FIRST DIVISION
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EMERITA MUOZ, Petitioner, - versus - ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR.
and SAMUEL GO CHAN, Respondents. x - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x EMERITA MUOZ, Petitioner, - versus - SPOUSES SAMUEL GO CHAN and AIDA
C. CHAN, and THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 142676 G.R. No. 146718 Present: Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: June
6, 2011 |
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before
Us are the following consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In
G.R. No. 142676, Emerita Muoz
(Muoz) is seeking the reversal, annulment, and setting aside of the Decision[1]
dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution[2] dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders[3]
dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88
(RTC-Branch 88) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 8286, the
forcible entry case instituted by Muoz against Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr.
(Atty. Yabut) and Samuel Go Chan before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 33 of Quezon City; and nullified the MeTC Order[4] dated May 16, 1994, granting Muozs
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which
restored possession of the subject property to Muoz.
In
G.R. No. 146718, Muoz is praying
for the reversal, setting aside, and nullification of the Decision[5] dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution[6]
dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which
affirmed the Orders[7] dated
August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 95
(RTC-Branch 95) in Civil Case No. Q-28580 denying Muozs Motion for an Alias
Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy
of TCT No. 53297[8] against respondents Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) and the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan
(spouses Chan).
I
FACTS
The
subject property is a house and lot at
On
October 15, 1979, Muoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on
TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. The
next day, on October 16, 1979, Muoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the
deeds of absolute sale dated December 28, 1972 and July 16, 1979, the
cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names, and the restoration
and revival of TCT No. 186306 in Muozs name.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-28580 and raffled to
RTC-Branch 95. On October 17, 1979,
Muoz caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. In an Order dated December 17, 1979, the
RTC-Branch 95 granted the spouses Gos motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in
possession of the subject property. The
writ was implemented by the sheriff on March 26, 1980, driving Muoz and her
housemates away from the subject property.
Muoz
filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals, assailing the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
10148. The appellate court dismissed
Muozs petition on January 4, 1980. Yee
L. Ching and his son Frederick M. Ching filed an urgent motion for leave to
intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 10148 and for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). The Court of
Appeals issued a TRO. However, in a
Resolution dated March 18, 1980, the appellate court denied the motion to
intervene of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching, and cancelled the TRO
previously issued. Yee L. Ching and
Frederick M. Ching challenged before this Court, in G.R. No. 53463, the
Resolution dated March 18, 1980 of the Court of Appeals. Eventually, in a Resolution dated June 3,
1981, the Court dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 53463, for lack of merit and
failure of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching to substantially show that the
RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals gravely abused their discretion. In a subsequent Resolution dated June 21,
1982, the Court clarified that its Resolution of June 3, 1981 was without
prejudice to the continuation of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-28580 still
pending before the trial court, in order that proper and final adjudication
may be made of whether or not the deed of sale by Emerita L. Muoz in favor of
Emilia M. Ching is a real, genuine and authentic transaction, thereby to settle
once and for all the issue of ownership of the property herein in question.[11]
Trial
in Civil Case No. Q-28580 proceeded before RTC-Branch 95.
In
the meantime, Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 258977 was cancelled on October 28, 1982 on
the basis of an alleged final judgment in favor of the spouses Go.[12] The spouses Go obtained a loan of P500,000.00
from BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) and to secure the same, they
constituted a mortgage on the subject property on November 23, 1982.[13] When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment
of their loan, BPI Family foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family was the highest bidder at the
auction sale of the subject property.
The spouses Go failed to exercise their right of redemption within the
prescribed period, thus, BPI Family was finally able to register the subject
property in its name on October 23, 1987 under TCT No. 370364.[14] Apparently, the original copy of TCT No.
370364 was among those razed in the fire at the Quezon City Register of Deeds
on June 11, 1988. As a result of the
administrative reconstitution of the lost title, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) was
issued to BPI Family. On December 3, 1990, BPI Family executed in favor of the
spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan) a Deed of Absolute Sale[15]
covering the subject property for and in consideration of P3,350,000.00. Consequently, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) in
the name of BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No. 53297 was issued in the
spouses Chans names on January 28, 1991.[16] The spouses Chan obtained a loan from BPI
Family on October 2, 1992 for the construction of a building on the subject
property, and to secure the same, constituted a mortgage on the subject
property in favor of BPI Family.[17]
On
July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decision[18]
in Civil Case No. Q-28580, against Emilia M. Ching, Yee L. Ching, and the
spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching, et al.). It found that Muozs signature on the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972 was forged; that Muoz never sold the
subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching; and that the spouses Go were
not innocent purchasers for value of the subject property. The fallo
of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
for lack of merit [Emilia M. Ching, et
al.s] respective counterclaims, cross-claims, and counter-cross-claim,
declaring as null and void ab initio the following documents, to wit:
(a) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, copy of which is marked in
evidence as Exh. M; (b) TCT No. 186366 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. N; (c) Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 16, 1979, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. 3; and, (d)
TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District III, copy of which
is marked in evidence as Exh. 4, and
directing defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records
of the subject property the registrations of all the said documents and to
restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances, TCT No. 186306 of the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh.
