Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
MANUEL
YBIERNAS, VICENTE YBIERNAS, MARIA CORAZON ANGELES, VIOLETA YBIERNAS, and
VALENTIN YBIERNAS, Petitioners, - versus - ESTER
TANCO-GABALDON, MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC., and THE SHERIFF OF THE Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 178925
Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: June 1,
2011 |
|
|
|
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari assails
the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions[1]
dated January 31, 2007 and July 16, 2007. The assailed Resolutions granted respondents
motion for new trial of a case for quieting of title and damages, decided in
petitioners favor by the trial court in a summary judgment.
The
facts of the case are, as follows:
Estrella
Mapa Vda. de Ybiernas (Estrella) owned a parcel of land located in Talisay,
Negros Occidental, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-83976.
On April 28, 1988, Estrella executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[2]
over the property in favor of her heirs, Dionisio Ybiernas (Dionisio) and
petitioners Manuel Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, and Maria Corazon Angeles.
On
June 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 47, Bacolod City issued
an Order in Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC (G.L.R.O.) Rec. No. 97,
Entry
No. 334150; Order; Dionisio M. Ybiernas; Order issued by the RTC of Negros Occ.
to register and annotate the deed of sale on this title without need of
presenting the owners duplicate. Date of order-June 30, 1989; Date of
prescription-July 5, 1989 at 10:45 a.m.
Entry
No. 334151; Sale; Dionisio Ybiernas, et al; Deed of absolute sale of this
property for the sum of P650,000.00 in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas,
Vicente M. Ybiernas, Manuel M. Ybiernas and Maria Corazon Y. Angeles in
undivided equal share to each; doc. no. 437, page 89, book VI, series of 1988
of the not. reg. of Mr. Indalecio P. Arriola of
On
October 29, 1991, respondents Ester Tanco-Gabaldon and Manila Bay Spinning Mills,
Inc. filed with the RTC of Pasig City a Complaint[4] for
sum of money and damages, amounting to P6,000,000.00, against
Estrella and three other individuals. The Complaint alleged that the defendants
were guilty of fraud when they misrepresented to herein respondents that they
own a parcel of land in
Upon
respondents motion, the Pasig City RTC, in an Order[5]
dated November 6, 1991, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment upon filing of a bond. The sheriff issued the corresponding writ of
attachment and levied the subject property.[6] On
November 13, 1991, the notice of attachment was annotated on TCT No. T-83976 as
Entry No. 346816.[7]
When
Estrellas heirs learned about the levy, Dionisio filed, on January 14, 1992, an
Affidavit of Third-Party Claim, asserting the transfer of ownership to them.[8] Respondents,
however, filed an indemnity bond; thus, the sheriff refused to lift the levy.
The
Pasig City RTC resolved the Complaint for sum of money in favor of respondents,
and Estrella, et al. were ordered to pay P6,000,000.00, plus legal
interest and damages. Respondents, however, elevated the case all the way up to
this Court, questioning the interest rate. This Court eventually denied the
appeal in a Minute Resolution dated November 20, 2002, which became final and
executory on April 14, 2003.[9]
In
the meantime, Dionisio died and was succeeded by his heirs, petitioners
Valentin Ybiernas and Violeta Ybiernas.
On
November 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a Complaint
for Quieting of Title and Damages,[10]
claiming that the levy was invalid because the property is not owned by any of
the defendants in the Pasig City RTC case. They averred that the annotation of
the RTC Order and the Deed of Absolute Sale on TCT No. T-83976 serves as notice
to the whole world that the property is no longer owned by Estrella.
In
their Answer with Counterclaims,[11]
respondents contended that (a) the case constituted an interference in the
proceeding of the Pasig City RTC, a co-equal court; (b) petitioners should have
filed their claims against the indemnity bond filed by respondents; and (c)
petitioners were guilty of forum-shopping, considering that the case actually
sought a relief similar to the third-party claim.
During
pre-trial, the parties admitted, among others, the [e]xistence of the Order
dated June 30, 1989 by RTC Branch 47,
On
July 30, 2004, petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC
initially denied the motion in the Order dated December 23, 2004.[13] Upon petitioners motion for reconsideration,
the RTC granted the motion for summary judgment in the decision[14]
dated December 27, 2005. The RTC made the following pronouncement:
A consideration of the issues defined by the
parties during the pre-trial x x x shows quite clearly that they are issues
that may already be properly resolved now at this stage of the proceedings in
this case, as they, other than the amount of damages, are quite apparently pure
questions of law, the factual antecedents for these issues having already been
admitted by the parties.
