Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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William Endeliseo Barroga, |
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G.R. No. 174158 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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BERSAMIN, |
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VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. |
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Bactad,[1] |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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June 27, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
Our labor laws are enacted not solely
for the purpose of protecting the working class but also the management by
equally recognizing its right to conduct its own legitimate business affairs.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2]
seeks the reversal of the Resolutions dated May 15, 2006[3]
and August 4, 2006[4] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93991, which dismissed petitioner
William Endeliseo Barrogas Petition for Certiorari for procedural
infirmities, as well as the Decision[5]
dated August 25, 2005 and Resolution[6]
dated January 31, 2006 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), with
respect to the dismissal of petitioners claim of constructive dismissal against
respondents Data Center College of the Philippines and its President and General
Manager, Wilfred Bactad.
Factual
Antecedents
On November 11, 1991, petitioner was
employed as an Instructor in P1,200.00 allowance for board and lodging during his stint as
instructor in UNP-Vigan. In 1994, he was
recalled to Laoag campus. On October 3, 2003, petitioner received a Memorandum[9]
transferring him to Data Center College Bangued, Abra branch as Head for
Education/Instructor due to an urgent need for an experienced officer and
computer instructor thereat.
However, petitioner declined to
accept his transfer to Abra citing the deteriorating health condition of his father
and the absence of additional remuneration to defray expenses for board and
lodging which constitutes implicit diminution of his salary.[10]
On November 10, 2003, petitioner
filed a Complaint[11]
for constructive dismissal against respondents.
Petitioner alleged that his proposed transfer to Abra constitutes a
demotion in rank and diminution in pay and would cause personal inconvenience
and hardship. He argued that although he
was being transferred to Abra branch supposedly with the same position he was
then holding in Laoag branch as Head for Education, he later learned through a Memorandum[12]
from the administrator of Abra branch that he will be re-assigned merely as an
instructor, thereby relegating him from an administrative officer to a
rank-and-file employee. Moreover, the
elimination of his allowance for board and lodging will result to an indirect
reduction of his salary which is prohibited by labor laws. Petitioner also claimed that when he questioned
the indefinite suspension of the scholarship for post-graduate studies extended
to him by respondents,[13]
the latter became indifferent to his legitimate grievances which eventually led
to his prejudicial re-assignment. He averred
that his transfer is not indispensable to the schools operation considering
that respondents even suggested that he take an indefinite leave of absence in
the meantime if only to address his personal difficulties.[14]
Petitioner thus prayed for his
reinstatement and backwages. Further, as
Head for Education at Data Center College Laoag branch, petitioner asked for
the payment of an overload honorarium as compensation for the additional teaching
load in excess of what should have been prescribed to him. Exemplary damages and attorneys fees were
likewise prayed for.
For their part, respondents claimed
that they were merely exercising their management prerogative to transfer
employees for the purpose of advancing the schools interests. They argued that petitioners refusal to be transferred
to Abra constitutes insubordination. They claimed that petitioners appointment
as instructor carries a proviso of possible re-assignments to any branch or
tie-up schools as the schools necessity demands. Respondents argued that petitioners
designation as Head for Education in Laoag branch was merely temporary and that
he would still occupy his original plantilla item as instructor at his proposed
assignment in Abra branch. Respondents
denied liability to petitioners monetary claims.
Ruling of the
Labor Arbiter
On September 24, 2004, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision[15]
dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no
demotion in rank as petitioners original appointment as instructor on November
11, 1991 conferred upon respondents the right to transfer him to any of the
schools branches and that petitioners designation as Head for Education can
be withdrawn anytime since he held such administrative position in a
non-permanent capacity. The Labor
Arbiter held that the exclusion of his allowance for board, lodging and
transportation was not constructive dismissal, enunciating that the concept of
non-diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code prohibits the
elimination of benefits that are presently paid to workers to satisfy the
requirements of prevailing minimum wage rates. Since the benefit claimed by petitioner is
beyond the coverage of the minimum wage law, its non-inclusion in his re-assignment
is not considered a violation. The Labor
Arbiter also denied petitioners claim for overload honorarium for failure to
present sufficient evidence to warrant entitlement to the same. The claim for damages was likewise denied.
Ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission
In a Decision[16]
dated August 25, 2005, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter that
there was no constructive dismissal. It
ruled that the management decision to transfer petitioner was well within the
rights of respondents in consonance with petitioners contract of employment and
which was not sufficiently shown to have been exercised arbitrarily by
respondents. It agreed with the Labor
Arbiter that petitioners designation as Head for Education was temporary for
which he could not invoke any tenurial security. Further, the NLRC held that it was not proven
with certainty that the transfer would unduly prejudice petitioners financial
situation. The NLRC, however, found petitioner
to be entitled to overload honorarium pursuant to CHED Memorandum Order No. 25
for having assumed the position of Head for Education, albeit on a temporary
basis. The NLRC disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED by ordering
the respondent Data Center College of the Philippines, to pay the complainant
the sum of SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN THUNDRED [sic] THIRTY and 39/100 Pesos (P73,730.39), representing
overload honorarium.
All
other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[17]
From this Decision, both parties
filed their respective motion for partial reconsideration. Petitioner assailed the NLRC Decision insofar as
it dismissed his claims for reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorneys
fees.[18]
Respondents, for their part, questioned
the NLRCs award of overload honorarium in favor of petitioner. These motions were denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution dated January 31, 2006.[19]
Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
Both parties filed petitions for certiorari before the CA. Respondents petition for certiorari was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 94205, which is not subject of the instant review. On the other hand, petitioner filed on April
7, 2006, a Petition for Certiorari[20]
with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93991 assailing the NLRCs finding that
no constructive dismissal existed. Realizing
his failure to attach the requisite affidavit of service of the petition upon
respondents, petitioner filed on April 27, 2006, an Ex-Parte Manifestation and
Motion[21]
to admit the attached affidavit of service and registry receipt in compliance
with the rules.
On May 15, 2006, the CA dismissed
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 93991 in a Resolution which reads:
Petition
is DISMISSED outright due to the following infirmities:
1.
there is no
statement of material dates as to when the petitioner received the assailed
decision dated August 25, 2005 and when he filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof;
2.
there is no
affidavit of service attached to the petition;
3.
these
initiatory pleadings and the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated August 25, 2005 are not attached to the petition.
SO ORDERED.
[22]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23]
alleging that the material dates of receipt of the NLRC Decision and the filing
of his motion for reconsideration are explicitly stated in his Partial Motion
for Reconsideration which was attached as an annex to the petition and was made
an integral part thereof. As to the
absence of the affidavit of service, petitioner argued that there is no legal
impediment for the belated admission of the affidavit of service as it was duly
filed before the dismissal of the petition. As for his failure to attach respondents
motion for reconsideration, petitioner manifested that a separate petition for certiorari
has been filed by respondents and is pending with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 94205, where the denial of said motion is at issue.
On
Due
to non-compliance despite opportunity afforded to comply, petitioners June 9, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED
for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Issues
Hence, this
petition assigning the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI [UNDER RULE 65] OF
THE PETITIONER BY GIVING PRECEDENT TO TECHNICALITIES RATHER THAN THE
MERITORIOUS GROUNDS ASSERTED THEREIN.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS CONSLUSIONS OF LAW IN RENDERING IT[S] ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION
STATING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED, THUS, NOT
ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT, BACKWAGES, AND ATTORNEYS FEES.[25]
Petitioner imputes
grave abuse of discretion on the CA in not giving due course to his petition
despite substantial compliance with the requisite formalities as well as on the
NLRC in not ruling that he was constructively dismissed by respondents.
Our Ruling
Petitioners substantial
compliance calls
for the relaxation of the rules.
Therefore, the CA should have given due course to the petition.