L, as well as ordering defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien
jointly and severally to pay [Muoz] the sum of P50,000.00 as and for
attorneys fees and to pay the costs of suit.
The court also hereby dismisses the rest of the claims in [Muozs]
complaint, there being no satisfactory warrant therefor.[19]
Emilia
M. Ching, et al.s, appeal of the
foregoing judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33811
before the Court of Appeals. In its
Decision[20] dated
March 4, 1993, the appellate court not only affirmed the appealed judgment, but
also ordered the spouses Go and their successors-in-interest and assigns and
those acting on their behalf to vacate the subject property, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against [Emilia M. Ching, et al.].
The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued on December 17, 1979
is hereby set aside and declared dissolved.
Defendants-appellants Go and Tan, their successors-in-interest and
assigns and those acting on their behalf, are ordered to vacate the disputed
premises and to deliver the same to [Muoz] immediately upon receipt of this decision.[21]
Emilia
L. Ching, et al., filed before this
Court a motion for extension of time to file their petition for review, which
was assigned the docket number G.R. No. 109260.
However, they failed to file their intended petition within the extended
period which expired on April 23, 1993.
In a Resolution[22]
dated July 12, 1993, the Court declared G.R. No. 109260 terminated. The Resolution dated July 12, 1993 of the
Court in G.R. No. 109260 became final and executory on July 15, 1993 and was
entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on even date.[23]
More
than two months later, on September 20, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 issued a writ
of execution to implement the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
The spouses Chan, who bought the
subject property from BPI Family, then came forward and filed before the
RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion to Stop Execution as Against
Spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida Chan,[24]
opposing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The spouses Chan asserted ownership and
possession of the subject property on the basis of a clean title registered in
their names under TCT No. 53297. The
spouses Chan further contended that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580
could not be executed against them since they were not parties to the said
case; they were not successors-in-interest, assigns, or acting on behalf of the
spouses Go; and they purchased the subject property from BPI Family without any
notice of defect in the latters title.
It
was only at this point that Muoz, upon her own inquiry, discovered the
cancellation on October 28, 1982 of her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the spouses
Gos TCT No. 258977, and the subsequent events that led to the transfer and
registration of the title to the subject property from the spouses Go, to BPI
Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan.
In
its Order[25] dated December 28, 1993, the RTC-Branch
95 denied the spouses Chans urgent motion to stop the execution. According to the RTC-Branch 95, the photocopy
of TCT No. 370364 in the name of BPI Family, submitted by the spouses Chan with
their motion, could hardly be regarded as satisfactory proof that Muozs
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens
annotated therein were also missing from the original copy of said certificate
of title. Muozs adverse claim and
notice of lis pendens were annotated
on TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names as P.E.-8078 and P.E.-8178,
respectively. So when TCT No. 258977 of
the spouses Go was cancelled and TCT No. 370364 was issued to BPI Family, it
could be presumed that the Register of Deeds regularly performed his official
duty by carrying over Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens to TCT No. 370364.
In addition, the RTC-Branch 95 pointed out that in this jurisdiction,
the entry of the notice of lis pendens
in the day book of the Register of Deeds was already sufficient notice to the
whole world of the dispute over the subject property, and there was no more
need to annotate the same on the owners duplicate of the certificate of
title. Finally, the RTC-Branch 95 held
that TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) of BPI Family and TCT No. 53297 of the spouses
Chan shall be subject to the reservation under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 26[26]
[t]hat certificates of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the manner
stated in sections five and six hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party
whose right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the
time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which has not been made
on the reconstituted certificate of title.
Thus, the spouses Chan were deemed to have taken the disputed property
subject to the final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-28580.
