|
Government service insurance system (GSIS), Petitioner, - versus
- group management corporation (GMC) and lapu-lapu development & HOUSING corporation (LLDHc), Respondents. x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x GROUP
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (GMC), Petitioner, - versus
- lapu-lapu development & HOUSING corporation (LLDHc) and Government service insurance system (GSIS), Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 167000
G.R. No. 169971
Present:
Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated: June 8, 2011 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
At bar are two
consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari
concerning 78 parcels of land located in Barrio Marigondon,
In the Petition in G.R. No. 167000, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) seeks to reverse and set aside the November 25, 2004
Decision[1]
and January 20, 2005 Resolution[2] of
the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85096 and to
annul and set aside the March 11, 2004[3]
and May 7, 2004[4] Orders
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City (Lapu-Lapu RTC) in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
In the Petition
in G.R. No. 169971, Group Management Corporation (GMC) seeks to
reverse and set aside the September 23, 2005 Decision[5]
in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 wherein the
Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
annulled and set aside the March 11, 2004 Order of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil
Case No. 2203-L.
Both these cases stem from the same
undisputed factual antecedents as follows:
Lapu-Lapu
Development & Housing Corporation[6]
(LLDHC) was the registered owner of seventy-eight (78) lots (subject lots), situated
in Barrio Marigondon,
On February 4,
1974, LLDHC and the GSIS entered into a Project and Loan Agreement for the
development of the subject lots. GSIS
agreed to extend a Twenty-Five Million Peso-loan (P25,000,000.00) to
LLDHC, and in return, LLDHC will develop, subdivide, and sell its lots to GSIS
members. To secure the payment of the
loan, LLDHC executed a real estate mortgage over the subject lots in favor of
GSIS.
For LLDHCs
failure to fulfill its obligations, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage. As the lone bidder in the public auction
sale, GSIS acquired the subject lots, and eventually was able to consolidate
its ownership over the subject lots with the corresponding transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) issued in its name.
On November 19,
1979, GMC offered to purchase on installments the subject lots from GSIS for a
total price of One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000.00),
with the aggregate area specified as 423,177 square meters. GSIS accepted the offer and on February 26,
1980, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the subject lots. However, when GMC discovered that the total
area of the subject lots was only 298,504 square meters, it wrote GSIS and
proposed to proportionately reduce the purchase price to conform to the actual
total area of the subject lots. GSIS
approved this proposal and an Amendment to the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed
to reflect the final sales agreement between GSIS and GMC.
On April 23,
1980, LLDHC filed a complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure with Writ of
Mandatory Injunction against GSIS before the RTC of Manila (Manila RTC). This became Civil Case No. R-82-3429[7]
and was assigned to Branch 38.
On November 3,
1989, GMC filed its own complaint against GSIS for Specific Performance with
Damages before the Lapu-Lapu RTC. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
2203-L and it sought to compel GSIS to execute a Final Deed of Sale over
the subject lots since the purchase price had already been fully paid by
GMC. GSIS, in defense, submitted to the
court a Commission on Audit (COA) Memorandum dated April 3, 1989, purportedly disallowing
in audit the sale of the subject lots for apparent inherent irregularities,
the sale price to GMC being lower than GSISs purchase price at the public
auction. LLDHC, having been allowed to
intervene, filed a Motion to Dismiss GMCs complaint. When this motion was denied, LLDHC filed its
Answer-in-Intervention and participated in the ensuing proceedings as an
intervenor.
GMC, on February
1, 1992, filed its own Motion to Intervene with a Complaint-in-Intervention in
Civil Case No. R-82-3429. This was
dismissed on February 17, 1992 and finally denied on March 23, 1992 by the
Manila RTC on the ground that GMC can protect its interest in another
proceeding.[8]
On February 24,
1992, after a full-blown trial, the Lapu-Lapu RTC rendered its Decision[9]
in Civil Case No. 2203-L, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to:
1.
Execute
the final deed of absolute sale and deliver the seventy-eight (78) certificates
of title covering said seventy-eight (78) parcels of land to the [Group
Management Corporation (GMC)];
2.
Pay
[GMC] actual damages, plus attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, in the
amount of P285,638.88 and P100,000.00 exemplary damages;
3.
[D]ismissing
in toto intervenors complaint-in-intervention for lack of evidence of
legal standing and legal interest in the suit, as well as failure to
substantiate any cause of action against either [GMC] or [GSIS].[10]
In deciding in
favor of GMC, the Lapu-Lapu RTC held that there existed a valid and binding
sales contract between GSIS and GMC, which GSIS could not continue to ignore
without any justifiable reason especially since GMC had already fully complied
with its obligations. [11]
The Lapu-Lapu
RTC found GSISs invocation of COAs alleged disapproval of the sale belated
and self-serving. The Lapu-Lapu RTC said
that COA, in disapproving GSISs sale of the subject lots to GMC, violated its
own circular which excludes the disposal by a government owned and/or
controlled corporation of its acquired assets (e.g., foreclosed assets or collaterals acquired in the
regular course of business).[12] The Lapu-Lapu RTC also held that COA may not
intrude into GSISs charter-granted power to dispose of its acquired assets
within five years from acquisition by preventing/aborting the sale in question
by refusing to pass it in audit.[13] Moreover, the Lapu-Lapu RTC held that the
GSIS-proferred COA Memorandum was inadmissible in evidence not only because as
a mere photocopy it failed to measure up to the best evidence rule under the
Revised Rules of Court, but also because no one from COA, not even the auditor
who supposedly prepared it, was ever presented to testify to the veracity of
its contents or its due execution.[14]
In
dismissing LLDHCs complaint-in-intervention, the Lapu-Lapu RTC held that LLDHC
failed to prove its legal personality as a party-intervenor and all it was able
to establish was a suggestion of right for [GSIS] to renege [on] the sale for
reasons peculiar to [GSIS] but not transmissible nor subject to invocation by
[LLDHC].[15]
LLDHC and GSIS filed their separate
Notices of Appeal but these were dismissed by the Lapu-Lapu RTC on December 6,
1993.[16]
On May 10, 1994, the Manila RTC
rendered a Decision[17]
in Civil Case No. R-82-3429. The Manila RTC held that GSIS was unable to prove
the alleged violations committed by LLDHC to warrant the foreclosure of the
mortgage over the subject lots. Thus,
the Manila RTC annulled the foreclosure made by GSIS and ordered LLDHC to pay
GSIS the balance of its loan with interest, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. ANNULLING the foreclosure by the
defendant GSIS of the mortgage over the seventy-eight (78) parcels of land here
involved:
2. CANCELLING the consolidated
certificates of [title] issued in the name of GSIS and directing the Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue new certificates of [title] over those
seventy-eight (78) parcels of land in the name of the plaintiff, in exactly the
same condition as they were before the foreclosure;
3. ORDERING the plaintiff to pay the
GSIS the amount of P9,200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of
twelve (12%) percent per annum commencing from October 12, 1989 until fully
paid; and
4. ORDERING defendant GSIS to
execute a properly registrable release of discharge of mortgage over the parcels
of land here involved after full payment of such amount by the plaintiff.
