Republic of the
Supreme
Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
|
NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICIY CONSUMERS FOR REFORMS, INC. (NASECORE), represented
by PETRONILO ILAGAN; FEDERATION OF VILLAGE ASSOCIATIONS (FOVA), represented
by SIEFRIEDO VELOSO; and FEDERATION OF LAS PIAS VILLAGE (FOLVA), represented
by BONIFACIO DAZO, Petitioners, - versus - ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC. (MERALCO), Respondents. |
G. R. No. 190795 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, *LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION, PEREZ, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: July 6, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),
created under the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001(EPIRA),[1]
used to apply the Return on Rate Base (RORB) method to determine the proper amount
a distribution utility (DU) may charge for the services it provides. The RORB
scheme had been the method for computing allowable electricity charges in the
At the initial hearing, on 6 October
2009, the following entered their appearances: (1) Meralco, (2) Mallillin, and
(3) FOVA. Petitioners NASECORE and FOLVA failed to appear despite due notice.[5]
Meralco presented its first witness on
13 November 2009. At the date of hearing, FOLVA failed to appear despite due
notice.[6]
Likewise, on 19 November 2009, the continuation of Meralcos presentation of
its witness, petitioners NASECORE, FOVA, and FOLVA all failed to appear despite
due notice.[7]
NASECORE had sent a letter requesting that it be excused from the said hearing,
but reserved its right to cross-examine the witness presented by Meralco. The
latter objected to this request by virtue of the ERCs Rules of Practice and
Procedure. ERC ruled that the absence of NASECORE and FOVA was deemed a waiver
of their right to cross-examine Meralcos first witness.[8]
At the 26 November 2009 hearing, NASECORE and
FOLVA again failed to attend the hearing despite due notice. Upon motion by
Meralco, ERC declared that NASECORE had waived its right to cross-examine the
second witness of Meralco for failure to attend the said hearing. ERC then gave
Meralco five (5) days from said date of hearing within which to file its Formal
Offer of Evidence. FOVA and all the other Intervenors were, likewise, given ten
(10) days from receipt thereof to file their comments thereon and fifteen (15)
days from said date of hearing to file their position papers or Memoranda.[9]
On 1 December 2009, Meralco filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence with compliance. On 7 December 2009, it was directed
by ERC to submit additional documents to facilitate the evaluation of its
application.
Petitioner
NASECORE claims that it was only on 8 December 2009, that it received Meralcos
Formal Offer of Evidence, together with a copy of the 7 December 2009 ERC
Order. Thus, it believes that it has until 18 December 2009 to file its comment
thereon.
On 10 December 2009, Petitioner NASECORE filed with ERC a Manifestation with Motion dated 9 December 2009 requesting that the ERC direct applicant Meralco to furnish intervenor NASECORE all the items in ERCs directive/Order dated 7 December 2009; to furnish Intervenor NASECORE a copy of the Records of the Proceedings of the hearings held on 19 and 26 November 2009; and to grant the same intervenor fifteen (15) days, from receipt of applicants compliance with the ERCs Order dated 7 December 2009, within which to file its comment to applicants Formal Offer of Evidence.
On 14 December 2009,[10]
Meralcos application in the MAP2010
case was approved by ERC. Petitioner NASECORE protests this claiming
approval as premature, that there were still four days before the expiration of the period given to it to file
its opposition to the formal offer of evidence of Meralco, and before
petitioner NASECORE received its copy of the documents Meralco was required to
additionally submit in the 7 December 2009 ERC Order.
A day after the aforementioned Decision,
or on 15 December 2009, petitioner NASECORE allegedly received the additional
documents Meralco submitted in compliance with the ERCs 7 December 2009 Order.
Malillin filed his Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) before the ERC.[11] Instead of filing their own motions for
reconsideration, petitioners came directly to this Court via a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an Urgent Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Status Quo Order.
