Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE
OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - GARRY
DE LA CRUZ y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 185717 Present: LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: June
8, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This
is an appeal from the Decision[1]
dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727,
which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007 Decision[2] in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in
The Facts
In
an Information[3] filed on
June 3, 2003, accused was indicted for the crime allegedly committed as follows:
That on
or about the 29th of May, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport
or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully
sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, zero point zero two (0.02) gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.
Upon
arraignment on
Version of the Prosecution
After conducting surveillance for a
week, the Station Drug Enforcement Unit in La Loma,
On May 29, 2003, at around 9:00 a.m.,
the stations Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Police Inspector Oliver Villanueva
(P/Insp. Villanueva), gave a briefing on the buy-bust operation. Police Officer 2 Edcel Ibasco (PO2 Ibasco)
was designated as poseur-buyer, while PO1 Roderick
Thereafter, the buy-bust team
proceeded to Biak-na-Bato corner Mauban Streets,
The buy-bust team then brought the
accused to the station. The accused was
turned over to the desk officer on duty, along with the substance in the sachet
bought from him and the recovered buy-bust money. After inquest, the Information was filed on
June 3, 2003. Accused was then committed
to the Quezon City Jail.[6]
Consequently, the substance inside
the sachet believed to be shabu was sent to and examined by a Philippine
National Police forensic chemist, Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (Engr. Jabonillo). The laboratory result confirmed that the
substance was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Only PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia
testified for the prosecution during the trial.
The testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by
the defense.
Version of the Defense
The accused denied selling shabu
to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused
used the defense of denial and alleged a frame-up by the arresting officers.
The
accused testified that he was arrested on May 29, 2003 at around 9:00 a.m.
inside his house at Barangay Manresa,
In
the police precinct, he was investigated and subsequently detained. They showed him a plastic sachet which they allegedly
recovered from him. Then a man
approached him and demanded PhP 30,000 for his release, but he said he did not
have the money. Thereafter, he was
presented for inquest.
A
witness, Rodolfo Buencamino (Buencamino), narrated that in the morning of May
29, 2003, he called the police precinct to have a certain Taba, an alleged drug
pusher in their area, arrested. PO2
Ibasco and other police officers responded immediately. When the police officers arrived, Buencamino pointed
to Taba, who, however, was able to evade arrest. Thereafter, he was surprised to see the
accused inside the vehicle of the policemen.
But he did not know why and where the accused was arrested since he did
not witness the actual arrest.
Another
witness, Marbelita Collado Lepiten (Lepiten), testified that she was at the
terrace of her house on
The Ruling
of the RTC
On
February 8, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
GARRY DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P500,000.00) PESOS.
SO
ORDERED.
In
convicting the accused, the RTC relied on and gave credence to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Citing People v. Jubail,[7]
which enumerated the elements required to be established by the
prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the trial court found
that the prosecution had established the elements of the crime.
The
RTC pointed out that Buencamino may, indeed, have called the police to arrest a
certain Taba, an alleged pusher in the area, but he was not present when the
accused was arrested. The trial court likewise
did not accord evidentiary weight to the testimony of Lepiten, who testified
that she saw the accused talking to Taba and that when the police officers
entered the house of the accused, she was unaware of what transpired inside. Thus, the RTC concluded that her testimony
did not provide clear and convincing justification to cast doubt on the candid
and straightforward testimonies of the police officers.
Applying
the presumption of the performance of official function, the lack of showing any
ill motive on the part of the police officers to testify against the accused,
and the principle that the bare denial of an accused is inherently weak, the
RTC convicted the accused.
Consequently,
with his conviction, the accused started to serve his sentence[8]
and was subsequently committed to the New Bilibid Prison in
Aggrieved,
accused appealed[9] his
conviction before the CA.
The Ruling
of the CA
On
June 30, 2008, the appellate court rendered the appealed decision, wholly affirming
the findings of the RTC and the conviction of appellant. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is
hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision supra is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO
ORDERED.
