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G.R. No. 169985
Present: carpio MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO,
JJ.
Promulgated:
June 15, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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Before the Court is a
petition for review on certiorari[1]
assailing the
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Maria
Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths ()
and one-fourth () pro-indiviso,
respectively - of a parcel of land located in Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan, covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 24695, with an area of 28,171 square meters.[5]
In
September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths () share to Benigna Llamas.[6]
The sale was duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When Benigna died in
1944,[7]
she willed her three-fourths () share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas
and Josefa Llamas.[8]
Thus, Alejandra and Josefa each owned one-half () of Benignas three-fourths ()
share.
On
Also
on
WITNESSETH
That we [petitioner and respondent] are the absolute
owners of [the subject property] which is particularly described as follows:
xxx
That our ownership over the said portion mentioned
above is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale xxx
That in said deed of sale mentioned in the immediate
preceding paragraph, our respective share consist of 5, 282.13 [one-half of
10,564 square meters] square meter each.
That we hereby agreed and covenanted that our
respective share shall be as follows:
Casimero Valdez 7,544.27[12]
square meters of the parcel of land described above.[13]
On
In
1996, the respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the
requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him on the
subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner had
already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title (TCTs): one, TCT No. 195812 - covering an area of 3,020 square meters; and two, TCT No. 195813 - covering an area of
1,004 square meters (or a total of 4,024 square meters).
The
Register of Deeds informed the respondent that they could not find the record
of OCT No. 24695; instead, the Register of Deeds furnished the respondent with
the following[16] (collectively, petitioners documents):
1. Two
(2) deeds of absolute sale dated June 14, 1969, both executed by Sta. Maria,
purportedly conveying an unspecified portion of OCT No. 24695 as follows:
a.
11, 568 square
meters to the respondent and petitioner[17]
b.
8, 689 square
meters to one Virgilia Li Meneses[18]
2. Deed
of Absolute
I, Benigna Llamas, Fernandez xxx do sell xxx by way of
ABSOLUTE SALE unto the said Casimero Valdez, Modesto Leoveras and Virgilia Meneses their heirs and assigns,
7,544 sq.m.; 4,024 sq. m. and 8,689
sq. m. more or less respectively of a parcel of land which is
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land xxx covered by [OCT No.] 24695.
(Emphases added)
3. Subdivision
Plan of PSU 21864 of OCT No. 24695[20]
4.
Affidavit
of Confirmation of Subdivision[21] dated
That we, Virgilia Li Meneses, xxx Dominga Manangan;
Modesto Leoveras; and Casimero Valdez xxx
xxx are co-owners of a certain parcel of land with an
area of 28, 171 sq. m. more or less in subdivision plan Psu 21864 xxx covered
by [OCT No.] 24695 situated at Poblacion (now Pugaro), Manaoag, Pangasinan;
xxx we agree xxx to subdivide and hereby confirmed the
subdivision in the following manner xxx:
Lot 2 with
an area of 3, 020 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leoveras xxx;
Lot 3 with
an area of 1,004 sq. m. xxx to Modesto Leoveras xxx;
On
June 21, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title,
Reconveyance and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of
the 1,004-square meter portion (disputed
property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled
only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties Agreement.
The
respondent sought the nullification of the petitioners titles by contesting
the authenticity of the petitioners documents. Particularly, the respondent
assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting Benignas death certificate. The respondent
argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed, which purports to convey
4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already died in
1944. The respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the
parties her three-fourths () share in 1969 because she had already sold her
share to Benigna in 1932.[22]
The respondent denied his purported signature appearing in the Affidavit,[23]
and prayed for:
a) xxx the cancellation of the [petitioners documents];
b) the cancellation
of TCT No. 195813 in the name of
c) the cancellation and nullification of [TCT No.
195812] covering an area of 3,020 square meters xxx;
d) [the issuance of] title xxx in the name of
[respondent] over an area of 17, 104 square meters of OCT 24695; [24] (Underscoring
supplied)
In
his defense, the petitioner claimed that the parties already had (i) delineated
their respective portions of the subject property even before they acquired it
in 1969 and (ii) agreed that upon acquisition, each would own the portion as
delineated; that the area he actually possessed and subsequently acquired has a
total area of 4,024 square meters, which he subdivided into two portions and
caused to be covered by the two TCTs in question. The petitioner claimed that in
signing the Agreement, he was led to believe, based on the parties rough
estimation, that the area he actually possessed is only 3,020 square meters
contrary to the parties real intention - i.e., the extent of their
ownership would be based on their actual possession.[25]
The
petitioner further claimed that the respondent voluntarily participated in
executing the Affidavit, which corrected the mistake in the previously executed
Agreement[26] and
confirmed the petitioners ownership over the disputed property. The petitioner
asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a declaration that he is the
lawful owner of the parcels of land covered by his titles.