All claims and counterclaims by the parties as against each other are hereby dismissed.
No
pronouncement as to costs.[18]
Armed
with the Manila RTC decision, LLDHC, on July 27, 1994, filed before the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision
in Civil Case No. 2203-L.[19] LLDHC alleged that the Manila RTC decision
nullified the sale of the subject lots to GMC and consequently, the Lapu-Lapu
RTC decision was also nullified.
This
petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
34696, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on December 29, 1994.[20] The Court of Appeals, in finding that the
grounds LLDHC relied on were without merit, said:
In fine, there being no showing from
the allegations of the petition that the respondent court is without
jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the parties in Civil Case No. 2309
[2203-L], petitioner has no cause of action for the annulment of judgment. The
complaint must allege ultimate facts for the annulment of the decision
(Avendana v. Bautista, 142 SCRA 41). We
find none in this case.[21]
No appeal having been taken by
LLDHC, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34696 became
final and executory on January 28, 1995, as stated in the Entry of Final
Judgment dated August 18, 1995.[22]
On February 2, 1995, LLDHC filed
before this Court a Petition for Certiorari[23] docketed as G.R. No. 118633. LLDHC, in
seeking to annul the February 24, 1992 Decision of the Lapu-Lapu RTC, again
alleged that the Manila RTC Decision nullified the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision.
Finding the petition a mere
reproduction of the Petition for Annulment filed before the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 34696, this Court, in a Resolution[24]
dated September 6, 1996, dismissed the petition in this wise:
In a last ditch attempt to annul the
February 24, 1992 Decision of the respondent court, this petition was brought
before us on February 2, 1995.
Dismissal of this petition is inevitable.
The instant petition which is
captioned, For: Certiorari With Preliminary Injunction, is actually another
Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the February 24, 1992 Decision of the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 27 in Civil Case No.
2203-L. A close perusal of this petition
as well as the Petition for Annulment of Judgment brought by the petitioner
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34696 reveals that the instant
petition is a mere reproduction of the petition/complaint filed before the
appellate tribunal for annulment of judgment.
Paragraphs two (2) to eighteen (18) of this petition were copied
verbatim from the Petition for Annulment of Judgment earlier filed in the court
a quo, except for the designation of the parties thereto, i.e.,
plaintiff was changed to petitioner, defendant to respondent. In fact, even the prayer in this petition is
the same prayer in the Petition for Annulment of Judgment dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, x x x.
x x x x
Under Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, it is the Court
of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court), and not this Court, which
has jurisdiction to annul judgments of Regional Trial Courts, viz:
SEC.
9. Jurisdiction -- The Intermediate Appellate
Court shall exercise:
x x x x
(2) Exclusive
original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Courts; and
x x x x
Thus,
this Court apparently has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition which is
evidently another petition to annul the February 24, 1992 Decision of the
respondent Branch 27, Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, it appearing that
jurisdiction thereto properly pertains to the Court of Appeals. Such a petition was brought before the
appellate court, but due to petitioners failure to nullify Judge Risos
Decision in said forum, LLDHC, apparently at a loss as to what legal remedy to
take, brought the instant petition under the guise of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 seeking once again to annul the judgment of Branch 27.
Instead
of filing this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is
essentially another Petition to Annul Judgment, petitioner LLDHC should have
filed a timely Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 29, 1994, dismissing
the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the petitioner LLDHC before the
court a quo. But, this is all
academic now. The appellate courts
decision had become final and executory on January 28, 1995.[25]
Despite
such pronouncements, this Court, nevertheless, passed upon the merits of
LLDHCs Petition for Certiorari in
G.R. No. 118633. This Court said that
the petition, which was truly for annulment of judgment,[26]
cannot prosper because the two grounds on which a judgment may be annulled were
not present in the case.[27] Going further, this Court held that even if
the petition were to be given due course as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, it would
still be dismissible for not being brought within a reasonable period of time
as it took LLDHC almost three years from the time it received the February 24,
1992 decision until the time it brought this action.[28]
LLDHCs
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality[29]
on November 18, 1996, and on February 18, 1997, an Entry of Judgment[30]
was made certifying that the September 6, 1996 Resolution of this Court in G.R.
No. 118633 had become final and executory on December 23, 1996.
Consequently,
on November 28, 1996, the Lapu-Lapu RTC issued an Order[31]
directing the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2203-L. A corresponding Writ of Execution[32]
was issued on December 17, 1996. The
Motions to Stay Execution filed by LLDHC and GSIS were denied by the Lapu-Lapu
RTC on February 19, 1997.[33]
Meanwhile,
on December 27, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[34]
in the separate appeals taken by GSIS and LLDHC from the May 10, 1994 Manila
RTC Decision in Civil Case No. R-82-3429.
This case, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 49117, affirmed the Manila RTC decision with
modification insofar as awarding LLDHC attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.
On
March 3, 1997, GSIS came to this Court on a Petition for Review of the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 49117. This was
docketed as G.R. No. 127732 and was
dismissed on April 14, 1997[35]
due to late filing, the due date being January 31, 1997. This dismissal became final and executory on
May 30, 1997.[36]
On March 8, 1997, LLDHC filed a
Petition for Certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals, praying that GMC and the Lapu-Lapu RTC be ordered to cease and desist
from proceeding with the execution of its Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L, on
the theory that the Manila RTC decision was a supervening event which made it
mandatory for the Lapu-Lapu RTC to stop the execution of its decision. This case was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 44052. On
July 16, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued an Order temporarily restraining the
Lapu-Lapu RTC and GMC from executing the February 24, 1992
decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L so as not to render the resolution of the
case moot and academic.[37]
On
July 21, 1997, because of GSISs continued refusal to implement the December
17, 1996 Writ of Execution, the Lapu-Lapu RTC, upon GMCs motion, issued an
Order[38]
redirecting its instructions to the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, to
wit:
WHEREFORE,
the defendant GSIS having refused to implement the Order of this Court dated
December 17, 1996 the Court in accordance with Rule 39, Sec. 10-a of the 1997
Rules of Procedure, hereby directs the Register of Deeds of Lapu-lapu City to
cancel the Transfer Certificate of Titles of the properties involved in this
case and to issue new ones in the name of the plaintiff and to deliver the same
to the latter within ten (10) days after this Order shall have become final.[39]
While the TRO issued by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44052 was
in effect, the Manila RTC, on August 1, 1997, issued a Writ of Execution[40]
of its judgment in Civil Case No. R-82-3429.