The
CA upheld the findings of the trial court that the essential elements required
for the conviction of an accused for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165
were present in the instant case. The
appellate court brushed aside the irregularities raised by accused-appellant by
putting premium credence on the testimonies of the arresting police officers,
who positively identified accused-appellant in open court. One with the trial court, the CA found no
improper motive on the part of the police officers who, it said, were regularly
performing their official duties.
Besides, relying on People v. Barlaan,[10] the
CA held that the irregularities raised that there was no coordination with the
PDEA and that no inventory was made and no photograph taken of the seized drug,
if true, did not invalidate the legitimate buy-bust operation conducted. Moreover, the CA found that the corpus
delicti, i.e., the confiscated
shabu and the PhP 100 bill, were presented as evidence of the commission
of the offense.
The
CA also ruled that accused-appellants mere denial, as corroborated by
Buencamino and Lepiten, deserved scant consideration vis--vis the positive
identification by the arresting officers who arrested him in flagrante delicto. Anent the questioned chain of custody, the CA
found it unbroken and duly proven by the prosecution.
The Issues
Hence,
We have this appeal.
Only
accused-appellant, however, filed his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental
Brief),[11]
while the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of the
Thus,
accused-appellant raises the same assignment of errors, in that:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF
DENIAL.[15]
The
Courts Ruling
The
appeal is meritorious.
Accused-appellant
argues that, first, the prosecution has not proved his commission of the
crime charged for the following irregularities: (1) the arresting officers did
not coordinate with the PDEA, as required under Sec. 86 of RA 9165; (2) no
physical inventory was conducted and photograph taken of the alleged seized
drug in the presence of public officials, as required by Sec. 21 of RA 9165;
and (3) the chain of custody was not duly proved by the prosecution. And second,
his denial is worthy of credence upon corroboration by the credible witnesses
presented by the defense.
After
a careful and thorough review of the records, We are convinced that accused-appellant
should be acquitted, for the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt
his commission of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165.
A
buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in
flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not
only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for
anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.[16] However, where there really was no buy-bust
operation conducted, it cannot be denied that the elements for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs cannot be duly proved despite the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the seeming straightforward testimony in
court by the arresting police officers. After all, the indictment for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs will not have a leg to stand on.
This
is the situation in the instant case.
The
courts a quo uniformly based their
findings and affirmance of accused-appellants guilt on: (1) the
straightforward testimony of the arresting police officers; (2) their positive
identification of accused-appellant; (3) no ill motive was shown for their
testimony against accused-appellant; (4) the self-serving defense of denial by
accused-appellant; (5) the seeming irregularities in the conduct of the
buy-bust operation and the arrest of accused-appellant not invalidating the
operation; and (6) the testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten not showing that
the buy-bust operation was not conducted.
Although
the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be
disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied in a case under
appeal,[17]
as here.
For
the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements
must be proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the
transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court
of the corpus delicti.[18]
In
People v. Doria,[19]
the Court laid down the objective test in determining the credibility of
prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations. It is the duty of the prosecution to present
a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery
of the illegal drug subject of sale.[20] We said that [t]he manner by which the
initial contact was made, x x x the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of
the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug x x x must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by the courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.[21]
No Surveillance Conducted
The
testimony of PO2 Ibasco on direct examination did not mention an alleged
surveillance conducted by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia prior to the alleged
buy-bust operation, the corresponding intelligence report, and the written
communiqu with the PDEA. The defense in
cross-examination put to task both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia concerning these
matters, as attested to in the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension[22]
executed by the two police officers on May 30, 2003. PO2 Ibasco testified that his unit,
specifically PO1 Valencia and himself, conducted surveillance on
accused-appellant for a week prior to the buy-bust operation on May 29, 2003
which, according to him, turned out positive, i.e., accused-appellant was,
indeed, selling shabu.
PO2
Ibasco on cross-examination testified, thus:
ATTY.
LOYOLA:
Being an operative, you are of
course, trained in intelligence work?
PO2
IBASCO:
Yes, sir.
Q: You said you conducted surveillance but
you cannot show any proof that there is an intelligence report, you have no
proof?