The three
material dates which should be stated in the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 are the dates when the notice of the judgment was received, when
a motion for reconsideration was filed and when the notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration was received.[26]
These dates should be reflected in the
petition to enable the reviewing court to determine if the petition was filed
on time.[27] Indeed, petitioners petition before the CA stated
only the date of his receipt of the NLRCs Resolution denying his motion for partial
reconsideration. It failed to state when
petitioner received the assailed NLRC Decision and when he filed his partial motion
for reconsideration. However, this
omission is not at all fatal because these material dates are reflected in
petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration attached as Annex N of the
petition. In Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo,[28]
we held that failure to state these two dates in the petition may be excused if
the same are evident from the records of the case. It was further ruled by this Court that the
more important material date which must be duly alleged in the petition is the
date of receipt of the resolution of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
In the case at bar, petitioner has duly complied with this rule.
Next, the CA
dismissed the petition for failure to attach an affidavit of service. However, records show that petitioner timely
rectified this omission by submitting the required affidavit of service even
before the CA dismissed his petition.
Thirdly, petitioners
failure to attach respondents motion for reconsideration to the assailed NLRC
decision is not sufficient ground for the CA to outrightly dismiss his
petition. The issue that was raised in
respondents motion for reconsideration is the propriety of the NLRCs grant of
overload honorarium in favor of petitioner. This particular issue was not at all raised in
petitioners petition for certiorari with the CA, therefore, there is no
need for petitioner to append a copy of this motion to his petition. Besides, as already mentioned, the denial of
respondents motion for reconsideration has been assailed by respondents before
the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94205.
At any rate, the Rules do not specify the documents which should be
appended to the petition except that they should be relevant to the judgment,
final order or resolution being assailed. Petitioner is thus justified in attaching the
documents which he believed are sufficient to make out a prima facie
case.[29]
The Court has time
and again upheld the theory that the rules of procedure are designed to secure
and not to override substantial justice.[30]
These are mere tools to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases, hence, their strict and rigid application
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must be avoided.[31] The CA thus should not have outrightly
dismissed petitioners petition based on these procedural lapses.
Petitioners transfer is not
tantamount to constructive dismissal.
Nevertheless, the instant petition
merits dismissal on substantial grounds. After a careful review of the records and the
arguments of the parties, we do not find any sufficient basis to conclude that petitioners
re-assignment amounted to constructive dismissal.
Constructive dismissal is quitting because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or because
of a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. It exists when there is a clear act of discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer which becomes unbearable for the
employee to continue his employment.[32]
Petitioner alleges that the real purpose
of his transfer is to demote him to the rank of an instructor from being the
Head for Education performing administrative functions. Petitioner further argues that his re-assignment
will entail an indirect reduction of his salary or diminution of pay
considering that no additional allowance will be given to cover for board and
lodging expenses. He claims that such
additional allowance was given in the past and therefore cannot be discontinued
and withdrawn without violating the prohibition against non-diminution of
benefits.
These allegations are bereft of
merit.
Petitioner was originally appointed
as instructor in 1991 and was given additional administrative functions as Head
for Education during his stint in Laoag branch. He did not deny having been designated as Head
for Education in a temporary capacity for which he cannot invoke any tenurial
security. Hence, being temporary in
character, such designation is terminable at the pleasure of respondents who
made such appointment.[33]
Moreover, respondents right to transfer petitioner rests not only on
contractual stipulation but also on jurisprudential authorities. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both relied on
the condition laid down in petitioners employment contract that respondents
have the prerogative to assign petitioner in any of its branches or tie-up
schools as the necessity demands. In any
event, it is management prerogative for employers to transfer employees on just
and valid grounds such as genuine business necessity.[34]
It is also important to stress at this
point that respondents have shown that it was experiencing some financial
constraints. Because of this, respondents
opted to temporarily suspend the post-graduate studies of petitioner and some
other employees who were given scholarship grants in order to prioritize more
important expenditures.[35]
Indeed, we cannot
fully subscribe to petitioners contention that his re-assignment was tainted
with bad faith. As a matter of fact,
respondents displayed commiseration over the health condition of petitioners
father when they suggested that he take an indefinite leave of absence to
attend to this personal difficulty. Also, during the time when respondents
directed all its administrative officers to submit courtesy resignations,
petitioners letter of resignation was not accepted.[36]
This bolsters the fact that respondents never intended to get rid of
petitioner. In fine, petitioners
assertions of bad faith on the part of respondents are purely unsubstantiated conjectures.