On August 7, 1997, the Sheriff implemented the Writ and ordered the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City
to cancel the consolidated certificates of title issued in the name of GSIS and
to issue new ones in favor of LLDHC. In
conformity with the TRO, the Lapu-Lapu
RTC on August 19, 1997, ordered[41]
the suspension of its July 21, 1997 Order.
With no similar restraining order against the execution of the Manila
RTC Decision, a Writ of Possession was issued on August 21, 1997 to cause GSIS
and all persons claiming rights under it to vacate the properties in question
and to place LLDHC in peaceful possession thereof.[42]
On
October 23, 1997, the Lapu-Lapu RTC, being aware of the events that have taken
place while the TRO was in effect, issued an Order[43]
reiterating its previous Orders of November 28, 1996, December 17, 1996, and
July 21, 1997. The Lapu-Lapu RTC held
that since the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 44052 had already lapsed by operation of law, and the February 24, 1992
Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L had not only become final and
executory but had been affirmed and upheld by both the Court of Appeals and this
Court, the inescapable mandate was to give due course to the efficacy of its
decision. The Lapu-Lapu RTC thus
directed the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to effect the transfer of the
titles to the subject lots in favor of GMC and declared any and all acts done
by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City null and void starting with the
surreptitious issuance of the new certificates of title in the name of [LLDHC],
contrary to its decision and orders.[44]
On November 13, 1997, LLDHC filed
before the Court of Appeals another Petition for Certiorari with
preliminary injunction and motion to consolidate with CA-G.R. SP No. 44052. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45946, but was dismissed[45]
on November 20, 1997 for LLDHCs failure to comply with Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which requires the petition to be accompanied
by, among others, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto.[46]
The
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 44052 would likewise be dismissed[47]
by the Court of Appeals on January 9, 1998, but this time, on the merits, to
wit:
The
validity of the decision of the respondent judge in Civil Case No. 2303-L has
thus been brought both before this Court and to the Supreme Court by the
petitioner. In both instances the
respondent judge has been upheld. The
instant petition is petitioners latest attempt to resist the implementation or
execution of that decision using as a shield a decision of a Regional Trial
Court in the National Capital Region. We
are not prepared to allow it. The
applicable rule and jurisprudence are clear.
The prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution, and the issuance thereof is a ministerial duty compellable by
mandamus. We do not believe that there
exists in this instance a supervening event which would justify a deviation
from this rule.[48]
Prior to
this, however, on November 28, 1997, the Lapu-Lapu RTC, acting on GMCs Omnibus
Motion, made the following orders: for LLDHC to show cause why it should not be
declared in contempt; for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to be
issued to restrain all persons acting on LLDHCs orders from carrying out such
orders in defiance of its final and executory judgment; and for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to be issued to direct the ouster of
LLDHC. The Lapu-Lapu RTC also declared
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City in contempt and directed the Office of
the City Sheriff to implement the above orders and to immediately detain and confine
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City at the City Jail if he continues to
refuse to transfer the titles of the subject lots after ten days from receipt
of this order.[49]
On
December 22, 1997, the Lapu-Lapu RTC denied[50]
the motion for reconsideration filed by the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu
City. In separate motions, LLDHC, and
again the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, sought the reconsideration of
the November 28, 1997 and December 22, 1997 Orders. On May 27, 1998, the Lapu-Lapu RTC, acting
under a new judge,[51]
granted both motions and accordingly set aside the November 28, 1997 and
December 22, 1997 Orders.[52]
With the
denial[53] of its motion for reconsideration on August 4,
1998, GMC came to this Court on a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,
seeking to set aside the May 27, 1998 Order of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil
Case No. 2203-L. The Petition was
referred to the Court of Appeals, which under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, exercises original jurisdiction to issue
such writs.[54] This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 50650.
On April 30, 1999, the Court of
Appeals rendered its Decision[55]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 50650, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition being partly meritorious, the Court hereby resolves as follows:
(1)
To
AFFIRM the Orders of May 28, 1998 and August 4, 1998 in Civil Case No. 2203-L
insofar as they set aside the order holding respondent Register of Deeds guilty
of indirect contempt of court and to NULLIFY said orders in so far as they set
aside the directives contained in paragraphs (a) and (b) and (c) of the order
dated November 28, 1997.
(2)
To
DECLARE without FORCE and EFFECT insofar as petitioner Group Management
Corporation is concerned the decision in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 as well as
the orders and writs issued for its execution and enforcement: and
(3)
To
ENJOIN respondent Lapu-Lapu Development and Housing Corporation, along with its
agents and representatives and/or persons/public officials/employees acting in
its interest, specifically respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 38,
and respondent Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, from obstructing,
interfering with or in any manner delaying the implementation/execution/
enforcement by the Lapu-Lapu City RTC of its order and writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 2203-L.
For
lack of sufficient basis the charge of contempt of court against respondent
Lapu-Lapu Development and Housing Corporation and the public respondents is
hereby DISMISSED.[56]
With the denial of LLDHCs motion
for reconsideration on December 29, 1999,[57]
LLDHC, on January 26, 2000, filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the April 30, 1999 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
50650. This petition was docketed as G.R. No. 141407.
This Court dismissed LLDHCs
petition and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
50650 in its decision dated September 9, 2002.[58] LLDHCs Motion for Reconsideration and Second
Motion for Reconsideration were also denied on November 13, 2002[59]
and February 3, 2003,[60]
respectively.
The September 9, 2002 decision of
this Court in G.R. No. 141407 became final on March 10, 2003.[61]
On March 11, 2004, the Lapu-Lapu
RTC, acting on GMCs Motion for Execution, issued an Order[62]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing
considerations, plaintiff Group Management Corporations motion is GRANTED,
while defendant GSIS motion to stay the issuance of a writ of execution is
denied for lack of merit. Consequently,
the Sheriff of this Court is directed to proceed with the immediate
implementation of this Courts decision dated February 24, 1992, by enforcing
completely this Courts Order of Execution dated November 28, 1996, the writ of
execution dated December 17, 1996, the Order dated July 21, 1997, the Order
dated October 23 1997, the Order dated November 28, 1997 and the Order dated
December 22, 1997.[63]
On May 7, 2004, the Lapu-Lapu RTC
denied[64]
the motions for reconsideration filed by LLDHC and GSIS.
On
May 27, 2004, LLDHC filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus[65]
against the Lapu-Lapu RTC for having issued the Orders of March 11, 2004 and
May 7, 2004 (assailed Orders). This
petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
84382, sought the annulment of the assailed Orders and for the Court of
Appeals to command the Lapu-Lapu RTC to desist from further proceeding in Civil
Case No. 2203-L, to dismiss GMCs Motion for Execution, and for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the
Lapu-Lapu RTC and GMC.