On
January 3, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an Alias Writ of Execution.[27] On January 10, 1994, the writ was enforced,
and possession of the subject property was taken from the spouses Chan and
returned to Muoz.[28] In its Orders dated April 8, 1994 and June
17, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the spouses Chans motion for
reconsideration and notice of appeal, respectively.[29]
G.R.
No. 142676
Pending
resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chans motion for
reconsideration and notice of appeal in Civil Case No. Q-28580, Muoz
instituted before the MeTC on February 4, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry
with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction[30]
against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, docketed as Civil Case No. 8286. Muoz alleged in her complaint that she had
been in actual and physical possession of the subject property since January
10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and two
security guards for the said property.
On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other
men, some of whom were armed, ousted Muoz of possession of the subject
property by stealth, threat, force, and intimidation. Muoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and
all persons claiming right under them to vacate the subject property. Muoz additionally prayed for judgment making
the mandatory injunction permanent and directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
to pay Muoz: (1) compensation for the unlawful occupation of the subject
property in the amount of P50,000.00 per month, beginning February 2,
1994 until the said property is fully and completely turned over to Muoz; (2)
attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P1,500.00 per
court appearance of Muozs counsel; and (3) costs of suit.
Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muozs allegations, insisting that Samuel Go
Chan is the valid, lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the subject
property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
averred that the Turn-Over of Possession and Receipt of Possession dated January
10, 1994 attached to Muozs complaint as proof that the subject property had
been placed in her possession is a falsified document. The Writ of Execution issued on September 20,
1993 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had already expired and the Sheriffs Return on
the Writ another document purporting to show that possession of the subject
property was turned-over to Muoz on January 10, 1994 was then being
challenged in a complaint before the Office of Deputy Court Administrator
Reynaldo L. Suarez of the Supreme Court.
Samuel Go Chans possession of the subject property has never been
interrupted. His sister, Cely Chan,
resided at the subject property and was never removed therefrom. On February 2, 1994, Atty. Yabut was at the
subject property only to protect the rights and interest of his client, Samuel
Go Chan, and since the latters possession of the subject property had never
been interrupted, Atty. Yabut entered the same peacefully, without
intimidation, force, or stealth. The
other people at the subject property on February 2, 1994 were there to attend
the services at the
The
MeTC received evidence from the parties on whether a writ of preliminary
injunction should be issued, as prayed for by Muoz. In its Order dated May 16, 1994, the MeTC
adjudged that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was already executed
against the spouses Chan and there was, indeed, a turn-over of possession of
the subject property to Muoz.
Accordingly, the MeTC granted Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, restoring possession of the subject
property to Muoz.
Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut questioned the foregoing MeTC order through a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction[32]
before the RTC-Branch 88, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. They asserted that they were not bound by the
execution of the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 as
they were not parties to the said case. Muoz,
on the other hand, argued that the MeTC Order of May 16, 1994 was an
interlocutory order, and under Section 19 of the Rules of Summary Procedure, a
petition for certiorari against an
interlocutory order issued by the court is one of the prohibited pleadings and
motions in summary proceedings.
In
its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC Order dated May 16,
1994.
On
August 5, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued another Order resolving Muozs motion
to dismiss the petition for certiorari
in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
June 10, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, and motion to resolve with additional grounds for dismissal. According to the RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC
failed to distinguish the issue of finality of the judgment of the RTC-Branch
95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 from the assertions of Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabut that the spouses Chan are not covered by said final judgment because they
are not successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of the spouses Go and they
are purchasers of the subject property in good faith. The issue of whether the final judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan was then still being
litigated in the same case before RTC-Branch 95, where the spouses Chans
motion for reconsideration of the denial of their notice of appeal was
pending. The RTC-Branch 88 further found
that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing Muozs
complaint for forcible entry on the ground of lis pendens, as the issue as to who between Muoz and the spouses
Chan had the better right to possession of the subject property was the subject
of the pending proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch
95. In the end, the RTC-Branch 88
decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court renders judgment
(a) Denying
the motion to dismiss of respondent Muoz for lack of merit;
(b) Denying
the motion for reconsideration of respondent Muoz for the recall and/or
setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction granted to petitioners;
(c) Declaring
the Order dated May 16, 1994 of Public respondent Hon. Elsa de Guzman in Civil
Case No. 8286 illegal and therefore null and void; and
(d) Dismissing
the ejectment suit in Civil Case No. 8286 on ground of lis pendens.
Without pronouncement as to costs.[33]
Muoz
appealed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88
before the Court of Appeals. Her appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35322.