The Court agrees with the Labor
Arbiter that there was no violation of the prohibition on diminution of benefits.
Indeed, any benefit and perks being
enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced and discontinued, otherwise, the constitutional
mandate to afford full protection to labor shall be offended.[37]
But the rule against diminution of
benefits is applicable only if the grant or benefit is founded on an express
policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period which is consistent
and deliberate.[38]
Petitioner was granted a monthly
allowance for board and lodging during his stint as instructor in UNP-Vigan, Ilocos Sur as evinced in a letter dated June
6,
1992 with the
condition stated in the following tenor:
Please
be informed that during your assignment at our tie-up at UNP-VIGAN, ILOCOS
SUR , you will be receiving a monthly Board and Lodging of Pesos: One
Thousand Two Hundred x x x (P1,200.00).
However, you are only entitled to such allowance,
if you are assigned to the said tie-up and the same will be changed or
forfeited depending upon the place of your next reassignment.[39] (Italics supplied.)
Petitioner failed to present any
other evidence that respondents committed to provide the additional allowance
or that they were consistently granting such benefit as to have ripened into a
practice which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. Moreover, there is no conclusive proof that
petitioners basic salary will be reduced as it was not shown that such
allowance is part of petitioners basic salary. Hence, there will be no violation of the rule
against diminution of pay enunciated under Article 100 of the Labor Code.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions
dated May 15, 2006 and August 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
93991 are SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Also appears as Wilfredo Bactad in some parts of the records.
[2] Rollo, pp. 3-30.
[3] Annex A of the Petition, id. at 31-32; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
[4] Annex B of the Petition, id. at 33.
[5] Annex D of the Petition, id. at 37-50; penned by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and concurred in by Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay and Angelita A. Gacutan.
[6] Annex C of the Petition, id. at 34-36.
[7] Annex W of the Petition, id. at 165.
[8] Annex V of the Petition, id. at 164.
[9] Dated October 3, 2003, Annex U of the Petition, id. at 163.
[10] See petitioners letter to respondent Bactad dated October 13, 2003, Annex X of the Petition, id. at 166.
[11] Annex F of the Petition, id. at 56.
[12] Dated November 4, 2003, Annex Z of the Petition, id. at 168.
[13] See petitioners letter to respondent Bactad dated October 27, 2003, Annex AA of the Petition, id. at 170.
[14] See respondent Bactads letter to petitioner dated October 29, 2003, Annex Y of the Petition, id. at 167.
[15] Annex M of the Petition, id. at 92-108; penned by NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1 Officer-in-Charge Irenarco R. Rimando.
[16] Supra note 5.
[17] Rollo, p. 49.
[18] See petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Additional Documentary Evidence, Annex O of the Petition, id. at 124-135.
[19] Supra note 6.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 2-16.
[21]
[22] Supra note 3.
[23] CA rollo, pp. 99-104.
[24] Supra note 4.
[25] Rollo,
p. 12.
[26] Batugan v. Balindong, G.R. No.
181384,
[27] Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and Employees Organization (TIPTEO) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158703, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 112, 127.
[28] G.R. No. 176995,
[29] Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, 487 Phil. 412, 424-425 (2004).
[30] Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 623, 629 (2000).
[31] Van Melle Phils., Inc. v. Endaya, 458 Phil. 420, 430 (2003).
[32] Montederamos v. Tri-Union International Corporation, G.R. No. 176700, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 370, 376.
[33] Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 782, 790 (2001).
[34] Merck Sharp and Dohme (
[35] See respondents letter to the Commission on Higher Education dated December 11, 2003 in relation to petitioners letter seeking clarification of the temporary suspension of the employees masteral studies, rollo, pp. 172-173.
[36] See respondents letter to petitioner dated September 26, 2003, Annex Z-1 of the Petition, id. at 169.
[37] Arco Metal Products Co., Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Arco Metal-NAFLU (SAMARM-NAFLU), G.R. No. 170734, May 14, 2008, 554 SCRA 110, 118.
[38] TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC Employees
[39] Supra note 8.
[40] Aguanza v. Asian Terminal, Inc., G.R. No. 163505, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 104, 113.