G.R. No. 169191

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ROMEO VILLARUEL,

Petitioner,

-versus-

YEO HAN GUAN, doing business under the name and style YUHANS ENTERPRISES,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 169191

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 1, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition are the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 16, 2005 and August 2, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79105. The CA Decision modified the March 31, 2003 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA 028050-01, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

On February 15, 1999, herein petitioner filed with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City a Complaint[3] for payment of separation pay against Yuhans Enterprises.

Subsequently, in his Amended Complaint and Position Paper[4] dated December 6, 1999, petitioner alleged that in June 1963, he was employed as a machine operator by Ribonette Manufacturing Company, an enterprise engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling PVC pipes and is owned and managed by herein respondent Yeo Han Guan. Over a period of almost twenty (20) years, the company changed its name four times. Starting in 1993 up to the time of the filing of petitioner's complaint in 1999, the company was operating under the name of Yuhans Enterprises. Despite the changes in the company's name, petitioner remained in the employ of respondent. Petitioner further alleged that on October 5, 1998, he got sick and was confined in a hospital; on December 12, 1998, he reported for work but was no longer permitted to go back because of his illness; he asked that respondent allow him to continue working but be assigned a lighter kind of work but his request was denied; instead, he was offered a sum of P15,000.00 as his separation pay; however, the said amount corresponds only to the period between 1993 and 1999; petitioner prayed that he be granted separation pay computed from his first day of employment in June 1963, but respondent refused. Aside from separation pay, petitioner prayed for the payment of service incentive leave for three years as well as attorney's fees.

On the other hand, respondent averred in his Position Paper[5] that petitioner was hired as machine operator from March 1, 1993 until he stopped working sometime in February 1999 on the ground that he was suffering from illness; after his recovery, petitioner was directed to report for work, but he never showed up. Respondent was later caught by surprise when petitioner filed the instant case for recovery of separation pay. Respondent claimed that he never terminated the services of petitioner and that during their mandatory conference, he even told the latter that he could go back to work anytime but petitioner clearly manifested that he was no longer interested in returning to work and instead asked for separation pay.

On November 27, 2000, the Labor Arbiter handling the case rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's Decision reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against herein respondent, as follows:

1. Ordering the respondents to pay separation benefits equivalent to one-half () month salary per year of service, a fraction of six months equivalent to one year to herein complainant based on the complainant's length of service reckoned from June 1963 up to October 1998 as provided under Article 284 of the Labor Code, the same computed by the Computation and Examination Unit which we hereby adopt and approved (sic) as our own in the amount of NINETY-ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE PESOS (P91,445.00);

2. Ordering the respondents to pay service incentive leave equivalent to fifteen days salary in the amount of THREE THOUSAND FIFTEEN PESOS (P3,015.00).

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal with the NLRC.

On March 31, 2003, the Third Division of the NLRC rendered its Decision[7] dismissing respondent's appeal and affirming the Labor Arbiter's Decision.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[8] but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution[9] dated May 30, 2003.

Respondent then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

On February 16, 2005, the CA promulgated its presently assailed Decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partially GRANTED. The award of separation pay is hereby DELETED, but the Decision insofar as it awards private respondent [herein petitioner] service incentive leave pay of three thousand and fifteen pesos (P3,015.00) stands. The NLRC is permanently ENJOINED from partially executing its Decision dated November 27, 2000 insofar as the award of separation pay is concerned; or if it has already effected execution, it should order the private respondent to forthwith restitute the same.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Herein petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the CA Decision, but it was denied by the CA via a Resolution[12] dated August 2, 2005.

Hence, the instant petition based on the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE ADMISSION BY [PETITIONER] OF THE FACT AND VALIDITY OF HIS TERMINATION BY THE [RESPONDENT].

[THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED] IN DENYING [PETITIONER'S] ENTITLEMENT TO SEPARATION PAY UNDER ARTICLE 284 OF THE LABOR CODE AND UNDER THE OMNIBUS RULES IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR CODE.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF THAT AN EMPLOYEE IS SUFFERING FROM DISEASE THAT HAS TO BE TERMINATED REST[S] UPON THE EMPLOYER IN ORDER FOR THE EMPLOYEE TO BE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ORDERING THE DELETION OF THE AWARD OF SEPARATION PAY TO THE [PETITIONER].[13]

The Court finds the petition without merit.

The assigned errors in the instant petition essentially boil down to the question of whether petitioner is entitled to separation pay under the provisions of the Labor Code, particularly Article 284 thereof, which reads as follows:

An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half () month salary for every year of service whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one (1) whole year.

A plain reading of the abovequoted provision clearly presupposes that it is the employer who terminates the services of the employee found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees. It does not contemplate a situation where it is the employee who severs his or her employment ties. This is precisely the reason why Section 8,[14] Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, directs that an employer shall not terminate the services of the employee unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment.

Hence, the pivotal question that should be settled in the present case is whether respondent, in fact, dismissed petitioner from his employment.

A perusal of the Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC would show, however, that there was no discussion with respect to the abovementioned issue. Both lower tribunals merely concluded that petitioner is entitled to separation pay under Article 284 of the Labor Code without any explanation. The Court finds no convincing justification, in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter on why petitioner is entitled to such pay. In the same manner, the NLRC Decision did not give any rationalization as the gist thereof simply consisted of a quoted portion of the appealed Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On the other hand, the Court agrees with the CA in its observation of the following circumstances as proof that respondent did not terminate petitioner's employment: first, the only cause of action in petitioner's original complaint is that he was offered a very low separation pay; second, there was no allegation of illegal dismissal, both in petitioner's original and amended complaints and position paper; and, third, there was no prayer for reinstatement.

