121472-H, by finding the accused guilty of child abuse, defined and
penalized in Sec. 5(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, instead of the crime
of rape.
The Information,
dated
Criminal
Case No. 121472-H
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses EDUARDO
DAHILIG Y AGARAN, of the crime of Rape (Violation of Article 266-A
par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA 8353 and in further relation to Section 5(a) of RA
8369), committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of December
2000, in the municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, by means of
force and intimidation, and taking advantage of night time and in the dwelling
of complainant, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with one AAA,[3] sixteen
(16) year old minor at the time of the commission of the offense, against her
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
[Underscoring supplied]
During the trial, the prosecution presented AAA, the private complainant; and Police Senior Inspector Bonnie Y. Chua, the medico-legal officer, as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented the accused himself, Eduardo Dahilig (accused), as its sole witness.
Accused and AAA
were both employed as house helpers by a certain Karen Gomez. AAA was only
sixteen (16) years old at the time of the commission of the act, having been
born on
Version of the Prosecution
On
The following day, AAA angrily confronted the accused and asked him why he did such an act against her. He reacted by getting all his belongings and immediately left their employers house. AAA then informed her employer what the accused did to her. Their employer immediately assisted her in filing a case against him. This caused the arrest of the accused and, at this point, he offered to marry her. His offer, however, was rejected because AAA was determined to seek justice for the ordeal she suffered in his hands.
A few days after the incident, AAA was medically examined. The
medico-legal examination disclosed that there was a healing laceration in her
hymen although no spermatozoa was found. It was also stated in the medico-legal
report that AAA could have lost her virginity on or about
Version of
the Accused
Accused denied having
raped AAA. According to him, the sexual congress that transpired between them
was consensual as she was then his girlfriend.
He related that he came to know AAA sometime in July 2000 and after a
month of courtship, they became sweethearts. In fact, on
On the day of the
incident, he was very tired and decided to lie down on the floor where AAA and
Roxanne were sleeping. AAA noticed him and moved beside him. At around
At around
Accused went to Bulacan and stayed there for two (2) months. He then proceeded to Ilocos where he requested his grandfather and mother to fetch AAA because he wanted to marry her. She, however, refused to go with the two insisting that he personally fetch her.
Three weeks later,
the accused returned to
Sometime thereafter, he received a subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor informing him that he had been charged with the crime of rape against AAA. For lack of funds, he was also not able to attend the hearings at the prosecutors office either. Finally, after several months, he was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued against him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In convicting the accused, the RTC reasoned out that, in its observation, AAA never wavered in her assertion that the accused sexually molested her against her will. According to the trial court, her narration bore the earmarks of truth and was consistent throughout. As to his sweetheart defense, the accused failed to prove it by clear and convincing evidence. What he laid before the court for its consideration was a mere self-serving claim of their relationship. It fell short of the rule that a sweetheart defense cannot be given credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, and pictures, to name a few. Bolstering AAAs story was the medico-legal finding that there was a deep-healing laceration which was consistent with the charge that she had been raped. Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused EDUARDO DAHILIG Y AGARAN GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape (Violation of Article 266-A par.
1 in rel. to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 8353 and in further relation to Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 8369)
and the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Accused EDUARDO
DAHILIG Y AGARAN is hereby adjudged to pay AAA the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),
as moral damages and FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),
as civil indemnity.
SO
ORDERED.[5] [Underscoring supplied]
Ruling of
the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the RTC but clarified that the crime charged should have been Child Abuse as defined and penalized in Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. Its conclusion was based on the fact that the complainant was a minor, being 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense and, as such, was a child subject of sexual abuse. R.A. No. 7610 defines children as persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of her age. Considering that AAA was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, having been born on August 17, 1984 and the accused had admitted having sexual intercourse with her, all the elements of child abuse were present. Thus, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED JULY 19, 2005 is MODIFIED, finding EDUARDO DAHILIG Y AGARAN guilty of child abuse as defined
and penalized by Sec. 5, (b), Republic Act No. 7610, and, accordingly,
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 11 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum; and to pay to AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00
as civil indemnity.