RTC RULING
The
RTC dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that the respondent failed to
preponderantly prove that the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit are fabricated and,
consequently, no ground exists to nullify the petitioners titles. The court
observed that the respondent did not even compare his genuine signature with the
signatures appearing in these documents.
CA RULING
On
appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the
Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. The CA gave weight to Benignas death
certificate which shows the impossibility of Benignas execution of the deed in
1969. The CA also noted the discrepancy between the respondents signatures as appearing
in the Affidavit, on one hand, and the documents on record, on the other.[27]
The CA added that the respondents failure to compare his genuine signature
from his purported signatures appearing in the petitioners documents is not
fatal, since Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court allows the court to
make its own comparison. In light of its observations, the CA ruled:
As the totality of the evidence presented sufficiently
sustains [the respondents] claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner]
were based on forged and spurious documents, it behooves this Court to annul
these certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated
Unwilling
to accept the CAs reversal of the RTC ruling, the petitioner filed the present
appeal by certiorari, claiming that
the CA committed gross misappreciation of the facts[29]
by going beyond what the respondent sought in his complaint.
THE PETITION
The
petitioner claims that the CA should not have ordered the reconveyance of both
parcels of land covered by the TCTs in question since the respondent only seeks
the reconveyance of the disputed property i.e., the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 195813.
The
petitioner asserts that after the
subject sale, the parties physically partitioned the subject property and
possessed their respective portions, thereby setting the limits of their ownership.
The
petitioner admits that the Benigna Deed is fabricated but hastens to add that
it was only designed (i) to affirm the true intent and agreement of the
parties on the extent of their ownership, as shown by their actual physical
possession, and (ii) as a convenient tool to facilitate the transfer of title
to his name.
THE RESPONDENTS COMMENT
The
respondent claims that since the petitioner himself admitted using a spurious
document in obtaining his titles (as alleged in the complaint and as found by
the CA), then the CA correctly cancelled the latters titles.[30]
The
petitioner forged the respondents signature in the Affidavit to make it appear
that he agreed to the division indicated in the document. The respondent
defended the CAs reconveyance of both parcels of land, covered by the
petitioners titles, to the respondent by arguing that if the distribution in
the Affidavit is followed, the original intendment of the parties on their shares of the subject property
would be grievously impaired[31]
THE ISSUES
The two basic
issues[32]
for our resolution are:
1. Whether
the CA erred in nullifying the petitioners titles.
2. Whether
the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the parcel of land covered by the
petitioners titles.
THE RULING
We partially
grant the petition.
An
action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of
another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to
him.[33] The
plaintiff in this action must allege and prove his ownership of the land in
dispute and the defendants erroneous, fraudulent or wrongful registration of
the property.
We rule that the respondent
adequately proved his ownership of the disputed property by virtue of the (i)
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the
parties Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the parties Agreement, which
cover the subject property.
The petitioner does not
dispute the due execution and the authenticity
of these documents,[34]
particularly the Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does
not reflect the true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently executed
in order to reflect the parties true intention.
The petitioners argument
calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule,[35] i.e., when the terms of an
agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain
all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other
than what is contained in the written agreement.[36]
Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have
been waived and abandoned.[37]
To
avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a
party to present evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention
of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the
parties.[38]
At
the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged
true intention of the parties by presenting the Affidavit, which allegedly
corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement
and confirmed his ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It
was the petitioners
staunch assertion that the respondent co-executed this Affidavit supposedly to
reflect the parties true intention.
In the present petition,
however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the Benigna Deed is fabricated,
thereby completely bolstering the respondents cause of action for reconveyance
of the disputed property on the ground of fraudulent registration of title.
Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna Deed, the
petitioners admission, coupled with the respondents denial of his purported
signature in the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this
document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioners defense.
Curiously,
if the parties truly intended to include in the petitioners share the disputed
property, the petitioner obviously need not go at length of fabricating a deed
of sale to support his application for the transfer of title of his rightful portion
of the subject property. Notably, there is nothing in the Affidavit (that
supposedly corrected the mistake in the earlier Agreement) that supports the
petitioners claim that the partition of the subject property is based on the
parties actual possession.
