SECOND DIVISION
|
ELVIRA LATEO y ELEAZAR, FRANCISCO ELCA y ARCAS, and BARTOLOME BALDEMOR y MADRIGAL, Petitioners, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 161651
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, BERSAMIN,* ABAD, and Promulgated: June 8,
2011 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the August 7, 2003 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23240, which affirmed with
modification the March 17, 1998 decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, convicting Elvira
Lateo (Lateo), Francisco Elca (Elca), and Bartolome Baldemor (Baldemor) of
attempted estafa.
On April 28, 1995, Lateo, Elca, and
Baldemor (petitioners), along with Orlando Lalota (Lalota) and Nolasco de
Guzman (De Guzman), were charged with estafa
in an information, which reads:
That on or about April 27, 1995, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
ELVIRA LATEO y ELEAZAR, conspiring and confederating with FRANCISCO ELCA y
ARCAS, BARTOLOME BALDEMOR y MADRIGAL, ORLANDO LALOTA and NOLASCO DE GUZMAN, and
mutually helping one another, acting in common accord, by means of deceit, that
is, by falsely representing themselves to be the true and [lawful] owner of a
piece of land located in the province of Cavite, and possessing power,
influence, qualification, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary
transactions and by means of other similar deceits, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce ELEONOR LUCERO to part with her
money in the amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, as indeed she parted only with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, which said accused actually received in marked
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of said ELEONOR LUCERO in the
aforestated amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) PESOS Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 31, 1995, petitioners,
with the assistance of their counsel, entered their respective pleas of not
guilty. Accused Lalota and De Guzman remained at large.
Trial on the merits then ensued. The prosecutions version of the facts is
summarized by the CA in this wise:
Sometime in 1994, [petitioners] Lateo and
Elca proposed that [Lucero] finance the titling of the 122 hectares of land
located in Muntinlupa allegedly owned by [petitioner] Elca as the sole heir of
Gregorio Elca. Title to the property had not been transferred to [petitioner]
Elcas name because of a certain discrepancy between the Deed of Sale and TCT
No. 77730. [Petitioner] Elca offered to
assign to [Lucero] 70 hectares of said land. She was then introduced to
[petitioner] Baldemor, Orlando Lalota and Nolasco de Guzman.
[Lucero]
released to [petitioners] about P4.7 million in staggered amounts. [Petitioner] Elca told [Lucero] that certain
portions of the property will first be put in the name of [petitioner] Lateo
and would later be assigned to her. [Lucero]
was given a Deed of Sale dated March 27, 1987.
[Petitioner] Elca likewise executed an irrevocable Special Power of
Attorney in favor of [Lucero]. Later,
she was presented certified true copies of three (3) titles, TCT Nos. 195550, 195551
and 195552 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City in the name of
[petitioner] Lateo covering approximately twenty-seven (27) hectares of Plan
A-7 of the Mutinlupa Estate, situated in Barrio Magdaong, Poblacion,
Muntinlupa. However, [in] December 1994,
when [Lucero] verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati, she discovered
that the aforesaid titles of the property were actually registered in the names
of Marc Oliver R. Singson, Mary Jeanne S. Go and Feliza C. Torrigoza.
[Lucero]
confronted [petitioners] and demanded from them [the] return of the money. She was told that they did not have any money
to return. They instead offered a five
(5) hectare property identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441 located
at Bacoor, P2 million for
the transfer of title.
When
[Lucero] verified with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that
[petitioner] Elca only had a pending application for the sales patent over a four
(4)[-hectare] area of the subject land.
These misrepresentations prompted her to file a complaint with the Task
Force Kamagong, PACC,
On
April 26, 1995, the task force conducted an entrapment at Furosato
Restaurant. [Petitioners] were
apprehended in possession of marked 100-peso bills amounting to P100,000.00,
supposedly in exchange for the Deed of Assignment prepared by [Lucero] for
their transaction.[4]
Petitioners
version, on the other hand, is summed up as follows:
Sometime in 1994, [Lucero], [petitioner]
Lateo, Oscar Lalota met with [petitioner] Elca in Muntinlupa to discuss the
proposal of [Lucero] to finance the titling of [petitioner] Elcas land.