A: Yes, sir. There is, we were dispatched.
Q: Where is your proof now?
A: Its in our office.
Q: Your dispatch order for the surveillance
do you have any?
A: I dont have it now sir but its in the
office.
Q: You said that you conducted surveillance
for one week, did I hear you right?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: So, you are saying you did not actually
see him selling drugs at that time during the surveillance?
A: We saw him, sir.
x x x x
Q: None.
You did not even coordinate this operation with the PDEA?
A: We coordinated it, sir.
Q: What is your proof that you indeed
coordinated?
A: Its in the office, sir.
ATTY.
LOYOLA:
May I make a reservation for
continuance of the cross-examination considering that there are documents that
the witness has to present.
COURT:
What documents?
ATTY.
LOYOLA:
The proof your Honor that there was
indeed a coordination and the intelligence report.
COURT:
Will you be able to produce those
documents?
A: Yes, sir. Titingnan
ko po.
PROSECUTOR
ANTERO:
Titingnan?
COURT:
You are not sure? You dont have any copy of those documents?
A: You Honor, what we have in the office is
the dispatch.[23]
PO1 Valencia, likewise, on cross-examination
testified:
ATTY.
LOYOLA:
Mr. Witness, tell me during the
orientation, you will agree with me that there was no coordination made to the
PDEA regarding this intended buy bust operation?
PO1
We have coordinated at the PDEA.
Q: You say that but you have no proof to
show us that there was coordination?
A: We have, sir.
Q: What is your proof?
A: We have files in our office for
coordination.
Q: Are you sure about that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, based on the
information, you already planned to conduct a buy bust operation against the
accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you will agree with me that there
was no surveillance against the accused?
A: We have conducted a surveillance one
week before the operation and we conducted surveillance Pinakawalan namin ang informant.
Q: What do you mean pinakawalan ang informant?
A: So that we have a spy inside to verify
whether Garry was really selling shabu.
x x x x
Q: In fact you dont have any information
report?
A: We have, sir. Its in the office. Its with Insp. Villanueva.
Q: And because you claim that you have
submitted an information and report, of course, you should have come up with an
intelligence report.
A: Yes, sir. Its also in the office of Insp. Villanueva.
x x x x
Q: And the alleged recovered item, the
plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance was brought by whom
to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
A: I cannot remember who brought it sir
because it was a long time ago.[24]
These
documentsspecifically the dispatch order, the intelligence report of the
alleged surveillance, and the written communiqu from the PDEA for the conduct
of the surveillance and buy-bust operationwere not, however, presented in
court. Evidently, these documents are
non-existent, tending to show that there really was no surveillance and,
consequently, no intelligence report about the surveillance or the averred
written communiqu from PDEA attesting to coordination with said agency. Worse, the prosecution never bothered to
explain why it could not present these documents. Thus, there is no basis to say that
accused-appellant allegedly sold shabu
a week before he was arrested.
Even
putting this lapse aside, the other irregularities raised by accused-appellant
in the backdrop of the uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten
tend to show that there was really no buy-bust operation conducted resulting in
the valid arrest of accused-appellant.
Generally,
non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that no buy-bust
operation against appellant ever took place.[25] The prosecutions failure to submit in
evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 will not discharge the
accused from the crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will
not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.[26]
No Buy-Bust Operation
But
where there are other pieces of evidence putting in doubt the conduct of the
buy-bust operation, these irregularities take on more significance which are,
well nigh, fatal to the prosecution.
Putting
in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation are the uncontroverted
testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, which gave credence to
accused-appellants denial and frame-up theory.
