Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE |
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G.R. No. 176740 |
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Appellee, |
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Present: |
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-versus- |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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PEREZ, and |
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MENDOZA,⃰ JJ. |
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CARLO DUMADAG y ROMIO, |
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Promulgated: |
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Appellant. |
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June 22, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
The
fact of sexual intercourse in this case is undisputed. What confronts this
Court is the question of whether the sexual congress between appellant and the
private complainant was done through force and intimidation or was voluntary
and consensual.
For review is the July 3, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01843 affirming with modification the
Decision[2]
dated April 16, 2001[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 08, Aparri, Cagayan, finding Carlo
Dumadag y Romio (appellant) guilty of the crime of rape.
Factual
Antecedents
On June 14, 1999, an Information for
rape was filed with the RTC against appellant, which contained the following
accusations:
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses
CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO, upon complaint filed by the offended party, AAA,[4]
in the Municipal Trial Court of CCC, DDD found on page one (1) of the
records of the case and forming an integral part of this Information, of the
crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 [sic], of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, of Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That
on or about December 25, 1998, in the Municipality of CCC, province of DDD,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a knife, with lewd design, by use of force or intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
herein offended party, a woman below eighteen (18) years of age, all against
her will and consent.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[5]
During his arraignment on October
26, 1999, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de officio, entered a negative plea to the charge. At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution
and the defense made stipulation of facts as to the identities of the private
complainant and the appellant and that a medical certificate was issued to the
former. Shortly after termination of the
conference, trial on merits commenced.
Version of the
Prosecution
The evidence for
the prosecution established the following facts:
AAA, a young
barrio lass, 16 years of age at the time she testified on February 21, 2000,
declared that in the early morning of December 25, 1998, she was on her way
home after hearing the midnight mass at BBB, CCC, DDD. She was a little bit behind Thelma, Carlos and
Clarence, all surnamed Dumadag. All of a
sudden, appellant approached her from behind and poked a Batangas knife on her
threatening to stab her if she shouts. He
pulled her towards the house of Joel Boyet Ursulum (Boyet). Once inside, she was forced to remove her
pants and panty because of fear. Appellant
also removed his pants and brief and pushed her on a bamboo bed. Pointing the knife at the left portion of her
abdomen, appellant ordered her to hold his penis against her vagina. Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of her. After appellant was through,
they stayed inside the house until six oclock in the morning of December 25,
1998. All this time, appellant continued
to hold the knife. Pleading that she be
allowed to go home, appellant finally let her go after threatening to kill her if
she reports the incident to her parents. AAA decided not to disclose what transpired
because of fear. Nevertheless, AAAs
uncle, EEE learned from appellant himself that the latter had sexual
intercourse with her. Her uncle relayed
the information to her father who confronted her about the incident. After confirming the same from AAA, they
decided to report the matter to the police where she was investigated and her
sworn statement taken.
Dr. Jane
Toribio-Berona (Dr. Toribio-Berona) conducted a physical examination on AAA. She identified the medical certificate[6]
issued by her wherein it was indicated that there was laceration on AAAs
hymen.
Version of the
Defense
On the other
hand, appellant does not deny having had sexual intercourse with AAA. Instead, he claimed that it was voluntary and
without the use of force since they were lovers. To support his claim that AAA was his
girlfriend, appellant presented Boyet and Nieves Irish Oandasan (Nieves Irish) who
both corroborated his sweetheart defense.
Ruling of the Regional
Trial Court
After trial, the
RTC declared appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the charge
lodged against him after finding AAAs testimony to be credible[7]
as it was given in a candid and straightforward manner.[8]
It rejected appellants sweetheart defense holding that a sweetheart cannot
be forced to have sex against her will.[9]
Consequently he was condemned to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and payment of damages, viz:
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds accused, CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
AAA the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (p100,000.00) as moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as civil indemnity.
SO
ORDERED.[10]
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[11]
on April 24, 2001 with the trial court. The records of this case were
transmitted to this Court. Both parties
filed their respective Briefs.[12]
Consistent however to this Courts
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[13]
the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.[14]
In his brief,
appellant assigned the following errors, viz:
I. The
trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of [the]
private complainant that accused poked a knife at the left side of her [abdomen]
after she came out from [the] church.
