Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
MEGAN SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- regional
trial court of iloilo, branch 68, dumangas, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 170352 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: June 1, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before
this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August 23, 2004
Decision[2]
and October 12, 2005 Resolution[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 75789.
The
facts of the case are as follows:
On
On
On
In
response, CIMICO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumangas,
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the motions to place the mills share in escrow to the court is
hereby GRANTED.
Megan Sugar Corporation or its
director-officer, Mr. Joey Concha, who is General Manager of Megan, is ordered
to deposit in escrow within five (5) days upon receipt of this order, the sugar
quedans representing the millers share to the Court starting from December 19,
2002 and thereafter, in every Friday of the week pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by plaintiff CIMICO and defendant NFSC.
SO ORDERED. [15]
On
On
Aggrieved
by the orders issued by the RTC, MEGAN filed before the CA a petition for certiorari,[20]
dated
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Petition for Certiorari is hereby
DENIED and forthwith DISMISSED for lack of merit. Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[21]
In
denying MEGANs petition, the CA ruled that since Atty. Sabig had actively
participated before the RTC, MEGAN was already estopped from assailing the
RTCs jurisdiction.
Aggrieved,
MEGAN then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[22]
which was, however, denied by the CA in Resolution dated
Hence,
herein petition, with MEGAN raising the following issues for this Courts
consideration, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS
ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE ASSAILED ORDERS BECAUSE OF THE ACTS OF ATTY.
REUBEN MIKHAIL SABIG.
II.
WHETHER
OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDERS DATED
The
petition is not meritorious.
MEGAN
points out that its board of directors did not issue a resolution authorizing
Atty. Sabig to represent the corporation before the RTC. It contends that Atty. Sabig was an
unauthorized agent and as such his actions should not bind the corporation. In
addition, MEGAN argues that the counsels of the different parties were aware of
Atty. Sabigs lack of authority because he declared in court that he was still
in the process of taking over the case and that his voluntary appearance was
just for the hearing of the motion for intervention of Passi Sugar.
Both
EPCIB and NFSC, however, claim that MEGAN is already estopped from assailing
the authority of Atty. Sabig. They contend that Atty. Sabig had actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC and had even filed a number of
motions asking for affirmative relief. They
also point out that Jose Concha (Concha), who was a member of the Board of
Directors of MEGAN, accompanied Atty. Sabig during the hearing. Lastly, EPCIB and NFSC contend that all the
motions, pleadings and court orders were sent to the office of MEGAN; yet,
despite the same, MEGAN never repudiated the authority of Atty. Sabig.
After
a judicial examination of the records pertinent to the case at bar, this Court
agrees with the finding of the CA that MEGAN is already estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Relevant
to the discussion herein is the transcript surrounding the events of the
ATTY.
Appearing
as counsel for defendant PCI Equitable Bank, your Honor.
ATTY.
CORNELIO PANES:
Also
appearing as counsel for defendant New Frontier Sugar Corporation.
ATTY.
ANTONIO SINGSON:
I am
appearing, your Honor, as counsel for Passisugar.
ATTY.
REUBEN MIKHAIL SABIG:
Appearing
your Honor, for Megan Sugar, Inc.
ATTY. LEBRILLA: Your Honor, the counsel for the plaintiff
CIMICO has not yet arrived.
ATTY.
SABIG: Your Honor, we have been furnished of a copy of the motion. Ive talked to Atty. [Leonardo] Jiz and he
informed me that he cannot attend this hearing because we are in the process of
taking over this case. However, the
Passisugar had intervened and we have to appear because we have been copy
furnished of the motion, and also, your Honor, since the motion will directly
affect Megan and we are appearing in this hearing despite the fact that we had
not officially received the copy of the motion.
Anyway, your Honor, since we are in the process of taking over this
case, Atty. Jiz told me that he cannot appear today.
COURT: Here
is the representative from CIMICO.
ATTY. PANES: Yes, your Honor, Atty. Gonzales is
here.
ATTY.
NELIA JESUSA GONZALES:
I am
appearing in behalf of the plaintiff CIMICO, your Honor.
x x x x
COURT: Shall
we tackle first your motion for intervention?
ATTY. SINGSON: Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. PANES: Yes, your Honor, and I would like to
make a manifestation in relation to the appearance made by Atty. Sabig. Megan is not, in anyway, a party [to] this
case and if he must join, he can file a motion for intervention. We would like to reiterate our stand that he
cannot participate in any proceeding before this Court particularly in this
case.
COURT: Yes,
that is right.
ATTY. SINGSON: Yes, your Honor, unless there is a
substitution of the plaintiff.
ATTY. SABIG: I understand, your Honor, that we have
been served a copy of this motion.