On July 6, 2004, GSIS filed its own
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order[66]
before the Court of Appeals to annul the assailed Orders of the Lapu-Lapu RTC,
to prohibit the judge therein and the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City from
implementing such assailed Orders, and for the issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction to maintain the status
quo while the case is under litigation.
This petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 85096.
The Court of Appeals initially
dismissed outright LLDHCs petition for failure to attach the Required
Secretarys Certificate/Board Resolution authorizing petitioner to initiate the
petition,[67] but in
a Resolution[68] dated
August 2, 2004, after having found the explanation for the mistake
satisfactory, the Court of Appeals, on equitable consideration and for the
purpose of preserving the status quo during the pendency of the appeal,[69]
issued a TRO against the Lapu-Lapu RTC from enforcing its jurisdiction and
judgment/order in Civil Case No. 2203-L until further orders. In its August 30, 2004 Resolution,[70]
the Court of Appeals, without resolving the case on its merits, also issued a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, commanding the Lapu-Lapu RTC to cease and
desist from implementing the assailed Orders in Civil Case No. 2203-L, until
further orders.
On November 25, 2004, the Twentieth
Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
85096. It dismissed GSISs petition and
affirmed the assailed Orders of March 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004. The Court of Appeals found no merit in GSISs
petition since the judgment in Civil Case No. 2203-L, which was decided way
back on February 24, 1992, had long become final and executory, which meant
that the Lapu-Lapu RTC had no legal obstacle to cause said judgment to be
executed and enforced. The Court of
Appeals quoted in full, portions of this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 141407 to
underscore the fact that no less than the Supreme Court had declared that the
decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L was valid and binding and had become final
and executory a long time ago and had not been in any way nullified by the
decision rendered by the Manila RTC on May 10, 1994 in Civil Case No.
R-82-3429. On January 20, 2005, the
Court of Appeals upheld its decision and denied GSISs Motion for
Reconsideration.[71]
However, on September 23, 2005, the
Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals came out with its own
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382. It
granted LLDHCs petition, contrary to the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 85096, and annulled and set aside the March 11, 2004 Order of the
Lapu-Lapu RTC in this wise:
WHEREFORE,
finding merit in the instant Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, the same is hereby GRANTED,
and the assailed Order, dated March 11, 2004, of the Regional Trial Court, 7th
Judicial Region, Branch 27,
Accordingly, respondent Judge
Benedicto Cobarde is hereby ORDERED:
a) to DESIST from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 2203-L; and
b) to DISMISS GMCs Motion for Execution in the abovementioned case;
Meanwhile, the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction earlier issued is hereby declared PERMANENT. No pronouncement
as to costs.[72]
GSIS[73]
and GMC[74]
are now before this Court, with their separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari,
assailing the decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85096 and CA-G.R.
SP No. 84382, respectively.
In
G.R. No. 167000, GSIS is assailing the Orders issued by the Lapu-Lapu RTC on
March 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004 for being legally unenforceable on GSIS because
the titles of the 78 lots in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City were already in LLDHCs
name, due to the final and executory judgment rendered by the Manila RTC in
Civil Case No. R-82-3429. GSIS contends
that it is legally and physically impossible for it to comply with the assailed
Orders as the subject matter to be delivered or performed have already been
taken away from [75]
GSIS. GSIS asserts that the
circumstances which have arisen, from the judgment of the Manila RTC to the
cancellation of GSISs titles, are supervening events which should be
considered as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgments because
they render the execution of the final and executory judgment of the Lapu-Lapu
RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L unjust and inequitable. GSIS further claims that it should not be
made to pay damages of any kind because its funds and properties are exempt
from execution, garnishment, and other legal processes under Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 8291.
LLDHC, in its Compliance,[76]
believes that it was impleaded in this case as a mere nominal party since it
filed its own Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which
was granted in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382. LLDHC essentially agrees with GSIS that the
implementation of the assailed Orders have become legally impossible due to the
fully implemented Writ of Execution issued by the Manila RTC in Civil Case No.
R-82-3429. LLDHC alleges that because of
this supervening event, GSIS cannot be compelled to execute a final deed of
sale in GMCs favor, and LLDHC cannot be divested of its titles, ownership and
possession of the subject properties.[77]
GMC in its comment[78]
argues that GSIS has no legal standing to institute this petition because it
has no more interest in the subject lots, since it is no longer in possession
and the titles thereto have already been registered in LLDHCs name. GMC claims that the decision of the Special
Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is barred by res judicata, and that LLDHC is guilty of forum shopping for filing
several petitions before the Court of Appeals and this Court with the same
issues and arguments. GMC also asserts
that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 is enforceable only between GSIS
and LLDHC as GMC was not a party to the case, and that the Manila RTC cannot
overrule the Lapu-Lapu RTC, they being co-equal courts.
In G.R. No. 169971, GMC is praying
that the decision of the Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 be reversed and
set aside. GMC is claiming that the
Court of Appeals, in rendering the said decision, committed a palpable legal
error by overruling several final decisions rendered by the Lapu-Lapu RTC, the
Court of Appeals, and this Court.[79] GMC claims that the Lapu-Lapu RTCs duty to
continue with the implementation of its orders is purely ministerial as the
judgment has not only become final and executory, but has been affirmed by both
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in several equally final and
executory decisions.[80] GMC, repeating its arguments in G.R. No.
167000, maintains that the petition is barred by res judicata, that there is forum shopping, and that the Manila RTC
decision is not binding on GMC.
LLDHC in its comment[81]
insists that there is a supervening event which rendered it necessary to stay
the execution of the judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC. LLDHC also asserts that, as correctly found
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84382, the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L was not
affirmed with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court as the
decision was not reviewed on the merits.
SUMMARY
OF THE ISSUES
The present case is peculiar in the
sense that it involves two conflicting final and executory decisions of two
different trial courts. Moreover, one of
the RTC decisions had been fully executed and implemented. To complicate things further, the parties
have previously filed several petitions, which have reached not only the Court
of Appeals but also this Court. Upon
consolidation of the two petitions, this Court has narrowed down the issues to
the following:
1.
Whether or not the decision of the
Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 constitutes a supervening event, which
should be admitted as an exception to the doctrine of finality of judgments.
2.
Whether or not the September 23, 2005
Decision of the Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84382 and GSISs Petition in G.R. No. 167000 are barred by res judicata.
3.
Whether or not there is a legal and
physical impossibility for GSIS to comply with the March 11, 2004 and May 7,
2004 Orders of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
4.
Whether or not LLDHC and GSIS are guilty
of forum shopping.