Petitioners main assertion is that the
ERC Decision approving the MAP2010 application of Meralco is null
and void for having been issued in violation of their right to due process of
law.[12]
They further ask this Court to stay the execution of the aforementioned
Decision for being void, to wit:
As already shown
earlier, the assailed ERC Decision is a patent nullity due to lack of due
process of law. Thus, being a void decision, it can not (sic) be the source of
any right on the part of MERALCO to collect additional charges from their
customers. Invariably, the 4.3 million customers of MERALCO has (sic) no
obligation whatsoever to pay additional distribution charges to MERALCO. To
implement such void ERC decision, is plainly oppressive, confiscatory, and
unjust.[13]
On 26 January 2010, Meralco filed its
Comment to the instant Petition. Meralco contends that the said Petition should
be denied due course or dismissed for the following reasons:
1. Petitioners
have availed of an improper remedy;[14]
2. Petitioners
have failed to observe the proper hierarchy of courts;[15]
3. Petitioners
were amply afforded the right to participate in the proceedings and have thus
been afforded sufficient opportunity to be heard;[16]
and
4.
Meralco has already voluntarily
suspended the implementation of the approved MAP2010 rates rendering
the issues raised in this Petition moot.[17]
Meralco furthermore opposes petitioners
prayer for the issuance of a TRO or Status quo order. It argues that petitioners
failed to present an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the
writ considering that Meralco already voluntarily suspended the implementation
of the assailed Decision pending resolution of Mallillins MR. In fact, on 1
February 2010, ERC issued an Order suspending the implementation of the 14
December 2009 Decision pending the resolution of Mallillins MR.
On 27 August 2010, ERC filed its
Comment. The ERC argued that a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not the
proper remedy in the case at bar; that there was no denial of petitioners
right to procedural due process; and
that its 10 March 2010 order has rendered the instant petition moot. In this
Order, the ERC granted the MR of Mallillin and directed the implementation of the
therein reflected revised distribution rates.
On 8 April 2010, petitioners filed their
Reply to Meralcos Comment. In their Reply, petitioners, for the first time,
put forward the following arguments:
(1) Meralco,
from 2003-2008, has been earning more than the 12% rate of recovery considered
by law as just and reasonable.
Petitioners
newly argue that the ERC erred in approving Meralcos application for
increasing its charges in spite of the validation by the Commission on Audit
(COA), through a report, of a computation showing Meralcos income as exceeding
the 12% mandated by law. Petitioners conclude thus:
In view of the
COA Audit Report (x x x), the position of the herein petitioners were validated, i.e., that Meralcos rate
increase of P0.0865/KWh granted in 2003
was not only unnecessary but also unreasonable, hence MERALCO should not only be ordered to roll back its rate but
also to refund its excess revenues to consumers.
(2)
Questionable rate-setting methodology
adopted by ERC.
According to petitioners, this Court
ordered the ERC to consider the 2003 increase it granted to Meralco as
provisional until it has taken action on the COA Audit Report but that ERC
disregarded this order because of its adamant position that the PBR rate fixing
methodology is the be-all-and-end-all of its rate fixing function while
sacrificing the interests of millions of consumers.[18]
They argue that it is not the validity
of the rate setting methodology employed but the reasonableness of the rates to
be applied that ought to be the controlling factor in determining the rates
that a public utility should be allowed to implement.[19]
Thus, the ERC should not limit itself
with the use of the PBR method if it would result in unreasonable rates.
Rather, the ERC should have the authority to employ any method so long as the result was reasonable to both consumer
and investor. In effect, petitioners are asking this court to adopt the end
result doctrine, which was pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Power Commission v. Hope Natural
Gas Co.[20] and
cited in the concurring opinion of former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in Republic v. Medina.[21]
Petitioners contend that the use of the
PBR method results in disadvantage to the public, viz:
In fine, MERALCO
succeeded in wangling from the ERC through an internationally accepted
rate-setting methodology (i.e, Performance Based Rate [PBR]) a rate that will
not only guarantee that its operations shall remain viable but a rate that will
give it astronomical profits at the expense of the consuming public whom it is
obligated to serve.
A table showing that the common
stockholders of Meralco, for the last 21 years, had earned 424% on their actual
investment, per year, was also presented by petitioners. Petitioners conclude
that these numbers negate any argument that Meralco needs a rate increase,
irrespective of any under rate methodology applied.[22]
The Issue of the Validity
of the PBR was not Squarely Raised in this Petition; the Sole Issue is the
Denial of Due Process
We have ruled that issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, much less when first proposed in the reply to the comment on the petition for review.[23] To allow petitioners to blindside Meralco with such newly raised issues violates the latters due process rights. Having been raised for the first time, this Court cannot rule on the issues regarding the unreasonableness of Meralcos rates and the validity of the choice of the PBR method. If petitioners wanted to include these issues for resolution, the proper procedure was for them to ask this Court to allow them to amend their Petition for the inclusion of the aforementioned issues. Thus, we rule that the sole issue for resolution in this case is whether or not petitioners right to due process of law was violated when the ERC issued its Order before the expiration of the period granted to petitioners to file their comment.
