SPECIAL THIRD
DIVISION
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HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary in the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and
the PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC), Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R. No. 170146 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR.,* VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. |
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ATTY. ANTONIO
F. MONTEMAYOR, Respondent. |
Promulgated: June 8, 2011 |
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RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This resolves the motion
for reconsideration of our Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting aside the
October 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision
dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581, which
found the respondent administratively liable for failure to declare in his 2001
and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive cars
registered in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
in relation to Section 8 (A) of R.A. No. 6713.
The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal from service on respondent, with all accessory penalties.
The motion is anchored on the
following grounds:
1. Respondent
was subjected to two (2) administrative/criminal Investigations equivalently
resulting in violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
2. Who to follow between conflicting
decisions of two (2) government agencies involving the same facts and issues
affecting the rights of the Respondent.
3. Respondents constitutional right to due
process was violated.
4. Penalties prescribed by the Honorable
Court is too harsh and severe on the alleged offense committed/omitted.[1]
On the first ground, the Court finds
it bereft of merit. Respondent asserts that since the PAGC charge involving
non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was already the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman in
OMB-C-C-04-0568-LSC, along with the criminal complaint for unexplained wealth,
the former can no longer be pursued without violating the rule on double
jeopardy.
Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon
a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4)
when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.[2] We have held that none of these requisites
applies where the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the
same criminal offense against the respondent public officer.[3] The
dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute double
jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of the trial.[4]
With respect to the
second ground, respondent underscores the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the
criminal and administrative complaints against him, including the charge
subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP. It is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman
as a constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No. 6770, has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, as against
the PAGC which is not a constitutional
body but a mere creation of the OP. Under
said law, it is the Ombudsman who has disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the government, such as herein respondent.
The argument is
untenable.
The same wrongful act
committed by the public officer can subject him to civil, administrative and
criminal liabilities. We held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan[5]:
[I]t
is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or
employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a
wrongful act or omission. This simply
means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or
wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be
held civilly liable to reimburse the
injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring
officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to
suspension, removal from office, or other administrative
sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the
penal and civil liabilities. (Italics in the original.)
Dismissal
of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding
against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative
liability.[6] Res judicata
did not set in because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the Ombudsman dismissing
the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only
had the power to investigate and file the appropriate case before the
Sandiganbayan.[7]
In the analogous case of Montemayor v. Bundalian,[8]
this Court ruled:
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that
the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the
administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman
does not operate as res judicata in
the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible
criminal liability for the acquisition of the
Respondent
argues that it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint filed against him.
Notwithstanding the consolidation of the administrative offense
(non-declaration in the SSAL) with the criminal complaints for unexplained
wealth (Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019) and also for perjury (Article 183, Revised
Penal Code, as amended) before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondents
objection on jurisdictional grounds cannot be sustained.
Section 12
of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution mandated the Ombudsman to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman
is empowered to conduct investigations on his own or upon complaint by any
person when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient. He is also given broad
powers to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public
officials and employees.
The
investigative authority of the Ombudsman is defined in Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Such
jurisdiction over public officers and employees, however, is not exclusive.
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution
and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with
other similarly authorized government agencies, such as the PCGG and judges
of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the
Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction
with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective
officials.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent
who is a presidential appointee is under the disciplinary authority of the OP.
Executive Order No. 12 dated April 16, 2001 created the PAGC which was
granted the authority to investigate
presidential and also non-presidential employees who may have acted in
conspiracy or may have been involved with a presidential appointee or ranking
officer mentioned x x x.[10] On this score, we do not agree with
respondent that the PAGC should have deferred to the Ombudsman instead of
proceeding with the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of his
petition for certiorari with the CA challenging the PAGCs jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law.
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties
but continues until the case is terminated.[11]
It may be recalled that at the time
respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit under the Ombudsmans
Order dated
As
to the third ground raised by respondent, we find no merit in his reiteration
of the alleged gross violation of his right to due process. Records bear out that he was given several
opportunities to answer the charge against him and present evidence on his
defense, which he stubbornly ignored despite repeated warnings that his failure
to submit the required answer/counter-affidavit and position paper with
supporting evidence shall be construed as waiver on his part of the right to do
so.
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the
opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently
met.[13] What is offensive to
due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.[14] This Court has repeatedly
stressed that parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to
answer charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process.[15] Having persisted in his refusal to file his
pleadings and evidence before the PAGC, respondent cannot validly claim that
his right to due process was violated.
In his dissenting opinion, my esteemed colleague, Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin, concurred with the CAs finding that respondents right to due
process was violated by the unilateral investigation conducted by the PAGC
which did not furnish the respondent with a copy of the prejudicial PAGC
resolution. The dissent also agreed
with the CAs observation that there was a rush on the part of the PAGC to
find the respondent guilty of the charge.
This was supposedly manifested in the issuance by the PAGC of its
resolution even without taking into consideration any explanation and
refutation of the charges that he might make, and even before the CA could
finally resolve his suit to challenge the PAGCs jurisdiction to investigate
him. On the other hand, the dissent
proposed that the non-submission by respondent of his counter-affidavit or
verified answer as directed by the PAGC should not be taken against him. Respondents refusal was not motivated by
bad faith, considering his firm belief that PAGC did not have jurisdiction to
administratively or disciplinarily investigate him.
We do not share this view adopted by the dissent.
Records
reveal that on
On
the other hand, the PAGC submitted to the OP its
Still
on respondents repeated claim that he was denied due process, it must be noted
that when respondent received a copy of the OP Decision dated
We
also find nothing irregular in considering the investigation terminated and
submitting the case for resolution based on available evidence upon failure of
the respondent to file his counter-affidavit or answer despite giving him ample
opportunity to do so. This is allowed by
the Rules of Procedure of the PAGC. The
PAGC is also not required to furnish the respondent and complainant copy of its
resolution.