The total period of the preventive detention of the
accused shall be credited to him provided he has satisfied the conditions
imposed in Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO
ORDERED. [6] [Underscoring supplied]
In this forum, both the prosecution and the accused opted not to file any supplemental briefs and manifested that they were adopting their arguments in their respective briefs filed before the CA. In his Appellants Brief, the accused presented the following:
ASSIGNMENT
OF ERRORS
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTIONS WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WHEN THE
LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[7]
In advocacy of his position, the accused argues that the testimony of AAA was beclouded with inconsistencies and implausibility. He goes on to say that it was highly improbable for their co-worker, Roxanne, not to have been awakened despite AAAs shouts. He further argues that if the sex was not consensual, he would not have bothered removing her clothes considering that during the alleged time of commission, as recounted by AAA, she was shouting and struggling. With respect to the medico-legals finding on forcible intercourse, it was not conclusive because he precisely admitted having consensual sex with her.
The accused insists that he and AAA were sweethearts and the sexual
congress that took place between them on the evening of
The Court finds no merit in the appeal.
Well-settled the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by a trial court, whose findings are binding and conclusive on appellate courts.[8] Matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the elusive and incommunicable evidence of that witness deportment on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied to the appellate courts which usually rely on the cold pages of the silent records of the case.[9]
In this case, the trial court observed that AAA never wavered in her assertion that she was molested by the accused. It even further wrote that her narrations palpably bear the earmarks of truth and are in accord with the material points involved.[10]
There is no dispute that the accused had sexual intercourse with AAA, a fact which he clearly acknowledged. Contrary to his claim, however, the act was not consensual as proven by the convincing testimony of AAA who replied as follows:
Q:
Lets start from the beginning Miss
witness. You said that you went down to the floor from the bed?
A:
Yes, maam.
Q: Was there anybody in the floor when you
went down?
A: None.
Q:
When you went down and there was no
person there in the floor, what did you do?
A: I continued sleeping on the floor.
Q:
Were you awakened by anything while
you were sleeping on the floor?
A: Yes maam.
Q: What awakened you?
A: I felt that somebody was lying beside me
on the floor.
Q: What was this person doing, if any?
A: Pinaghihipuan po ako.
xxx xxx
xxx
Q: What did you do when you were awakened
when you felt that somebody was touching your breast, your face, and your legs?
A: I struggled.[11]
xxx
xxx xxx
Q:
When you were undressed, what did
the accused do?
A:
He kissed me on the face and on my
lips.
Q:
And while he was doing that, what
were you doing?
A:
I was resisting him maam.
Q:
What happened after that?
A:
He inserted his penis in my vagina.
Q:
While he was inserting his organ in
your vagina, what were you doing?
A:
I was pleading to him and begging
him not continue.
Q:
What was the position of your hands
at that time
A:
When he was inserting his organ to
my vagina, he was holding my both hands very tightly.[12]
Moreover, the accused argues that AAA should not be believed because her narration of facts was inconsistent and highly improbable. The points he has raised, however, have no controlling significance and do not seriously affect the findings of the courts below.
The fact that Roxanne was not awakened by the cries for help of AAA does not negate her categorical and consistent assertion that the accused forcibly defiled her. It is not unnatural that some persons are simply deep sleepers who cannot easily be awakened even by loud noises.
The sweetheart defense proffered by the accused likewise deserves scant consideration. For the said theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.[13]
Clearly, the accused sexually abused AAA.
The question now is what crime has been committed? Is it Rape (Violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353), or is it Child Abuse, defined and penalized by Sec. 5, (b), R.A. No. 7610?
As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v. Abay,[14] however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced.[15] A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.[16] Specifically, Abay reads:
Under Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be
prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of
the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion
perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the
offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised
Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the
same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person
cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal
act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b)
of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex
crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
In this case,
the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was committed against her.
The Information against appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time
of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for
violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610 or rape under Article 266-A
(except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may
have alleged the elements of both crimes, the prosecutions
evidence only established that appellant sexually violated the person of AAA
through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument
and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. Considering, however, that the information correctly charged the accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that he was convicted therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.
For said reason, the Court sets aside the October 29, 2008 CA
decision and reinstates the
WHEREFORE, the
October 29, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as acting member of the Second Division per Special
Order No. 1006 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-14.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 16-25.
[3] The name of the
victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to
establish or compromise her identity are not disclosed to protect her privacy.
Fictitious initials are used instead. (People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No.
167693,
[4] CA rollo, pp.
8-9
[5] Id. at 24-25.
[6] Rollo, p. 13.
[7] CA rollo, p.
38.
[8] People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342,
349 (2004).
[9] People v. Del Mundo, Jr., 408 Phil. 118, 129 (2001).
[10] CA rollo, p.
22.
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13] People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570,
[14] G.R. No. 177752,
[15] People v. Optana, 404 Phil. 316, 351 (2001).
[16] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 21 which provides: Section
21. No person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.