There Has Been No Denial
of Due Process, at most only an Irregularity in the Precipitate Issuance of the
Assailed Decision, which Irregularity ERC has Sought to Remedy
In Cooperative
Devt. Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Coop., Inc. et al.,[24] it was held that the appellate court
violated the therein petitioners right to be heard when it rendered judgment
against them without allowing them to file their comment or opposition.
In the case at bar, petitioners were
required to file their comment on the formal offer of evidence of Meralco.
However, the ERC rendered its Decision prior to the lapse of the period granted
to petitioners. According to petitioners, ERCs failure to accord them a
reasonable opportunity to present their oppositions or comments on the
application of Meralco clearly denied them due process of law. The ERC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it deprived them of their opportunity
to be heard.
This prompted Petitioners to file the
present Petition on 20 January 2010.
This Court is of the Opinion that considering the facts in this case, including all the events that occurred both prior to and subsequent to the issuance of the 14 December 2010 Decision, the ERC did not deprive petitioners of their right to be heard.
Petitioners claim that that they were
not given a chance to submit their evidence or memorandum in support of their
position that Meralco had been charging rates that were beyond the 12%
reasonable rate of return established in jurisprudence.[25] The records show, however, that they had been
given notice to attend all the hearings conducted by the ERC, but that they
voluntarily failed to appear in or attend those hearings.
Furthermore, after the issuance of the assailed Order, Mallillin filed an MR before petitioners filed their Petition in this Court. On 25 January 2010, the ERC issued an Order directing Petitioners NASECORE, FOLVA, and FOVA to file their respective comments on Mallillins MR. Petitioners were given a period of ten days from receipt of the order, to file their comments. The ERC also scheduled the hearing on the said MR on 5 February 2010.
On 26 January 2010, Meralco filed a Manifestation and Motion wherein it expressed its decision to voluntarily suspend the implementation of the 14 December 2009 Decision pending the ERCs resolution of Mallillins MR.
Instead of filing their comments, petitioners NASECORE and FOVA, through separate letters respectively dated 28 January 2010 and 31 January 2010, sought to excuse themselves from participating in the proceedings before the ERC on the ground that they have already filed the present Petition.
On 1 February 2010, the ERC issued an Order suspending the implementation of the herein questioned 14 December 2010 Decision pending the resolution of the MR.
During the 5 February 2010 hearing, only Meralco appeared. Neither petitioners nor Mallillin participated in the proceedings.
On
10 March 2010, ERC issued an Order granting the MR with modification, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Engr. Robert F. Mallillin is hereby GRANTED WITH MODIFICATION. Accordingly,
MERALCO is hereby directed to implement the revised distribution rates,
excluding all rate distortions, as shown in the foregoing table. Consequently,
the Order dated February 1, 2010 issued by the Commission granting the
deferment of the implementation of the Decision dated December 14, 2009 pending
final resolution of Engr. Mallillins motions is hereby LIFTED.
SO
ORDERED.[26]
Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
granted, there is no denial of due process. It must not be overlooked that
prior to the issuance of the assailed Decision, petitioners were given several
opportunities to attend the hearings and to present all their pleadings and
evidence in the MAP2010 case. Petitioners voluntarily failed to
appear in most of those hearings.
Although it is true that the ERC erred in
prematurely issuing its Decision, its subsequent act of ordering petitioners to
file their comments on Mallillins MR cured this defect. We have held that any
defect in the observance of due process requirements is cured by the filing of
a MR.[27]
Thus, denial of due process cannot be invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his MR.[28] Even though
petitioners never filed a MR, the fact that they were still given notice of
Mallillins filing of a MR and the opportunity to file their comments thereto
makes immaterial ERCs failure to admit their comment in the MAP2010 case.
After all, petitioners allegations in their unfiled comment could have still,
easily and just as effectively, been raised in the MAP2010 case by
incorporating the arguments in the comment to be filed in the MR case. It must
be remembered that the standard of due process impressed upon administrative
tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored.[29]
The
opportunity granted by the ERC of, technically, allowing petitioners to finally
be able to file their comment in the case, resolves the procedural irregularity
previously inflicted upon petitioners.
