Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION
|
THE COCA-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - CLARITA P. GACAYAN, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 149433 Present: CORONA,
C.J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PERALTA,* and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: June
22, 2011 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
For
resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner The Coca-Cola
Export Corporation (petitioner company) of our Decision promulgated on December
15, 2010, denying its petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated May 30, 2001, and subsequent
Resolution dated August 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
49192.
In
our Decision dated December 15, 2010, we affirmed with modification the
decision of the Court of Appeals which ruled that respondent Clarita P. Gacayan
(respondent Gacayan) was illegally dismissed from her employment with
petitioner company. We upheld the
appellate courts order that respondent Gacayan be reinstated to her former
position, if possible, otherwise to a substantially equivalent position without
loss of seniority rights and full backwages.
We, however, modified the award of backwages, ruling that they should be
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of
respondent Gacayans reinstatement.
In
support of its motion, petitioner company advanced the following arguments:
I.
LOSS OF TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE, AS A JUST CAUSE FOR TERMINATION, IS NOT RESTRICTED TO
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES BUT LIKEWISE APPLIES TO SUPERVISORS OR OTHER PERSONNEL
OCCUPYING POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
II.
RESPONDENTS
BREACH OF PETITIONERS TRUST IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED AND BORNE BY THE RECORDS.
III.
RESPONDENTS
WRONGFUL, MALICIOUS, AND FRAUDULENT INTENT IS EVIDENT FROM THE RECORDS.
IV.
RESPONDENTS
DISMISSAL IS NOT HARSH BUT IS COMPLETELY COMMENSURATE TO THE SEVERITY OF HER
ACTS. THE COURTS ORDER FOR RESPONDENTS
REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES REWARDS GROSS DISHONESTY AND ENNOBLES BREACH OF
TRUST.[1]
To
resolve the instant motion, it is necessary to restate briefly the factual background
of the case.
One
of the benefits enjoyed by the employees of petitioner company was the
reimbursement of meal and transportation expenses incurred while rendering
overtime work. This was allowed only
when the employee worked overtime for at least four hours on a Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday, and for at least two hours on weekdays. The maximum amount allowed to be reimbursed
was one hundred fifty (P150.00) pesos.
It was in connection with this company policy that respondent Gacayan,
then a Senior Financial Accountant, was made to explain the alleged alterations
in three (3) receipts which she submitted to support her claim for
reimbursement of meal expenses, to wit:
1) McDonalds Receipt No. 875493 dated October 1, 1994 for P111.00;
2) Shakeys Pizza Parlor Receipt No. 122658 dated November 20, 1994 for P174.06;
and 3) Shakeys Pizza Parlor Receipt No. 41274 dated July 19, 1994 for P130.50.
Petitioner
company sent respondent Gacayan several memoranda requiring her to explain why
her claims for reimbursement should not be considered fraudulent since there
were alterations, i.e., the dates of
issuance of the receipts and the food items purchased as enumerated thereon, in
the receipts she submitted.
Consequently,
respondent Gacayan submitted her explanation denying any personal knowledge in
the commission of the alterations on the subject receipts.
Petitioner
company then conducted a hearing and formal investigation on the matter to give
respondent Gacayan an opportunity to explain the issues against her and to
present her side. After attending the
first scheduled hearing and participating thereat, respondent Gacayan did not
attend the succeeding hearings, citing her doctors advice to rest, and likewise
complaining of the alleged partiality of the investigating committee against
her.
In
a letter dated April 4, 1995, petitioner company dismissed respondent Gacayan
for fraudulently submitting tampered and/or altered receipts in support of her
petty cash reimbursements in gross violation of the companys rules and
regulations.
On
June 6, 1995, respondent Gacayan filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
In
a Decision dated June 17, 1996, the Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent
Gacayans complaint for lack of merit.
This was affirmed by the NLRC in its Resolution dated April 14, 1998.
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and ruled that the penalty
imposed on respondent Gacayan was too harsh.
The Court of Appeals ordered the immediate reinstatement of respondent
Gacayan to her former position or to a substantially equivalent position
without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages. Hence, petitioner company filed with this
Court a petition for review on certiorari
which was denied in our Decision dated December 15, 2010.
In
our Decision dated December 15, 2010, we declared that respondent Gacayans
dismissal from employment was not grounded on any of the just causes enumerated
under Article 282[2] of
the Labor Code since petitioner company, in its termination letter dated April
4, 1998, neither mentioned its alleged loss of trust and confidence in
respondent Gacayan, nor discussed the alleged sensitive and delicate position
of respondent Gacayan requiring the utmost trust of petitioner company.
Petitioner company now
begs us to reconsider this pronouncement, arguing that respondent Gacayans
position as a Senior Financial Accountant with the Job Description of a
Financial Project Analyst has duties which clearly qualify her as one
occupying a position of trust and responsibility, thus:
8.1. Provides
support in the form of financial analyses and evaluation of alternative
strategies or action plans to assist management in strategic and operational
decision-making.
