Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
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Re: Letter
of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations
of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court |
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A.M.
No. 10-10-4-SC Present: CORONA,
C.J., CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, ABAD,
VILLARAMA,
JR., PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
and SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated: June 7, 2011 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For
disposition of the Court are the following:
(a)
the
Motion for Reconsideration[1]
dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent University of the Philippines (UP) law
professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and
(b) the Manifestation[2]
dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondents Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof.
Theodore O. Te.
In support of their Motion for
Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza relied on the following
grounds:
GROUNDS
A. THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, IS PREMISED ON A FINDING OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS BREACHED THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.
B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1) THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA CASE AND IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC HAVE NO RELATION TO THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION, AND THEREFORE (2) THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ACCESS AND ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC, TO PRESENT THEIR OWN EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES, AND TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION WITH SUCH EVIDENCE.
C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE IN BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR HAVING ISSUED THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT.[3]
In
their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents pray that (a) the Courts
Decision dated March 8, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside and the respondents
Compliance dated November 18, 2010 be deemed satisfactory, and (b) the Court
expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC to the respondents (i.e., joined by some faculty members of
the University of the Philippines school of law) effectively finding them
guilty of making false charges against Associate Justice Mariano C. del
Castillo (Justice Del Castillo). In the
alternative, they pray that they be afforded their full rights to due process
and provided the full opportunity to present evidence on the matters subject of
the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010.[4]
Anent the first ground, Professors
Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding the docketing of this
matter as an administrative case, there was purportedly a finding that respondents were
guilty of indirect contempt in view of (1) the mention made in the Show Cause
Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In
re Kelly,[5] a case
involving a contempt charge; and (2) the references to respondents
contumacious language or contumacious speech and conduct and to several
authorities which dealt with contempt proceedings in the Decision dated March
8, 2011.
The shallowness of such argument is
all too easily revealed. It is true that
contumacious speech and conduct directed against the courts done by any person,
whether or not a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect contempt
under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x x
(d)
Any improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
A charge of indirect contempt, if
proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as imprisonment
or a fine or both.[6]
The
very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial
officer, if committed by a member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender
to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts.[7] In such disciplinary cases, the sanctions are
not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or
admonition.
Contrary
to Professors Catindig and Lafortezas theory, what established jurisprudence
tells us is that the same incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior
directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical
violation, or both in the discretion
of the Court.
In
Salcedo v. Hernandez,[8]
for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and offensive
statements, the concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt and liable administratively. For this reason, two separate penalties were imposed upon him, a fine
(for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his
lawyerly duty to give due respect to the Court).
The full case
title[9] of
In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen[10] and the sanction imposed indubitably
show that the proceeding involved therein was disciplinary.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court in Almacen adverted to a few principles and authorities involving
contempt proceedings aside from jurisprudence on ethical responsibilities of
lawyers, Atty. Almacen was only meted out an administrative sanction
(indefinite suspension from the practice of law) and no penal sanction was
imposed upon him. Indeed, in Almacen, the Court explicitly stated that whether or not respondent lawyer
could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and actuations was
immaterial as the sole issue in his disciplinary case concerns his professional
identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of the
Court.[11]
Conversely,
In re Vicente Sotto[12] was purely a contempt proceeding.
Nonetheless, the Court in that case saw fit to remind Atty. Sotto that:
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.[13]
Atty. Sotto was expressly found
liable only for contempt and accordingly fined the amount of P1,000.00
payable within 15 days from promulgation of judgment. The unmistakable reference to Atty. Sottos failure
to observe his ethical duties as a lawyer did not convert the action against
him into a disciplinary proceeding. In
fact, part of the disposition of the case was to require Atty. Sotto to show
cause, within the same period given for the payment of the fine, why he should
not be disbarred for his contemptuous statements against the Court published in
a newspaper.
Similar
to Salcedo, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan[14]
involved both contempt and disciplinary proceedings for the lawyers act of
making public statements to the media that were offensive and disrespectful of
the Court and its members relating to matters that were sub judice. This was evident
in the May 2, 1988 Resolution of the Court which required respondent lawyer to
explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not
be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions.[15] In Zaldivar,
however, although the Court found that respondents act constituted both
contempt and gross misconduct as a member of the Bar, he was only
administratively sanctioned with an indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.
The
lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates
contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for
intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the
evil sought to be prevented is the same the degradation of the courts and the
loss of trust in the administration of justice.