We
find that there has been no denial of due process and that any irregularity in
the premature issuance of the assailed Decision has been remedied by the ERC
through its Order which gave petitioners the right to participate in the
hearing of the MR filed by Mallillin.
Petitioners have
Chosen the Wrong Remedy and the Wrong Forum; the Real Motive for Bringing
Petition was to Obtain an indefinite TRO, this the Court cannot Countenance
Section 1, Rule 23 of the ERCS Rules of
Procedure expressly provides for the remedy of filing a motion for
reconsideration, viz:
A party
adversely affected by a final order, resolution, or decision of the Commission
rendered in an adjudicative proceeding may, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof, file a motion for reconsideration. In its motion,
the movant may also request for reopening of the proceeding for the purpose of
taking additional evidence in accordance with Section 17 of Rule 18. No more
than one motion for reconsideration by each party shall be entertained.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a petition for certiorari may be filed when there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The
plain and adequate remedy referred to in Rule 65 is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision.[30]
Thus, it is a well-settled rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
is a condition sine qua non
before
the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.[31]
The purpose of this rule is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct
itself.[32]
However, this requirement is not an ironclad rule. The prior filing of a motion
for reconsideration may be dispensed with if petitioners are able to show a
concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so.[33]
The
Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and take cognizance of the
petition if it raises an issue of paramount importance and constitutional
significance.[34]
Thus:
True, we had, on
certain occasions, entertained direct recourse to this Court as an exception to
the rule on hierarchy of courts. In those exceptional cases, however, we
recognized an exception because it was dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice,
or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.[35]
Petitioners claim that they did not file any motion
for reconsideration with the ERC in order to prevent the imminent miscarriage
of justice, that the issue involves the principles of social justice, that the
Decision sought to be set aside is a
patent nullity and that the need for relief therefore is extremely urgent[36];
because they believe that the same would be a futile exercise considering that
the ERC had blatantly disregarded the Supreme Court directive to consider the
last increase of Meralco as provisional until ERC has taken action on the COA
Audit Report;[37]
and because an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient.[38]
They also claim that the direct resort to the
Supreme Court resorted to by them is in order to timely prevent a grave
injustice to the 4.3 million customers of Meralco who stand to suffer by reason
of a patently void decision by ERC which would result in additional monthly
billing of at least half a billion pesos;[39]
because time is of the essence; and because transcendental constitutional
issues are involved in this case.[40]
Petitioners further argue that their decision to go
directly to this Court is justified because of the number of consumers
affected by the said Decision; because the amount involved in the controversy
is so huge (P605.25 million [plus 12% VAT] additional billing per month);
because it is violative of the provisions of EPIRA; because it is contrary to
the constitutional provisions on social justice, and because it is in utter
disregard of the COA Audit Report.[41]
We do not uphold petitioners arguments on this matter.
In
Cervantes v. CA,[42] this Court ruled:
It must be
emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as
a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner
and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion
for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of
filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete,
compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.
The general statements used by Petitioner to excuse their direct recourse to this Court are not the concrete, compelling, and valid reasons required by jurisprudence to justify their failure to comply with the mandated procedural requirements. In addition to this, the urgency of the resolution of matters raised by petitioners is negated, by the fact that rates approved by the ERC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing powers, are in a sense, inherently only provisional.
Furthermore, this Court finds that the real motive behind the filing of the
present Petition is to obtain an indefinite TRO and this, the Court cannot countenance.
Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the rules for permanent
injunctions, to wit:
Sec. 9. When final
injunction granted.
If after the
trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act
or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final
injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the
commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Petitioners assert that this Court
should issue a TRO because of the huge amount that would unduly burden the
consumers with the continued application of the MAP2010 rates.
According to petitioners, if not stayed, the present financial hardships of
4.3 million MERALCO customers due to the global financial meltdown and the
recent calamities in the country will surely further worsen. Petitioners also
claim that there is an extreme urgency to secure a TRO, considering that the
assailed Decision is immediately executory.
The purpose of a TRO is to prevent a
threatened wrong and to protect the property or rights involved from further
injury, until the issues can be determined after a hearing on the merits.[43]
Under
Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued
only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by a verified
application that great or irreparable injury would be incurred by an applicant
before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.