As
to issue No. 1 [whether ownership has been transferred to petitioners], it is a
fact well-established, as admitted by the parties and shown by the annotation
as Entry No. 334151 on said TCT No. T-8[39]76, that the said Deed of Absolute
Sale, dated April 28, 1988 over the subject property by Estrella Mapa Vda. de
Ybiernas in favor of Dionisio Ybiernas, Vicente Ybiernas, Manuel Ybiernas and
Maria Corazon Y. Angeles, was validly annotated as such Entry No. 334151,
inscribed on July 5, 1989, on said TCT No. T-83976 registered in the name of
Estrella M. Ybiernas.
Neither
the defendants nor anyone else has challenged the validity of the judicial
proceedings before RTC, Branch 47,
Thus, the dispositive portion of the December
27, 2005 RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, except as to the amount of
damages, a summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, and as prayed for by the plaintiffs in their complaint:
1. The levy on attachment made by herein
defendant Sheriff of RTC, Branch 163,
2. Entry No. 346816 on the same TCT No. T-83976
is hereby CANCELLED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Respondents filed a notice of appeal,[17]
and it was granted by the RTC.
While
the appeal was pending in the CA, respondents filed a motion for new trial,[18] claiming
that they have discovered on May 9, 2006 that Cadastral Case No. 10 did not
exist and the April 28, 1988 Deed of Sale was simulated. Attached to the motion
were the affidavit[19]
of Atty. Gerely C. Rico, who conducted the research in
a. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by Ildefonso
M. Villanueva, Jr., Clerk of Court VI of the RTC of Bacolod City, stating that:
no cadastral case involving
b. Certification dated 09 May 2006 issued by
Atty. Mehafee G. Sideno, Clerk of Court V of the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch
47, stating that: as per records of this court, no Cadastral Case No. 10, LRC,
GLRO Rec. 97, Lot No. 713-C-1-B, Psd 220027, filed by Dionisio Ybiernas was
filed and docketed in this office.[21]
c. Certification dated 11 July 2006 issued by Estrella
M. Domingo, OIC Archives Division of the National Archives Office, stating that:
no copy is on file with this Office of a DEED OF SALE allegedly executed by
and among ESTRELLA MAPA VDA. DE YBIERNAS, DIONISIO YBIERNAS, VICENTE M.
YBIERNAS, JR., MANUEL YBIERNAS and MARIA CORAZON ANGELES, ratified on April 28,
1988 before INDALECIO P. ARRIOLA, a notary public for and within Iloilo
City and acknowledged as Doc. No. 437;
Page No. 89; Book No. VI; Series of 1988.[22]
Respondents
argued that they have satisfied all the requisites for the grant of a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence: (1) they discovered the evidence after the trial court
rendered its judgment on
December 27, 2005; (2) they could not
have discovered and produced the evidence during the trial with reasonable
diligence; and (3) the evidence was material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching, and was of such weight that, if admitted, would
probably change the judgment. On the second requisite, respondents explained that
they could not have discovered the evidence with reasonable diligence because
they relied in good faith on the veracity of the RTC Order dated June 30, 1989,
based on the principle that the issuance of a court order, as an act of a
public officer, enjoys the presumption of regularity. On the third requisite,
respondents pointed out that, if the nonexistence of Cadastral Case No. 10 and
the invalidity of the Order dated June 30, 1989 were allowed to be proven by
the newly discovered evidence, the action for quieting of title would probably
be dismissed, as respondents levy would be declared superior to petitioners
claim.[23]
In
their Comment/Opposition, petitioners argued that (a) the questioned decision
was a partial summary judgment which could not be the subject of a motion for
new trial; (b) the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10 was an admitted fact
which could not be questioned in a motion for new trial; and (c) there was no
newly discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial.[24]
The
CA did not agree with petitioners. Hence, on January 31, 2007, it granted respondents
motion for new trial, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants-appellants having satisfied all the elements necessary to justify the filing of a Motion for New Trial which appears to be meritorious and in the higher interest of substantial justice, the said motion is GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, let a
new trial of the Quieting of Title case be held and let said case be REMANDED to the Court a quo for said purpose.
