EN
BANC
|
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA in his
official capacity as THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Petitioner, - versus - HON. JENNY LIND R. ALDECOA-DELORINO, Presiding
Judge, Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, ASSOCIATION OF
PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, representing JG Summit Petrochemical Corporation, et al., Respondents. |
G.R. No.
177130
Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR., PEREZ, SERENO,* JJ. Promulgated: June 7, 2011 |
x
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D
E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Then Executive Secretary petitioner Eduardo Ermita assailed via certiorari
the writ of preliminary injunction
granted by public respondent Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa Delorino, then
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 137, by Omnibus Order[1]
dated February 6, 2007 in favor of private respondent Association of
Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines
(APMP or private respondent) denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and
enjoining the government from implementing Executive Order No. 486.
Executive
Order No. 486 (E.O. 486) issued on January 12, 2006 by then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo reads:
LIFTING THE SUSPENSION OF THE
APPLICATION OF THE TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEDULE ON PETROCHEMICALS AND CERTAIN
PLASTIC PRODUCTS UNDER THE COMMON EFFECTIVE PREFERENTIAL TARIFF (CEPT) SCHEME
FOR THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA)
WHEREAS, Executive
Order 234 dated 27 April 2000, which implemented the 2000-2003 Philippine
schedule of tariff reduction of products transferred from the Temporary
Exclusion List and the Sensitive List to the Inclusion List of the accelerated
CEPT Scheme for the AFTA, provided that the
CEPT rates on petrochemicals and certain plastic products will be reduced to 5%
on 01 January 2003;
WHEREAS, Executive Order 161
issued on 9 January 2003 provides for the suspension of the application of the
tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain products in 2003 and
2004 only;
WHEREAS, the government
recognizes the need to provide an enabling environment for the naphtha cracker
plant to attain international competitiveness;
WHEREAS, the NEDA Board
approved the lifting of the suspension
of the aforesaid tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain
plastic products and the reversion of the CEPT rates on these products to EO
161 (s.2003) levels once the naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to
the powers vested in me under Section 402 of the Tariff and Customs Code of
1978 (Presidential Decree No. 1464), as amended, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. The articles specifically listed in Annex
"A" (Articles Granted Concession under the CEPT Scheme for the
AFTA) hereof, as classified under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code of
1978, as amended, shall be subject to the ASEAN CEPT rates in accordance with
the schedule indicated in Column 4 of Annex "A". The
ASEAN CEPT rates so indicated shall be accorded to imports coming from ASEAN
Member States applying CEPT concession to the same product pursuant to Article
4 of the CEPT Agreement and Its Interpretative Notes.
SECTION 2. In
the event that any subsequent change is made in the basic (MFN) Philippine rate
of duty on any of the article listed in Annex "A" to a rate
lower than the rate prescribed in Column 4 of Annex ""A, such
article shall automatically be accorded the corresponding reduced duty.
SECTION 3. From the date of effectivity of this
Executive Order, all articles listed in Annex "A" entered into
or withdrawn from warehouses in the Philippines for consumption shall be
imposed the rates of duty therein prescribed subject to qualification under
the Rules of Origin as provided for in the Agreement on the CEPT Scheme for the
AFTA signed on 28 January 1992.
SECTION 4.
The Department of Trade and Industry, in coordination with National Economic
and Development Authority, the Department of Finance, the Tariff Commission and
the Bureau of Customs, shall promulgate the implementing rules and regulations
that will govern the reversion of the CEPT rates on petrochemicals and plastic
products to EO 161 (s.2003) levels once the naphtha cracker plant is in
commercial operation.
SECTION 5.
All presidential issuances, administrative rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, which are contrary to or inconsistent with this Executive Order are
hereby revoked or modified accordingly.
SECTION 6. This
Executive Order shall take effect immediately following its complete
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
Done in the City of
The above issuance in effect reduces protective tariff rates
from 10% to 5% on the entry of inexpensive products, particularly plastic food
packaging, from ASEAN Free Trade (AFTA) member countries into the
Philippines.
