Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
|
DANILO A. AURELIO,
Petitioner, - versus - VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 175367
Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson, NACHURA,
PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: June 6, 2011 |
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PERALTA,
J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the October 6, 2005 Decision[2] and October 26, 2006
Resolution,[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were
married on
On
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void,
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition
are the following allegations, to wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife
are psychologically incapable of performing and complying with their essential
marital obligations. Said psychological
incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested
by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity
to discern the plight of his working wife.
The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance
and contrition. He refused to assist in
the maintenance of the family. He
refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings
of his wife. He liked to humiliate and
embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is
effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly from joy
to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot
stand frustration or disappointment. She
cannot delay to gratify her needs. She
gets upset when she cannot get what she wants.
Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted
their relationship. Their incapacity to
accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the
breakdown of their marriage. Private
respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to
take care of him. The psychological
make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that
the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital
obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers
from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him
immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.[5]
On
On
On
A review of the petition
shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268
SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the
root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the
respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation
of juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The
allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged
in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in
paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability
was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action
presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Whether or not the
allegations are meritorious depends upon
the proofs to be presented by both parties. This, in turn, will entail
the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on the
merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of
evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail.
Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the
hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant
nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.[9]
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In a Resolution dated
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that
respondents complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized
in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence
of a sufficient cause of action.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this
Courts consideration, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE
APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE
COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE
APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY
TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY
REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
[12]
Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents
complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this present petition would have
been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10[13] prohibits the filing of a
motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may,
after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this
Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in
the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1)
Burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2)
The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
(3)
The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.
(4)
Such
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5)
Such illness
must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.[15]
This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No.
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations
contained in respondents petition are insufficient to support a declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner
contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that
such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital
obligation must be stated in the petition.[17]
First, contrary to
petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their
psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist
clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise
alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring
about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly
suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The
incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to
be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds
that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged
in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states
that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter
for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the
same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence,
witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court
after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8,
which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It
would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first
instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to
substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own attendant facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.[18]
It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as
it would be in the best position to
scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the
testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the
parties.
Given the
allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules
that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It
must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[19] Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the
allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient and that the
RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an
error of judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.[20]
Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an
interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners
remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his
answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in
case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time.[21]
The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition
for certiorari in the CA.[22]
WHEREFORE, premises considered the
petition is DENIED. The October
6, 2005 Decision and
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp.
11-30.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M.
Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Danilo B. Pine,
concurring; id. at 31-35.
[3] Rollo pp.
36-37.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] CA rollo, pp.
2-22.
[11] Rollo, p. 35.
[12] Id at 17.
[13]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (RE: PROPOSED RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES)
Section 7. Motion to Dismiss. - No motion to dismiss
the petition shall be allowed, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other
ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an
affirmative defense in an answer.
[14] 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[15]
[16] Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800,
[17] Rollo, p. 25.
[18] Ngo Te v. Rowena
Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193, 228.
[19] Solvic
Industrial Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 125548, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 432, 44 (Italics supplied); Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 374 Phil 859, 864 (1999).
[20] Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing
Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 287,
306.
[21]