8.2. Scope of
work is mainly financial analysis but may include assessment of tax, legal,
regulatory, socio-political, marketing, operating, and other considerations.
8.3. Liaises
with the Bottler to comply with Corporate Bottler financial reporting
requirements and to ensure Bottlers plans are aligned with TCCECs
[Respondents]. Includes:
Business
Plan.
Monthly
Rolling Estimate.
Monthly
variance analysis (vs Budget and prior year, Pesos and Dlrs)
Dividend
Declared Report and monitoring of dividend remittances.
Quarterly
reports.
Analysis
of financial issues/questions raised by Corporate.
Presentation
charts.
8.4. Assists
management on various initiatives on ad hoc basis (scope of work depends on
objectives).
Ad
hoc requests from Corporation for Information.
Accounting
for REFPET project costs.
Foundation
3-year plan.
Finance
representative in MRP II project.
CCFEL
ROSS conversion project.
BLI
and BII recapitalization.[3]
According to petitioner
company, respondent Gacayan had access to and was responsible for confidential,
delicate, and sensitive matters, particularly relating to its operations and
finances. Moreover, petitioner company
maintains that respondent Gacayan was in-charge of the proper handling of funds
as among her tasks was the preparation of the Business Plan, Monthly Rolling
Estimate, Monthly variance analysis (vs Budget and prior year, Pesos and Dlrs),
Dividend Declared Report and monitoring of dividend remittances, and Quarterly
reports.[4]
Petitioner company further calls on the
Court to affirm our ruling in Divine Word
College of San Jose v. Aurelio[5] and Panday
v. National Labor Relations Commission[6]
that a Senior Bookkeeper (in the former case) or a Branch Accountant (in the
latter case) held a position of trust and confidence.
Likewise,
petitioner company maintains that respondent Gacayans act of falsifying or
altering receipts in order to secure unwarranted reimbursements, not only once,
but on three (3) separate occasions, were clearly established by the evidence
on record and unambiguously displays [r]espondent [Gacayan]s wrongful intent.[7]
After
due consideration of the motion for reconsideration, we find the same impressed
with merit.
It
is well-settled in our jurisdiction that loss of trust and confidence
constitutes a just and valid cause for an employees termination. In Etcuban,
Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.,[8] this Court held:
Law
and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to dismiss
employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence. More so, in the case of supervisors or
personnel occupying positions of responsibility, loss of trust justifies
termination. Loss of confidence as a
just cause for termination of employment is premised from the fact that an
employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation holds where a person is
entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling,
or care and protection of the employers property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for
dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related such as would show the
employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.[9]
In
the instant case, respondent Gacayan was the Senior Financial Accountant of
petitioner company. While respondent Gacayan
denies that she is handling or has custody of petitioners funds, a re-examination
of the records of this case reveals that she indeed handled delicate and
confidential matters in the financial analyses and evaluations of the action
plans and strategies of petitioner company.
Respondent Gacayan was also privy to the strategic and operational
decision-making of petitioner company, a sensitive and delicate position
requiring the latters utmost trust and confidence. As such, she should be considered as holding
a position of responsibility or of trust and confidence.
We
revert to the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, that
respondent Gacayan betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on her when she,
ironically a Senior Financial Accountant tasked with ensuring financial
reportorial/regulatory compliance from others, repeatedly submitted tampered or
altered receipts to support her claim for meal reimbursements, in gross
violation of the rules and regulations of petitioner company. Upon review, even the Court of Appeals did not
absolve respondent Gacayan of wrongdoing but rather merely held that dismissal
was too harsh a penalty for her infraction.
It has oft been held
that loss of confidence should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
illegal, improper and unjustified. It
must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in
bad faith. It bears stressing that what
is at stake here are the sole means of livelihood, the name and the reputation
of the employee.[10]
Verily, in Tiu and/or Conti Pawnshop v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[11]
we held that the language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states that the
loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust
reposed in the employee by the employer.
Ordinary breach will not suffice; it must be willful. Such breach is willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.[12] And in the case of supervisors or personnel
occupying positions of responsibility, like respondent Gacayan, the loss of
trust and confidence must spring from the voluntary or willful act of the
employee, or by reason of some blameworthy act or omission on the part of the
employee.[13]
Thus,
petitioner company must sufficiently and convincingly show that the loss of
trust and confidence in respondent Gacayan was founded on clearly established
facts, incidents and substantial evidence.