DISCUSSION
First Issue:
Supervening Event
It is
well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may not be changed,
altered or modified in any way even if the modification were for the purpose of
correcting an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. This is referred to as the doctrine of
finality of judgments, and this doctrine applies even to the highest court of
the land.[82] This Court explained its rationale in this
wise:
The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors,
the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed
by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught
the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the
rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.[83]
This Court has,
on several occasions, ruled that the doctrine of finality of judgments admits
of certain exceptions, namely:
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its
execution unjust and inequitable.[84]
Both GSIS and LLDHC claim that the execution
of the decision and orders in Civil Case No. 2203-L should be stayed because of
the occurrence of supervening events which render the execution of the
judgment impossible, unfair, unjust and inequitable.[85] However,
in order for an event to be considered a supervening event to justify the
alteration or modification of a final judgment, the event must have transpired after the judgment has become final and
executory, to wit:
Supervening events refer to facts
which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new
circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the
trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.[86]
The Lapu-Lapu
RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L was promulgated on February 24, 1992, while the Manila RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. R-82-3429 was promulgated on May
10, 1994. As early as December 6,
1993, both GSISs and LLDHCs appeals of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision were
dismissed by the said RTC.[87] Only GSIS moved to reconsider this dismissal,
which was denied on July 6, 1994.[88] Strictly speaking, the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision
should have attained finality at that stage; however, LLDHC filed with the
Court of Appeals its Petition for Annulment of Judgment (CA-G.R. SP No. 34696)
on July 27, 1994 and it used therein the Manila RTC Decision as its main ground
for annulment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision.
The Court of Appeals nonetheless
dismissed LLDHCs Petition for Annulment of Judgment, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34696,[89]
and that became final and executory on January 28, 1995,[90]
after LLDHC interposed no
appeal. The entry of judgment in this
case was issued on August 18, 1995.[91] Moreover, the similar petition of LLDHC
before this Court in G.R. No. 118633 was decided on September 6, 1996 and
became final and executory on December 23, 1996. Therefore, the ruling by the Manila RTC is
evidently not a supervening event. It
was already in existence even before the decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L
attained finality.
Just as LLDHC
and GSIS, as the losing parties, had the right to file their respective appeals
within the prescribed period, GMC, as the winning party in Civil Case No.
2203-L, equally had the correlative right to benefit from the finality of the
resolution of its case,[92]
to wit:
A final
judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by law
under the due process clause of the Constitution. A final judgment is a vested
interest which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize
and protect, and of which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily
without injustice.[93]
(Citations omitted.)
Since the Manila
RTC decision does not constitute a supervening event, there is therefore
neither reason nor justification to alter, modify or annul the Lapu-Lapu RTC
Decision and Orders, which have long become final and executory. Thus, in the present case, GMC must not be
deprived of its right to enjoy the fruits of a final verdict.
It is settled in jurisprudence that
to stay execution of a final judgment, a supervening event must create a
substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties which would render
execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable making it
imperative to stay immediate execution in the interest of justice.[94]
However, what would be unjust and
inequitable is for the Court to accord preference to the Manila RTC Decision on
this occasion when in the past, the Court of Appeals and this Court have
repeatedly, consistently, and with finality rejected LLDHCs moves to use the
Manila RTC Decision as a ground to annul, and/or to bar the execution of, the
Lapu Lapu RTC Decision. To be sure, in the
Decision dated September 9, 2002 in G.R. No. 141407, penned by former Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court already passed upon the lack of effect
of the Manila RTC Decision on the finality of the Lapu Lapu RTC decision in
this wise:
The records of the case clearly
show that the Lapulapu Decision has become final and executory and is thus
valid and binding upon the parties. Obviously, petitioner [LLDHC] is again
trying another backdoor attempt to annul
the final and executory Decision of
the Lapulapu RTC.
First, it was petitioner that filed on
March 11, 1992 a Notice of Appeal
contesting the Lapulapu RTC Judgment in Civil Case No. 2203-L rendered on
February 24, 1992. The Notice was however rejected
by the said RTC for being frivolous and dilatory. Since petitioner had done
nothing thereafter, the Decision clearly became final and executory.
However, upon receipt of the
Manila RTC Decision, petitioner found a new tool to evade the already final
Lapulapu Decision by seeking the annulment of the latter in a Petition with the
CA. However, the appellate court dismissed the
action, because petitioner had been unable to prove any of the grounds for
annulment; namely lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud. Because no appeal
had been taken by petitioner, the ruling of the CA also became final and
executory.
Second, the Supreme Court likewise recognized the finality of the CA Decision
when it threw out LLDHCs Petition for Certiorari in GR No. 118633. This
Court ruled thus:
Instead
of filing this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which is
essentially another Petition to Annul Judgment, petitioner LLDHC should have
filed a timely Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 29, 1994, dismissing
the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the petitioner LLDHC before the
court a quo. But this is all academic now. The appellate courts decision
had become final and executory on January 28, 1995.
Jurisprudence
mandates that when a decision becomes final and executory, it becomes valid and
binding upon the parties and their successors in interest. Such decision or
order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may
have been. Petitioners failure to file an appeal within the reglementary
period renders the judgment final and executory. The perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure to
conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and
executory and, hence, unappealable. Therefore,
since the Lapulapu Decision has become final and executory, its execution has
become mandatory and ministerial on the part of the judge.
The CA correctly ruled that the
Lapulapu Judgment is binding upon petitioner [LLDHC] which, by its own motion,
participated as an intervenor.
In fact, the latter filed an Answer in
Intervention and thereafter actively
took part in the trial. Thus, having had an opportunity to be heard and to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling it complained of, it cannot
claim that it was denied due process of law. What the law prohibits is the
absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. Jurisprudence teaches that a
party cannot feign denial of due process if it has been afforded the
opportunity to present its side.
Petitioner likewise claims that
Private Respondent GMC cannot escape the adverse effects of the final and
executory judgment of the Manila RTC.
Again, we do not agree. A trial court has no power to
stop an act that has been authorized by another trial court of equal rank. As correctly stated by the CA, the Decision
rendered by the
Third, petitioner grievously errs in insisting that the judgment of the
It likewise does not escape the
attention of this Court that the only reason the Manila RTC Decision was
implemented ahead of the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision was that LLDHC successfully
secured a TRO from the Court of Appeals through its petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
44052, which was eventually dismissed by the appellate court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Manila RTC
Decision did not constitute a supervening event that would forestall the execution
of the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision. This
decision of the Court of Appeals likewise became final and executory in 1998.
It bears repeating that the issue
of whether or not the Manila RTC Decision could nullify or render unenforceable
the Lapu Lapu RTC Decision has been litigated many times over in different
fora. It would be the height of inequity
if the Court were to now reverse the Court of Appeals and its own final and
executory rulings and allow GSIS to prevent the execution of the Lapu Lapu RTC
Decision on the same legal grounds previously discredited by the courts.
