REPUBLIC OF THE
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G.R. No. 168335
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, j., Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN, *ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR. and *SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated: June 6, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We resolve the Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1]
filed by the Republic of the
Antecedent Facts
On
P8,500.00
monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a housewife. They have one child,
Christopher.
On
The
RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the
parties.
In
his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their
breakfast because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their
child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market
when Juvy brought him there.[6]
The
respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00
he entrusted to her.
He added that Juvy
stole his ATM
card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his (the respondents)
fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing mahjong and kuwaho three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed
money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a
hospital.[7]
Aside
from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a
psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent.
According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the
latter did not respond.[8] In
her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by his wifes behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.
x x x
The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:
1. After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because the defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this became the daily routine of the plaintiff before reporting to work;
2. After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the plaintiff was the one cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her gambling activities and never attended to her husbands needs;
3. There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of the irresponsible attitude of the defendant;
4. That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an occasion wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them for gambling;
5. Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place, wherein the defendant would come with stories so that people [would] feel pity on her and give her money. Through false pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors, relatives and other people.
6. That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling), but the defendant never listened to his advices;
7. That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff will leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to] some place. This act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by being an irresponsible mother;
8. That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the couples separation.
Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.
The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again and hoping she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care, treating her to places for a weekend vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and failed to perform the basic obligations as a wife.
So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.[9]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties
marriage in its decision of
After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all obtaining in this case.
x x x x
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is granted and the marriage
between petitioner and defendant
is hereby declared
null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the
The CA Decision
The
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision
to the CA. The CA, in its decision dated
The CA held that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It
explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled
with her acts of gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity to comply with
her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys
condition to be permanent, incurable and existing at the time of the
celebration of her marriage with the respondent.[11]
The
petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in
its resolution dated
The Petition and the Issues
The
petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence
presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvys psychological
incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner
additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical
antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys condition.[13]
The respondent took the exact opposite view.
The
issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage
to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy
suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with
her essential marital obligations.
The Courts Ruling
After
due consideration, we resolve
to grant the petition, and hold that no sufficient
basis exists to
annul the marriage
on the ground
of psychological incapacity under the
terms of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code
and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code
provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[14]
In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15]
the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.[16]
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code in
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are footnoted
below.[17] These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in
In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,[19]
we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)[20]
which provided that the complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te[21]
placed some cloud in the continued applicability of the time-tested Molina[22]
guidelines. We stated in
this case that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all
cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be
bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no
psychological incapacity case can be considered as completely on "all
fours" with another.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting[23] and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,[24] however, laid to rest any question
regarding the continued applicability of Molina.[25] In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te[26] did not abandon Molina.[27]
Far from abandoning Molina,[28]
Ngo Te[29]
simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also
explained that Suazo[30]
that Ngo Te[31]
merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.[32]
The
Present Case
In the present case
and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents
evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the
latters psychological report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
a.
The respondents testimony
The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a)
refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care
of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount
of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the
respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his
account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check;
(f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and
(g) indulged in gambling.
These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar,
et al.,[33] we ruled that
it is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed
to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown
to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not
physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown.[34] A
cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys
condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her essential
marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed
indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing
more than the difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of
marital obligations. In Ricardo B.
Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,[35]
we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or
neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.
In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents
signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondents ATM, and of squandering
a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her,
while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were mere
isolated incidents and not recurring
acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for
money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her
child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage
that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations.
The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors
(gambling and what the respondent refers to as swindling) only two (2) years after their marriage, and
after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also
shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys income during the early
stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari
store and by working as a manicurist.
b.
The Psychologists Report
The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents
cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time
required by Article 36 of the Family Code.
To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that
she derived her conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent.
Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a considerable
degree of bias; thus, a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description
alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course
aware of our pronouncement in Marcos[36]
that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be
examined by the psychologist as a condition
precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity
can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof
cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently
of a psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such
independent evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources
who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage
would have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the
psychologists report.
Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the
psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative traits which she
considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and
irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her
lack of initiative to change), and declared that psychological findings tend
to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders
x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these
disorders appear to be incorrigible.[37] In
the end, the psychologist opined
without stating the psychological basis for
her conclusion that there is
sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically
incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only
son.[38]
We find this kind
of conclusion and report grossly
inadequate. First, we note that the
psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she
administered on the respondent
and the root
cause of Juvys psychological
condition. We also stress
that the acts alleged to have been
committed by Juvy all occurred during
the marriage; there was no showing
that any mental
disorder existed at the inception of the
marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of
Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is
serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties.
Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the particular type
of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish
the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy
lacks the initiative to change and that her mental incapacity appears
incorrigible[39] are insufficient to prove
that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
c. The Psychologists Testimony
The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving
the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvys alleged psychological
defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report
i.e., that Juvy was lazy and
irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the
respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child without
linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these allegations,
even if true, all occurred during the
marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight
into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time
of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed.
Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys
psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.
She, likewise, failed
to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these
respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love
and affection, Juvy was hesitant to
change. From this premise, she jumped
to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to
be incurable or incorrigible, and
would be very hard to cure. These unfounded
conclusions cannot be equated
with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To be
declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be
reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed,
psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[40]
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the
foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by
the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage lies with the plaintiff.[41]
Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or
one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a
grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated,
we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.[42]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Designated additional member vice Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
per Special Order No. 997, dated
* Sick Leave.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 51-58; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, and concurred in by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court).
[3]
[4] CA rollo, pp. 47-58; penned by Judge Melencio Claros.
[5] Records, pp. 2-3.
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8] TSN,
[9] Record of Exhibits, Exhibit K, pp. 14-16.
[10] Supra note 4, at 55-57.
[11] Supra note 2.
[12] Supra note 3.
[13] Rollo, pp. 10-49.
[14] So v.
[15] G.R. No. 112019,
[16] See Padilla-Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738,
[17] G.R. No. 108763,
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as
the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.
The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x x
(5) Such illness
must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential
marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the
(8) The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[18] Supra note 15.
[19] G.R. No. 136490,
[20] Took effect on
[21] G.R. No. 161793,
[22] Supra note 17.
[23] G.R. No. 166562,
[24] G.R. No. 164493,
[25] Supra note 17.
[26] Supra note 21.
[27] Supra note 17.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Supra note 21.
[30] Supra note 23.
[31] Supra note 21.
[32] Agraviador
v. Amparo Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729,
[33] G.R. No. 139676,
[34] See Bier
v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294,
[35] G.R. No. 165321,
[36] Supra note 19.
[37] Supra note 9, Exhibit K-1, at 15.
[38] Supra note 9, Exhibit K-2, at 16.
[39] Supra note 37.
[40] Supra note 15.
[41] See Paz
v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579,
[42] Supra note 32.