In
its motion for reconsideration, petitioner company emphasized the clear and
convincing evidence on record that respondent Gacayan breached the trust and
confidence reposed in her when she repeatedly submitted tampered or altered
receipts to support her claim for meal reimbursement. Petitioner company maintained that respondent
Gacayan cannot mistakenly file a claim for overtime meal allowance
reimbursement for a day she knew she was not entitled to, as she did not
actually render overtime work. Petitioner
company reiterated its evidence showing that respondent Gacayan acted with
wrongful, malicious and fraudulent intent when she repeatedly submitted
tampered or altered receipts.
With regard to the
first receipt in question, McDonalds Receipt No. 875493 dated October 1, 1994
for P111.00, petitioner company was able to secure a certification[14]
from the issuing branch of McDonalds that said receipt was not issued on
October 1, 1994 but on October 2, 1994.
The second receipt, Shakeys Pizza Parlor Receipt No. 122658 dated
November 20, 1994 for P174.06, was actually for three orders of Bunch of
Lunch and not a single order of Buddy Pack with Extra Mojos as claimed by
respondent Gacayan. Petitioner company
presented the sworn affidavit[15]
of the delivery personnel of Shakeys Pasong Tamo to attest to this fact. Lastly, the third receipt, Shakeys Pizza
Parlor Receipt No. 41274 dated July 19, 1994 for P130.50, was found to
be actually issued on July 17, 1994.
Moreover, another employee who supposedly shared the food with
respondent Gacayan denied in a sworn affidavit[16]
that she partook of the said meal. In
sum, petitioner company highlighted in its motion that the gravity of
respondent Gacayans offense lies in the inherent dishonesty of her alteration
of the said receipts even though the amounts she received were minimal sums.
Respondent Gacayan
intentionally, knowingly, purposely, and without justifiable excuse, submitted
tampered or altered receipts to support her claim for meal reimbursement. Respondent Gacayan failed to sufficiently
refute the charges against her for the submission of said fraudulent items of
expense. All she did was to deny any
personal knowledge in the commission of the alterations in the subject receipts
and to point fingers at other people who may have done the alterations.[17]
First, respondent
Gacayan blamed the McDonalds staff for the mistake in the date on the first
receipt. She also blamed her sisters
driver for allegedly giving her a wrong receipt. Second, respondent Gacayan blamed the
delivery staff of Shakeys for bringing yet another wrong receipt. She allegedly requested the delivery
personnel to merely write the correct items which she ordered and to sign the
said receipt to authenticate the alterations made in order to avoid the hassle
of having to wait for a replacement receipt.
This, however, was contradicted by the delivery personnel who narrated
that what was ordered and what he delivered were three orders of Bunch of Lunch
and not a Buddy Pack. The delivery personnel
further recounted that the call for delivery on that particular day was made by
a certain Leah Gatayan (Gacayan) who turned out to be respondent Gacayans
daughter who was with her in the office as evidenced by the logbook entry of
the security guard in respondent Gacayans office. Third, respondent Gacayan claimed to have
shared a meal with a certain CAV (Corazon A. Varona), who executed an affidavit
denying such an instance of meal-sharing with her.
Although the amounts
involved in the subject receipts were relatively small, or only the dates
and/or items ordered were altered or tampered with, respondent Gacayans act of
submitting fraudulent items of expense adversely reflected on her integrity and
honesty, which is ample basis for petitioner company to lose its trust and
confidence in her.
On
the issue of due process, petitioner company complied with all the
aforementioned requirements for the valid dismissal of respondent Gacayan. We quote with approval the Labor Arbiter in
his disquisition, to wit:
As
far as the notice requirement is concerned, the law requires the employer to
give two (2) kinds of notices to the employee sought to be terminated:
It
is evident from the said provisions that the employer is required to furnish an
employee who is to be dismissed two (2) written notices before such
termination. The first is the notice to
apprise the employee of the particular act or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought. This may loosely be
considered as the proper charge. The
second is the notice informing the employee of the employers decision to
dismiss him. This decision, however,
must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from receipt of
the first notice within which to answer the charge, and ample opportunity to be
heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires. This is in consonance with the
express provisions of law on the protection of labor and the broader dictates
of procedural due process. Non
compliance therewith is fatal because these requirements are conditions sine
qua non before dismissal may be validly effected. (Tiu vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 215 SCRA 540, 551-552, emphasis added).
Tested
against the foregoing yardstick, the termination of complainant [herein
respondent] is clearly valid.
Respondents
[herein petitioner] complied with the notice requirement strictly to the
letter. Complainant [respondent] was
given the first notice which the Supreme Court amply termed in the foregoing
jurisprudence as the proper charge.
This Office further notes that more than one notice was given to the
complainant [respondent]. In fact,
complainant [respondent] was repeatedly directed to answer the charges against
her. As she in fact did.
Complainant
[Respondent] was given repeated opportunities to ventilate her side through the
numerous hearings scheduled by the respondents [petitioner]. But after attending only the first hearing,
complainant [respondent] suddenly refused in fact she failed to attend the two
(2) other hearings. [Even] when she came
to know that the Shakeys delivery man was going to be invited.