On
June 28, 1994, in a meeting called by [Lucero], she laid down the terms and
conditions regarding her plans to finance the titling of [petitioner] Elcas
land. She proposed that 22 out of the
122 hectares of the land would be given to the old tenants of the property, the
30 hectares would be titled in the name of [petitioner] Elca as his retained
share and the other 70 hectares would be her profit as financier of the
transaction. [Lucero] would also pay P10.00
for every square meter of the 70 hectares or a total amount of P7
million. All the expenses for the
titling and management of the land would be deducted from P7
million. The remaining balance would
then be given to [petitioners].
[Lucero]
assigned Oscar Lalota to work for the titling of the land and to prepare all
documents necessary thereto. [Petitioner] Baldemor would act as overseer of the
transaction as [Luceros] attorney-in-fact.
[Petitioner] Lateo would serve as secretary and assistant of [Lucero]. [Petitioner] Elca would guard the property to
keep off squatters. He and his wife were
instructed to sign all documents prepared by Oscar Lalota.
In
December 1994, [Lucero] told [petitioner] Elca that upon verification from the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City, she found out that all the documents
submitted by Oscar Lalota pertaining to their transaction were falsified. Oscar Lalota disappeared after getting the
money.
In
order to recover her losses from the anomalous transaction, [Lucero] offered to
purchase [petitioner] Elcas property in P100.00 per square meter. [Petitioner] Elca informed [Lucero] that the
land was not yet titled although the documents had already been completed. [Lucero] agreed to pay in advance the amount
of P200,000.00 for the immediate titling of the land.
On
December 21, 1994, however, [Lucero] gave no advance payment. [Petitioner] Elca was made to return [in]
January 1995. On that date still [Lucero]
made no payment.
On
[April] 25, 1995, [Lucero] promised to give the P200,000.00 advance
payment at Furosato Restaurant [on] Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Having failed to contact his lawyer, on [April]
26, 1995, [petitioner] Elca went alone to Furosato Restaurant. Because of the absence of [petitioner] Lateo,
[Lucero] postponed their meeting to [April] 27, 1995.
When
[petitioner] Elca arrived at Furosato Restaurant on [April] 27, 1995, [Lucero] and
her lawyer Atty. Velasquez, [petitioners] Lateo and Baldemor and Atty. Ambrosio
were already there. Atty. Velasquez,
upon the order of [Lucero], produced a document entitled Contract to Sell
outlining their agreement over the 2 hectares of land in Bacoor,
After
the signing of the Deed of Assignment, [Lucero] brought out the P200,000.00
as the promised payment for the land.
While [petitioner] Baldemor was counting the money, Atty. Velasquez and [Lucero]
went to the comfort room. Thereafter,
several agents of the PACC approached them.
They were arrested and brought to the NBI Headquarters.[5]
After
trial, the RTC rendered a decision[6]
dated March 17, 1998, viz.:
It should be noted that the transaction over
the P2,000,000.00) pesos plus expenses for titling
and the property can be transferred to her.
The
second transaction which covers the Bacoor property was again an attempt to defraud
[Lucero] when Francisco Elca again represented himself as the owner of the said
property when in truth and in fact his right was merely derived from his
application to purchase Friar Lands dated June 25, 1992 which at the time of
the transaction was still being protested as shown by the Investigation Report
of Rogelio N. Bruno, Special Investigator II, DENR, Land Management Bureau (Exhibit
LLLL) hence accused has no right and/or authority to deliver or transfer the
ownership over said parcel of land to [Lucero].
In
the case of Celino vs. CA 163 SCRA 97, it was held that Estafa under Art. 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by means of using fictitious
name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transaction or by means of
other similar deceits. Further, in the
case of Villaflor vs. CA 192 SCRA 680, the Supreme Court held: what is material
is the fact that appellant was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation when
knowing that the car was then owned by the Northern Motors, Inc., still he told
the private complainant that the car was actually owned by him for purposes of
and at the time he obtained the loan from the latter. Indubitably, the accused was in bad faith in
obtaining the loan under such circumstance.
The
attempt to defraud the complainant did not materialize due to the timely
intervention of the Task Force Kamagong operatives.
Art.
6, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the
offender convinces (sic) the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. The entrapment thus
prevented the consummation of the transaction over the
x x x [I]n the case of Koh Tieck Heng vs. People
192 SCRA 533, the Court held [that] although one of the essential elements of
Estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, in the absence of proof
thereof, the offender would x x x be guilty of attempted estafa. Appellant commenced the commission of the
crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime not by reason of [their] spontaneous desistance but because
of his apprehension of the authorities before they could obtain the
amount. Since only the intent to cause
damage and not the damage itself has been shown respondent court correctly
convicted appellant of attempted estafa.