II.
The trial court erred in not acquitting
accused-appellant on [the] ground of reasonable doubt.[15]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Resolving
jointly the foregoing imputations against the trial court, the CA affirmed with
modification the appealed judgment of conviction. The CA ruled that there is
nothing on record which shows that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied a fact or circumstance of weight and substance
which would have affected the case. The
CA junked appellants contentions that he and AAA were lovers; that no force
or intimidation was employed on AAA; and that there was contradiction as to
which of his hands was placed around the neck of AAA. The CA further held that AAAs simple
account of her ordeal evinces sincerity and truthfulness. It disposed of the appeal in its assailed Decision
promulgated on July 3, 2006, thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the assailed
Decision promulgated on April 19, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 08, in Criminal Case No. 08-1157, finding the accused-appellant
Carlo Dumadag y Romio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that
appellant is ordered to pay the victim AAA the reduced amount of Php50,000.00
as moral damages, in addition to the Php50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by
the trial court.
SO
ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved,
appellant is now before this Court submitting anew for resolution the same
matters he argued before the CA. Per Resolution[17]
dated June 4, 2007, the parties were notified that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desire within 30 days from notice. Appellant informed the Court that he would no longer
file a supplemental brief as all relevant matters were already taken up.[18]
Appellee, for its part, opted not to
file any supplemental brief.[19]
Thus, this case was submitted for
decision on the basis of their respective briefs filed with the CA.
In his bid for
acquittal, appellant points out several circumstances purportedly showing that AAAs
testimony is not worthy of credence. According to appellant, it is highly
improbable for him to poke a knife on her without being noticed since the
members of his (appellant) family were just a little bit ahead of her. He claims that from a distance of 200 meters
from the church to the house of Boyet, it would be impossible that nobody saw
them considering that his right arm was allegedly placed around her neck and at
the same time a knife was poked on the left side of her body. He further asserts that she could have made an
outcry considering that she was with his (appellant) parents in going home
after the midnight mass.
Our Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The
improbabilities alluded to by the appellant hinge on the assessment of the
credibility of AAA. When credibility
is the issue that comes to fore, this Court generally defers to the findings of
the trial court which had the first hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of
witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct and attitude during their
presentation. Hence, the trial courts
factual findings especially when affirmed by the appellate court are accorded
the highest degree of respect and are conclusive and binding on this Court. A review of such findings by this Court is not
warranted save upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances such as when
the courts evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which[, if considered, would] affect the result of the
case.[20]
Unfortunately for appellant, none of these recognized exceptions necessitating
a reversal of the assailed Decision obtains in this instance.
The gravamen of
the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent.[21]
On the basis of the records, the Court
finds AAA candidly and categorically recounted the manner appellant
threatened her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her
will. AAA consistently testified that
while she was on her way home after hearing the midnight mass on December 24,
1998, appellant suddenly and unexpectedly grabbed her, placed his right hand
around her neck and poked a knife at the left portion of her abdomen,
threatening to kill her if she shouts. He made her walk towards the house of Boyet
where she was forced to lie on a bed and with the knife aimed at her side
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.[22]
Reviewing the antecedents of this case,
the Court, just as the courts below, is convinced of the truth and sincerity in
the account of AAA. It bears to stress
that [a]s a rule, testimonies of child victims of rape are given full weight
and credit for youth and immaturity are badges of truth.[23]
Neither is it
improbable for appellant to employ such criminal design in the presence of his
(appellant) own family especially when overcome by lust. It is a common judicial experience that
rapists are not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of
people nearby.[24] [L]ust is no respecter of time and place.[25]
As established, AAA was silenced by
appellants threat of killing her with a knife.[26] Thus, the reason for AAAs failure to shout
or cry for help is because she was overcame by fear. It has been held that minors, like AAA,
could be easily intimidated and cowed into silence even by the mildest threat
against their lives.[27]
Also it is not
impossible for them to walk from the church to the house of Boyet
unnoticed. Except for his bare argument,
nothing was adduced that church goers passed through that road about the same
time as the incident. In fact, AAA
testified that she did not encounter other persons on the way to the house of
Boyet.[28]
In trying to discredit further AAAs
testimony, appellant assails her behavior before, during and after the rape
incident. He contends that in all these
instances, AAA had all the chances to escape but she did not. He argues that AAA had the opportunity to
run when they were entering the house of Boyet and during their more or less
five hours stay inside the house yet she decided to remain. He claims that such behavior is unnatural,
incredible and beyond human experience.