Aside from the nullification of the two orders, Muoz additionally
prayed for the dismissal from the service of the RTC-Branch 88 presiding judge
and the disbarment of Atty. Yabut.
The
Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 21, 1995, sustained the appealed
orders of RTC-Branch 88. The Court of
Appeals held that the MeTC should have dismissed the forcible entry case on the
ground of lis pendens; that the
spouses Chan were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and impleading them
only in the execution stage of said case vitiated their right to due process;
that the order of the RTC-Branch 95 involving the spouses Chan in Civil Case
No. Q-28580 was null and void, considering that they are strangers to the case,
and they are innocent purchasers for value of the subject property; that the
notice of lis pendens was already
cancelled from the spouses Gos certificate of title at the time they mortgaged
the subject property to BPI Family; and that the title to the subject property
was already free of any and all liens and encumbrances when the spouses Chan
purchased the said property from BPI Family.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated March 9, 2000, denied Muozs motion for
reconsideration.
G.R. No. 146718
Meanwhile, Muoz filed before the
RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 a Motion to Cite the Register of Deeds
in Contempt of Court for the failure of the Register of Deeds to restore
Muozs TCT No. 186306 despite having been served with a copy of the writ of
execution on October 11, 1993. In its
Judgment (on the Contempt Proceedings against the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City Samuel C. Cleofe)[34]
dated March 18, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion, convinced that
the Register of Deeds had a valid excuse for his inability to implement the
served writ. The Register of Deeds could
not cancel the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297, the subsisting certificate of title
over the subject property, absent any authority or directive for him to do
so. The directive in the final judgment
in Civil Case No. Q-28580 and the writ of execution for the same only pertained
to the cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977.
Thereafter,
Muoz filed a Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan and a Second Motion
for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muoz also filed a Motion for an Alias Writ
of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. 53297,[35] in which she prayed for the issuance of
an alias writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds not only to cancel
TCT No. 258977 and all documents declared null and void ab initio in the dispositive portion of the Decision[36]
dated July 19, 1991 of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and to restore
and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances Muozs TCT No. 186306, but
likewise to cancel the present certificate of title covering the subject
property, TCT No. 53297.
In
its Order dated August 21, 1995, the RTC-Branch 95 denied all of Muozs aforementioned
motions. The RTC-Branch 95 was of the
view that Samuel Go Chans title should be litigated in another forum, not in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 where the judgment had already become final and
executory. The RTC-Branch 95 also
stressed that since the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had long become
final and executory, it could no longer be changed or amended except for
clerical error or mistake. Accordingly,
the RTC-Branch 95 resolved as follows:
1. Ordering,
as it hereby orders, the denial of [Muozs] first and second motions for
contempt and hereby absolves respondents Samuel Go Chan, Celia Chan, Atty.
Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr., and several John Does of the Contempt Charges against
them.
2. Ordering,
as it hereby orders, the issuance of an alias writ of execution directing the
Courts Deputy Sheriff:
(a)
Defendants
Go Song and Tan Sio Kien, their successors-in-interest and assigns and those
acting on their behalf to vacate the disputed premises and deliver the same to
[Muoz];
(b)
Defendant
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel from the records of the subject
property the registration of all the following documents, to wit: (1) Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 186366 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (3) Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 16, 1979; and (4) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro
Manila II, and to restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances TCT
No. 186306 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City; and
(c)
Defendants
Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muoz]
the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the cost of
suit.[37]
Unrelenting,
Muoz filed a Motion for Clarificatory Order, pointing out that the spouses
Chan are the present occupants of the subject property. The Order dated August 21, 1995 of the
RTC-Branch 95 directed the deputy sheriff to deliver the subject property to
Muoz, and this could not be done unless the spouses Chan are evicted
therefrom. Resultantly, Muoz prayed
that a clarificatory order be made categorically stating that the spouses
Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan, and all persons claiming right under them, are
likewise evicted from the subject premises pursuant to the Order of 21 August
1995.[38]
Once
more, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion in its Order dated October 3,
1995. The RTC-Branch 95 reiterated the
rule that after the judgment had become final, only clerical errors, as
distinguished from substantial errors, can be amended by the court. Furthermore, when the decision or judgment
sought to be amended is promulgated by an appellate court, it is beyond the
power of the trial court to change, amplify, enlarge, alter, or modify. Ultimately, the RTC-Branch 95 pronounced that
it was restrained x x x to consider as mere clerical error the exclusion of
spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan in the Decision of the Court dated July
19, 1991, a final judgment, which judgment cannot now be made to speak a
different language.[39]
Attributing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Branch 95 in issuing its
Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995, Muoz filed before this Court
a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was remanded to the
Court of Appeals in observance of the hierarchy of courts, where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. The
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on September 29, 2000 dismissing Muozs
petition. The Court of Appeals agreed
with the RTC-Branch 95 that the spouses Chan could not be covered by the alias
writ of execution considering that they were not impleaded in Civil Case No.