APMP, an organization composed of
manufacturers of petrochemical and resin products, opposed the implementation
of E.O. 486. Contending that the E.O.
would affect local manufacturers, it filed a petition before the RTC of Makati,
docketed as Civil Case No. 06-2004, seeking the declaration of its unconstitutionality
for being violative of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6647 which prohibits the
President from increasing or reducing taxes while Congress is in session[2]
and Sec. 402(e)[3] of
the Tariff and Customs Code. It
thereupon prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
its implementation.
Petitioner contends that public respondent gravely abused
her discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition and
granting the writ of preliminary injunction as the exercise of the
quasi-legislative functions of the President cannot be enjoined. He avers that writs of prohibition lie only
against those persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.
By granting injunctive relief, petitioner contends that public
respondent effectively preempted the trial of and pre-judged the case, given that
what private respondent seeks is to stop the implementation of E.O. 486. Further, petitioner contends that the grant
of injunctive relief was not supported by fact and law, for what APMP sought to
be protected was future economic benefits which may be affected by the
implementation of the E.O. benefits which its members have no right to since
protective tariff rates are government privileges wherein no one can claim any
vested right to.
On the merits, petitioner maintains that E.O. 486 is not
constitutionally infirm, it having been issued under the authority of Secs. 401
and 402 of the Tariff and Customs Code which set no limitations on the
Presidents power to adjust tariff rate and serve as the governments response
to its AFTA commitment on Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).
Since it is only the
Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and granting a writ of preliminary
injunction that is being assailed, the Court will not pass on the constitutionality
of E.O. 486 which is still pending before the trial court.
Private respondent
prays in its Comment for the denial of the present petition, alleging that,
among other things, the petition is premature as petitioner failed to file a
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Omnibus Order of public respondent,
and maintaining the propriety of the remedy of prohibition which it filed to
assail the E.O.
The issues then are:
1.
Whether
public respondent erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition and not granting petitioners motion to dismiss the petition;
2.
Whether
a motion for reconsideration should have been filed by petitioner; and
3.
Whether
public respondent erred in granting the writ of preliminary injunction in favor
of APMP.
On the issue of jurisdiction
Rule 65, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (emphasis supplied)
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association
v. Defensor[4] expounds on prohibition as a remedy
to assail executive issuances:
A petition for
prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary
writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering
said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies
against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in
order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where
there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for
its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents
are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a
writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. (emphasis supplied)
Be
that as it may, it is settled that what
determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[5]
A perusal of the petition of APMP before
the trial court readily shows that it is not a mere petition for prohibition
with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. For it is also one for certiorari as it
specifically alleges that E.O. 486 is invalid for being unconstitutional, it having
been issued in contravention of Sec. 4
of R.A. 6647 and Sec. 402(e) of the
Tariff and Customs Code, hence, its enforcement should be enjoined and
petitioner prohibited from implementing the same.
Petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials.[6] Thus, even if the petition was denominated as
one for prohibition, public respondent did not err in treating it also as one
for certiorari and taking cognizance of the controversy.
On the propriety of filing a motion
for reconsideration
Ordinarily, certiorari
as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is
first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to
correct its assigned errors.[7]
This rule, however, is not without exceptions.
The rule is,
however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order
is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,
a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in
a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved.[8] (emphasis
supplied)
The
present case involves the constitutionality and implementation of an executive issuance involving tariff rates
and, as alleged by petitioner, the
Governments commitments under the AFTA.
Clearly, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed
with following exceptions (c ) and (i) in the above enumeration in Siok Ping Tang.
On the grant of
the writ of
preliminary
injunction
APMP
alleges that it is composed of manufacturers of petrochemical products and that
the implementation of the assailed E.O. reducing tariff rates on certain petroleum-based
products will result in the local market being flooded with lower-priced
imported goods which will, consequently, adversely affect their sales
profits. In granting the assailed writ,
public respondent held that, based on
the initial evidence presented, the APMP
stands to lose substantial revenues
and some of its members may eventually have to close up or stop ongoing works
on their Naphtha Cracker plants if E.O.
