G.R.
Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
Promulgated:
June 28,
2011
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DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO,
J.:
The
majority decision upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws because (1)
of the pendency of the conversion bills during the 11th Congress;
and (2) compliance with the requirements of the Local Government Code prior
to its amendment by Republic Act No. 9009.
I
reiterate my dissent.
I.
The Cityhood Laws violate
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city,
municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The
Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any other law. There
is only one Local Government Code.1
To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, the Constitution
expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself
all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion
of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any
other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Notably, each Cityhood Law provides in its Separability Clause that
if any of its provisions is inconsistent with the Local Government Code,
the other consistent provisions shall continue to be in full force
and effect. The clear and inescapable implication is that any provision
in each Cityhood Law that is inconsistent with the Local Government Code has
no force and effect in short, void and ineffective. Each Cityhood Law
expressly and unequivocally acknowledges the superiority of the Local
Government Code, and that in case of conflict, the
Local Government Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Law. The clear intent
and express language of the Cityhood Laws is for these laws to conform to the
Local Government Code and not the other way around.
Moreover,
Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government
Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood Laws as separate
and distinct from the Local Government Code. In other words, the Cityhood
Laws do not form integral parts of the Local Government Code but
are separate and distinct laws. There is therefore no question that the
Cityhood Laws are laws other than the Local Government Code. As
such, the Cityhood Laws cannot stipulate an exception from the requirements for
the creation of cities, prescribed in the Local Government Code, without
running afoul of the explicit mandate of Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.
Contrary
to the faulty conclusion of the majority, the Cityhood Laws do not amend the
Local Government Code. The Legislature never intended the Cityhood Laws to
amend the Local Government Code. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood
Laws can this interpretation be discerned. Neither the title nor the body of
the Cityhood Laws sustains such conclusion. Simply put, there is absolutely
nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support the majority decision that the Cityhood
Laws amended the Local Government Code.
II.
The Cityhood Laws
violate the equal protection clause.
There is
no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills
in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending
bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is
not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending
cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of
a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally
related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities.
The fact
of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009.
That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement
that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.
In the
same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing
of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as
against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the
effectivity of RA 9009.
Further,
limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement
that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as
worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were
written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, is unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
III.
Respondent
municipalities must comply with the
P100
million income requirement under the prevailing LGC.
RA
No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code precisely because the criteria in
the old Local Government Code were no longer sufficient. In short, RA No. 9009
repealed the old income requirement of P20 million, a requirement that
no longer exists in our statute books. Compliance with the old income
requirement is compliance with a repealed, dead, and non-existent law a
totally useless, futile, and empty act. Worse, compliance with the old
requirement is an outright violation of the Constitution which
expressly commands that no x x x city x x x shall be created x x x except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.
Therefore, respondent municipalities in order to validly convert into cities
must comply with the P100 million income requirement
under the prevailing Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, and not with
the old P20 million income requirement. Otherwise, such compliance with
the old P20 million income requirement is void for being
unconstitutional.
There
must be strict compliance with the express command of the Constitution that no
city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code. Substantial compliance is
insufficient because it will discriminate against all other cities that were
created before and after the enactment of the Cityhood Laws in strict
compliance with the criteria in the Local Government Code, as amended by RA No.
9009. The conversion of municipalities into new cities means an increase in the
Internal Revenue Allotment of the former municipalities and a corresponding
decrease in the Internal Revenue Allotment of all other existing cities.
There must be strict, not only substantial, compliance with the constitutional
requirement because the economic lifeline of existing cities may be seriously
affected.
IV.
The increased income
requirement of P100 million
is neither arbitrary
nor difficult to comply.
According
to the majority, the imposition of the income requirement of P100
million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. x x x no research
or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal
took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise.
This is
glaring error.
The
Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the Constitution to
show the courts data like inflation figures to support the increased income
requirement. As long as the increased income requirement is not impossible to
comply, such increase is a policy determination involving the wisdom of the
law, which exclusively lies within the province of the Legislature. When the
Legislature enacts laws increasing taxes, tax rates, or capital requirements
for businesses, the Court cannot refuse to apply such laws on the ground that
there is no economic justification for such increases. Economic, political or
social justifications for the enactment of laws go into the wisdom of the law,
outside the purview of judicial review. This Court cannot refuse to apply the
law unless the law violates a specific provision of the Constitution. There is
plainly nothing unconstitutional in increasing the income requirement from P20
million to P100 million because such increase does not violate any
express or implied provision of the Constitution.
V.
Failure of 59 existing cities
to post P100 million annual income
does not render the P100
million income requirement
difficult to comply.
Suffice
it to state that there is no Constitutional or statutory requirement for the 59
existing cities to comply with the P100 million income
requirement. Obviously, these cities were already cities prior to the
amendment of the Local Government Code providing for the increased income
requirement of P100 million. In other words, at the time of their
creation, these cities have complied with the criteria prescribed under the old
Local Government Code for the creation of cities, and thus are not required to
comply with the P100 million income requirement of the prevailing Local
Government Code. It is utterly misplaced and grossly erroneous to cite the
non-compliance by the 59 existing cities with the increased income
requirement of P100 million to conclude that the P100 million
income requirement is arbitrary and difficult to comply.
Moreover,
as stated, the increased income requirement of P100 million is neither
unconstitutional nor unlawful. Unless the P100 million income requirement violates a provision of the Constitution or a
law, such requirement for the creation of a city must be strictly complied
with. Any local government unit applying for cityhood, whether located in or
outside the metropolis and whether within the National Capital Region or not,
must meet the P100 million income requirement prescribed by the
prevailing Local Government Code. There is absolutely nothing unconstitutional
or unlawful if the P100 million income requirement
is easily complied with by local government units within or near the National
Capital Region. The majoritys groundless and unfair discrimination against
these metropolis-located local government units must necessarily fail.
VI.
The Cityhood Laws violate
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Uniform
and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are
essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to
all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local
government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis
supplied)
If the
criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory,
there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
A city
with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being
equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an
annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area,
population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are
material in determining the just share of local government units in national
taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution
of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution.
As pointed
out by petitioners, respondent municipalities have a total population
equivalent to that of Davao City only, or around 1.3 million people. Yet, the
IRA that pertains to the 16 municipalities (P4,019,776,072)
is more than double that for Davao City (P1,874,175,271). x x x As a
result, the per capita IRA alloted for the individual denizen of Davao is even
less than half of the average per capita IRA of the inhabitants of the sixteen
(16) municipalities (P1,374.70 divided by P3,117.24).
This
indisputable fact vividly reveals the economic inequity that will inevitably
result from the unjust allocation of the IRA as a consequence of the conversion
of respondent municipalities into cities. Clearly, if
the existing cities share in the Internal Revenue Allotment is unreasonably
reduced, it is possible, even expected, that these cities may have to lay-off
workers and abandon projects, greatly hampering, or worse paralyzing, the
delivery of much needed public services in their respective territorial
jurisdictions.
VII.
Conclusion
The
Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including
the conversion of a municipality into a city. To avoid discrimination and
ensure uniformity and equality, such criteria cannot be embodied in any other
law except the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which
are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provide an exemption
from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. Clearly, the
Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. In addition, the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection
clause and Section 6, Article X of the Constitution on the fair and equitable
distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Without any
doubt, the Cityhood Laws must be striken down for being unconstitutional.
Accordingly,
I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the League of Cities
of the Philippines.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
1 Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.