Q-28580. The cancellation of TCT No.
53297 in the spouses Chans names could not be done apart from a separate
action exclusively for that matter. The
spouses Chan are deemed buyers in good faith and for value as the certificate
of title delivered to them by BPI Family was free from any liens or encumbrances
or any mark that would have raised the spouses Chans suspicions. Every person dealing with registered lands
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the
vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and
inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the
property. The Court of Appeals denied
Muozs motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated January 5, 2001.
Muoz
comes before this Court via the present consolidated petitions.
Muoz
posits that the final judgment and writ of execution of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 bind not only Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, but also
their successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on their behalf,
namely, BPI Family and spouses Chan. The
spouses Chan cannot be deemed innocent purchasers for value of the property
since the cancellation of the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977 is completely null
and void.
Muoz
further argues that the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 in Civil Case No. 8286
correctly ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
restoring possession of the subject property to her, as she had already
acquired prior possession of the said property upon the execution of the final
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
Also, the spouses Chans petition for certiorari before the RTC-Branch 88, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-94-20632, challenging the Order dated
May 16, 1994 of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 8286, is a prohibited pleading under
the Rules of Summary Procedure; and the RTC-Branch 88 and the Court of Appeals
should be faulted for giving due course to the said petition even in the
absence of jurisdiction.
On
the other hand, in their comments to the two petitions at bar, the spouses
Chan, Atty. Yabut, and BPI Family assert that given the peculiar factual
circumstances of the case, RTC-Branch 88 was justified in taking cognizance of
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabuts petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that Muoz is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 88 after participating in the
proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that the spouses Chans title to the
subject property is not affected by the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil
Case No. Q-28580, and the said judgment cannot be executed against the spouses
Chan since they are neither parties to the case, nor are they the
successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on behalf of Emilia M. Ching
or the spouses Go; that BPI Family and consequently, the spouses Chan, obtained
title to the subject property as innocent purchasers for value, there being no
notice of any infirmity in said title; and that Muoz is guilty of forum shopping
for filing her petition in G.R. No. 146718 even while her petition in G.R. No.
142676 is still pending.
II
RULING
For
the sake of expediency, we will be discussing first the merits of the petition
in G.R. No. 146718.
G.R.
No. 146718
Civil
Case No. Q-28580 involved Muozs complaint for the annulment of the deeds of
absolute sale dated December 28, 1972[40]
and July 16, 1979,[41]
the cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977, and the restoration and
revival of Muozs TCT No. 186306. The
final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 was in favor of Muoz
and against Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go.
The problem arose when during the pendency of the said case, title and
possession of the subject property were transferred from the spouses Go, to BPI
Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan.
BPI Family and the spouses Chan were never impleaded as parties and were
not referred to in the dispositive portion of the final judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-28580.
Muoz
questions in G.R. No. 146718: (1) the
Order dated August 21, 1995 denying her Motion for Contempt against the spouses
Chan, Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, and
Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the
Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297; and (2) the Order dated October 3,
1995 denying her Motion for Clarificatory Order, both issued by the RTC-Branch
95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and upheld by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 40019. In sum, Muoz was seeking in
her aforementioned motions: (1) a categorical order from the RTC-Branch 95 that
the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 be executed against the spouses
Chan; and (2) the surrender and cancellation of the spouses Chans TCT No.
53297 and restoration of Muozs TCT No. 186306.
There
is no merit in Muozs petition in G.R. No. 146718.
Civil
Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real property. In Heirs
of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,[42]
we described an action for reconveyance as follows:
An action for
reconveyance is an action in personam available to a
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the
The
rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem
is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case
or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in
personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but
not upon strangers. A judgment directing
a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their
successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action. An action for declaration of
nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance,
is a real action but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns
the right to a tangible thing. Any
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.[44]
Since
they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in
Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family
and the spouses Chan. The effect of the
said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply
issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court. In the same
manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court.
Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto.[45]
A
similar situation existed in Dino v.