The culpability of x x x the accused is
strengthened by the transfer of his rights over the same subject land in Cavite
in favor of Leticia Ramirez (Exhibit NNNN) thus clearly influencing his
intention to defraud herein complainant as the same shows his lack of intent to
transfer his rights and/or ownership to complainant.
The representations made by Francisco Elca that
he owns the property in Bacoor, Cavite, his having offered the same again to
the complainant in lieu of the aborted deal in the Muntinlupa property their
constant follow-up of complainants decision over the matter convincing the
complainant to accept the offer and their persona[l] presence at the place of
entrapment and their receipt of the P100,000.00 marked money which they
even counted one after the other, thus making all of them positive of the
presence of fluorescent powder. Those
among others indicate strongly that all three accused Francisco Elca, Elvira
Lateo and Bartolome Baldemor attempted to deceive and defraud complainant
Eleanor Lucero.[7]
The RTC decreed that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds
all accused Francisco Elca, Elvira Lateo and Bartolome Baldemor guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted Estafa and is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of
Ten (10) years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,[9] but the
RTC denied it on December 28, 1998.[10]
Petitioners appealed to the CA,
assigning in their brief the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I. That
with due respect to the Honorable Court, it is respectfully submitted that it
erred in finding that THEY ARE GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ESTAFA UNDER
ARTICLE 315 PAR. 2(a) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. That
the basis of the findings of the Honorable Court that they (three accused) are
guilty of attempted estafa is not in accordance with the evidence on record.
III. That
the Honorable Court erred in the imposition of the appropriate penalty based on
its findings assuming without admitting that they (three accused) are guilty of
attempted estafa.[11]
The CA was not at all persuaded by
petitioners arguments and sustained petitioners conviction, although with
modification as to the penalty imposed.
The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposed. [Petitioners] Elvira E. Lateo,
Francisco A. Elca and Bartolome M. Baldemor are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Cost against [petitioners].
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,[13] but
their motion also suffered the same fate, as the CA denied it on January 12,
2004.[14]
Before us, petitioners insist that
their conviction lacked factual and legal basis. They assail the RTC finding, which was sustained
by the CA, that the transaction involving the Bacoor property was again an
attempt to defraud Eleonor Lucero (Lucero).
Petitioners deny that they deceived Lucero. They claim that Lucero was
aware that the Bacoor property is not yet titled in the name of Elca; and that
they went to Furosato restaurant upon Luceros invitation and on Luceros
representation that she would hand to them the P200,000.00 needed to
facilitate the issuance of title in Elcas name. Petitioners, therefore, plead
for an acquittal. Finally, petitioners
assail the penalty imposed by the CA for being erroneous.
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), on the other hand, asserts that the CA correctly sustained petitioners
conviction for attempted estafa. However, it recommends for further
modification of the penalty to six (6) months
of arresto mayor.
Inarguably, the resolution of the
issues raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the sufficiency of the
evidence presented, including the credibility of the witnesses, a course of
action which this Court will not do, consistent with our repeated holding that
this Court is not a trier of facts. Basic is the rule that factual findings of
trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are
entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms
the findings.[15]
It is true that the rule admits of
several exceptions,[16] but
none of the recognized exceptions is present in the case at bar.
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code lists the ways by which estafa
may be committed, which includes:
Art.
315. Swindling (estafa). x x x.
x x x x
2. By
means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending
to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business
or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of the felony are as follows:
1.
That
there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2.
That
such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3.
That the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4.
That as
a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[17]
We agree with the finding of the
trial court that the transaction involving the Bacoor property was a
continuation of the transaction involving parcels of land in Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. When Lucero discovered that Elcas certificates of title over the
Muntinlupa property were fake, Elca offered, as substitute, the 5-hectare
portion of his purported 14-hectare lot in Bacoor, Cavite, but asked for an additional
P2,000,000.00, in this wise:
Dear Ms. Lucero:
This
is with reference to the advances we had obtained from you in the total amount
of P4.7 million, more or less. It
was agreed that the said advances shall be due and demandable upon the release
of titles over my parcels of land situated in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila of which
we are presently working out with appropriate government agencies. Your current demand fro[m] us to pay the
aforesaid amount plus your unilaterally imposed interests is therefore
premature and baseless.