486 is implemented. Public respondent
thus ruled that the APMP was entitled to the writ as it has a valuable stake
in the petrochemical industry and the enforcement of E.O. 486 will adversely affect its members;
and that petitioner violated APMPs right
on the strength of an invalid executive issuance.
Public respondent noted
that the Southern Cross case cited by petitioner which
ruled that no court is allowed to grant injunction to restrain the collection
of taxes is inapplicable in the present case, since restraining the
implementation of E.O. 486 will not deprive the Government of revenues; instead, it will result in more revenues as the proposed reduction of
rates will be enjoined.
Public respondent thus concluded
that there is sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of APMP.
It is well to
emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a
pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof.[9]
In the present case, however, where it is the Government which is being enjoined
from implementing an issuance which enjoys the presumption of validity, such
discretion must be exercised with utmost caution. Executive
Secretary v. Court of Appeals,[10]
enlightens:
In Social Security Commission v. Judge Bayona, we ruled that a law is
presumed constitutional until otherwise declared by judicial interpretation. The suspension of the operation of the law
is a matter of extreme delicacy because it is an interference with the official
acts not only of the duly elected representatives of the people but also of the
highest magistrate of the land.
In Younger v. Harris, Jr., the Supreme Court of the
Federal
injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with
respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a
matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful
is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers
only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. 752 Beal
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 49, 61 S.Ct. 418, 420, 85
L.Ed. 577.
And similarly, in Douglas, supra, we made clear, after reaffirming this rule,
that:
"It
does not appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with any
injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully
and in good faith . . ." 319 U.S., at 164, 63 S.Ct., at 881.
The possible unconstitutionality of a
statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good
faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith,
harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable
relief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored.
To be entitled to a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional,
the party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the
merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits
and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. The higher
standard reflects judicial deference toward "legislation or regulations
developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes." Moreover,
an injunction will alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide
the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be
undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.
Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and authority,
in assessing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must
sensitively assess all the equities of the situation, including the public
interest. In litigations between
governmental and private parties, courts go much further both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are accustomed to
go when only private interests are involved.
Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed,
a writ of preliminary injunction is issued precisely to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can
be thoroughly studied or adjudicated to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Still, even if it is a temporary and ancillary
remedy, its issuance should not be trifled with, and an applicant must
convincingly show its entitlement to the relief. St.
James College of Paranaque v. Equitable PCI Bank,[11]
explains:
Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court, an application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if
the following grounds are established, thus: virtual
law library
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
And following jurisprudence, these requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction, be it mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent
the infliction of irreparable injury. (emphasis supplied)a1a
It is thus ineluctable that for it to be
entitled to the writ, the APMP must show that it has a clear and
unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgent necessity for
its issuance.[12] That APMP had cause of action and the
standing to interpose the action for prohibition did not ipso facto call for the grant of injunctive relief in its favor
without it proving its entitlement thereto.
Transfield Philippines, Inc. v.
Luzon Hydro Corporation,[13] illuminates on
the right of a party to injunctive relief:
Before a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the
complaint that there exists a right to
be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are
violative of the said right. It must be shown that the invasion of the right
sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Moreover, an injunctive
remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
(emphasis supplied)
Contrary to
public respondents ruling, APMP failed to adduce any
evidence to prove that it had a clear and unmistakable right which was or would
be violated by the enforcement of E.O. 486. The filing of the petition at the court a quo was anchored on APMP and its
members fear of loss or reduction of
their income once E.O. 486 is implemented and imported plastic and similar
products flood the domestic market due to reduced tariff rates. As
correctly posited by petitioner, APMP was seeking protection over future economic benefits which, at
best, it had an inchoate right to.
More importantly,
tariff protection is not a right, but a privilege granted by the government and,
therefore, APMP cannot claim redress for alleged violation thereof. In a similar case wherein the validity of R.A.
9337 with respect to provisions authorizing the President to increase the
value-added tax (VAT) rates, the Court held:
The input tax is not a property or a
property right within the constitutional purview of the due process
clause. A VAT-registered persons
entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege.