Court of Appeals,[46]
where we resolved that:
As the registered owner of the subject property,
petitioners are not bound by decision in Civil Case No. R-18073 for they were
never summoned in said case and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. 73069 was already cancelled at the
time petitioners purchased the subject property. While it is true that petitioners are
indispensable parties in Civil Case No. R-18073, without whom no complete
relief could be accorded to the private respondents, the fact still remains
that petitioners were never actually joined as defendants in said case. Impleading petitioners as additional
defendants only in the execution stage of said case violated petitioners right
to due process as no notice of lis
pendens was annotated on the existing certificate of title of said property
nor were petitioners given notice of the pending case, therefore petitioners
remain strangers in said case and the Order of the trial court involving them
is null and void, considering that petitioners are innocent purchasers of the
subject property for value.[47]
We
further stress that Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, clearly provides that [a] certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Herein, several Torrens titles were already
issued after the cancellation of Muozs.
Certificates of title had been successively issued to Emilia M. Ching,
spouses Go, BPI Family, and spouses Chan.
Civil Case No. Q-28580, in which a final judgment had already been
rendered, specifically challenged the validity of the certificates of title of
Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go only.
To have the present certificate of title of the spouses Chan cancelled,
Muoz must institute another case directly attacking the validity of the
same.
The
fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses
Go were already declared null and void ab
initio by final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 is not enough, for it
does not automatically make the subsequent titles of BPI Family and the spouses
Chan correspondingly null and void ab
initio.
It
has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the
root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and
for value. Following the principle of
indefeasibility of a
Hence,
we pronounced in Republic v. Agunoy, Sr.[49]:
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner's own
judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the public
domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding
[E]ven on the
supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct result of
a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring
cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply here for We are confronted
with the functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to
follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or
forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate
of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.[50] (Emphases ours.)
Although
the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality in Civil Case No. Q-28580 that the
titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were null and void, there is yet
no similar determination on the titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The question of whether or not the titles to
the subject property of BPI Family and the spouses Chan are null and void,
since they are merely the successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of Emilia
M. Ching and the spouses Go, ultimately depends on the issue of whether or not
BPI Family and the spouses Chan obtained their titles to the subject property
in bad faith, i.e., with notice of
Muozs adverse claim and knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No.
Q-28580. The latter is a factual issue
on which we cannot rule in the present petition, not only because we are not a
trier of facts, but more importantly, because it was not among the issues
raised and tried in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
In
support of her prayer for an alias writ of execution against BPI Family and the
spouses Go, Muoz cites our ruling in Calalang
v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[51]
in relation to De la Cruz v. De la Cruz.[52]
De la Cruz
is an action for reconveyance of
Calalang
actually involved two petitions: (1) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition originally
filed by Virginia Calalang (Calalang) before this Court, and (2) a petition for
injunction with damages originally filed by Augusto M. de Leon (De
Muozs
reliance on Calalang is
misplaced. There are substantial
differences in the facts and issues involved in Calalang and the present case.
In
Calalang, there is duplication or
overlapping of certificates of title issued to different persons over the same
property. We already upheld in De la Cruz the validity of the
certificate of title of INK over
In
the instant case, there has been no duplication or overlapping of certificates
of title. The subject property has
always been covered by only one certificate of title at a time, and at present,
such certificate is in the spouses Chans names. As we have previously discussed herein, Muoz
cannot have the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297 cancelled by a mere motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. Q-28580, when the
spouses Chan were not parties to the case.
Civil Case No. Q-28580 was a proceeding in personam, and the final judgment rendered therein declaring
null and void the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the
spouses Go should bind only the parties thereto. Furthermore, despite the void titles of
Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, the derivative titles of BPI Family and the
spouses Chan may still be valid provided that they had acquired the same in
good faith and for value.
More
in point with the instant petition is Pineda
v.
Being
a suit for injunction, Civil Case No. Q-45767 partakes of an action in
personam. In Domagas v. Jensen, we have explained the
nature of an action in personam and
enumerated some actions and proceedings which are in personam, viz:
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an
action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam,
or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the
jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control
or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person
of the defendant. Of this character
are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to
fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment
against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to
determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for
injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive
act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held
that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which
personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between
the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
The
respondent judge's jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the parties in the
injunction suit. To stress, the petition for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767, was filed only
by therein petitioners Augusto M. de Leon, Jose de Castro, Jose A. Panlilio,
Felicidad Vergara Vda. De Pineda, Fernando L. Vitug I, Fernando M. Vitug II,
Fernando M. Vitug III, and Faustino Tobia, and later amended to include Elena
Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-Generoso as additional petitioners therein, against
Bishop Erao Manalo, in his capacity as titular and spiritual head of I.N.K.
Herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al.
never became parties thereto. Any and all orders and writs of execution, which
the respondent judge may issue in that case can, therefore, be enforced only
against those parties and not against the herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. In issuing the
assailed Order dated 22 April 1998, which directed the issuance of the 2nd
Alias Writ of Execution to eject non-parties (herein petitioners), the
respondent judge clearly went out of bounds and committed grave abuse of
discretion.
The
nature of the injunction suit Civil
Case No. Q-45767 as an action in
personam in the RTC remains to be the same whether it is elevated to the CA
or to this Court for review. An action in personam does not become an action in rem just because a pronouncement
confirming I.N.K.'s title to
After
evaluating the arguments of both parties, decisive on the incident is the
decision of the Supreme Court in favor of the respondent I.N.K., represented by
its titular and spiritual head Bishop Erao G. Manalo, sustaining its ownership
over the subject
As a final word, this decision
shall not be misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our ruling in Calalang.
The final ruling on I.N.K.'s
ownership and title is not at all affected.
Private respondent I.N.K., as the true and lawful owner of Lot 671 as
ruled by the Court in Calalang,
simply has to file the proper action against the herein petitioners to enforce
its property rights within the bounds of the law and our rules. I.N.K.'s recourse of asking for the issuance
of an alias writ of execution against the petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-45767 and the respondent judge's orders in said
case, granting I.N.K.'s prayer and enforcing the alias writ of execution
against the present petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very
fundamental rules and must therefore be stricken down.[54] (Emphases ours.)
Consistent
with Pineda, and as appositely
recommended by the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals in the present case,
Muozs legal remedy is to directly assail in a separate action the validity of
the certificates of title of BPI Family and the spouses Chan.
G.R. No. 142676
G.R. No. 142676 is Muozs appeal
of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case she instituted
against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut before the MeTC.
There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of
physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal
from the beginning and the basic inquiry
centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two
allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first,
the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and
second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of
the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof,
what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of
the property. Indeed, any of the
parties who can prove prior possession de
facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such
cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff
needs merely to prove prior possession de
facto and undue deprivation thereof.[55]
Title is never in issue in a
forcible entry case, the court should base its decision on who had prior
physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for
forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the court to
restore possession regardless of title or ownership.[56]
We more extensively discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals[57] that:
Ownership or the right to possess
arising from ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of possession.
The parties cannot present evidence to prove ownership or right to legal
possession except to prove the nature of the possession when necessary to
resolve the issue of physical possession. The same is true when the defendant
asserts the absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a ground for the
courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.
The only
question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is
entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession
de facto and not to the possession de jure.
It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is
questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their
applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government
agency. Regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of
property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a
better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has
to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.[58] (Emphases ours.)
Based on the foregoing, we find
that the RTC-Branch 88 erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No.
8286 even before completion of the proceedings before the MeTC. At the time said case was ordered dismissed
by RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC had only gone so far as holding a hearing on and
eventually granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Muoz alleges in her complaint in
Civil Case No. 8286 that she had been in prior possession of the subject
property since it was turned-over to her by the sheriff on January 10, 1994,
pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC-Branch 95 to
implement the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The factual issue of who was in prior
possession of the subject property should be litigated between the parties regardless
of whether or not the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the
spouses Chan. Hence, the pendency of the
latter issue in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not warrant
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The two cases could proceed independently of
one another.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver
that the spouses Chan have never lost possession of the subject property since
acquiring the same from BPI Family in 1990.
This is a worthy defense to Muozs complaint for forcible entry, which
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut should substantiate with evidence in the
continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC.
In
addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is governed by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 19 whereof provides:
SEC. 19. Prohibited
pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
x x x x
(g) Petition
for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the court.
The
purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule
prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in
order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases.[59]
Interlocutory
orders are those that determine incidental matters that do not touch on the
merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings.[60] An order granting a preliminary injunction,
whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and
unappealable.[61]
The
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the MeTC in its Order dated
May 16, 1994, directing that Muoz be placed in possession of the subject
property during the course of Civil Case No. 8286, is an interlocutory
order. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
assailed the said order before the RTC-Branch 88 via a petition for certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-94-20632. The RTC-Branch 88 gave due
course to said petition, and not only declared the MeTC Order dated May 16,
1994 null and void, but went further by dismissing Civil Case No. 8286.