However,
with regards to your alternative demand that you be given a total of 5 hectares
(2 has. upon signing of an agreement assigning my rights and additional 3 has.
upon complete release of the remaining 14 hectares) please be informed that I
am now amenable, provided that an additional P2.0 million will be paid
to me to take care of my other personal commitments. These 5 hectares are situated in Malipay, Bacoor,
P450.00 per square meter and hence, the
property will be more [than] sufficient to cover our obligates (sic).
Please
be guided accordingly.
Very
truly yours,
(Signed)
Francisco
N. Elca
Bo.
Katihan, Poblacion
Muntinlupa,
Metro
As it turned out, Elca did not own 14
hectares in Bacoor,
In Alcantara v. Court of Appeals,[21]
this Court, citing People v. Balasa,[22]
explained the meaning of fraud and deceit, viz.:
[F]raud in its general sense is deemed to
comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing
all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted
to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions
or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the
false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal injury.
Indubitably, petitioners parody that
Elca owned 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite, and was offering a 5-hectare portion of
it, in substitution of the Muntinlupa property, and demanding an additional P2,000,000.00
from Lucero, constituted fraud and deceit.
To reiterate, it is an oft-repeated
principle that the factual findings of the trial courts, including their
assessment of the witness credibility, are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the findings.[23]
Considering that there is nothing in the records that shows that the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court were erroneous, we affirm
their conclusion that petitioners attempted to defraud Lucero again.
Undoubtedly, petitioners commenced
the commission of the crime of estafa
but they failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime, not by reason of their own spontaneous desistance but because of their
apprehension by the authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since only
the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been shown,[24] the
RTC and the CA correctly convicted petitioners of attempted estafa.
On the penalty. The RTC sentenced petitioners to an imprisonment
term of ten (10) years and one (1) day
to twelve years. The CA modified it to six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Petitioners and the OSG both argue that
the penalty imposed by the CA was wrong, and plead for its modification.
The penalty for estafa depends on the
amount defrauded. Thus, if the crime of estafa
had been consummated, Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount of P100,000.00.[25]
Hence, the applicable penalty under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
would have been prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for every P10,000.00
in excess of the first P22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty
should not exceed twenty years.
Since what was established was only
attempted estafa, then the applicable
penalty would be that which is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law
for the consummated felony pursuant to Article 51,[26]
in relation to Article 61(5),[27]
of the RPC. Accordingly, the imposable
penalty would be arresto mayor in its
medium period to arresto mayor in its
maximum period,[28] or an
imprisonment term ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. And because the amount involved exceeded P22,000.00,
one (1) year imprisonment for every P10,000.00
should be added, bringing the total to seven (7) years.
However, we agree with the OSG that
it would be inequitable to impose the additional incremental penalty of 7 years
to the maximum period of penalty, considering that petitioners were charged and
convicted merely of attempted and not consummated estafa. We, therefore,
modify the penalty and sentence petitioners to imprisonment of four (4) months
of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23240 are AFFIRMED. Petitioners Elvira Lateo,
Francisco Elca, and Bartolome Baldemor are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of attempted estafa, and are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per raffle dated April 5, 2011.
* * Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per raffle dated April 5, 2011.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court), concurring; CA rollo, pp. 135-143.
[2] Records, Vol. IV, pp. 182-198.
[3] Records, Vol. I, pp. 4-5.
[4] Supra note 1, at 136-137.
[5]
[6] Supra note 2.
[7]
[8] Records,
[9]
[10]
[11] CA rollo, pp. 69-79.
[12] Supra note 1, at 143.
[13] CA rollo, pp. 144-150.
[14]
[15] Pucay v. People, G.R. No. 167084, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 411, 420.
[16] (1) When the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. (
[17] Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 462 Phil. 72, 88-89 (2003).
[18] Exhibit Q; records, Vol. II, p. 176.
[19] Exhibit 18; records, Vol. IV, p. 25.
[20] See Exhibit LLLL; id. at 343-346.
[21] Supra
note 17, at 89.
[22] G.R.
Nos. 106357 & 108601-02, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 49.
[23] Pucay v. People, supra note 15, at 423.
[24] See Koh Tieck Heng v. People, G.R. Nos. 48535-36, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 533, 545.
[25] See Exhibits VVV-2 to VVV-581; records, Vol. II, pp. 205-322.
[26] Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crime. The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
[27] Art. 61. - Rules for graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
x x x x
(5) When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not specifically provided for in the four preceding rules, the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.
[28] See Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111399, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 116, 139.