The Court is not unaware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort
to the practice of planting evidence to extract information from or even to
harass civilians.[27] This Court has been issuing cautionary
warnings to trial courts to exercise extra
vigilance in trying drug cases, lest an innocent person is made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[28]
The
defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the
regular performance of their official duties.[29] Nonetheless, such a defense may be given
credence when there is sufficient evidence or proof making it to be very
plausible or true. We are of the view
that accused-appellants defenses of denial and frame-up are credible given the
circumstances of the case. Indeed,
jurisprudence has established that the defense of denial assumes significance
only when the prosecutions evidence is such that it does not prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt,[30]
as in the instant case. At the very
least, there is reasonable doubt that there was a buy-bust operation conducted
and that accused-appellant sold the seized shabu. After all, a criminal conviction rests on the strength
of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.[31]
Notably,
Buencamino voluntarily testified to the effect that he called the police asking
them to apprehend a certain Taba, a notorious drug pusher in their area. PO2 Ibasco and company responded to his call
and Buencamino helped identify and direct the policemen but Taba
unfortunately escaped. Thus, Buencamino
testified:
ATTY.
BARTOLOME:
Mr. Witness, who asked you to
testify today?
BUENCAMINO:
I volunteered myself to testify.
x x x x
Q: Can you tell us how, when and where the
accused was arrested?
A: I was the one who called-up the precinct
to arrest a certain Taba and not
Garry. Taba was the target of the
operation.
Q: When was that?
A: May 29, 2003.
Q: Why did you call the police station?
A: Ibasco talked to me to arrest Taba.
Q: Why are they going to arrest Taba?
A: Because he is a pusher in the area.
Q: Why do you know Ibasco?
A: Because he was a previous resident of
Barangay Manresa.
Q: You said you called police officer [sic]
what was the topic. Mr. Witness?
A: That Taba is already there and he
already showed up and they immediately responded to arrest Taba.
Q: So, Ibasco immediately responded to your
call?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When they arrived in your place what
happened else, if any?
A: I pointed to Taba so they could arrest
him.
Q: Where they able to arrest Taba?
A: No, sir.
He was able to escape.
Q: Whey they were not able to arrest alias
Taba what happened, next Mr. Witness? What
happened to Garry Dela Cruz?
A: I was surprised because I saw Garry Dela
Cruz already inside the vehicle and I dont know why Garry was inside the
vehicle.[32]
Buencaminos
assertion of knowing PO2 Ibasco was likewise not rebutted. Moreover, the presentation of the police
logbook on calls received in the morning of May 29, 2003 would indeed show if
Buencamino or someone else made a call to the precinct about a certain Taba,
but then, again, the prosecution did not bother to rebut the testimony of Buencamino. Verily, this time the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced[33]
applies. In fact, the prosecution did
not even assail Buencaminos credibility as a witness but merely made the point
in the cross-examination that he had no actual knowledge of the arrest of
accused-appellant. Thus, Buencamino was
cross-examined:
PROSECUTOR
ANTERO:
You were not with Garry at the time
he was arrested?
BUENCAMINO:
No, sir.
Q: You dont know where he was arrested at
that time?
A: I dont know where Garry was, sir.
PROSECUTOR
ANTERO:
That will be all, your Honor.[34]
More
telling is the testimony of Lepiten which, uncontroverted, shows that there was
no buy-bust operation. Her testimony
corroborates the testimony of Buencamino that police enforcers indeed responded
to Buencaminos phone call but were not able to apprehend Taba. This destroys the buy-bust operation angle
testified to by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia.
Since the buy-bust operation allegedly happened not inside the house of
accused-appellant but in an open area in front of a shanty, such cannot be
sustained in light of what Lepiten witnessed: The policemen chased but were not
able to arrest Taba; thereafter, the policemen went inside the house of accused-appellant,
emerging later with him who was led to the vehicle of the policemen. Thus, Lepiten testified:
ATTY.
BARTOLOME:
Mrs. Witness, where were you on May
29, 2003, if you could still remember?
COURT:
What time?
ATTY.
BARTOLOME:
At around 9:00 in the morning.
LEPITEN:
I was at the terrace of the house we
are renting while sipping coffee.
Q: Where is that house located?
A:
COURT:
Where is this, Novaliches?
A: No, your Honor, near San Francisco Del
Monte.
x x x x
ATTY.