The
prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is plain
enough. Its further exposition is
unnecessary verbiage.[62] The petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No.
Q-94-20632 is clearly covered by the said prohibition, thus, it should have
been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch 88.
While the circumstances involved in Muozs forcible entry case against
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are admittedly very peculiar, these are
insufficient to except the petition for certiorari
of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the
prohibition. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and
under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.[63]
Nonetheless,
even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC may accord to Muoz in the event
that she is able to successfully prove forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and
Atty. Yabut into the subject property (i.e.,
that the sheriff actually turned-over to Muoz the possession of the subject
property on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such possession by
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut on February 2, 1994 by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth).
Taking into account our ruling in G.R. No. 146718 that the final
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not extend to the spouses Chan, who
were not impleaded as parties to the said case the MeTC is precluded from granting to Muoz relief, whether preliminary or
final, that will give her possession of the subject property. Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the
wrongful execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Based on the same reason, Muoz can no longer
insist on the reinstatement of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 granting a
preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her in possession of the subject
property during the course of the trial.
Muoz though may recover damages if she is able to prove wrongful
deprivation of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until
the finality of this decision in G.R. No. 146718.
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, we:
(1)
GRANT
Emerita Muozs petition in G.R. No. 142676.
We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Decision dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution
dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which
affirmed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. We DIRECT
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City to reinstate Emerita Muozs
complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 8286 and to resume the
proceedings only to determine whether or not Emerita Muoz was forcibly
deprived of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until
finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is entitled to an
award for damages for deprivation of possession during the aforementioned
period of time; and
(2) DENY
Emerita Munozs petition in G.R. No. 146718 for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the Decision dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution dated January 5, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which in turn, affirmed the
Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
95 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
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MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
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JOSE Associate
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[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 67-74; penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Eugenio S. Labitoria, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), pp. 61-72; penned by Associate Justice
Eubulo G. Verzola with Associate Justices
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] According to Yee L. Chings Answer
with Cross-Claim in Civil Case No. Q-28580, he
was out of the country at the time he supposedly executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale in Muozs favor. Emilia M. Ching
was somehow able to make it appear that her husband, Yee L. Ching, signed the
said Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yee L.
Ching confronted Emilia M. Ching regarding the papers, Emilia M. Ching
abandoned him. Nonetheless, Yee L. Ching
ratified the transfer of the subject property to Muoz (Rollo [G.R. No. 142676], pp. 111-112).
[10] Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), p. 102.
[11]
[12] Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 101.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 102-106.
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), pp. 98-100.
[25] Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), p. 127.
[26] An Act Providing a Special Procedure
for the Reconstitution of
[27] Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 128-129.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 110.
[35]
[36] Rollo (G.R. No. 142676), pp. 102-106.
[37] Rollo (G.R. No. 146718), p. 128.
[38]
[39]
[40] Purported sale of the subject property by Muoz to Emilia M. Ching.
[41] Purported sale of the subject property by Emilia M. Ching to the spouses Go.
[42] G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173.
[43]
[44] Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61, 86-87 (2002).
[45] Orquiola v. Court of Appeals,
435 Phil. 323, 332-333 (2002).
[46] G.R. No. 95921, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 422.
[47]
[48] Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 765 (1998).
[49] 492 Phil. 118 (2005), citing Pino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94114, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 434, 445; Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43972, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 735, 741; Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 Phil. 88, 93-94 (1985).
[50] Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., id. at 137-138.
[51] G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992, 208 SCRA 215 and G.R. No. 76265, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 88.
[52] 215 Phil. 593 (1984).
[53] G.R. No. 143482, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 47.
[54]
[55] Baes v.
[56] Domalsin
v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 115, 132.
[57] G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492.
[58]
[59] Go v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 214, 224 (1998).
[60] Silverio, Jr. v. Filipino Business Consultants, Inc., 504 Phil. 150, 158 (2005).
[61] United Coconut Planters Bank v. United Alloy Philippines Corporation, 490 Phil. 353, 363 (2005).
[62] Bayview Hotel, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No.
119337, June 17, 1997, 273 SCRA 540, 547-548.
[63] Don Tino Realty and Development Corporation v. Florentino, 372 Phil. 882, 890-891 (1999).