If such irreparable injury would result
from the non-issuance of the requested writ or if the extreme urgency
referred to by petitioners indeed exists, then they should have been more
vigilant in protecting their rights. As they have all been duly notified of the
proceedings in the ERC case, they should have appeared before the ERC and
participated in the trials.
We find that petitioners erred in
thinking that the non-issuance of the TRO they requested would put consumers in
danger of suffering an irreparable injury. But this asserted injury can be
repaired, because, had petitioners participated in the proceedings before the
ERC and the latter had found merit in their appeal, the undue increase in
electric bills shall be refunded to the consumers.
All the other issues raised by
petitioners in connection with the MAP2010 case are factual in
nature and should be raised before the ERC not before this Court. Allegations
and issues in connection with the rate increases under ERC Case No. 2008-018-
RC and ERC Case No. 2008-004-RC, including the question of whether Meralco
improperly exceeded the 12% maximum rate of return provided by law, are more
properly to be disposed of in another pending case, G.R. No. 191150.[44]
Before finally disposing of this case, we deem it proper to warn the ERC that it cannot give a deadline to parties before it that it will not respect. Even though the ERC, as an administrative agency, is not bound by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, it is still bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before it.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T
I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
Chairperson, Second Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
* Additional member of the Second
Division as per Special Order No. 1031 dated 30 June 2011.
[1] Republic Act No. 9136.
[2] Sec. 43. Functions of the ERC. - The ERC shall promote
competition, encourage market development, ensure customer choice and
discourage/penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity
industry. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key
functions in the restructured industry:
(f) In the public interest,
establish and enforce a methodology for setting transmission and
distribution wheeling rates and
retail rates for the captive market of a distribution utility, taking into
account all relevant considerations, including the efficiency or inefficiency
of the regulated entities. The rates must be such as to allow the recovery of
just and reasonable costs and a reasonable return on rate base (RORB) to enable
the entity to operate viably. The ERC may adopt alternative forms of
internationally-accepted rate-setting methodology as it may deem appropriate.
The rate-setting methodology so adopted and applied must ensure a reasonable
price of electricity. The rates prescribed shall be non-discriminatory. To
achieve this objective and to ensure the complete removal of cross subsidies,
the cap on the recoverable rate of system losses prescribed in Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 7832, is hereby amended and shall be replaced by caps which
shall be determined by the ERC based on load density, sales mix, cost of
service, delivery voltage and other technical considerations it may promulgate.
The ERC shall determine such form or rate-setting methodology, which shall
promote efficiency. In case the rate setting methodology used is RORB, it shall
be
subject to the following
guidelines:
.
. . .
. . .
. .
[3] ERC Resolution No. 12-02, Series
of 2004, adopting the Distribution Wheeling Rate Guidelines; Rules for Setting
Distribution Wheeling Rates for Privately Owned Distribution Utilities, 13 December
2006.
[4] Rollo at 1532.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Decision, ERC Case No. 2009-057
RC, 14 December 2009.
[10] Rollo at 1535
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] 320
[21] G.R. No. L-32068, 4 October
1971, 41 SCRA 643.
[22] Rollo at 476.
[23] Sps. Rasdas v. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, 13 December
2005, 477 SCRA 538.
[24] G.R. No. 137489, 29 May 2002,
382 SCRA 552.
[25] Rollo at 468.
[26]
[27]
A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 170623, 9 July 2010.
[28] Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079,31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 463, 473.
[29] Supra note 26.
[30] Sim v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 157376, 2 October 2007, 534 SCRA 515.
[31]Republic of the Phil. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos.
141796 and 141804, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 146.
[32] Metro Transit Organization, Inc. and Bantang, Jr. v. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 142133, November 19, 2002, 392
SCRA 229.
[33] Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166755, 18 November 2005,
475 SCRA 562, 569.
[34] Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v.
[35] Chong,
et al. v. Dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 184948, 21 July 2009, 593 SCRA 311, citing
Gelidon v. De la Rama, G.R. No.
105072, 9 December 1993, 228 SCRA 322, 326-327.
[36] Rollo at 7-8, citing ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. Comelec, 323 SCRA 811 (2000).
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42] G.R. No. 166755, 18 November 2005,
475 SCRA 562.
[43] Lim v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. Nos.
115044 and 117263, 27 January 1995, citing Ohio
Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 73 L. Ed. 972, 49 S. Ct. 256; Gobbi v. Dilao, 58 Or. 14, 111 p. 49,
113, p. 57.
[44] NASECORE, et. al. v. MERALCO.