Appellants
contentions fail to persuade.
The failure of AAA
to flee despite opportunity does not necessarily deviate from natural human
conduct. It bears emphasis that human
reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying
experience such as sexual assault. There
is no uniform behavior expected of victims after being raped.[29]
Moreover, [n]ot all rape victims can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.[30]
AAA, being then a minor and subjected
to a threat to her life, should not be judged by the norms of behavior expected
of mature persons.
The fact that
there is no evidence of resistance on the part of AAA does not cloud her
credibility. The failure of a victim to
physically resist does not negate rape when intimidation is exercised upon [her]
and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists assault
because of fear for life and physical safety.[31] In this case, AAA was dragged by appellant
with a knife pointed on her neck and warned not to shout or to reveal the
incident to anyone or else she would be killed.
That warning was instilled in AAAs mind such that even when appellant
was just holding his weapon after the intercourse, she did not attempt to flee.
The intimidations made by the appellant
are sufficient since it instilled fear in her mind that if she would not submit
to his bestial demands, something bad would befall her. Well-settled is the rule that where the
victim is threatened with bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a
deadly weapon, such as a pistol, knife, ice pick or bolo, such constitutes
intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful
desires of the rapist.[32]
There is no question that AAA
underwent sexual intercourse as admitted by appellant himself and as shown by
the medical findings of Dr. Toribio-Berona.[33]
However, appellant denies having raped
her and instead, claims that he and AAA were lovers and the act of sexual
intercourse was a free and voluntary act between them. In short, he interposes the sweetheart
theory to exculpate himself from the rape charge filed against him.
Appellants claim that they are
lovers is untenable. For one, such claim
was not substantiated by the evidence on the record. The only evidence adduced by appellant were
his testimony and those of his relatives Boyet and Nieves Irish. According to Boyet,
he knows of their relationship because they were conversing and writing each
other[34]
while Nieves Irish saw them once walking in the street.[35]
To the mind of the Court, these are not
enough evidence to prove that a romantic relationship existed between appellant
and AAA. In People v. Napudo[36]
where the accused likewise invoked the
sweetheart defense, this Court held that:
[T]he fact alone that two people were seen seated beside each other,
conversing during a jeepney ride, without more, cannot give rise to the
inference that they were sweethearts. Intimacies such as loving caresses,
cuddling, tender smiles, sweet murmurs or any other affectionate gestures that
one bestows upon his or her lover would have been seen and are expected to
indicate the presence of the relationship.
Other than his self-serving
assertions and those of his witnesses which were rightly discredited by the
trial court, nothing supports appellants claim that he and AAA were indeed
lovers. A sweetheart defense, to be credible, should be substantiated by
some documentary or other evidence of relationship [such as notes, gifts,
pictures, mementos] and the like.[37]
Appellant failed to discharge this burden.
Besides, even if it were true that
appellant and AAA were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate
rape. Definitely, a man cannot demand
sexual gratification from a fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on the
pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.[38]
But what destroyed the veracity of appellants sweetheart defense were the
credible declaration of AAA that she does not love him[39]
and her categorical denial that he is her boyfriend.[40]
With the credibility of AAA having
been firmly established, the courts below did not err in finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed through force and
intimidation. The sweetheart theory interposed by appellant was correctly
rejected for lack of substantial corroboration.