In consonance with the above findings, the Court finds that petitioner was the one who initiated the severance of his employment relations with respondent. It is evident from the various pleadings filed by petitioner that he never intended to return to his employment with respondent on the ground that his health is failing. Indeed, petitioner did not ask for reinstatement. In fact, he rejected respondent's offer for him to return to work. This is tantamount to resignation.

Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.[15]

It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that aside from Article 284 of the Labor Code, the award of separation pay is also authorized in the situations dealt with in Article 283[16] of the same Code and under Section 4 (b), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the said Code[17] where there is illegal dismissal and reinstatement is no longer feasible. By way of exception, this Court has allowed grants of separation pay to stand as a measure of social justice where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.[18] However, there is no provision in the Labor Code which grants separation pay to voluntarily resigning employees. In fact, the rule is that an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay, except when it is stipulated in the employment contract or CBA, or it is sanctioned by established employer practice or policy.[19] In the present case, neither the abovementioned provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations nor the exceptions apply because petitioner was not dismissed from his employment and there is no evidence to show that payment of separation pay is stipulated in his employment contract or sanctioned by established practice or policy of herein respondent, his employer.

Since petitioner was not terminated from his employment and, instead, is deemed to have resigned therefrom, he is not entitled to separation pay under the provisions of the Labor Code.

The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court, in a number of cases, has granted financial assistance to separated employees as a measure of social and compassionate justice and as an equitable concession. Taking into consideration the factual circumstances obtaining in the present case, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to this kind of assistance.

Citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Sedan,[20] this Court, in the more recent case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Antonio,[21] held:

But we must stress that this Court did allow, in several instances, the grant of financial assistance. In the words of Justice Sabino de Leon, Jr., now deceased, financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice and exceptional circumstances, and as an equitable concession. The instant case equally calls for balancing the interests of the employer with those of the worker, if only to approximate what Justice Laurel calls justice in its secular sense.

In this instance, our attention has been called to the following circumstances: that private respondent joined the company when he was a young man of 25 years and stayed on until he was 48 years old; that he had given to the company the best years of his youth, working on board ship for almost 24 years; that in those years there was not a single report of him transgressing any of the company rules and regulations; that he applied for optional retirement under the company's non-contributory plan when his daughter died and for his own health reasons; and that it would appear that he had served the company well, since even the company said that the reason it refused his application for optional retirement was that it still needed his services; that he denies receiving the telegram asking him to report back to work; but that considering his age and health, he preferred to stay home rather than risk further working in a ship at sea.

In our view, with these special circumstances, we can call upon the same "social and compassionate justice" cited in several cases allowing financial assistance. These circumstances indubitably merit equitable concessions, via the principle of "compassionate justice" for the working class. x x x

In the present case, respondent had been employed with the petitioner for almost twelve (12) years. On February 13, 1996, he suffered from a "fractured left transverse process of fourth lumbar vertebra," while their vessel was at the port of Yokohama, Japan. After consulting a doctor, he was required to rest for a month. When he was repatriated to Manila and examined by a company doctor, he was declared fit to continue his work. When he reported for work, petitioner refused to employ him despite the assurance of its personnel manager. Respondent patiently waited for more than one year to embark on the vessel as 2^nd Engineer, but the position was not given to him, as it was occupied by another person known to one of the stockholders. Consequently, for having been deprived of continued employment with petitioner's vessel, respondent opted to apply for optional retirement. In addition, records show that respondent's seaman's book, as duly noted and signed by the captain of the vessel was marked "Very Good," and "recommended for hire." Moreover, respondent had no derogatory record on file over his long years of service with the petitioner.

Considering all of the foregoing and in line with Eastern, the ends of social and compassionate justice would be served best if respondent will be given some equitable relief. Thus, the award of P100,000.00 to respondent as financial assistance is deemed equitable under the circumstances.[22]

While the abovecited cases authorized the grant of financial assistance in lieu of retirement benefits, the Court finds no cogent reason not to employ the same guiding principle of compassionate justice applied by the Court, taking into consideration the factual circumstances obtaining in the present case. In this regard, the Court finds credence in petitioner's contention that he is in the employ of respondent for more than 35 years. In the absence of a substantial refutation on the part of respondent, the Court agrees with the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that respondent company is not distinct from its predecessors but, in fact, merely continued the operation of the latter under the same owners and the same business venture. The Court further notes that there is no evidence on record to show that petitioner has any derogatory record during his long years of service with respondent and that his employment was severed not by reason of any infraction on his part but because of his failing physical condition. Add to this the willingness of respondent to give him financial assistance. Hence, based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the award of P50,000.00 to petitioner as financial assistance is deemed equitable under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by awarding petitioner with financial assistance in the amount of P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Magdangal M. de Leon, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.

[14] Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.

[15] Virjen Shipping Corporation v. Barraquio, G.R. No. 178127, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 541, 548.

[16] Article 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

[17] Book VI, Rule I, Section 4(b) In case the establishment where the employee is to be reinstated has closed or ceased operations or where his former position no longer exists at the time of reinstatement for reasons not attributable to the fault of the employer, the employee shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to one month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year.

[18] CJC Trading, Inc. v. NLRC, 316 Phil. 887, 893 (1995).

[19] Hinatuan Mining Corporation v. NLRC, 335 Phil. 1090, 1093-1094 (1997).

[20] G.R. No. 159354, April 7, 2006, 486 SCRA 565.

[21] G.R. No. 171587, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 590.