Second Issue:
Res Judicata
GMC
asserts that the September 23, 2005 Decision of the
Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 and
the petition herein by GSIS in G.R. No. 167000 are barred by res judicata as the issues involved had
been fully resolved not only by the lower courts but by this Court as
well. GSIS and LLDHC both insist that res judicata does not apply as this
Court has not yet rendered a decision involving the same or any similar
petition.[96] The petitions by LLDHC before the Court of
Appeals and GSIS before this Court both prayed for the annulment of the March
11, 2004 and May 7, 2004 Orders of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L. These assailed Orders were both issued to
resolve the parties motions and to have the February 24, 1992 judgment
implemented and executed.
In Republic of the
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.[98]
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[99]
we enumerated the elements of res
judicata as follows:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the same parties.[100]
All three parties herein are in agreement with the facts that
led to the petitions in this case.
However, not all of them agree that the matters involved in this case
have already been judicially settled.
While GMC contends that GSISs petition is barred by res judicata, both GSIS and LLDHC assert
that this Court has not yet decided any similar petition, thus disputing the
claim of res judicata.
Res judicata has two concepts: (1) "bar by prior
judgment" as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; and (2) "conclusiveness of judgment" in Rule 39,
Section 47(c), which reads as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order
is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same
title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto.
In explaining the two
concepts of res judicata, this Court
held that:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is "conclusiveness of judgment." Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues.[101]
In Pealosa v. Tuason,[102]
we laid down the test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the
first and second cases are identical:
Would the same evidence support and establish both the present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the former action.[103]
Res judicata clearly exists in G.R. No. 167000
and in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 because both GSISs and LLDHCs actions put in
issue the validity of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision and were based on the
assumption that it has either been modified, altered or nullified by the Manila
RTC Decision.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 84382, LLDHC sought to annul the assailed
Orders of the Lapu-Lapu RTC and to order the judge therein to desist from
further proceeding in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
LLDHC sought for the same reliefs in its Petition for Annulment of
Judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 34696 and G.R. No. 118633, in its Petition for Certiorari
in CA-G.R. SP No. 44052, and in its Petition for Review on Certiorari in
G.R. No. 141407, all of which have been decided with finality.
In G.R. No. 167000, GSIS is praying for the reversal of the
November 25, 2004 Decision and January 20, 2005 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
85096, wherein the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed Orders. The validity of these assailed Orders hinges
on the validity of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision, which issue had already been
decided with finality by both the Court of Appeals and this Court.
Notwithstanding the difference in the
forms of actions GSIS and LLDHC filed, the doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were
litigating the same thing, i.e., the 78 lots in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu
City, and more importantly, the same contentions and evidence were used in all
causes of action. As this Court held in Mendiola v. Court of Appeals[104]:
The test of identity of causes of
action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would
support and establish the former and the present causes of action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid
cases is of no moment. x x x.[105]
The
doctrine of res judicata makes a final judgment on the merits rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction conclusive as to the rights of the parties
and their privies and amounts to an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.[106] Even a
finding of conclusiveness of judgment operates as estoppel with respect to
matters in issue or points controverted, on the determination of which the
finding or judgment was anchored.[107]
Evidently,
this Court could dispose of this case simply upon the application of the
principle of res judicata. It is clear that GSISs petition in G.R. No.
167000 and LLDHCs petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 should have never reached
those stages for having been barred by a final and executory judgment on their
claims. However, considering the nature
of the case before us, this Court is compelled to make a final determination of
the issues in the interest of substantial justice and to end the wasteful use
of our courts time and resources.
Third Issue:
GSISs
Compliance with the
Lapu-Lapu RTC Judgment and
Orders
GSIS asserts that the
assailed Orders cannot be enforced upon it given the physical and legal
impossibility for it to comply as the titles over the subject properties were
transferred to LLDHC under the Manila RTC writ of execution.
A closer perusal of the
March 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004 Orders shows that GSISs argument holds no
water. The May 7, 2004 Order denied
GSISs and LLDHCs motions for reconsideration of the March 11, 2004
Order. The March 11, 2004 Order resolved
GMCs urgent manifestation and motion to proceed with the implementation of the
February 24, 1992 final and executory decision and GSISs and LLDHCs
opposition thereto, as well as GSISs motion to stay the issuance of a writ of
execution against it. The dispositive
portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, plaintiff Group Management Corporations motion is GRANTED, while defendant GSIS motion to stay the issuance of a writ of execution is denied for lack of merit. Consequently, the Sheriff of this Court is directed to proceed with the immediate implementation of this Courts decision dated February 24, 1992, by enforcing completely this Courts Order of Execution dated November 28, 1996, the writ of execution dated December 17, 1996, the Order dated July 21, 1997, the Order dated October 23, 1997, the Order dated November 28, 1997 and the Order dated December 22, 1997.[108] (Emphasis ours.)
While the previous orders
and writs of execution issued by the Lapu-Lapu RTC required the GSIS to execute
the final deed of sale and to deliver the subject properties, the Lapu-Lapu
RTC, in its subsequent Orders, modified this by directing its order to the Register
of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City. In its July
21, 1997 Order,[109]
the Lapu-Lapu RTC, seeing GSISs obstinate refusal to implement the courts
previous orders, directed the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to cancel the
Transfer Certificates of Title of the subject properties and to issue new ones
in the name of GMC, and to deliver the same to GMC. Moreover, in its October 23, 1997 Order, the
Lapu-Lapu RTC, noting the implemented judgment of the Manila RTC, declared the
issuance of new titles to LLDHC null and void for being contrary to the courts
February 24, 1992 decision and directed the Register of Deeds to effect the
transfer of the titles to GMC.
Considering that the
assailed Orders merely directed the Lapu-Lapu RTCs Sheriff to proceed with the
implementation of the courts previous orders, that is, to make sure that the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City complied with the orders, GSIS had nothing
to comply with insofar as the titles to, and possession of, the subject
properties were concerned, the Orders being clearly directed towards the
Sheriff of the Lapu-Lapu RTC and the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City. Hence, GSISs argument of legal and physical
impossibility of compliance with the assailed Orders is baseless.