The distinction
between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for
persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or
take away rights, which were created by the law of the state, although it
may not take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights.[14]
(emphasis supplied)
Assuming
arguendo that it was upon the governments assurances that the members of APMP
allegedly invested hundred of millions of dollars in putting up the necessary
infrastructure, that does not vest upon APMP a right which must be protected.
Respecting
the element of irreparable injury, the landmark case of Social Security Commission v. Bayona[15]
teaches:
Damages
are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of
injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured
with reasonable accuracy (Crouc v. Central Labor Council, 83 ALR, 193).
"An irreparable injury which a
court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and
continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be
estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement"
(Phipps v. Rogue River Valley Canal Co., 7 ALR, 741). An irreparable injury to
authorize an injunction consists of "a serious charge of, or is
destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character
in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar
quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the
owner of the loss thereof" (Dunker v. Field and Tub Club, 92 P., 502). (emphasis supplied)
As does the more recent
case of Philippine Air Lines v. National
Labor Relations Commission:[16]
An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such
constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had
therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of
mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be
adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the
nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain
pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, aside
from APMPs allegations that the reduced tariff rates will adversely affect its
members business and may lead to closure,
there is no showing what irreparable injury it stood to suffer with
the implementation of E.O. 486.
In
fine,
not only is there no showing of a clear right
on the part of APMP which was violated;
the injury sought to be protected is prospective in nature, hence, the
injunctive relief should not have been granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated February 6, 2007
issued by public respondent Hon. Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino is REVERSED insofar as it granted a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction in favor of private respondent, Association of
Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP). Accordingly, the Writ is DISSOLVED, and the case REMANDED
to the court of origin for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice ARTURO
D. BRION Associate
Justice |
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate
Justice
|
|
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
MARIANO
C. Associate
Justice MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate
Justice |
|
JOSE
Associate Justice |
JOSE
CATRAL Associate
Justice |
MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice
* No
part.
[1] Rollo, pp. 50-58.
[2] Sec. 4. The ad valorem rates herein of
import duties indicated hereof shall be subject to modification by Congress
after review and recommendation by the National Economic and Development
Authority after one (1) year from the effectivity of the rates prescribed:
Provided, That before any recommendation is submitted to Congress pursuant
to this Section, the Tariff Commission shall conduct an investigation in the
course of which shall hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall be
afforded reasonable opportunity to be present, produce evidence and to be
heard. The Tariff Commission shall also hear the views and recommendations
of any government office, agency or instrumentality concerned. chan robles
virtual law library.
Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the National Economic and Development Authority shall recommend to Congress the necessary adjustment in such specific rates of import duties indicates thereof after six (6) months from their effectivity: Provided, finally, That the President may not increase or decrease any ad valorem or specific duty rates herein provided when Congress is in session. (emphasis supplied)
[3] Sec. 402.
x
x x x
e. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to give any authority to cancel or reduce in
any manner any of the indebtedness of any foreign country to the Philippines or
any claim of the Philippines against any foreign country. (emphasis
supplied)
[4] G.R.
No. 163980, August 3, 2006, 497 SCRA 581.
[5] Vide Fernando v. Spouses Lim, G.R.
No. 176282, August 22, 2008, 563 SCRA 147.
[6] Francisco v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010.
[8] Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, G.R. No. 162575, December 15, 2010.
[9] Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 797 (2002).
[10] G.R.
No. 131719, 473 Phil. 27 (2004).
[11] G.R. No. 179441, August 9,
2010, 627 SCRA 328.
[12] Vide First Global Realty and
Devt. Corp. v. San Agustin, 427
Phil. 593 (2002).
[13] G.R.
No. 146717, 485 Phil. 699 (2004).
[14] Abakada Guro Party List, Inc. v. Hon. Exec.
Sec. Ermita, 506 Phil. 1 (2005).
[15] G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 126.
[16] G.R. No. 120567, March 20, 1998, 287 SCRA
672.