The
dissent of Justice Bersamin assails the OPs complete reliance on the PAGCs
findings and recommendation which constituted a gross violation of
administrative due process as set forth in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[17].
Among others, it is required that [T]he tribunal or any of its judges
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. Justice
Bersamin thus concludes that the OP should have itself reviewed and appreciated
the evidence presented and independently considered
the facts and the law of the controversy.
It was also pointed out that the OPs statement that the respondents
arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration With Motion For Leave To Admit
Explanation/Refutation of Complaint were a mere reiteration of matters
previously considered, was a patent
untruth.
We
disagree.
The
OP decision, after quoting verbatim the findings and recommendation of the
PAGC, adopted the same with a brief statement preceding the dispositive
portion:
After a
circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the recommendation
of PAGC and the legal premises as well as the factual findings that hold it
together. Respondent failed to disclose
in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of the prescription of
the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded ample
opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let the opportunity pass
by.[18]
The
relevant consideration is not the brevity of the above disquisition adopting fully
the findings and recommendation of the PAGC as the investigating authority. It is rather the fact that the OP is not a
court but an administrative body determining the liability of respondent who
was administratively charged, in the exercise of its disciplinary authority
over presidential appointees.
In
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,[19]
this Court ruled that the rights of parties in an administrative proceedings
are not violated by the brevity of the decision rendered by the OP incorporating
the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been
satisfied. Thus:
It must be stated that Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the
case a[t] bar. Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial
proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled Judiciary, and all of its
provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of
government. Certainly, it would be error
to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative
agencies are oblige[d] to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.
The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as
long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the
cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:
1) The right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
2) The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
3) The decision must have something to
support itself.
4) The evidence must be substantial.
5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
6) The tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
7) The board or body should, in all
controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.
As can be seen above, among these
rights are the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; and that the decision be rendered in such a manner that the parties
to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. Note that there
is no requirement in Ang Tibay that
the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and
expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and
legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.
At bar, the Office of the President
apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient, and said
so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was
not the product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision noted, were
already contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected
need only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an
informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65.
x x x x
Accordingly, based on close scrutiny
of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court rules that the said
Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative
due process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The Office of the President did not
violate petitioners right to due process when it rendered its one-page
Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe
to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-informed as
to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as
the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the
President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of
the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner would
not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and make a
presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and
the issues involved in its case.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)
Since
respondent repeatedly refused to answer the administrative charge against him
despite notice and warning by the PAGC, he submitted his evidence only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the OP, attaching the same to his motion for
reconsideration. That the OP denied the
motion by sustaining the PAGCs findings without any separate discussion of
respondents arguments and belatedly submitted evidence only meant that the OP
found the same lacking in merit and
insufficient to overturn its ruling on respondents administrative liability.
On
the fourth ground cited by the respondent, we maintain that the penalty of
dismissal from the service is justified as no acceptable explanation was given for
the non-declaration of the two expensive cars in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL.
Pursuant
to Section 11, paragraph (b) of R.A. No. 6713, any violation of the law proven in a proper administrative proceeding
shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or
employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him. Respondents deliberate attempt to evade the
mandatory disclosure of all assets acquired during the period covered was
evident when he first claimed that the vehicles were lumped under the entry
Machineries/Equipment or still mortgaged, and later averred that these were
already sold by the end of the year covered and the proceeds already spent.
Under
this scheme, respondent would have acquired as many assets never to be declared
at anytime. Such act erodes the function of requiring accuracy of entries in
the SSAL which must be a true and
detailed statement. It undermines
the SSAL as the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public
officers and employees in the government through which the public are able to
monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; [as] a valid check and
balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.[21]
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate
Justice |
WE
CONCUR: CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice Chairperson |
|
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PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
MARIANO
C. Associate
Justice |
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MARIA
Associate
Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
|
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CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
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RENATO C. CORONA Chief
Justice |
* Designated Additional Member per Raffle
dated
** Designated
Additional Member per Raffle dated
[1] Rollo,
p. 477.
[2] Almario
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
127772, March 22, 2001, 355 SCRA 1, 7.
[3] Apolinario
v.
[4] Trinidad
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166038, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA
415, 424, citing Vincoy v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 156558, June 14, 2004, 432 SCRA 36, 40.
[5] G.R. No. 123045,
[6] Office
of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, A.M. No. P-89-290,
[7] Apolinario
v.
[8] G.R. No. 149335,
[9] Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia, G.R. No. 167711, October 10, 2008, 568 SCRA
327, 339, citing Panlilio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 92276, June 26, 1992, 210 SCRA
421; Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government, G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226; Honasan
II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R.
No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46; and Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA
242.
[10] Sec. 4 (b).
[11] Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte, G.R. No. 168670, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA
155, 173, citing Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Cabato, 384 Phil. 252, 261
(2000).
[12] See Panlilio
v. Salonga, G.R. No. 113087,
[13] Medina
v. Commission on Audit (COA), G.R. No. 176478, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA
684, 696-697, citing Montemayor v.
Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158, 165 (2003).
[14] Octava
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166105, March 22, 2007, 518 SCRA 759,
764, citing Garments
and Textile Export Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
114711 & 115889, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 258, 299.
[15] Garcia
v. Pajaro, G.R. No. 141149,
[16] Rollo,
pp. 100-104.
[17] 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[18] Rollo,
p. 90.
[19] G.R. No. 166051,
[20]
[21] Ombudsman
v. Valeroso, G.R. No. 167828,