GSIS also argues that it cannot be the subject [of any]
execution including [the] payment of any damage and other monetary judgments
because all GSIS funds and properties are absolutely and expressly exempt from
execution and other legal processes under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291.[110]
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291 provides:
SECTION 39. Exemption from Tax,
Legal Process and Lien.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial
solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all
times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this
Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the
GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the
actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution rate necessary to
sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the
contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and
benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or
duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of
this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances,
regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation
of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered
ineffective and without legal force and effect.
x
x x x
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
This
Court, in Rubia v. Government Service
Insurance System,[111]
held that the exemption of GSIS is not absolute and does not encompass all of
its funds, to wit:
In so far as Section 39 of the GSIS charter exempts the GSIS from execution, suffice it to say that such exemption is not absolute and does not encompass all the GSIS funds. By way of illustration and as may be gleaned from the Implementing Rules and Regulation of the GSIS Act of 1997, one exemption refers to social security benefits and other benefits of GSIS members under Republic Act No. 8291 in connection with financial obligations of the members to other parties. The pertinent GSIS Rule provides:
Rule XV. Funds of the GSIS
Section 15.7 Exemption of Benefits of Members from Tax, Attachment, Execution, Levy or other Legal Processes. The social security benefits and other benefits of GSIS members under R.A. 8291 shall be exempt from tax, attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies in connection with all financial obligations of the member, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties or incurred in connection with his position or work, as well as COA disallowances. Monetary liability in favor of the GSIS, however, may be deducted from the benefits of the member. [Emphasis supplied]
The processual exemption of the GSIS funds and properties under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter, in our view, should be read consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to maintain actuarial solvency of the GSIS in the protection of assets which are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of its members. Clearly, the exemption should be limited to the purposes and objects covered. Any interpretation that would give it an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS assets from legal processes absolutely would be unwarranted.
Furthermore, the declared policy of the State in Section 39 of the GSIS Charter granting GSIS an exemption from tax, lien, attachment, levy, execution, and other legal processes should be read together with the grant of power to the GSIS to invest its "excess funds" under Section 36 of the same Act. Under Section 36, the GSIS is granted the ancillary power to invest in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees, by using its excess funds for investment purposes. In the exercise of such function and power, the GSIS is allowed to assume a character similar to a private corporation. Thus, it may sue and be sued, as also, explicitly granted by its charter. Needless to say, where proper, under Section 36, the GSIS may be held liable for the contracts it has entered into in the course of its business investments. For GSIS cannot claim a special immunity from liability in regard to its business ventures under said Section. Nor can it deny contracting parties, in our view, the right of redress and the enforcement of a claim, particularly as it arises from a purely contractual relationship, of a private character between an individual and the GSIS.[112]
This ruling has been
reiterated in the more recent case of Government
Service Insurance System v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71,[113]
wherein GSIS, which was also the petitioner in that case, asked to reverse this
Courts findings in Rubia and grant
GSIS absolute immunity. This Court
rejected that plea and held that GSIS should not be allowed to hide behind such
immunity especially since its obligation arose from its own wrongful action in
a business transaction.
In this case, the monetary judgments against GSIS arose from
its failure to comply with its private and contractual obligation to GMC. As such, GSIS cannot claim immunity from the
enforcement of the final and executory judgment against it.[114]
Fourth Issue:
Forum Shopping
On the issue of forum shopping, this Court already found LLDHC guilty of forum shopping and was adjudged to pay treble costs way back in 2002 in G.R. No. 141407[115]:
There is forum shopping whenever, as
a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) from another. In Gatmaytan
v. CA, the petitioner therein repeatedly availed itself of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively. All those remedies were substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and
all raised substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved
adversely by, some other court. This
Court held that therein petitioner was trying to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision by filing multiple suits in several courts.
Hence, he was found guilty of forum shopping.
In the present case, after the
Lapulapu RTC had rendered its Decision in favor of private respondent,
petitioner filed several petitions before this Court and the CA essentially
seeking the annulment thereof. True,
petitioner had filed its Complaint in the Manila RTC before private respondent
filed its own suit in the Lapulapu RTC.
Records, however, show that private respondent learned of the
On July 27, 1994, almost two years
after the dismissal of its appeal by the Lapulapu RTC, petitioner filed in the
CA a suit for the annulment of that RTC judgment. On December 29, 1994, this suit was rejected
by the CA in a Decision which became final and executory on January 28, 1995,
after no appeal was taken by petitioner.
However, this action did not stop petitioner. On February 2, 1995, it filed with this Court
another Petition deceptively cloaked as certiorari, but which in reality
sought the annulment of the Lapulapu Decision.
This Court dismissed the Petition on September 6, 1996. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied with finality on November 18, 1996.
On November 28, 1996, Judge Risos of
the Lapulapu RTC directed the execution of the judgment in the case filed
before it. The Motion to Stay Execution
filed by petitioner was denied on February 19, 1997. Undaunted, it filed in this Court another
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. On September 21, 1998, we referred the
Petition to the CA for appropriate action.
This new Petition again essentially sought to annul the final and executory
Decision rendered by the Lapulapu RTC.
Needless to say, the new suit was unsuccessful. Still, this rejection did not stop
petitioner. It brought before this Court
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging the same facts
and circumstances and raising the same issues already decided by this Court in
G.R. No. 118633.
First
Philippine International Bank v. CA stresses that what is truly important
to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists is the vexation caused
the courts and the parties-litigants by one who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related facts and causes and/or
to grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the
possibility of conflicting rulings and decisions.
Petitioner in the present case sued
twice before the CA and thrice before this Court, alleging substantially the
same facts and circumstances, raising essentially the same issues, and praying
for almost identical reliefs for the annulment of the Decision rendered by the
Lapulapu RTC. This insidious practice of
repeatedly bringing essentially the same action -- albeit disguised in various
nomenclatures -- before different courts at different times is forum shopping
no less. Because of petitioners actions,
the execution of the Lapulapu Decision has been needlessly delayed and several
courts vexed.[116]
There is forum shopping when two or
more actions or proceedings, other than appeal or certiorari, involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, are instituted either
simultaneously or successively to obtain a more favorable decision.[117] This Court, in Spouses De la Cruz v. Joaquin,[118]
explained why forum shopping is disapproved of:
Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for the summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt of court.[119]
It is undeniable that both LLDHC and GSIS are guilty of forum
shopping, for having gone through several actions and proceedings from the
lowest court to this Court in the hopes that they will obtain a decision
favorable to them. In all those actions,
only one issue was in contention: the ownership of the subject lots. In the process, the parties degraded the
administration of justice, congested our court dockets, and abused our judicial
system. Moreover, the simultaneous and
successive actions filed below have resulted in conflicting decisions rendered
by not only the trial courts but also by different divisions of the Court of
Appeals.
The very purpose of the rule against forum shopping was to
stamp out the abominable practice of trifling with the administration of
justice. [120] It is evident from the history of this case
that not only were the parties and the courts vexed, but more importantly,
justice was delayed. As this Court held
in the earlier case of LLDHC against GMC: [The] insidious practice of
repeatedly bringing essentially the same action albeit disguised in various
nomenclatures before different courts at different times is forum shopping no less.[121]
Conclusion
Nonetheless, like we said, substantial justice requires the
resolution of this controversy on its merits.
It is the duty of this Court to put an end to this long-delayed
litigation and render a decision, which will bind all parties with finality.