SO ORDERED.[25]
At the outset, the CA noted that the
RTC summary judgment was a proper subject of an appeal because it was a final
adjudication on the merits of the case, having completely disposed of all the
issues except as to the amount of damages. The CA concluded that respondents
properly availed of a motion for new trial because such remedy could be availed
of at any time after the appeal from the lower court had been perfected and
before the CA loses jurisdiction over the case. According to the CA,
respondents were able to show that they obtained the new evidence only after
the trial of the case and after the summary judgment had been rendered. The CA
also held that respondents never admitted during the pre-trial the existence of
Cadastral Case No. 10; they only admitted the existence of the Order dated June
30, 1989 in Cadastral Case No. 10.
On July 16, 2007, the CA denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[26]
Petitioners subsequently filed this
petition for review on certiorari,
raising the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE QUESTIONED DECISION OF THE RTC IS A PROPER SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL AND A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULE 53 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS AN IMPROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION ADMITTED FACTS.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT NO NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED TO WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.[27]
Petitioners posit that no appeal could be taken from the
trial courts decision because it did not completely dispose of all the issues
in the case; it failed to settle the issue on damages. Petitioners categorize
the decision as a partial summary judgment, which in Guevarra, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,[28]
reiterated in GSIS v. Philippine Village
Hotel, Inc.,[29] the
Court pronounced as not a final and an appealable judgment, hence,
interlocutory and clearly an improper subject of an appeal. Petitioners
theorize then that the appeal could not have been perfected and the CA could not
have acquired jurisdiction over the case, including the motion for new trial. Accordingly,
they conclude that the motion for new trial should have been denied outright for
being violative of Section 1,[30]
Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the motion for new trial may
be filed after the appeal has been perfected. Petitioners argue that, pursuant
to Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, trial should proceed instead to settle
the issue on damages. Petitioners point
out that the case cited by the CA in its Decision, Bell Carpets International Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[31] is not applicable to the case because, unlike in
the present case, the trial courts ruling completely disposed of all the
issues in that case.
In
addition, petitioners insist that respondents already admitted the existence of
Cadastral Case No. 10 by its admission of the existence of the Order dated June
30, 1989. They maintain that respondents cannot admit the existence of an order
and yet deny the existence of the proceedings from which the order emanates.
Respondents judicial admission that the court Order existed necessarily
carried with it the admission that the cadastral proceedings where the Order
was issued likewise existed. Petitioners aver that respondents are bound by
their judicial admission and they cannot be allowed to present evidence to
contradict the same.
Petitioners
next argue that the purported newly discovered pieces of evidence have no
probative value. Petitioners say that the certifications are self-serving and
inconclusive opinions of court employees, who did not even indicate the period
when they occupied their positions and state whether they had the authority to
issue such certifications and whether they had personal knowledge of the
documents archived during the year that the deed of sale was executed. According
to petitioners, the certifications cannot overcome the presumption of
regularity in the issuance of the Order dated June 30, 1989. At most, the certifications
would simply show that the records of Cadastral Case No. 10 could no longer be
found in the records; hence, they would have no bearing on the result of the
case.
Petitioners
also emphasize that respondents failed to meet the burden of proving that the
newly discovered pieces of evidence presented comply with the requisites to
justify the holding of a new trial. They contend that respondents could have
discovered and presented in court the certifications during trial had they
exercised reasonable diligence.
Petitioners
arguments are untenable.
The
issue of whether the RTC judgment is a final judgment is indeed crucial. If the
judgment were not final, it would be an improper subject of an appeal. Hence,
no appeal would have been perfected before the CA, and the latter would not have
acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, including the motion for new trial.
But more importantly, only a final judgment or order, as opposed to an
interlocutory order, may be the subject of a motion for new trial.
A
final judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto,
such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground of res judicata or
prescription, for instance.[32] Just like any other judgment, a summary
judgment that satisfies the requirements of a final judgment will be considered
as such.
A
summary judgment is granted to settle
expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of
fact are involved, except the amount of
damages.[33] The
RTC judgment in this case fully determined the rights and obligations of the
parties relative to the case for quieting of title and left no other issue
unresolved, except the amount of damages. Hence, it is a final judgment.