Note that the RTC dismissed
the complaint based on the respondents alleged failure to prove the
spuriousness of the documents submitted by the petitioner to the Register of
Deeds. However, by admitting the presentation of a false deed in securing his
title, the petitioner rendered moot the issue of authenticity of the Benigna Deed
and relieved the respondent of the burden of proving its falsity as a ground to
nullify the petitioners titles.
By fraudulently causing the transfer
of the registration of title over the disputed property in his name, the
petitioner holds the title to this disputed property in trust for the benefit
of the respondent as the true owner;[39] registration does not vest title but merely
confirms or records title already existing and vested. The
The parties Agreement
effectively partitioned the subject property
The petitioner also relies
on his alleged actual possession of the disputed property to support his claim
of ownership. Notably, both parties make conflicting assertions of possession
of the disputed property.[41] The
petitioner testified on his possession as follows:
Q: How many
square meters did you get from the land and how many square meters was the
share of [respondent]?
A: 4[0]20 square
meters and my brother-in-law 6,000 plus square meters.
xxx
Q: Was there a
boundary between the 4,020 square meters and the rest of the property which
(sic) designated by your brother-in-law?
A: There is sir,
and the boundary is the fence.
Q: When did you
put up that fence which is the boundary?
A: After the
deed of sale was made.
Q: And that
boundary fence which you put according to you since the execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale in 1969 up to the present does it still exist?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Since the
time you purchased the property according to you you already divided the property,
is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that as
of today who is in possession of that 4,020 square meters?
A: I, sir.[42]
The
petitioner and the respondent were originally co-owners of the subject property
when they jointly bought it from the same vendor in 1969. However, the parties
immediately terminated this state of indivision by executing an Agreement, which is in the nature of a partition
agreement.
The
Civil Code of the
the partial or total extinguishment of co-ownership.[45]
In
the present case, the parties agreed to divide the subject property by giving
the petitioner the 3,020
square meters residential portion on the northern part near the Municipal
road.[46] There
is no dispute that this 3,020- square meter portion is the same parcel of land identified
as Lot No. 2 (which is not the
subject of the respondents action for
reconveyance) in the Affidavit and the Subdivision Plan presented by the
petitioner before the Register of Deeds. The fact that the Agreement lacks technical
description of the parties respective portions or that the subject property
was then still embraced by a single certificate of title could not legally
prevent a partition, where the different portions allotted to each were determined and became separately identifiable, as in this case.[47]
What is strikingly
significant is that even the petitioners own testimony merely attempted to
confirm his actual possession of the disputed property, without, however,
supporting his claim contrary to the written Agreement that the parties
ownership of the subject property would be co-extensive with their possession. This is the core of the petitioners defense.
At any rate, just as non-possession does not negate ownership, neither
does possession automatically prove ownership,[48]
especially in the face of an unambiguous document executed by the parties
themselves.
Contrary
to the petitioners claim that his actual possession determines the extent of
his ownership, it is the parties Agreement
that defines the extent of their ownership in the subject property. One of the
legal effects of partition, whether by agreement among the co-owners or by
judicial proceeding, is to terminate the co-ownership and, consequently, to
make the previous co-owners the absolute and exclusive owner of the share
allotted to him.[49]
Parenthetically,
the respondent declared for taxation purposes the portion he claims in December
1987.[50]
The total area (7,544 square meters) of the properties declared is equivalent
to the area allotted to the respondent under the Agreement. On the other hand,
the petitioner declared the 1,004-square meter portion only in September 1994, under
Tax Declaration No. 9393,[51]
despite his claim of exclusive and adverse possession since 1969.
Nullification of the petitioners title over the 3,020 square meter
portion
While the petitioner admitted using
a spurious document in securing his titles, nonetheless, he questions the CAs
nullification of TCT No. 195812 on the ground that, per the respondents own admission and the parties Agreement, he
is the rightful owner of the land covered by this title.
We disagree.
The petitioners argument confuses
registration of title with ownership.[52] While
the petitioners ownership over the land covered by TCT No. 195812 is
undisputed, his ownership only gave him the right
to apply for the proper transfer of title to the property in his name.
