Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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Spouses Manuel and Florentina |
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G.R. No. 170575 |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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VELASCO, JR., |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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June 8, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
The allegations in
the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of
the action[1]
and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.[2]
This Petition
for Review on Certiorari assails the
April 26, 2005 Decision[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the
Petition for Review before it. Also
assailed is the CA Resolution[4]
dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Factual
Antecedents
The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina
Del Rosario
and respondent
Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
filed by the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative
thereto as summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision are as follows:
The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be
the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located in
Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate
foundation, took possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a
memorandum of agreement entered into by and between it and the City of
In February and March 2003, the petitioners served
notices upon the respondent to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such notices
because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy
of said land.[5]
On July 7, 2003,
petitioners filed a Complaint[6]
for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) of
3.
Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of
land, situated at Dayao,
4. Sometime
in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took
full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d]
it for commercial purposes.
x x x x
7. Plaintiffs
have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without
any contractual or legal basis. Hence,
defendants possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.
8. But [plaintiffs]
patience has come to its limits. Hence,
sometime in the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said
defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property.
x x x x
10. Notwithstanding
receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it continues to
fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of
the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the
fifteen-day period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the
owners thereof.[7]
Upon service of
summons, respondent filed its Answer[8]
dated July 31, 2003 where it averred that:
3. The
defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to
the effect that the defendant took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and has been using the premises in accordance
with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant
corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the
plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years; the defendant specifically DENIES
the allegations contained in the last part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint
that the defendant has used the property leased for commercial purposes, the
truth of the matter being that the defendant has used and [is] still using the
property only for civic non-profit endeavors hewing closely to purposes of the
defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter
alia, devoted to general welfare, protection, and upliftment of the people
of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and elsewhere in the Philippines;
that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the compliance of its
avowed aims and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the
improvements, including a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of
the Foundation shall accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation
whatsoever, upon the expiration of this Lease (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex
2 hereof), eighteen (18) years hence;
x x x x
5. The defendant specifically DENIES the
allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, the truth being that the
defendant took possession of the subject property by virtue of Memorandums of
Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes 1 and 2 and
made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of Roxas,
which is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject
property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;
x x x x
8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth
in paragraph 10 of the Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental
to the plaintiffs and to vacate the premises, but specifically DENIES the rest
of the allegations thereof, the truth being that defendant has no obligation
whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or lessors of the
land occupied by defendant;
x x x x
As and by way of
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations,
and avers further that:
12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against
defendant.
The leased property does not belong to the
plaintiffs. The property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee]
of the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having acquired it by purchase from
the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as Annex 3 and made an integral part
hereof. While, admittedly, the said
certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the
ownership of the property covered therein has already transferred to the City
of
After the MTCC issued
an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on
October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of
Cause of Action. Records show that
before the instant case was filed, the City of
Ruling of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities
On November 24,
2003, the MTCC issued an Order[10]
resolving the respondents Motion. In
the said Order, the MTCC held that:
The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against
herein defendant. The defendant is the
lessee of the City of
The defendant had presented as its main defense
that the property was already sold by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of
the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 19,
1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.
Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown
that the purported Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend
that said document is merely defective.
They had not even denied the signatories to the said Contract of Sale;
specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that
plaintiffs did merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable
without any specifications.
When the parties pleadings fail to tender any
issue of fact, either because all the factual allegations have been admitted
expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a general denial; there is no need
of conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting evidence
anymore. The case is then ripe for
judicial determination, either through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court,
Rule 34) or by summary judgment under Rule 35, Rules of Court.
In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that
sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs,
defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed
the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes.
x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for someone to make
representation to them regarding the use of the subject property, but the same
never happened. Plaintiff[s] have
allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any
contractual or legal basis. Hence,
defendants possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.
x x x x
Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs
that the defendant took full control and possession of the subject property,
developed the same and has been using the premises in accordance with its
agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation
without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs
for over twenty-two long years.
That the defendants possession of the subject
property is by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the defendant
foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the
latter having acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale as
early as February 19, 1981, long before the defendant foundations occupation
of the property. In Alcos v. IAC 162
SCRA 823 (1988), Buyers immediate possession and occupation of the property
was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of
sale.
WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense
on forum shopping interposed by the defendant to be untenable and
unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this Court still finds the pleadings filed by
the plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses
this instant complaint. With cost
against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Ruling of the
Regional Trial Court
On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City,
Branch 17 rendered a Decision[12]
dated July 9, 2004 affirming the MTCC Order.
Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in a Decision[13]
dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision
of the RTC.
Petitioners timely
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14]
which was, however, denied in a Resolution[15]
dated November 15, 2005.
Issues
Still undaunted,
petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
I. Whether
x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should
limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,
II. Whether
x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.[16]
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The
allegations in petitioners Complaint constitute judicial admissions.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the
MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991, without their consent and
authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject property,
developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed
the respondent for several years, to make use of the land without any
contractual or legal basis. Petitioners
thus conclude that respondents possession of subject property is only by
tolerance.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides
that:
Sec. 4. Judicial
admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x
A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings
filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of
evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary
to be observed and complied with.[17] Correspondingly, facts alleged in the
complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon him.[18]
The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading
are conclusive as against the pleader.[19]
In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that
respondents took control and possession of subject property without their
consent and authority and that respondents use of the land was without any
contractual or legal basis.
Nature of
the action is determined by the judicial admissions in the Complaint.
In Spouses
Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,[20] citing Caiza v. Court of Appeals,[21] this Court held that what
determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.
This
Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,[22]
differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis--vis
unlawful detainer, to wit:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession
of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is
illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and
the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action
is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.[23]
The words by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth shall include every situation or condition under which one
person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had
prior possession, therefrom.[24] The foundation of the action is really the
forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered
without right.[25]
The act of going on the property and excluding
the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over
the property, and this is all that is necessary.[26] The employment of force, in this case, can be
deduced from petitioners allegation that respondent took full control and
possession of the subject property without their consent and authority.
Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any
secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or
remain within residence of another without permission,[27]
while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain
possession of the subject property.[28] The CA found that based on the petitioners
allegations in their complaint, respondents entry on the land of the
petitioners was by stealth x x x.[29] However, stealth as defined requires a
clandestine character which is not availing in the instant case as the entry of
the respondent into the property appears
to be with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners allegation
in their complaint that [c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant
foundation and considering further that it is plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor,
and now the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although
without any legal or contractual right, who transacted with the foundation,
plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the foundation using their
property.[30] To this Courts mind, this allegation if
true, also illustrates strategy.
Taken in
its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for
forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer.
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth.[31]
[W]here the defendants possession of
the property is illegal ab initio,
the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion)
is the remedy to recover possession.[32]
In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that
the respondent took possession and control of the subject property without any
contractual or legal basis.[33]
Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondents
possession was illegal from the very beginning.
Therefore, the foundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible
entry that is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person
who has entered without right.[34] Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there
can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondents possession was
illegal at the inception.[35]
Corollarily, since the
deprivation of physical
possession, as alleged
in
petitioners Complaint and as earlier
discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that the proper
remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not
the instant suit for unlawful detainer.
Petitioners
should have filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-year
period from the time of dispossession.
Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that
respondent took possession and occupancy of subject property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible
entry must be filed within one year from the time of dispossession,[36]
the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners filed
their Complaint in 2003. As a
consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the
respondent.
In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint,
and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed said order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the
Resolution dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87784 are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T
I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo, 453 Phil. 170, 176-177 (2003).
[2] Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672, 683-684 (1946).
[3] CA rollo,
pp. 98-104; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by
Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
[4]
[5]
[6] Rollo,
pp. 139-141.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] CA rollo,
pp. 69-73; penned by Acting
Presiding Judge Filpia D. Del Castillo.
[11]
[12]
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant appeal is
denied for lack of merit, and the questioned Order of the court a quo in Civil
Case No. V-2391 is affirmed.
[13]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING
the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed decision and order
of the RTC in
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo,
p. 9.
[17] Francisco Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in
the Philippines, Evidence,
Volume VII Part I, 1997 edition, p. 90 citing 2 Jones on Evidence, sec. 894;
[18] Federation of Free Farmers v. Court
of Appeals, 194
Phil. 328, 401 (1981).
[19] Alfelor
v. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451, 460.
[20] Supra note 1 at 175. Emphasis
supplied.
[21] 335 Phil. 1107 (1997).
[22] G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372.
[23]
[24] Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil 752, 756 (1918).
[25]
[26]
[27] Sumulong
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 384.
[28]
[29] Rollo,
p. 23.
[30]
[31] Sumulong
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 382.
[32] Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572 citing Emilia v. Bado, 131 Phil. 711 (1968).
[33] Rollo, p. 21
[34] Wong v. Carpio, G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118, 124.
[35] Muoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, September 23,
1992, 214 SCRA 216, 224.
[36] Rules
of Court, Rule 70, Section
1.