For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on
bar discipline (involving the duty to give due respect to the courts) in
contempt cases against lawyers and vice
versa.
Thus,
when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent
lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the
administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not
transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt.
Respondents contrary position in their motion for reconsideration is bereft of
any rational merit. Had this Court opted
to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is punishable by imprisonment
or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the
Court did not opt to do so. We cannot
see why respondents would stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being
cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when there is no
basis for such belief other than their own apparent misreading of the same.
With
respect to the second ground offered for reconsideration of the Decision dated
March 8, 2011, respondents continue to insist on their theory, previously
expounded in their Compliance, that the evidence and proceedings in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC was relevant to their own administrative case and thus, it was
necessary for them to be granted access to the evidence and records of that
case in order to prove their own defenses in the present case. The Decision already debunked at length the
theory that if respondents are able to prove the bases for their well founded
concerns regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, then
they would be exonerated of the administrative charges against them. It bears repeating here that what respondents
have been required to explain was their contumacious, intemperate and
irresponsible language and/or conduct in the issuance of the Restoring Integrity Statement, which
most certainly cannot be justified by a belief, well-founded or not, that
Justice Del Castillo and/or his legal researcher committed plagiarism.
To
dispel respondents misconception once and for all, it should be stressed that
this Court did not call the attention of respondents for having an opinion contrary
to that of the Court in the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo. Notably, even their co-respondent Prof. Raul
T. Vasquez stood fast on his opinion regarding the plagiarism issue. Still, he
was able to simply relate to this Court how he came to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement and
candidly conceded that he may have failed to assess the effect of the language
of the Statement. This straightforward and honest
explanation was found satisfactory despite the lack of reference to the evidence
in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC or the holding of any formal trial-type evidentiary
hearing, which respondents know fully well was not mandatory in administrative
proceedings. This circumstance belied
respondents justification for seeking access to the evidence and records of
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC and their assertion that they have in any way been denied
their due process rights. For the same
reason that A.M. 10-7-17-SC and the present case are independent of each other,
a passing mention of respondent law professors in the Resolution dated February
8, 2011 in A.M. 10-7-17-SC is not proof that this Court has found respondents
guilty of falsely accusing Justice Del Castillo of plagiarism nor is it any
prejudgment of the present case. For if so, no one would be exonerated or none
of the compliances would be found satisfactory in this administrative case.
Again, the case of Prof. Vasquez confirms that this Court duly considered
respondents submissions in this case before coming to a decision.
To
buttress their third ground for reconsideration, respondents mainly contend
that the Court erred in taking the emphatic language in the Statement in
isolation from the other statements evidencing the good intentions of
respondents and calling for constructive action. Again, these arguments have been
substantially addressed in the Decision dated March 8, 2011 and there is no
need to belabor these points here.
Suffice it to say that respondents avowed noble motives have been given
due weight and factored in the determination of the action taken with respect
to submissions of respondents.
In
all, the Court finds that respondent Professors Catindig and Laforteza have
offered no substantial arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision
dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their
motion.
As
for the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011, Dean Leonen and Professor Te alleged
that they support the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed by
Respondents Professors Tristan Catindig and Caren Laforteza on April 1,
2011. The rest of the assertions
therein are mere restatements of arguments previously proffered in respondents
compliances and have been extensively taken up in the Decision dated March 8,
2011.
Since
the Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors
Catindig and Lafortezas motion for reconsideration, did not raise any new
matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note
the same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court hereby RESOLVES to (a) DENY the Motion for Reconsideration
dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent Professors Tristan A. Catindig and
Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) NOTE
the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011 filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and
Professor Theodore O. Te.
SO
ORDERED.
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
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I maintain my Dissent ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
My dissent remains
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
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(no part)
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LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate
Justice
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MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO Associate
Justice
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I maintain my Separate Opinion |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice
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MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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JOSE
PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
JOSE
CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice
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I maintain my dissent
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 622-654.
[2] Id. at 655-668.
[3] Id. at 623-624.
[4] Id. at 646.
[5] 35 Phil. 944 (1916).
[6] Rules of Court, Rule 71, Section 7.
[7] See, for example, Canon 1, Rule 1.02, and Canon 11, Rule 11.03.
[8] 61 Phil. 724 (1935).
[9] In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen in G.R. No. L-27654, Antonio H. Calero v. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
[10] G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
[11] Id. at 597.
[12] 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
[13] Id. at 602.
[14] 248 Phil. 542 (1988).
[15] Id. at 551.