Obviously, the petitioner, even as a rightful owner, must comply with the
statutory provisions on the transfer of registered title to lands.[53]
Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that the subsequent registration
of title procured by the presentation of a forged deed or other instrument is null
and void. Thus, the subsequent issuance of TCT No. 195812 gave the
petitioner no better right than the tainted registration which was the basis
for the issuance of the same title. The Court simply cannot allow the petitioners
attempt to get around the proper procedure
for registering the transfer of title in his name by using spurious documents.
Reconveyance is the remedy of the rightful
owner only
While the CA correctly nullified
the petitioners certificates of title, the CA erred in ordering the
reconveyance of the entire subject
property in the respondents favor. The respondent himself admitted that the
3,020- square meter portion covered by TCT No. 195812 is the petitioners just
share in the subject property.[54]
Thus, although the petitioner obtained TCT No. 195812 using the same spurious
documents, the land covered by this title should not be reconveyed in favor of the
respondent since he is not the rightful owner of the property
covered by this title.[55]
WHEREFORE, the petition is
partially GRANTED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to RECONVEY to the respondent the parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 195813. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 12-21; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[3]
[4]
[5] Annex Q.
[6] Annex Q-2.
[7] Annex J.
[8] Annex K, par. 5, and Annex C, par. 3.
[9] Annex A. The deed was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on
[10] Annex C. The deed was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on June 20, 1977, under Entry No. 456594; Records, pp. 2-3.
[11] Annex D.
[12] The area of the subject property is 10,564 square meters. The Agreement itself states that prior to the allotment of the parties respective portions, the parties own a pro-indiviso one-half share, that is, 5,282 square meters of the subject land. The RTC found that under the Agreement, the respondent is entitled to 7,544 sq. m.
[13] Supra note 11; Annex O.
[14] The Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695 as Entry No. 456593, Annex N.
[15] Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[16] Records, pp. 4-5.
[17] Annex F.
[18] Annex H.
[19] Annex G.
[20] Annex S.
[21] Annex I.
[22]
TSN,
[23]
TSN,
[24] Records, pp. 7-8.
[25]
[26]
[27] These documents are: the Agreement, executed in 1994, the respondents Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the portion sold to him by the heirs of Alejandra, executed in 1977, and the Verification and Certification against Non-Forum Shopping attached to the Complaint.
[28] Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Esconde v. Barlongay, No. L-67583,
[34] In Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde (G.R. No. 140608,
September 23, 2004, 439 SCRA 1), the Court ruled that the allegation that the
written agreement does not express the true intention of the parties does not
carry with it the specific denial of the genuineness and due execution of the
written instrument.
[35] Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 9. Evidence
of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a
party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a)
An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(b)
The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c)
The validity of the written agreement; or
(d)
The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term agreement includes wills.
[36] Ortaez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107372,
[37] Heirs of Carmen
Cruz-Zamora v. Multiwood International, Inc., G.R. No. 146428,
[38]
Article 1359 of the Civil Code of the
When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a
contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to
embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to
the end that such true intention may be expressed.
If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a
meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper remedy is not reformation of
the instrument but annulment of the contract.
[39] Article 1456 of the Civil Code reads:
If property
is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
[40] Lopez v. Lopez, G.R. No. 161925,
[41] The respondent testified that he has been in
possession of the land in litigation since 1969. (TSN,
[42] TSN,
[43] Article 1079.
[44]
Arturo M. Tolentino, 2 Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
[45]
Article 494 of the Civil Code reads:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
[46] Supra note 11; Annex O.
[47] De la Cruz v. Cruz, No. L-27759,
[48]
[49]
Eduardo P. Caguioa, 2 Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1966
ed., p. 151, citing Article 1091 of the Civil Code which reads:
A partition legally
made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated
to him.
[50] In the
respondents Tax Declaration No. 3131 (Marked as Annex E), he declared the
following with their corresponding area: Residential 750 [square meters];
Unirrig. Rice land - 4,794.27 [square meters];
[51] Records, Annex 6.
[52] Ownership of a piece of land is one thing,
and registration under the
[53] Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1529 reads:
Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. xxx
Section 53 of P.D. 1529 reads:
Presentation of owners duplicate upon entry of new certificate. No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown.
xxx
Section 57 of P.D. 1529 reads:
Procedure in registration of conveyances. An owner desiring to convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner's duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The original and the owner's duplicate of the grantor's certificate shall be stamped "canceled". The deed of conveyance shall be filled and indorsed with the number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.
[54] TSN,
[55] Esconde v. Barlongay, No. L-67583,