BARTOLOME:
While drinking coffee, what
transpired next,
A: Yes, sir. While I was sitting on the terrace in front
of the house we are renting is the house of Garry. Garry was talking to a certain Taba whom I know.
x x x x
Q: While you saw them talking to each
other, what happened next?
A: Suddenly a maroon FX stopped.
Q: Where?
A: In front of the house of Garry.
Q: When this maroon FX stopped, what
happened next, if any?
A: Taba
ran, sir.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: Two (2) men in blue pants and white
shirt alighted from the maroon FX and ran after Taba.
Q: Were they able to arrest Taba, Ms. Witness?
A: No, sir.
They were not able to catch him.
Q: When they failed to arrest Taba, what did these two (2) men do, if
any?
A: They returned in front of the house and Garry
and I saw them entered the house of Garry.
x x x x
Q: What did they do, if any?
A: I dont know what they did inside
because I could not see them, sir. Then
I saw them went down and pushed Garry towards the FX.
x x x x
Q: After that what else happened, if any?
A: I just saw that they boarded Garry
inside the FX.
x x x x
COURT:
Any cross?
PROSECUTOR
ANTERO:
No cross, your Honor.[35]
Thus,
taking into consideration the defense of denial by accused-appellant, in light
of the foregoing testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, the Court cannot
conclude that there was a buy-bust operation conducted by the arresting police
officers as they attested to and testified on.
The prosecutions story is like a sieve full of holes.
Non-Compliance
with the Rule on Chain of Custody
Moreover,
the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the requisite chain of custody of
the seized specimen. Chain of custody
means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.[36] The CA found an unbroken chain of custody of
the purportedly confiscated shabu
specimen. However, the records belie
such conclusion.
The
testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia, as well as their Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension, were bereft of any assertion on how the seized shabu in a heat-sealed sachet was duly
passed from PO2 Ibasco, the chosen poseur-buyer, who allegedly received it from
accused-appellant, to forensic chemist Engr. Jabonillo, who conducted the
forensic examination. While the
testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense,
as duly embodied in the RCT Order dated March 16, 2004, it is likewise bereft
of any assertion substantially proving the custodial safeguards on the identity
and integrity of the shabu allegedly received
from accused-appellant. The stipulation merely
asserts:
x x x
that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police; that his
office received a request for laboratory examination marked as Exhibit A;
that together with said request is a brown envelope marked as Exhibit B;
which contained a plastic sachet marked as Exhibit B-1; that he conducted a
requested laboratory examination and, in connection therewith, he submitted a
Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit C.
The findings thereon showing the specimen positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit C-1, and the signature of the said police
officer was marked as Exhibit C-2. He
likewise issued a Certification marked as Exhibits D and D-1, and
thereafter, turned over the specimen to the evidence custodian and retrieved
the same for [sic] purposed proceeding scheduled today.[37]
While
both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified on the identity of the plastic
sachet duly marked with the initials EIGC, there was no sufficient proof of
compliance with the chain of custody. The
records merely show that, after the arrest of accused-appellant, the specimen was
allegedly turned over to the desk officer on duty, whose identity was not
revealed. Then it was the stations OIC,
P/Insp. Villanueva, who requested the forensic examination of the specimen. In gist, from the alleged receipt of the plastic
sachet containing 0.02 gram of shabu
by PO2 Ibasco from the alleged buy-bust operation, the chain of custody of the
specimen has not been substantially shown. The Court cannot make an inference that PO2
Ibasco passed the specimen to an unnamed desk officer on duty until it made its
way to the laboratory examination. There
are no details on who kept custody of the specimen, who brought it to the Crime
Laboratory, and who received and kept custody of it until Engr. Jabonillo
conducted the forensic examination. The
stipulated facts merely made an allusion that the specimen custodian of the
Crime Laboratory had possession of the specimen and released it for the
proceedings before the trial court.
It
is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect
is the very same substance offered
in court as exhibit; and that the
identity of said drug be established with the same unwavering exactitude as
that requisite to make a finding of guilt.[38] This, the prosecution failed to do. The prosecution must offer the testimony of
key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody.[39]
As
the Court aptly put in People v.