ATTY. PANES: A service copy of the motion is only a
notice and it is not, in anyway, [a] right for him to appear as a party.
COURT: Just a moment, Atty.
Panes. Shall we allow Atty. Sabig to
finish first?
ATTY. SABIG: This motion directly affects us and
thats why were voluntarily appearing, just for this hearing on the motion and
not for the case itself, specifically for the hearing [on] this motion. Thats our appearance for today because we
have been served and we have to protect our interest. We are not saying that we are taking over the
case but there is a hearing for the motion in intervention and we have been
served a copy, thats why we appear voluntarily.
ATTY. LEBRILLA: Your Honor, please, for the defendant, we do
not object to the appearance of the counsel for Megan provided that the counsel
could assure us that whatever he says [all through] in this proceeding will
[bind] his client, your Honor, as he is duly authorized by the corporation, under
oath, your Honor, that whatever he says here is binding upon the corporation.
ATTY. SABIG: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: But I thought all the while
that your motion for intervention will implead Megan.
ATTY. SINGSON: We will not yet implead them, your Honor.
COURT: Why will you not implead
them because they are now in possession of the mill?
ATTY. SINGSON: Thats why we want to be clarified. In what capacity is Megan entering into the
picture? Thats the point now that we
would like to ask them. So, whatever
statement youll be making here will bind Megan?
ATTY. SABIG: Yes, your Honor. Specifically for the hearing because
apparently, we have to voluntarily appear since they furnished us a copy that
would directly affect our rights.
x x x x
COURT: Are you saying that you are appearing now in behalf of Megan?
ATTY. SABIG: Yes,
your Honor.
COURT: And whatever statement you made here will bind Megan?
ATTY. SABIG: Yes,
your Honor.
x x x x
COURT: Thats why youre being asked now what interest [does] Megan have here?
ATTY. SABIG: We
are already in possession of the mill, your Honor.
ATTY. SINGSON: You
are in possession of the mill. [On] what
authority are you in possession, this Megan group?
ATTY. SABIG: We
have a Memorandum of Agreement which we entered, your Honor, and they
transferred their [referring to CIMICO] rights to us.[24]
The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy,
fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak
against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from
equitable principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid the
law in the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might
result. It has been applied by this Court wherever and whenever special
circumstances of a case so demand.[25]
Based
on the events and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the assailed
orders, this Court rules that MEGAN is estopped from assailing both the
authority of Atty. Sabig and the jurisdiction of the RTC. While it is true, as
claimed by MEGAN, that Atty. Sabig said in court that he was only appearing for
the hearing of Passi Sugars motion for intervention and not for the case
itself, his subsequent acts, coupled with MEGANs inaction and negligence to
repudiate his authority, effectively bars MEGAN from assailing the validity of
the RTC proceedings under the principle of estoppel.
In
the first place, Atty. Sabig is not a complete stranger to MEGAN. As a matter
of fact, as manifested by EPCIB, Atty. Sabig and his law firm SABIG SABIG &
VINGCO Law Office has represented MEGAN in other cases[26]
where the opposing parties involved were also CIMICO and EPCIB. As such,
contrary to MEGANs claim, such manifestation is neither immaterial nor
irrelevant,[27]
because at the very least, such fact shows that MEGAN knew Atty. Sabig.
MEGAN can no longer deny the authority of Atty. Sabig as they have
already clothed him with apparent authority to act in their behalf. It must be
remembered that when Atty. Sabig entered his appearance, he was accompanied by
Concha, MEGANs director and general manager.
Concha himself attended several court hearings, and on
Like the CA, this Court notes that MEGAN never repudiated the authority
of Atty. Sabig when all the motions, pleadings and court orders were sent not
to the office of Atty. Sabig but to the office of MEGAN, who in turn, would
forward all of the same to Atty. Sabig, to wit:
x x x All the motions, pleadings and other notices
in the civil case were mailed to Atty. Reuben Mikhail P. Sabig, Counsel for
Megan Sugar, NFSC Compound, Barangay Man-it, Passi, Iloilo City which is the
address of the Sugar Central being operated by Megan Sugar. The said address is
not the real office address of Atty. Sabig. As pointed out by private
respondent Equitable PCI Bank, the office address of Atty. Sabig is in
One of the instances of estoppel is when the principal has clothed the
agent with indicia of authority as to lead a reasonably prudent person to
believe that the agent actually has such authority.[32]
With the case of MEGAN, it had all the opportunity to repudiate the authority
of Atty. Sabig since all motions, pleadings and court orders were sent to
MEGANs office. However, MEGAN never questioned the acts of Atty. Sabig and
even took time and effort to forward all the court documents to him.