The Proper
Penalty
Under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. At the time of the commission of the offense
on December 25, 1998, Republic Act No. 8353 (otherwise known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997) was already in effect. The
amendatory law, particularly Article 266-B thereof, provides an identical
provision and imposes the same penalty when the crime of rape is committed with
the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. In this case, such
circumstance was sufficiently alleged in the Information and established during
the trial. In People v. Macapanas,[41] the Court ruled that [b]eing in the
nature of a qualifying circumstance, use of a deadly weapon increases the
penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty. This so-called qualified form of rape
committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Since the Information does not allege and the
prosecution failed to prove any other attending circumstance in the commission
of the offense, the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua[42] conformably with Article 63[43]
of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the courts
below on appellant.
As to damages, the Court affirms the
grant by the appellate court to AAA of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
and its reduction of the amount of moral damages to P50,000.00 based on
prevailing jurisprudence.[44]
Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory
damages is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[45]
Moral damages, on the other hand, are
automatically granted to the rape victim without presentation of further proof
other than the commission of the crime.[46]
The Court notes that both the courts
below failed to award exemplary damages. Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
should be awarded by reason of the established presence of the qualifying
circumstance of use of a deadly weapon as the Court recently ruled in People v. Toriaga.[47] The Court further held in said case that
under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, the rape victim is entitled to recover
exemplary damages following the ruling in People
v. Catubig.[48]
In addition, interest at the rate of
6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality
of this judgment until fully paid likewise pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[49]
WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01843 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that
appellant Carlo Dumadag y Romio is ordered to further pay
AAA P30, 000.00 as exemplary damages and interest at the rate of 6%
per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from the date the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
⃰ Per Special Order No. 1022 dated June 10,
2011.
[1] CA rollo, pp. 103-147; penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin, now Members of this Court.
[2] Records, pp. 156-165; penned by Judge Conrado F. Manauis.
[3] Promulgated on April 19, 2001, id. at 166.
[4] The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or
compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household
members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing
for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262,
An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, effective November 5, 2004.
[5] Records, p. 1.
[6] Exhibit A, id. at 5.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Appellants Brief, CA rollo, pp. 38-58; Appellees Brief, id. at 73-97.
[13] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[14] CA rollo, p. 101.
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo, p. 51.
[18]
[19]
[20] People v. Coja, G.R. No. 179277, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 176, 186.
[21] People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 170569, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 244, 255.
[22] TSN, February 21, 2000, pp. 4-6.
[23] People v. Veluz, G.R. No. 167755, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 500, 514.
[24] People v. Rebato, 410 Phil. 470, 479 (2001).
[25] People v. Montesa, G.R. No. 181899, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 317, 337.
[26] TSN, February 21, 2000, p. 6.
[27] People
v. Canete, G.R. No. 182193, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 549, 558-559 citing People v. Santos, 452 Phil. 1046, 1061 (2003).
[28] Supra note 26 at 9.
[29] People v. Crespo, G.R. No. 180500, September 11, 2008, 564 SCRA 613, 637.
[30] People v. Madia, 411 Phil. 666, 673 (2001).
[31] People v. Marcos, 368 Phil.143, 158 (1999).
[32] People v. Oga, G.R. No. 152302, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 354, 361.
[33] Supra note 6.
[34] TSN, July 11, 2000, p. 10.
[35] TSN, December 5, 2000, p. 4.
[36] G.R. No. 168448, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 213, 225.
[37] People v. Gabelinio, G.R. Nos. 132127-29, March 31, 2004, 426 SCRA 608, 621.
[38] People v. Manallo, 448 Phil 149, 166 (2003).
[39] TSN, February 21, 2000, p. 16.
[40] TSN, March 12, 2001, p. 3.
[41] G.R. No. 187049, March 4, 2010, 620 SCRA 54, 76.
[42]
[43] Article
63. Rules
for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
x x x x
2. When there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.
x x x x
[44] People
v. Macapanas, supra note 40.
[45] People v. Arivan, G.R. No. 176065, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 448, 470.
[46] People v. Diocado. G.R. No. 170567, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 123, 139.
[47] G.R. No. 177145, February 9, 2011. See also People v. Macapanas, supra note 40 at
76-77.
[48] 416 Phil. 102, 119-120 (2001).
[49] People
v. Galvez, G.R. No. 181827, February 2, 2011; People v. Alverio, G.R. No. 194259, March 16, 2011.