Cantalejo:
x x x the
failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized
drugs raises doubt as to its origins.
x x x
failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation of the presumption
of regularity accorded to police officers.
As a general rule, the testimony of police officers who apprehended the
accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption
that they have performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties
is tainted with irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed.
While
the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[40]
In
sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with the
chain of custody, We cannot but acquit accused-appellant on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The law demands that
only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.[41] In all criminal
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may
raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[42] As the Court often reiterated, it
would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime
charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.[43]
In
fine, We repeat what the Court fittingly held in People v. Ong, a case similarly involving a buy-bust operation, thus:
The Constitution mandates
that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. While appellants
defense engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it
is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a strong
suspicion or probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to
overcome the presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required.
In the case at bar, the
basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the prosecution not
being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral
certainty. By reasonable doubt is not
meant that which of possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such an investigation,
to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will
prosper even though the appellants innocence may be doubted, for a criminal
conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on
the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the
accused.[44]
WHEREFORE, the
instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry De La Cruz y Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged on basis of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the CA Decision dated June 30, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727 is SET ASIDE.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the
immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another
cause.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO
C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-20. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Vicente Q. Roxas.
[2] Records, pp. 127-132. Penned by Presiding Judge Severino B. De Castro, Jr.
[3]
[4]
[5] During
the trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses PO2 Edcel Ibasco and PO1
Roderick
[6] CA
rollo, p. 11, Commitment Order dated
[7] G.R. No. 143817, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 478.
[8] Rollo,
p. 25, Order of Commitment issued on
[9] CA
rollo, p. 23, Notice of Appeal dated
[10]
G.R. No. 177746,
[11] Rollo,
pp. 27-29, dated
[12]
[13]
CA rollo, pp. 37-51, dated
[14]
[15]
[16] People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179478, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 397, 417; citing People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 470, 484 and People v. Juatan, G.R. No. 104378, August 20, 1996, 260 SCRA 532, 538.
[17] People v. Robles, G.R. No. 177220, April
24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647, 654; citing People
v. Pedronan, G.R. No. 148668, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 183, 188.
[18] People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515
SCRA 537, 547; People v. Del Mundo,
G.R. No. 169141, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 554, 562.
[19]
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668.
[20]
[21]
[22]
Records, pp. 8-9.
[23]
TSN, March 16, 2004, pp. 115-119.
[24]
TSN, August 3, 2004, pp. 10-14.
[25] People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 447.
[26] People
v. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 571, 595
[27] People v. Daria, Jr., G.R. No. 186138,
September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 688, 709.
[28] Sales v. People, G.R. No. 182296, April
7, 2009, 584 SCRA 680, 686.
[29]
[30] People v. Mejia, G.R. No. 185723, August
4, 2009, 595 SCRA 356, 374.
[31] Dizon v. People, G.R. No. 144026, June
15, 2006, 490 SCRA 593, 613; citing People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000, 328 SCRA 185, 194.
[32]
TSN, September 12, 2006, pp. 2-4.
[33] Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 2(e).
[34] TSN,
September 12, 2006, pp. 4-5.
[35]
TSN, January 30, 2007, pp. 2-6.
[36] People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 179213, September
3, 2009, 598 SCRA 92, 101-102; People v.
Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762, 777.
[37]
Records, p. 47.
[38] Sales v. People, supra note 28, at
688-689.
[39] Catuiran v. People, G.R. No. 175647, May
8, 2009, 587 SCRA 567, 580.
[40]
G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 777, 788.
[41] People
v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 653.
[42] People v. Caigat, G.R. No. 137963,
February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 387, 396; citing People
v. Mariano, G.R. No. 134309, November 17, 2000, 347 SCRA 109 and People v. Tacipit, G.R. No. 109140 March 8, 1995, 242 SCRA 241.
[43] Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815,
September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 41, 60; citing
People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165,
March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 503, 512.
[44]
G.R. No. 175940 [Formerly G.R. Nos. 155361-62], February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 123,
141.