To this Courts mind, MEGAN cannot feign knowledge of the acts of Atty.
Sabig, as MEGAN was aware from the very beginning that CIMICO was involved in
an on-going litigation. Such fact is clearly spelled out in MEGANs MOA with
CIMICO, to wit:
WHEREAS, CIMICO had filed a 2nd Amended
Complaint for Sum of Money, Breach of Contract and Damages with Preliminary Injunction
with a Prayer for a Writ of Temporary Restraining Order against the NEW
FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION, pending before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial
Court, based in Dumangas, Iloilo, Philippines, entitled CENTRAL ILOILO MILLING
CORPORATION (CIMICO) versus NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION (NFSC), EQUITABLE
PCI BANK and PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY docketed as CIVIL CASE NO.
02-243;[33]
Considering that MEGANs rights stemmed from CIMICO and that MEGAN was
only to assume the last crop period of 2002-2003 under CIMICOs contract with
NFSC,[34]
it becomes improbable that MEGAN would just wait idly by for the final
resolution of the case and not send a lawyer to protect its interest.
In addition, it bears to point out that MEGAN was negligent when it did
not assail the authority of Atty. Sabig within a reasonable time from the
moment when the first adverse order was issued. To restate, the
MEGAN had all the opportunity to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC and
yet far from doing so, it even complied with the RTC Order. With the amount of
money involved, it is beyond belief for MEGAN to claim that it had no knowledge
of the events that transpired. Moreover, it bears to stress that Atty. Sabig
even filed subsequent motions asking for affirmative relief, more important of
which is his March 27, 2003 Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion[37]
asking the RTC to direct the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to release
certain quedans in favor of MEGAN on the premise that the same were not covered
by the RTC Orders. Atty. Sabig
manifested that 30% of the value of the quedans will be deposited in court as
payment for accrued rentals. Noteworthy is the fact that Atty. Sabigs motion
was favorably acted upon by the RTC. Like the CA, this Court finds that
estoppel has already set in. It is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.[38]
The party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid but because such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of
public policy.[39]
Lastly, this Court also notes that on
The rule is that the active participation of the party against whom the
action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of
the court or administrative body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an
invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys
jurisdiction.[42]
Based on the preceding discussion, this Court holds that MEGANs challenge to
Atty. Sabigs authority and the RTCs jurisdiction was a mere afterthought
after having received an unfavorable decision from the RTC. Certainly, it would be unjust and inequitable
to the other parties if this Court were to grant such a belated jurisdictional
challenge.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp.
10-46.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L.
[3]
[4] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 19-21.
[5] Docketed as Civil Case No. 02-240.
[6] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 9-17.
[7]
[8] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 731-732.
[9] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 322- 328.
[10] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 708-712.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, pp.
139-150.
[15]
[16] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 799- 804.
[17]
[18]
[19] Records, Vol. 3, pp.1069-1070.
[20] Rollo, pp.
159-190.
[21]
[22] Records, Vol. 4, pp. 1649-1660.
[23] Rollo, p. 20.
[24] TSN,
[25] Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 183 Phil. 54, 63-64 (1979).
[26] Civil Case No. 03-11917, Megan Sugar Corporation v. EPCIB, et al., filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54 of Bacolod
City; Civil Case No. 03-27542, Central
Iloilo Milling Corporation v. Megan Sugar Corporation et al., filed before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,
[27] See Consolidated Reply to Oppositions to Motion for Reconsideration
filed by New Frontier Sugar Corporation and Equitable PCIBank, records, Vol. 4,
pp. 1706- 1712.
[28] Records, Vol. 2, p. 730.
[29] Rural Bank of
Milaor (Camarines Sur) v. Ocfemia, 381 Phil. 911, 929 (2000).
[30] Professional
Services, Inc. v. Agana, G.R. Nos. 126297, 126467 and 127590, January
31, 2007, 513 SCRA 478, 500-501.
[31] Rollo, p. 56.
[32]
Woodchild Holdings, Inc.
v. Roxas Electric and Construction Company, Inc., 479 Phil. 896, 914 (2004).
[33] Records, Vol. 2, p. 732.
[34] Note that CIMICOs MOA with NFSC was only for three years, or from year 2000 to 2003. Hence, from the time CIMICO entered into a MOA with MEGAN in 2002, only one year remained from CIMICOs contract.
[35] See Comment, rollo,
pp. 360-376, 372.
[36] Rollo, pp.
154-155.
[37]
[38] Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, No.
[39]
La Campana Food Products,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 88246,
[40] Records, Vol. 3, pp. 1086-1088.
[41]
[42] Marquez v.
Secretary of Labor, 253 Phil. 329, 336 (1989).