Although it is settled that the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision was
not in any way nullified by the Manila RTC Decision, it is this Courts duty to
resolve the legal implications of having two conflicting, final, and executory
decisions in existence. In Collantes v. Court of Appeals,[122]
this Court, faced with the similar issue of having two conflicting, final and
executory decisions before it, offered three options to solve the dilemma: the first
is for the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to determine
which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments
had been rendered by a court of last resort.[123]
In Collantes,
this Court applied the first option and resolved the conflicting issues
anew. However, resorting to the first
solution in the case at bar would entail disregarding not only the final and
executory decisions of the Lapu-Lapu RTC and the Manila RTC, but also the final
and executory decisions of the Court of Appeals and this Court. Moreover, it would negate two decades worth
of litigating. Thus, we find it more
equitable and practicable to apply the second and third options consequently
maintaining the finality of one of the conflicting judgments. The primary criterion under the second option
is the time when the decision was rendered and became final and executory, such
that earlier decisions should prevail over the current ones since final and
executory decisions vest rights in the winning party. In the third solution, the main criterion is
the determination of which court or tribunal rendered the decision. Decisions of this Court should be accorded
more respect than those made by the lower courts.[124]
Applying these criteria to the case
at bar, the February 24, 1992 Decision of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No.
2203-L was not only promulgated first; it also attained finality on January 28,
1995, before the Manila RTCs May 10, 1994 Decision in Civil Case No. R-82-3429
became final on May 30, 1997. It is
especially noteworthy that months after the Lapu-Lapu RTC issued its writ of
execution on December 17, 1996, the Manila RTC issued its own writ of execution
on August 1, 1997. To recall, the Manila
RTC writ was only satisfied first because the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 44052 deemed it appropriate to issue a temporary restraining order against
the execution of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision, pending the case before it. Hence, the fact that the Manila RTC Decision
was implemented and executed first does not negate the fact that the Lapu-Lapu
RTC Decision was not only rendered earlier, but had also attained finality
earlier. Furthermore, while both
judgments reached the Court of Appeals, only Civil Case No. 2203-L was passed
upon on the merits by this Court. In
G.R. No. 141407, this Court resolved LLDHCs petition for review on certiorari
seeking to annul the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
50650. This Court, in dismissing the
petition, upheld the validity of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision and declared that
the Manila RTC Decision cannot bind GMC.
That decision became final and executory way back on March 10, 2003.
While this Court cannot blame the
parties for exhausting all available remedies to obtain a favorable judgment,
the issues involved in this case should have been resolved upon the finality of
this Courts decision in G.R. No. 141407.
As pronounced by this Court in Villanueva
v. Court of Appeals[125]:
The
interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the same dispute
recognizes that judicial resources are finite and the number of cases that can
be heard by the court is limited. Every
dispute that is reheard means that another will be delayed. In modern times when court dockets are filled
to overflowing, this concern is of critical importance. x x x.[126]
In summary, this Court finds the execution of the Lapu-Lapu
RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L to be in order. We affirm the assailed Orders of March 11, 2004
and May 7, 2004, which reiterate, among others, the October 23, 1997 Order
issued by the Lapu-Lapu RTC, directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City
to cancel the certificates of title of LLDHC and to issue new ones in GMCs
name. Whatever rights are due
LLDHC from GSIS as a result of the final judgment of the Manila RTC in Civil
Case No. R-82-3429, which we have previously held to be binding between GSIS
and LLDHC, may be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding. Such proceeding shall not further delay the
execution of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision.
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the petition in G.R.
No. 167000 is DENIED and the Decision dated
November 25, 2004 and Resolution
dated January 20, 2005 of the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No. 169971 is GRANTED and the Decision dated September 23, 2005 of
the Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice
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JOSE Associate Justice |
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[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), pp. 36-60; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Sesinado E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Rollo (G.R. No. 169971), pp. 583-601; penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring.
[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), p. 361; formerly known as B.C. Sunga Realty, Inc.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] CA rollo, pp. 41-50.
[35]
[36]
[37] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), p. 622.
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51] The previous judge retired on December 23, 1997.
[52] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), pp. 522-527.
[53]
[54] CA rollo, p. 393.
[55] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), pp. 89-112; penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero with Associate Justices Eubulo Verzola and Mariano H. Umali, concurring.
[56]
[57]
[58] Id. at 682-685; penned by Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban with Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno (Chairman), Renato C. Corona and Conchita Carpio-Morales, concurring.
[59]
[60]
[61] Lapulapu Development and Housing Corporation v. Group Management Corporation, 437 Phil. 297 (2002).
[62] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), pp. 113-115.
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71]
[72] Rollo (G.R. No. 169971), p. 601.
[73] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), pp.
3-35.
[74] Rollo (G.R. No. 169971), pp. 3-82.
[75] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), p. 20.
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79] Rollo (G.R. No. 169971), pp. 3-82.
[80]
[81]
[82] Dapar v. Biascan, 482 Phil. 385, 405 (2004).
[83] Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 123346, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 305, 337.
[84] Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, G.R.
No. 147082, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406, 418.
[85] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), pp. 18-20.
[86] Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 23 (2002).
[87] CA rollo, pp. 168-169.
[88] Id.
at 176.
[89] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), pp. 381-392.
[90]
[91]
[92] Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, supra note 83.
[93] Insular Bank of Asia and
[94] Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc., 504 Phil. 150, 162 (2005).
[95] Lapulapu Development and Housing Corporation
v. Group Management Corporation, supra note 61 at 312-315.
[96] Rollo (G.R. No. 169971), pp. 712, 882.
[97] G.R. No. 157557, March 10, 2006, 484
SCRA 416.
[98]
[99] 349 Phil. 99 (1998).
[100]
[101] Republic
of the
[102] 22 Phil. 303 (1912).
[103]
[104] 327 Phil. 1156 (1996).
[105]
[106]
Republic
of the
[107] Camara v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 858, 868 (1999).
[108] Rollo (G.R. No. 167000), p. 693.
[109]
[110]
[111] 476 Phil. 623 (2004).
[112]
[113] G.R. No. 175393, December 18, 2009,
608 SCRA 552, 584.
[114]
[115] Lapulapu Development and Housing Corporation v. Group Management Corporation, supra note 61.
[116]
[117] Spouses De la Cruz, v. Joaquin, 502 Phil. 803, 813 (2005).
[118]
[119]
[120] Young v. John Keng Seng a.k.a. John Sy, 446 Phil. 823, 832 (2003).
[121] Lapulapu Development and Housing Corporation v. Group Management Corporation, supra note 61 at 317.
[122] G.R. No. 169604, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 561.
[123]
[124] Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, supra note 84.
[125] 349 Phil. 99 (1998).
[126]