It
was only after the evidence against complainant [respondent] was received and
her fraudulent participation morally ascertained that respondents [petitioner]
finally decided to terminate his (sic) services. And after arriving at a conclusion,
complainant [respondent] was consequently informed of her termination which was
the sanction imposed on her.
Again,
following the yardstick laid down by the Tiu doctrine cited above, the
procedure in terminating complainant [respondent] was definitely followed. Her termination is therefore valied (sic) and
must be upheld for all intents and purposes.
Certainly,
complainant cannot now belatedly claim that she was denied due process. For it was her who repeatedly refused to
subsequently appear before the formal administrative investigation conducted by
respondent company [petitioner].
Due
process is not violated where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for
whatever reason, not to be heard. It is
obvious that if he opts to be silent where he has the right to be (sic) speak,
he cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced. (Pepsi Cola
Distributors of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995)[18]
Evidence
shows that respondent Gacayan was properly notified of the charges against
her. She received several memoranda[19]
from petitioner company requiring her to explain in writing why her claims for
reimbursement for meal expenses should not be considered fraudulent since there
were alterations in the receipts she submitted.
Petitioner company also sent respondent Gacayan a letter[20]
dated January 3, 1995 directing her to explain why she should not be subjected
to disciplinary sanctions for her violations of the companys rules and
regulations which punishes with dismissal the submission of any fraudulent item
of expense. Petitioner company even
advised respondent Gacayan to bring along a counsel of her choice at the
hearings conducted to investigate the matter.
Respondent
Gacayan submitted her explanation and denied any knowledge of the commission of
alterations on the receipts which she submitted. She even appeared and participated at the
proceedings of the investigation.
Clearly, respondent Gacayan was given ample opportunity to present her
side and rebut the evidence against her.
Despite
all the chances given by petitioner company for respondent Gacayan to present her
case, respondent Gacayan failed to attend the succeeding hearings and merely
filed applications for leave.[21] Petitioner company, however, continued to
send notices[22]
to respondent Gacayan informing her of the re-setting of the continuation of
the investigation on January 23, 1995 and March 15, 1995. With respondent Gacayans continued absence
at the scheduled hearings and after the evidence was evaluated, petitioner
company finally dismissed respondent Gacayan for fraudulently submitting
tampered or altered receipts in support of her petty cash reimbursements.
Given
the foregoing, it is evident that the required procedural due process for
respondent Gacayans termination was fully complied with. The
letter dated January 3, 1995 served on respondent Gacayan was the written
notice specifying the charges against her, while the subsequent letter[23]
dated April 4, 1995 served as the written notice of termination.
In fine, petitioner
company had sufficiently discharged its burden of proving that the dismissal of
respondent Gacayan was for just cause, that it was made within the parameters
of the law, and that respondent was afforded due process pursuant to the basic
tenets of equity, justice and fair play. We agree with petitioner company that to allow
respondent Gacayan to be reinstated to her former position with payment of
backwages would tend rather to reward dishonesty and ennoble breach of trust by
employees to the prejudice of the employer.
This
Court has always reminded that:
While
the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be expected that every labor
dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights which, as
such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play. [24]
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, we GRANT the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner The Coca-Cola Export Corporation
and RECONSIDER our Decision dated
December 15, 2010. The assailed Decision
dated May 30, 2001 and Resolution dated August 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 49192 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions dated April 14, 1998 and June
19, 1998 of the National Labor Relations Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
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DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA Associate Justice
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JOSE PORTUGAL
PEREZ Associate Justice |
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*
Per Raffle dated December
15, 2010.
[1] Rollo, p. 644.
[2] ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes:
(a)
Serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b)
Gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)
Fraud
or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e)
Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
[3] Rollo, pp. 646-647.
[4] Id. at 647.
[5] G.R.
No. 163706, March 29, 2007, 519 SCRA 497.
[6] G.R. No. 67664, May 20, 1992, 209
SCRA 122.
[7] Rollo, p. 649.
[8] G.R. No. 148410, January 17, 2005,
448 SCRA 516.
[9] Id.
at 528-529.
[10] Philippine
National Construction Corporation v. Matias, 497 Phil. 476, 489 (2005).
[11] G.R. No. 83433,
November 12, 1992, 215 SCRA 540.
[12] Id. at 547.
[13] Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, 359
Phil. 399, 406 (1998).
[14] Rollo, p. 144.
[15] Id.
at 147.
[16] Id.
at 163.
[17] Id.
at 115.
[18] Id.
at 281-285.
[19] Id.
at 142 and 145.
[20] Id.
at 149-150.
[21] Id.
at 117-118.
[22] Id.
at 161 and 168.
[23] Id.
at 169-170.
[24] Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc. v. Juangco, G.R. No. 166507, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 325, 331.