In
leaving out the determination of the amount of damages, the RTC did not remove its
summary judgment from the category of final judgments. In fact, under Section
3,[34]
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may not be rendered on the
amount of damages, although such judgment may be rendered on the issue of the
right to damages.[35]
In Jugador v. De Vera,[36] the
Court distinguished between the determination of the amount of damages and the
issue of the right to damages itself in case of a summary judgment. The Court elucidated
on this point, thus:
[A] summary judgment may be rendered except
as to the amount of damages. In other words, such judgment may be entered on
the issue relating to the existence of the right to damages. Chief Justice
Moran pertinently observes that if there is any real issue as to the amount of
damages, the c[o]urt, after rendering summary judgment, may proceed to assess
the amount recoverable.[37]
It
is therefore reasonable to distinguish the present case from GSIS v. Philippine Village Hotel, Inc.[38] In that case, the summary judgment specifically
stated that [t]rial on the issu[e] of damages shall resume. Evidently, there
remained an unresolved issue on the right to damages. Here, the trial court, in
stating that except as to the amount of damages, a summary judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, had, in
effect, resolved all issues, including the right to
damages in favor of the plaintiffs
(petitioners). What remained undetermined was only the amount of damages.
On
the issue of whether respondents are proscribed from presenting evidence that
would disprove the existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, we likewise sustain the
CA.
A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need for
proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by a showing that
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[39]
During
the pre-trial, respondents categorically admitted the existence of the Order
dated June 30, 1989 only. The Court cannot extend such admission to the
existence of Cadastral Case No. 10, considering the circumstances under which
the admission was made. In construing an admission, the court should consider the
purpose for which the admission is used and the surrounding circumstances and
statements.[40]
Respondents have constantly insisted that, in making the admission, they relied
in good faith on the veracity of the Order
which was presented by petitioners. Moreover, they relied on the presumption
that the Order has been issued by Judge Enrique T. Jocson in the regular
performance of his duties. It would therefore be prejudicial and unfair to
respondents if they would be prevented from proving that the Order is in fact
spurious by showing that there was no Cadastral Case No. 10 before the RTC,
Branch 47, of
Finally,
we find that a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is warranted. New trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity of a
judgment or prevent the failure of justice. Thus, the Rules allows the courts
to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when
there exists newly discovered evidence.[41] The grant or denial of a new trial is,
generally speaking, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which cannot
be interfered with unless a clear abuse thereof is shown.[42]
This
Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be
shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such
weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged
newly discovered evidence could have been
very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence,
the same cannot be considered newly discovered.[43]
The
only contentious element in the case is whether the evidence could have been
discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence. In Custodio
v. Sandiganbayan,[44]
the Court expounded on the due diligence requirement, thus:
The threshold
question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is whether the [proffered] evidence is in fact a newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by
due diligence. The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e.,
when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when
should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the
requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a
particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence
offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the
knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the
offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to
secure it.
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due
diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the
particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that
the phrase is often equated with reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to
the defendant. In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good
faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in
support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due
diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to
obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the
facts known to him.[45]
As
previously stated, respondents relied in good faith on the veracity of the
Order dated June 30, 1989 which petitioners presented in court. It was only
practical for them to do so, if only to expedite the proceedings. Given this
circumstance, we hold that respondents exercised reasonable diligence in
obtaining the evidence. The certifications therefore qualify as newly
discovered evidence.
The question of whether the
certifications presented by respondents have any probative value is left to the
judgment and discretion of the trial court which will be hearing the case anew.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Resolutions dated January 31, 2007
and July 16, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-47, 61.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Supra note 1.
[27] Rollo, pp. 452-453.
[28] 209 Phil. 241 (1983).
[29] 482 Phil. 47 (2004).
[30] Section
1. Period for filing; ground. At
any time after the appeal from the lower court has been perfected and before
the Court of Appeals loses jurisdiction over the case, a party may file a
motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not
have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of
due diligence and which is of such character as would probably change the result.
The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting
the grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence.
[31] G.R. No. 75315, May 7, 1990, 185 SCRA 35.
[32] Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, 395 Phil. 278, 293 (2000).
[33] Cotabato Timberland Co., Inc. v. C. Alcantara and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 145469, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 227, 233.
[34] Section
3. Motion and proceedings thereon.
The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for
the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or
admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[35] FLORENZ D. REGALADO, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, 368 (Eighth Revised Edition 2002).
[36] 94 Phil. 704 (1954).
[37]
[38] Supra note 29.
[39] Camitan v. Fidelity Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 163684, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 540, 549.
[40] Harmon v. Christy Lumber, Inc., 402 NW2D 690 (1987); see Moffett v. Arabian American Oil Co., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 174 (1949).
[41] Brig. Gen. Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, 493 Phil. 194, 203-204 (2005).
[42] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 157264, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 329, 340.
[43] Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 204-205.
[44]
[45]